geographical and social settings. This implies that the effectiveness of social economy organisations in delivering hard or soft outcomes of the type illustrated above will vary. The Third Sector may give people access to their own life-narratives but not necessarily under conditions of their own choosing.

For all its variety and flexibility, the range of organisations that the Third Sector can produce is limited – by funding regimes, by political agendas, by available personnel, by limits to legal forms, and so on. Significantly, this suggests that although local social economy organisations can be seen to produce positive outcomes in terms of both the hard and soft outputs, as illustrated above, they may not be equally relevant to all poor and marginalised communities or people. In other words, and contrary to the assumption prevalent in the current ‘best practice’ driven policy agenda that successful examples of the local social economy can be used to develop universally applicable models (cf. SEU 1998; DETR 1998; CEC 1998a,b), the factors that allow the social economy to ‘succeed’ in particular places seem to be quite specific. This suggests that place might matter in the case of the social economy because it seems that the nature of the locality in which it operates is of considerable significance in determining what succeeds and what fails and, for that matter, what success or failure might mean in different local contexts. The influence of the powers of place in shaping the social economy is, however, a dimension that is either wholly absent from conventional particularist academic and policy accounts of the social economy, or which is glossed over in pursuit of some generalisable best practice model. The following two chapters will examine the nature of social economy organisations in four locations of the UK to tease out the significance of place.

4 The corporatist social economy
Glasgow and Middlesbrough

Introduction
The nature of local dynamics may significantly influence social economy outcomes in particular towns, cities, and/or regions in the UK. This observation, relating to the varied abilities of places to combat social exclusion through the social economy, seems submerged in the government’s emphasis that all places can respond in similar ways. This is partly due to the government’s belief that: ‘Governments cannot do this [regeneration] on our own. Indeed it is a mistake to try. But we can help create the economic and social conditions that help communities to help themselves’ (Blair 2001).

There is a tacit assumption in a policy programme which has been quite explicitly proposed as a ‘national strategy for neighbourhood renewal’ that it is possible to deliver national solutions at a local scale. Put another way, the problems faced by deprived communities in the UK are sufficiently similar to be amenable to centrally-devised regeneration schemes delivered through flexible local partnerships and other organisations. Specifically with regard to the social economy component of such policies, there is an assumption that all places, albeit in different ways, possess latent capacities (in terms of social capital, institutional form and/or innovation, and individuals and groups with a strong personal commitment to community) to be able to deliver the kinds of sustainable, responsive, and locally-empowering social enterprises that policy-makers assume is possible. This assumption tends to rest on the understanding that the mechanisms that have generated the various examples of ‘best practice’ upon which its policy is based, are common to all poor communities. There is assumed to be sufficient commonality in the diversity of powers of place to make such an approach feasible. However, while best practice studies can tell us much about what works in particular places, they also can have the effect of abstracting them from the specific conditions – local, regional and national – in which they have developed and on which they are causally dependent. It may therefore be that it is the specificities – not the commonalities – of the powers of place that are decisive and these may exercise negative as well as positive influences on the character and development of the social economy.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the relationships between social enterprises and their local contexts – historical, social, and institutional. These two chapters highlight
the resulting variety, and also prepare the ground for a discussion in Chapter 6 on the ways in which local context affects the potential of the social economy. We demonstrate through an examination of two 'paired' analyses of four UK urban areas, that the assumption that the social economy is necessarily equally relevant to all local excluded communities is problematic. This chapter compares the way in which the social economy has developed in two places – Glasgow and Middlesbrough – where problems of poverty and exclusion associated with long-term deindustrialisation and a corporatist legacy of governance have shaped a social economy with limited community participation. Chapter 5 compares two places – Bristol and the London Borough of Tower Hamlets – where the problems generated by industrial change and unemployment, but also accompanied by other forms of exclusion (e.g. minority communities surrounded by areas of considerable wealth and prosperity) are associated with a different sort of social economy. These chapters reveal the influence on the local social economy of the historical balance in each place between four variables: the nature and practices of the local state, opportunity in the mainstream economy, the nature of local civil society, and non-local connections offering opportunities for local Third Sector activities. Thus, in each chapter, our paired comparisons of the social economy are prefaced by an account of the economic trends and nature of social exclusion in each urban context, and a summary of local civic and political legacies.

Economic trends and social exclusion

Although the problems facing both Glasgow and Middlesbrough stem from the loss of their respective former industrial bases, the nature and scale of their loss, and the consequences of it, have been different. This is in part due to the period over which the dismantling of the old industrial economy took place. In Glasgow, the mass-employing industries of ship-building, steel-making and other associated manufacturing have been in steady decline since at least the First World War – a secular decline only temporarily delayed by the war economy and the post-war boom (Pacione 1995). For Middlesbrough, the collapse of the local employment base has been more recent, because of repeated waves of investment in Teesside, initially in steel-making and related ship-building and engineering industries, then in the burgeoning inter-war chemicals industry, and subsequently in the post-war chemicals and steel industries. Following the oil crises of the early 1970s and the subsequent rapid restructuring and internationalisation of the chemical and steel making and using industries, however, Teesside experienced rapidly rising unemployment and a general and ongoing disinvestment on the part of those firms that had created and sustained the area over the previous century. Unemployment began to rise steadily in the 1970s and to a rate consistently higher than the national average, peaking at 22–3 per cent in 1984 and 1985 for Cleveland County as a whole, with parts of the inner-urban areas including Middlesbrough reaching 40 per cent (Beynon et al. 1994: 105).

