Econ 522 – Economics of Law – Spring 2014

 

 
 
Lectures:
 
Mondays and Wednesdays, 2:30-3:45 p.m., 5208 Social Science
 
 
 
 
 
Professor:
 
Dan Quint, dquint@ssc.wisc.edu
6444 Social Science, 263-2515
Office hours: Tuesday 2-4, and by appointment
 
 
 
 
 
Teaching Assistant:
 
Nathan Yoder, ndyoder@wisc.edu
6413 Social Science
Office hours: Wednesdays, 1:15-2:15 and 4-5
 
 
 
 
 
Exams:
 
Two in-class midterms Monday March 3 and Wednesday April 16
Final exam Monday May 12, 7:45-9:45 a.m., in 6210 Social Science
 
 
 
 
 
Office hours this week:
 
Nathan: Wed 1:15-2:15 and 4-5, Thu 11-1
Prof. Quint: Tue 2-4, Thu 3-5, Fri 1:30-2:30
 
 
 
Syllabus
 
Sample exam questions from past semesters, and the solution to one of them
 
 
 
Homework 0 – not an actual homework assignment, but an example we’ll use in lecture on Wed Jan 29, in case you want to look at it ahead of time
Homework 1 – due online via Learn@UW at NOON on Thursday, February 6
Homework 2 – due online via Learn@UW at NOON on Thursday, February 27
Homework 3 – due online via Learn@UW at NOON on Thursday, April 3
Homework 4 – due online via Learn@UW at NOON on Thursday, May 1
Note that I originally announced this homework as being due April 31.  There is no April 31.  Sorry for any confusion.
 
 
Introductory material
 
Lecture 1 – introduction, the Common and Civil Law traditions, dead whales and baseballs
Lecture 2 – efficiency – what it is
Lecture 3 – should the law aim to be efficient?
 
Property Law
 
Lecture 4 – intro to static game theory, and the Coase Theorem
Lecture 5 – foxes, bargaining, and transaction costs
Lecture 6 – what to do when there are transaction costs
Lecture 7 – designing an efficient property law system
Lecture 8 – sequential rationality and intellectual property
Lecture 9 – more intellectual property; limitations and exceptions to property rights
Lecture 10 – eminent domain and regulation; motivating contract law
 
Contract Law
 
Lecture 11 – motivating contracts, the Bargain Theory, breach
Lecture 12 – reliance, default rules, Hadley v Baxendale
Lecture 13 – reasons not to enforce a contract; efficient risk bearers
Lecture 14 – contracts based on faulty information; remedies for breach
Lecture 15 – more on remedies and incentives
Lecture 16 – repeated interactions; wrapping up contracts and introducing torts
 
Tort Law
 
Lecture 17 – elements of a tort; precaution, and a simple torts model
Lecture 18 – incentives for precaution and activity
Lecture 19 – the Hand Rule and the effects of errors
Lecture 20 – relaxing the assumptions of our model, and other extensions of tort law
Lecture 21 – vicarious liability, joint and several liability, punitive damages
 
Criminal Law and Concluding Material
 
Lecture 22 – criminal law part 1
Lecture 23 – criminal law part 2
Lecture 24 – behavioral law and econ
Lecture 25 – efficiency revisited and conclusions
 
 
 
Section Notes #1
Section Notes #2
Section Notes #3
Section Notes #4
Review Handout
Contract Notes #1
Contract Notes #2
Torts Notes #1
Review Handout #2
Solving the In-Class Examples
Final Review Handout
 
 
You can also check out last semester’s course materials – the course this spring will be very similar.