As a consequence of the loss of heavy manufacturing capacity and employment, both places have been forced to seek to restructure and diversify their local economies by attracting renewed investment and replacing the employment base. For both, fortunes have been mixed. In Glasgow, while attempts to rekindle manufacturing through heavy investment from the late 1950s in the car and steel industries at Cambusbarr, Ravenscraig, and Linwood ultimately failed, considerable numbers of jobs were created in the electronics and services sectors. The electronics industry in Lowland Scotland as a whole currently accounts for around 40,000 jobs. Importantly, however, many of these jobs are located in plants outside of the main conurbation of Glasgow itself – in the so-called ‘silicon glen’ to the north-west of the city – and did not employ those laid off by the older manufacturing industries.1

Much the same is also true of the services sector. Although between 1961–91 employment in the services sector in Glasgow rose from 48 per cent of the workforce to 77 per cent, this was almost entirely the result of the loss of jobs in all the other major sectors. Employment in the primary, manufacturing and construction sectors fell by 17.3 per cent, 44.3 per cent and 15.2 per cent, respectively, between 1981–91, while service sector jobs rose by only 1.1 per cent – a net loss of over 41,000 jobs, much of it again to areas surrounding the city (Pacione 1995: 146). In recent years there has been considerable investment in the retail capacity of the city centre, which is now a major shopping centre, and in developing call-centres, but this again has not provided jobs relevant to the main groups in need – the long-term male unemployed living in the peripheral housing estates or in the inner-city. Investment in the retail capacity of the town centre and attempts to stimulate small and medium private sector enterprises have not made up for the loss of skilled, predominantly male, manufacturing jobs. As a consequence, Glasgow still suffers acutely from the ‘jobs gap’ that has been identified in many of Britain’s inner cities (Turok and Edge 1999). Similarly in Middlesbrough attempts to replace this dramatic loss of employment and income through attracting inward investment in manufacturing and private sector services, most notably by the Teesside Development Corporation, comprehensively failed (Beynon et al. 1994).

In short, in both places there has been little growth in employment and such growth as has occurred has been in sectors that lack the potential to resolve the persistent unemployment problems that blight the local economy. As net VAT registrations – which indicate where entrepreneurial activity is developing in the local economy – demonstrate, in neither place is investment flowing into private sector activities that generate significant employment growth (Figure 4.1).

In the case of Glasgow the overall trend is sharply down, with the only signs of growth in real estate and in the public sector. In Middlesbrough, after a sharp fall in activity to 1995, there has been very little new activity in any major sector of the economy. This suggests that, while the condition of the local economy may not be deteriorating, neither is it improving from its very low level of activity. This is also borne out by the subdued rate of decline in unemployment in Middlesbrough. While Glasgow still has a large number of registered claimants, this figure has fallen considerably since 1995. In Middlesbrough, although the unemployment rate has fallen, the rate of fall is much less and bottoms out much sooner, indicative of a deeply depressed local economy.
The demise of the industrial bases of Glasgow and Middlesbrough has bequeathed problems of extreme deprivation and social exclusion. While in both places there have been some signs of recovery, and while there are pockets of relative wealth in particular wards and districts, the overall picture is one of pervasive need.

Of the ninety districts listed in the 1998 Revised Scottish Area Deprivation Index as the worst 10 per cent post-code districts (PCDs), fifty-seven were in Glasgow city. Of those outside of the city proper, a further twenty-two of these PCDs, particularly those in Paisley, Groomo North, and South Lanark, are on the boundaries of the city. Although Glasgow is by no means alone in suffering from high levels of poverty in Scotland, by all measures the extent and intensity of the problems faced by the city remain considerably higher than any other area. In the most recent analysis of the Intensity Measure of Deprivation, for example, Glasgow had the highest score of all Scottish Unitary Local Authorities, some 17 per cent higher than the next highest (Edinburgh) and considerably higher than the rest. This figure itself conceals the widely uneven distribution of poverty and social exclusion in the city (Figure 4.2), with particular concentrations in the northern and eastern areas around the city centre, and in the peripheral housing estates (Danson and Mooney 1998).

While not on the same scale as Glasgow and its hinterland, there are considerable problems of deprivation and poverty in Middlesbrough. Although there are

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*Figure 4.1* Net VAT registrations, (a) Glasgow and (b) Middlesbrough, 1994–8.¹

Source: National Online Manpower Information Service (NOMIS).

*Figure 4.2* Map of deprivation in Glasgow.²
some prosperous wards, the DETR’s (2000) Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) reveals that the majority of wards in Middlesbrough rank highly in the index. Three – Pallister, Thorntree, and St Hilda’s – are among the ten most deprived wards in England. Pallister and Thorntree form part of a large area of predominantly social housing, much of it of low quality and in a poor state of repair, which stretches across a large area to the south and east of the town centre. St Hilda’s is a small area, again containing largely social housing, situated in what used to be both the original settlement and industrial iron-making core of Middlesbrough on the banks of the Tees just north of the town centre. Until 1998 St Hilda’s was within the area controlled by the Teesside Development Corporation but has not noticeably benefited from any of the regeneration money that it administered. Housing in St Hilda’s is in a particularly poor state of repair, much of it vandalised and empty, and beset by persistent rumours among local residents that the council is deliberately allowing it to deteriorate prior to demolition. There are no schools, shops or services within the area itself and the last remaining old people’s home was closed by the council in 1999.

Low educational attainment is acute in these and other wards, as are problems of child poverty where four wards are among the worst ten nationally. Other notable problems include high and persistent unemployment and welfare dependency, poor health, and a lack of accessible health care facilities on many of the estates. These problems are compounded by the stigmatisation of the estate. For example, St Hilda is referred to as ‘over the border’ which, as Wood and Vamplew note, is used to imply on ‘the wrong side of the tracks’ or ‘beyond the pale’ (1999: 21). While St Hilda’s is subject to a specific form of labelling, all of the estates in the town have a strongly insular character. This is in part a consequence of the dispersed nature of housing in the town, a deliberate policy imposed by the major industrial interests in the town to fragment the working class and in the pattern of local authority housing (Beynon et al. 1994). The result is a series of dispersed communities with very little interaction with each other, with each fiercely defensive of its own turf.

This also in part contributes to the strong local intensity of deprivation in Middlesbrough. Local authority district comparisons produced as part of the IMD 2000 statistics demonstrate that, while Middlesbrough ranks very highly on many of the deprivation rankings, in the category of ‘local concentration’, Middlesbrough ranks highest out of all 354 English local authority districts.

The existence of intense deprivation within the town’s housing estates means that in addition to having very little local capacity, whether understood in terms of economic resources or social capital, these communities have few if any connections to those other parts of the local and regional economy that have been economically more successful. In the case of Glasgow, problems of isolation in the outer estates have likewise given rise to pockets of extreme deprivation. This is also the case, however, for those wards that directly adjoin the main retail centre of the city. The area immediately to the east of the city centre has been subject to repeated attempts at regeneration since the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project in the second half of the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is still marked by very low levels of economic activity and appears in stark contrast to the relative prosperity of neighbouring districts. The same is true to the south, where, facing the city centre across the Clyde, the Gorbals and Govan have remained largely untouched by new investment (Danson and Mooney 1998).

The locally-concentrated character of poverty in these places suggests that the model of the community-based social enterprise promoted by the current policy agenda should find there an environment rich in possibilities. The Third Sector might identify and exploit the latent capacities of such places by recycling whatever income and expenditure there is in the local economy to ‘turn needs into markets’ (Grimes 1997). There are clearly many unmet needs in both Glasgow and Middlesbrough. But, has the local civic and political capacity been there to respond? And if it has, in what ways has it responded to unmet need? How have the powers of place been mobilised to define and deal with local need?
Civic and political legacies

In both Glasgow and Middlesbrough the close relationships that existed in the past between a small set of dominant employers, trades unions, and local authorities, coupled with a general lack of social and cultural heterogeneity, has generated a corporatist and hierarchical political culture, resulting at times in considerable overlap between state and civic organisations. In both cities, the legacies of large mass-employing industries continue to affect the social and political landscape long after the industries themselves have shrunk or gone completely. In both Glasgow and Middlesbrough, social life was organised predominantly in relation to the workplace resulting in a particular gender division of labour – men in industrial workplaces, women in the home – and localised communities strongly identified with particular industries. However, similar industrial structures and divisions of labour were linked to strongly contrasting political cultures. In Glasgow, there was a very strong political culture mediated through highly-organised and militant trades unions, again emphasising the powerful links between spatially-defined communities and particular industries. Govan and the Gorbals, for instance, were strongly associated with the shipyards on ‘Red Clydeside’, an association that remains in spite of the fact that only a very small number of local people are still employed in what little remains of the industry. Participation in bitter industrial disputes, including such relatively recent events as the occupation of the shipyards in 1972 (Thompson and Hart 1972) and the extended fight to prevent the closure of the Ravenscraig steel plant in the early 1980s, strengthened the sense of community in many inner-city areas (Pacione 1998). This situation, however, produced a double dependency within working class communities on employers for jobs and wages and on trades unions for welfare and support. The demise of the main industrial base also meant the erosion of union power and wealth, leaving many inner-city communities isolated and very heavily dependent on state welfare at a time of sharp reductions in the level of welfare provision.

Further isolation and dependence was created as a consequence of the policy of rehousing inner-city communities in large peripheral housing estates and New Towns such as Cumbernauld, East Kilbride, and Livingston during the 1960s and 1970s. A very high proportion of the new homes built in these areas, as well as in parts of the city centre, was in the form of high-rise flats which were relatively cheap to build and able to house large numbers at high densities. The problems associated with high-rise buildings are well-documented throughout Britain and Glasgow itself began to revise its high-rise strategy in the early 1970s. However, by that point the problems for the communities transferred to such housing in the peripheral estates and New Towns were already well established. Familiar problems of poor transport links, high unemployment, social and economic isolation, crime, substance abuse and ill-health quickly became endemic. A particular problem concerned access to shops and services since it was not until 1971 that any attempt was made to incorporate private sector development into the peripheral housing schemes (Pacione 1995: 163).

In Middlesbrough as in Teesside more generally, political culture developed in quite a different way to that of Glasgow. The current social geography of Middlesbrough is in large part a product of the pervasive and paternalistic influence of the main firms that controlled the town’s industrial economy during the periods of very rapid growth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Beynon et al. 1994). Whereas in Glasgow the tradition was for social and welfare services to be organised through the trades unions and the local authorities, on Teesside such activities tended to be organised by the firms themselves, which built company towns around their main plants, while strongly influencing the character of trade unionism and union policies. With the establishment of the welfare state many of these services were supplied by local authorities but planning and investment decisions remained dominated by the interests of the large firms, refracted through a conservative local Labourism that was acutely tuned to the interests of ‘local industry’. This produced a different form of dependency among local people to that in Glasgow, as the major industrial concerns manipulated the development of the town to prevent the growth of a militant organised labour movement that would challenge their interests. As Beynon et al. note,

Through a selective provision of housing, roads, schools and other amenities, the steel and chemical companies developed an environment and social climate ideally suited to the reproduction of acquiescent and tractable labour forces. There was, quite deliberately, little opportunity created for waged employment other than in chemicals, steel and related industries. Partly because of this, the companies which led the development of the area exerted a particularly pervasive influence which extended beyond the relations of the workplace far into those of civil society.

(1994: 53)

The result, which can still be seen in the distribution of social housing in Middlesbrough, is a series of estates, often adjoining, but housing very insular communities with little or no recognition of common interests or identities.

The dominant industrial cultures of Teesside and Clydeside, which did so much to shape the local society, have also established enduring political cultures. Although the local politics of both places have for some time been dominated by ingrained Labour Party establishments, this masks significant differences between them. While Labour politics on Clydeside was strong to the left and prepared to be confrontational in its dealings with the major local employers, on Teesside the political establishment was much more dependent on and supportive of the major firms. The relative lack of autonomous worker organisation on Teesside – which had been actively prevented by employers via their encouragement of paternalistic company unionism – and, at least until the 1970s, apparent security of relatively well-paid local jobs, meant that the interests of capital coincided with those of the local Labour establishment, whose main interest lay in ensuring continuity. While both places, therefore, were characterised by very strong municipal political organisations, which in both cases were highly interventionist, their character was
very different. In the case of Glasgow, this was manifest in large-scale infrastructural planning schemes and centrally-organised social welfare programmes. In Middlesbrough this took the form of business-oriented investment strategies which assumed that the interests of local people would coincide with those of private sector employers.

The enduring corporatist political cultures of both cities have had a significant influence on the form and dynamics of the social economy. As we shall see in the rest of the chapter, first, it has not lent itself to sustained advocacy and action from below, and second, as a result of the gradual institutional hollowing out associated with deindustrialisation, this has left the local state in an influential position. The result in both places, albeit through very different routes and in respect of very different manifestations of the social economy, has been to increase the central control of regeneration activity, in both the mainstream and social economies, by the local state. This is counter-intuitive in the context of the prevailing discourses of devolved localism outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 that surrounds current advocacy of the social economy for poor places. The logic of current expectations of the Third Sector is that places with very severe problems of social exclusion – and Glasgow and Middlesbrough are both firmly in that category – should be developing localised organisations, mobilising local capacities and local people. That in fact to be the local state that is playing the leading role, in many ways serving to displace community-based activities or to fill the vacuums that their absence causes, suggests that the current policy agenda is unwarrantedly optimistic. Significantly for the current study, it emphasises the lack of account being taken in current social economy debates of the importance of place – local geographies and local histories – in the determination of social economy outcomes.

The social economy

Despite the similar problems facing Glasgow and Middlesbrough, the nature of the social economy in each place is markedly different. Glasgow has come to be closely associated with innovative and successful Third Sector activities, with the social economy dominated by large-scale, highly-professionalised organisations. These either deliver a wide range of services to people in one small area or provide one type of service on a city-wide and even region-wide scale, in ways which echo the statist provision of services. The social economy is highly centralised through a series of intermediary and networking organisations that draw together key members of local political elites, intellectuals and social economy animators. The social economy in Glasgow is strongly supported by the state and has close links to local political and administrative bodies, particularly to the city council through Scottish Enterprise Glasgow (SEG), national and European authorities (through, for example, the Strathclyde European Partnership and the Scottish Executive) and to higher education institutions located in the city (most notably the Territorial Employment Research Unit (TERU) at Glasgow University). There is, by contrast, comparatively little in the way of independent, small-scale community-owned Third Sector activity.

Middlesbrough, in contrast, has a much weaker social economy. There are a few (five currently) local community-based social enterprises based in the town and adjacent housing estates, all of which lead a very precarious existence, and two larger and more secure organisations operating on a wider geographical scale to deliver services to particular sections of the Teesside population. Whereas the social economy in Glasgow is both a significant employer and service provider, in Middlesbrough the social economy is a fragmented and marginal activity relative to the welfare activities of local government and the national state, either tightly controlled and closely scrutinised or directly organised by the local state.

Glasgow

Although Glasgow perhaps more than any other part of the UK has come to be associated with the Third Sector development, to some extent that reputation is based on activities that have largely disappeared. Following the failure of many social enterprises during the early 1990s, changes in the priorities of regeneration policy and funding and the reorganisation of local government, the conditions that had made Glasgow a testing ground for innovative community-based activities largely evaporated. As a consequence many activities that are elsewhere in the UK increasingly carried out by the Third Sector largely independently of local government, in Glasgow now come under the auspices of a range of intermediary organisations controlled to a greater or lesser degree by the City Council. The corporatist legacy of an earlier state provision thus lives on. This is not to say that there are no independent Third Sector organisations in the city – far from it. But they are in a minority. Only 17 per cent of those organisations identified as part of the social economy of the whole of Lowland Scotland were in fact social enterprises pursuing the goal of combining innovative and independent economic activity with community empowerment and local regeneration (McGregor et al. 1997: ii). However, those organisations that have been able to develop and grow wholly or largely independently of the local authority typically have been able to do so because they operate at a sufficiently large scale to insulate them from the many changes that have taken place affecting regeneration strategies in the area.

Glasgow's enduring reputation as a centre of social economy innovation stems in large part from the role played by the city throughout the 1980s as the centre of the largest social enterprise development programme in UK – the Community Business (CB) scheme. The CB programme began in the late 1970s in Paisley and was quickly extended to other parts of the city and to Strathclyde Region as a whole. From the early 1980s, the CB development programme was funded through the Urban Programme (UP) – regeneration funds provided by the UK government that were administered by the Scottish Office. In an arrangement that was unique in the UK, responsibility for the distribution of UP funds to community businesses was vested in an organisation established with the sole aim of promoting the community business model, Strathclyde Community Business, rather than local government or the Scottish Office.
Community businesses were given up to seven year’s funding after which time they were expected to have become financially-independent and community-owned businesses. Although this scheme extended to cover most of Scotland, by far the greatest level of activity was in Glasgow. Several hundred community business were established there between the late 1970s and the early 1990s when the scheme was wound up. Although the theoretical model of the community business remains highly influential throughout the rest of the UK, particularly through the work of John Pearce who launched and ran the CB programme (Pearce 1993), only a small handful of the Scottish community businesses have survived (Hayton 2000). There are several reasons for the disappearance of the community businesses in Glasgow. First, funding criteria for the urban programme moved towards more holistic, area-based programmes such as the current Social Inclusion Partnerships and the Priority Partnership Areas that preceded them. At the same time, Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) took over responsibility for business development and saw their role as one of encouraging private sector development rather than regeneration (Hayton et al. 1993). Second, and more importantly, community businesses failed to fulfil the expectations of their funders. One of Glasgow’s highest profile community businesses, Barrowfield, went into liquidation in 1989 despite being widely hailed as a replicable example of best practice (Hayton 2000: 196). As Hayton notes, by the early 1990s the CB scheme was really only able to be considered a success if success were to be measured by the amount of money that was being allocated to it and its inclusion in many regeneration strategies” (2000: 196). A growing body of academic analysis and policy reappraisal from the late 1980s onwards was increasingly finding that many of the projects operating were unsustainable in financial terms, were not cost effective, displacing rather than creating employment and, in many instances, were not really community businesses at all. A wide range of voluntary sector organisations counted themselves into the community business scheme because ‘many initiatives realised that by using the “community business” label, they could gain access to resources that would not otherwise be available’ (Hayton 2000: 197). As a consequence:

The main outcomes were that many initiatives that were not community businesses were supported and there was a high failure rate as the emphasis was upon new starts rather than providing development support . . . [. . .] Funding had . . . been provided at a far higher level than the support framework was capable of absorbing effectively. The consequence was a failure to deliver. Community business obtained short-term benefits by overselling but these were at the expense of the concept’s longer-term credibility, (ibid.)

Furthermore, other changes were taking place with significant ramifications for the social economy. In Glasgow, the reorganisation of local government in the mid 1990s, from two-tier (regional and town/city councils) to single-tier unitary authorities, has had important consequences for the social economy. In Glasgow
the fiscal pressures unleashed by this process on the inner-city were of such magnitude that activities seen by many in the City Council as essentially marginal were cut back. The Chief Executive of the East End Partnership in Glasgow, for example, described how, following the break up of Strathclyde Region, the municipalist attitudes of the City Council came to prevail, generally favouring large-scale housing-led approaches to regeneration rather than smaller community-based activities. As a consequence of this, he concluded,

I would say that across Glasgow there has been a sort of death of community organisations... People simply got pissed off, fed up and walked away from it. And that on top of funding cuts, local authority budget cuts. Smaller councils mean smaller budgets and the non-statutory things go first. So there's been cuts in all of these budgets and community organisations that used to receive funding no longer do, so they've just naturally died over the recent years.

This perception is supported by evidence of a 'fiscal crisis' in Glasgow in the years immediately following the creation of the unitary authorities. The effect of separating the centre of Glasgow from its more prosperous suburbs, combined with a significant overall fall in population, was particularly harsh:

Overall the gap between the inherited budgets from its [Glasgow City Council's] predecessors and its new spending assessments was 10.9 per cent, compared with a Scottish average of 1.5 per cent. Glasgow faced severe reductions in spending, and transitional arrangements were made to spread these over three years. In addition, the government built into the grant settlement assumptions that reorganisation would lead to efficiency savings in the bureaucracy. The cost to Glasgow was £7 million.

(Carmichael and Midwinter 1999: 92)

In order to accommodate this significant drop in revenues, Glasgow City Council was required to introduce a £68 million package of spending cuts, partly through reductions in administrative costs (mainly through redundancies), in services and in grants to individuals and organisations. Data for the City Council cited by Carmichael and Midwinter reveal that these cuts actually increased between 1996–7 and 1997–8 (Table 4.1).

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<th>Table 4.1. Balancing the budget in Glasgow (£m)</th>
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<td>1996–7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cutting administrative costs</td>
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<td>Cutting grants to other bodies</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Source: Carmichael and Midwinter 1999: 95, citing City of Glasgow Finance Department.

Given the heavy reliance of social economy organisations on local authority support, all three areas of spending reduction had a significant effect. Local government reorganisation served to undermine many of the few social enterprises that had managed to survive the reform of the Urban Programme and, more generally, greatly reduced the amount of local and community-based activity in the Third and voluntary sectors. This, combined with an overall reduction in the regeneration funds available through the Social Inclusion Partnership Fund and the increasingly competitive nature of the funding regime, eliminated many of the smaller and more precarious organisations from the Glasgow social economy. Such organisations have been unable to benefit either from a high degree of financial independence or from the protection of the public sector.

A major consequence of the collapse and discrediting of the community business model, and the subsequent shift of much more restricted funding away from small-scale community projects, has been to leave the current Glasgow social economy dominated by much larger scale organisations, many of them more closely integrated with the public sector than might otherwise have been the case. These take the form of a range of intermediary bodies whose task in Glasgow is, variously, to develop small private sector businesses, deliver and/or arrange training, and provide workspace for business start-ups. There are seven Local Development Companies (LDCs), established from the late 1980s to the early 1990s by the Glasgow Development Agency (now Scottish Enterprise Glasgow SEG), which are situated in the main areas of deprivation in the inner city and in the peripheral housing estates. In addition to these, and to some degree overlapping with them, are a range of Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs) established after 1997 with the reform of the Urban Programme. The SIPs are small area-based regeneration partnerships, similar to the New Deal for Communities projects in England, which have been awarded up to ten years funding to meet a range of targets, including the development of sustainable social enterprises (Sewell 1998). The SIPs themselves come under the auspices and oversight of the Glasgow Alliance which has a city-wide remit to co-ordinate development activity with LDCs, independent welfare organisations, health and education authorities, and LECs.

Responsibility for the development of social enterprises, which remains an explicit aim of at least some regeneration activity in the area despite the collapse of the CB programme, falls under the remit of all of these various organisations. Although many of these bodies are routinely described as constituting part of the social economy, they are in practice public sector quangos which deliver specific aspects of welfare provision, training and employment services and co-ordination at a local level on behalf of local and national authorities. As such they have tended to occupy spaces that might elsewhere be filled by more autonomous and independent Third Sector organisations providing an alternative to state provision rather than a conduit for it.

Glasgow, therefore, presents a paradox in terms of expectations and outcomes. Given Glasgow's enduring reputation as a hotbed of innovative Third Sector activity, and because of the sorts of assumptions about the equation of social
exclusion and the social economy outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, we might reasonably expect a wide range of local and community-run social enterprises. In practice what we find is a much more ambiguous picture, one in which independent community-based activities, as the quote above suggests, have largely disappeared, to be replaced with a much more top-down and centrist form of regeneration activity. This is not to suggest that independent social enterprises have simply vanished from Glasgow, a few persist in spite of the many changes outlined above. Rather, it is to note that these social enterprises that have survived have done so because they are of a scale and type that has allowed them to ride out the changing fortunes and fashions of regeneration policy in the city. Importantly, they do not conform to the localised, community-owned vision of the social economy held by its current advocates elsewhere in the UK. Before considering these organisations that typify Glasgow’s social economy, however, we will begin with one of very few organisations that in some respects comes close to the ideals of the social economy anticipated by policy-makers and outlined in Chapter 3, although in other ways it diverges significantly from them.

Most of those community businesses established in Glasgow in the 1980s were short-lived and almost all of those that had lasted through to the 1990s came to an end and went out of business following the retargeting of UP funds towards area-based schemes (Hayton 1993, 2000). One of the two survivors is Govan Workspace, formally established in 1981 though it originated in a Community Resource Centre formed in 1977. It was therefore one of the first Community Businesses established in Scotland, predating the formation of Strathclyde Community Business itself. Following the collapse of Barrowfield, Govan Workspace is one of only very few social enterprises in Scotland that are still community owned and controlled wholly independently of any intermediary organisation or public sector body.

Since its formation, Govan Workspace has grown steadily, developing a succession of derelict industrial sites (a disused bakery site, an old school, and a former shipyard building) into managed workspaces for local firms. Although one-off grants were sought for some of these developments, from the outset Govan Workspace’s main source of capital has come in the form of commercial loans and mortgages from private sector banks. The independence from the changing fashions among funding bodies that this has allowed is cited by the managing director as a significant factor in the project’s survival and growth for over two decades. Another important factor has been the focused nature of the project’s objectives. The purpose of the Workspace was, from the outset, not to attempt to provide the sort of wholesale local regeneration that many expect of the social economy, but – unusually for a social enterprise – to concentrate all its attention on the retention of private sector jobs and economic activity in one of the most deprived areas of the city. The Workspace sites now house over ninety firms employing over 500 people – 57 per cent of them living in Govan itself – engaged in a wide variety of mainly private sector activities. Until very recently, the project has not seen its role as one of delivering regeneration in any holistic sense because of a recognition from an early stage in the project’s life that the problems of the area were simply too great for a small social enterprise to tackle. Instead, Govan Workspace has had a long-term development plan to create a secure, self-financing community-owned asset which can then become the springboard for other activities. By 2003 when the project anticipates that it will have paid off all of its outstanding mortgages and loans, it will be generating a substantial surplus which it will plough into new ventures, possibly further workspace development and youth training to attempt to tackle with some of the wider and very acute problems of the area.

Despite living up to many of the paradigms of social enterprise practice, Govan Workspace is currently atypical of the social economy in Glasgow and indeed sees itself as operating very much on the margins. Although its managing director is involved in the local Social Inclusion Partnership and has other connections to the many public and voluntary sector networks in Glasgow, he describes the Workspace as ‘the leper colony’ – operating largely in isolation from the highly-professionalised and centralised social economy of Glasgow as a whole. Part of this isolation he attributes to the fact that Govan Workspace is still known as a Community Business, which, because of the wholesale discrediting of the term, he believes puts his organisation at a disadvantage in a very competitive and fashion-conscious environment.

Elsewhere in Glasgow organisations that might once have been established as independent community businesses now tend to come under the auspices of much larger organisations. For example, Castlemilk Electronic Village, formed in 1998, has been set up as a subsidiary company of the Castlemilk Economic Development Agency (CEDA), one of the seven LDGs, and which itself forms part of a large, well-established local regeneration organisation, the Castlemilk Partnership.

The Electronic Village that CEDA has established is intended to be one of a new breed of social enterprises in Scotland that differ from the failed community business model in that they provide local services on the back of a non-profit company which trades in open markets in competition with private sector competitors. The project combines a small-scale intermediate labour market training programme – which takes up to fourteen local long-term unemployed people and trains them as internet designers and managers – with a multi-purpose internet service. The commercial firm is run by a combination of professional information technology (IT) staff and people employed from the training programme and offers a range of internet access and website hosting services to companies and other Third Sector organisations locally and across the city. As the project expands, it is hoped that in addition to the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) scheme, the Electronic Village will be able to offer a range of free or subsidised internet services to the residents of the Castlemilk estate to overcome the problem of IT exclusion and the growing digital divide.

While the Castlemilk Electronic Village is being hailed as a success, which is important in a city which the idea of community business has been so thoroughly discredited, it is important to note that it could not have been launched without the backing of the larger organisation. Not only was the CEDA able to use its scale...
and established expertise to secure the capital funding required to launch the project, but it was also able to use its own computing needs to provide the Electronic Village with its first major 'customer'. However, the capacity of CEDA to do this was very unusual in Scotland. CEDA was one of the four original New Life for Urban Scotland projects launched by the Conservatives in 1987, and the only one in Glasgow. It is still receiving Social Inclusion Partnership Fund grants although not formally constituted as a SIP. As a result, the Castlemilk Partnerships have had a remarkably consistent and secure stream of public sector money for over fourteen years, especially when compared to many other projects and parts of the city. The result is a robust and multi-faceted organisation with a highly-trained and professional management team that has made very significant improvements in an area that was once a byword for urban blight. However, the implications of this in terms of the development of local social enterprises in Glasgow are ambiguous. Most importantly in the context of the localist agenda of much of the mainstream social economy debate, it belies the belief that successful social enterprises can somehow be wrought out of the latent capacities of poor people in poor places. Although Govan Workspace has, almost uniquely, been able to achieve something of the sort on behalf of the community it serves, revealingly its managing director is emphatic that he would not be able to repeat this under current conditions within Glasgow.

In contrast to the isolated development of the Workspace, the Electronic Village has been successful in large part because it has been able to draw on the economic and management resources of a much larger organisation. Furthermore, this organisation itself is funded largely through the public sector. This has enabled it to conduct careful market research and will enable it effectively to underwrite the Electronic Village until such time as it proves sufficiently competitive to stand alone. The degree of funding and other resources that have flowed into Castlemilk since the late 1980s, however, have not been available in most other parts of the city or, indeed, any other part of the UK.

In the East End of Glasgow, for example, another Local Development Company, the East End Partnership, the local SIP, and the Glasgow Alliance are also trying to develop new and existing social enterprises. There are some already in existence, most notably Calton Childcare which has been able to take advantage of renewed investment in child-care to create over sixty jobs for local women. This, however, is a rarity. Most of the other activities carried out under the umbrella of the East End Partnership are forms of training, job-search and small private sector business support that would previously have been delivered by a variety of smaller agencies. The amounts of funding available to the SIP with which to support social enterprises are very low indeed compared to the scale of local need. As one leading member of the local Glasgow Alliance Board, which oversees the distribution of funds in the area, remarked to us:

[We have] a budget of £8.4 million over the next three years [for the East End], but we have only got a commitment for this year of £2.8 million and indicative figures for 2001–2, 2002–3. But the crux here is that existing commitments have to be taken into consideration. So it's not new money. For example, last year [1998], to come within budget we had to close . . . five projects that comparatively speaking were fairly well known projects for issues in the area - good community-based projects like a neighbourhood hall, an adventure play park, a women's safety project, a print and communications unit. . . . But the [funding priorities] were budget driven, they weren't service delivery driven. So this year again because of the standards budget, which means you cannot have inflation built into it, we are aware that in order to come within budget we are going to have to look very, very closely at twenty-seven projects.

As this implies, the situation in many parts of Glasgow is markedly different to that in Castlemilk. None of the twenty-seven projects mentioned in the quote above was ultimately shut down, but only because, according to another member of the local Board, the City Council was sensitive to the political implications of allowing them to close and then stepped in to prevent closure. More generally, however, elsewhere in Glasgow the lack of institutional and economic resources effectively means that local community projects, including social enterprises, are being closed down rather than being re-established. Aside from new social enterprises in the process of being established under the auspices of larger organisations, there are currently very few organisations in the Glasgow social economy that are able to operate independently of the local authority, the SIPs or the LDCs.

Those that have been able to develop outside of this network include Glasgow's best-known and longest-established social enterprise, the Wise Group. The Wise Group has been able to weather the many changes to regeneration policy and funding in the city since its inception in the early 1980s, by virtue both of its scale of operation and the degree of influence it is able to wield at local, regional, and national levels. As suggested in the previous chapter, however, Wise is not a 'local' social enterprise in the sense that many proponents and practitioners of the social economy expect. It operates on many geographical scales and uses a professional staff to deliver a range of training services to large numbers of clients. In Glasgow alone Wise provides over 900 training places each year under its various ILM programmes. In addition to these, there are many more in subsidiary projects in other parts of Scotland and the rest of the UK (such as Newhamwise in London) and in indirectly affiliated organisations, such as those for which Wise provides consultancy services. The role played by Wise in the Glasgow social economy needs to be understood in two ways, first in terms of what it contributes to its clients via its own activities and second, the role it plays in influencing local and national social economy policy and practice.

In terms of its own activities, the Wise ILM model is well established and much emulated. Wise provides a year's on-the-job training for long-term unemployed people who, while they are within the scheme, produce socially useful goods and services for the people of Glasgow. Wise's core business centres on the use of its trainees to reclaim and landscape derelict open spaces and the 'back courts' of tenement blocks, to install insulation and security devices in social housing, and to
restore forestry throughout west and central Scotland. While employed by the programme, trainees receive a weekly wage of around £120 per week, a programme of classroom-based as well as in-work training, and they are expected to treat the Wise job as though it was permanent. Since many of the tasks performed by Wise involve direct interaction with the general public, particularly where work is carried out in people’s homes, the range of skills acquired by trainees is potentially very wide. The aim of Wise is to enable people who may have had little or no contact with the world of work to develop the full range of inter-personal and social skills which will help them move on into the open labour market at the end of their period of employment. More recently, Wise has broadened its client base to cover not just the long-term unemployed but also more ‘job-ready’ clients for whom it offers a more flexible and market-led course in the skills required by telephone call centres, a sector of significant employment growth. Wise has also launched a programme under which trainees help people with learning disabilities cope with the transition to paid work and independent living. The trainees under this scheme earn formal qualifications which allows them to move on into the care industry after they leave Wise.

In these various ways, Wise has been able to provide a very wide range of services for multiple communities throughout Glasgow and elsewhere and, as a consequence, has been widely held up as a model of Third Sector practice. That said, the image of Wise as an exemplary organisation is misplaced, and its experience is, in many crucial ways, atypical. This is most obvious in relation to its scale of operations. With a turnover of over £20 million per annum and operations throughout the UK, Wise falls well outside the category of ‘local’ social enterprise. Then, nearly all of its income is derived from the public sector and, apart from some very shrewd and creative property deals that the organisation has been able to engineer, there is little prospect of its ever greatly reducing its dependence on public sector funding. Rather, Wise uses money that would normally be distributed as welfare payments directly to clients by the public sector to create local multipliers in the form of wages and social services. As such, Wise argues that it is using public money more productively than would otherwise be the case to justify the high cost of training its clients. As Wise points out, this money does contribute to providing people with new skills and constitutes a valuable contribution, in the form of wages and other expenditure, to the local economy.

The importance of Wise in the context of the Glasgow social economy, however, does not lie wholly in relation to its own particular practice. Wise has been influential in the development of both local and, in the case of the New Deal ‘Welfare-To-Work’ scheme, national training and regeneration policies. Wise has very close links with the Scottish Enterprise Glasgow, with other social enterprises, with policy-makers throughout the UK, and with other Third Sector intermediary agencies. Wise was, for example, instrumental in the creation by the Glasgow Development Agency of its own ILM scheme, the widely- praised Glasgow Works project, Glasgow Works creates temporary ILM programmes to provide targeted training in direct response to particular labour market demands (SEU 1998).

More recently established social enterprises in Glasgow have also been able to preserve their independence by operating on a large scale. One Plus, for example, is a child-care and support service targeted at lone parents living in the more deprived areas of the city. Although founded in 1980 as the Strathclyde Project for Single Parents, One Plus only began to operate as an independent social enterprise in 1987 after its grant was cut. Since then it has grown to offer a range of services, including advocacy and counselling services for young women and lone parents and has an annual turnover of over £3 million. Much of One Plus’s recent growth has been enabled through a jointly-operated ILM project which it runs with Glasgow Works, funded through Scottish Enterprise Glasgow. The One Plus ILM offers training to young unemployed women, themselves often single mothers, which gives them both work-experience and an accredited qualification in child-care. Like many other child-care-based social enterprises in the UK, the aim of the One Plus training programme is that the women once trained will be able to establish their own small third or private sector child-care companies, either independently or as franchisees of One Plus itself.

Although, unlike Wise, One Plus still operates through local (though not necessarily community-based) teams, the organisation does not operate on a city-wide basis. Although very different in character from the Castlemilk Electronic Village, One Plus’s recent growth has in part been enabled through a strategic partnership with Glasgow Works, which is operated almost wholly by Scottish Enterprise Glasgow and at considerable cost to the public purse. This is not intended in any way as a criticism of One Plus, but rather to highlight the point that what the social economy, in the context of Glasgow, is increasingly defined and constituted as a series of large-scale organisations which are linked in one of several ways to a highly integrated and centralised system of funding and control. Where an organisation, such as One Plus or Wise, is able to retain a great deal of independence over its operation (even if it is effectively subsidised by the local state to a very high degree) such a state of affairs can have very positive welfare benefits. In the case of One Plus this means the provision of services for lone parents that were not previously available through the statutory services. Wise’s contribution is well-documented. However, as was illustrated in the case of the East End above, the constraints on funding, and the degree of political control of the regeneration agenda are not conducive to the development of small, independent social enterprises of the kind sought by current policy.

The example of Govan Workspace highlights some of the ambiguities and contradictions that exist within the social economy in Glasgow. As one of the first community businesses established under the Urban Programme, Govan Workspace can be seen as a successful example of just the kind of independent, self-financing, community-owned social enterprise currently expected by policy-makers. Although successful in achieving its stated aims, Govan Workspace does not in itself deliver much in the way of holistic regeneration for Govan. This is not intended as a criticism of the project, which measures its own considerable success in terms of the jobs it has created and maintained in Govan. However, it does illustrate that the expectations of the policy community – for jobs and welfare and
empowerment – may well be beyond the capacity of small social enterprises working in areas of severe deprivation. In the case of Govan, the level of need has increased sharply during the lifetime of the Workspace as what little remained of the shipyards has been removed. The Workspace will certainly be able to increase its role in the future once it has paid off its mortgages (though, it should be noted, this will have taken over 20 years to achieve). Even so, the contribution that it will then be able to make will be limited compared to the scale of need in the local community. The sorts of ambiguities surrounding a project like Govan Workspace extend to cover much of Glasgow’s social economy. The development of very large scale organisations such as Wise and One Plus, and the heavy involvement of Scottish Enterprise Glasgow in such projects as the Glasgow Works ILM scheme, has resulted in the conventional, small, community-based social enterprise becoming rare in Glasgow. While there is evidence, as in the case of the Castlemilk Electronic Village, that new forms of social enterprise are emerging, the dominance of the regeneration agenda by Glasgow City Council and the network of intermediary bodies and development companies, suggests that the bulk of the activities that might be expected to be carried out in a more autonomous and independent social economy will continue to be situated in organisations close to the public sector. The ‘professionalisation’ of the Scottish regeneration industry and the widespread demoralisation of deprived communities also suggests that the prospects for developing empowering community-owned projects are limited. This does not necessarily mean that the form of the social economy in Glasgow and the surrounding region will be less successful as a result (the ‘community-owned’ Community Business Programme was, after all, disastrous in economic terms). However, it does mean that the model of the social economy that is emerging is very different from the bottom-up, community-driven expectations of the academic and policy communities.

Middlesbrough

As noted earlier, the social economy in Middlesbrough is smaller, weaker and more marginal than its equivalent in Glasgow. Whereas Glasgow has at least some social economy presence in all parts of the city – albeit unevenly – in Middlesbrough the social economy is much more fragmented and sporadic, notable by its absence. This marked difference between Glasgow and Middlesbrough can to some extent be attributed to the different ways in which regeneration funds have been distributed in Scotland and England in recent decades. While in Scotland the Urban Programme was organised centrally by the Scottish Office and, for an extended period, aimed specifically at the development of social enterprises, this was not the case in England. Regeneration funds have tended to come under the control of local authorities and other local and regional agencies, most notably Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and Government Offices for the Regions, and the degree of emphasis on social economy development has as a consequence been very varied. Enthusiasm for and receptivity to the development of the social economy varies as a consequence of variation in local civic and political cultures. Active support for social enterprise development has only developed relatively recently in many places, greater attention having been paid to forms of regeneration based on investment by the private sector, either attracting large-scale investment projects and/or the in situ development of small and medium-sized enterprise clusters.

The nature of the current social economy in Middlesbrough provides one example of the effects of this sort of approach to regeneration in places in which community-based organisations have traditionally been seen as marginal to private sector-led economic development and public sector welfare provision. Middlesbrough has recently lost a number of organisations that have in the past potentially been key elements of the infrastructure of social economy development – most notably the local co-operative development agency. City Challenge funds won by the local authority were used to build a large Morrison’s Supermarket (part of a large private sector retailing company operating throughout the north of England) in the East of the town rather than to invest in local capacity. Most recently (2000), the council has contracted out much of its direct service delivery to a new partnership organisation owned jointly by the council and a private sector firm. The new company, Middlesbrough Direct, which will effectively replace the council as a service provider throughout the town, includes no direct representation from the Third Sector and has only one voluntary sector representative on its board. In some other parts of the UK (Bristol, for example, discussed in Chapter 5) local councils have deliberately sought to devolve aspects of service provision to the Third Sector as a means of developing community-based economic development. In contrast, in Middlesbrough the existing social economy has been bypassed in favour of what is, in effect, service privatisation. This, combined with the highly bureaucratic way in which Middlesbrough administers project funds, has been seen by many people to signal a lack of belief in the social economy and community-based regeneration on the part of senior council staff and local councillors. Instead, they are seen to favour larger scale and more immediately cost effective (i.e. cheaper) private sector-led solutions.

As a recent Report from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation examining Neighborhood Images in Teesside found, there remains a strong sense of and commitment to the local community on the part of residents even in Middlesbrough’s most hard-pressed areas (Wood and Vamplew 1999). Despite this, local people are currently unable to translate this sense of community into concrete social economy initiatives, largely because the resources and infrastructures to support such activities are absent or have been diverted to other uses. The nature of the problems faced by Middlesbrough, the nature and history of local people, and the attitude of the local authority have conspired to hinder the effectiveness of such social economy activities as do exist there.

The existing social economy on Teesside can be divided into two types of organisation. The more successful of these comprises a small number of organisations which operate throughout the area of the former Cleveland County, which was replaced with smaller unitary authorities, including Middlesbrough Town Council, in 1995. The second group consists of a small number of
community-based social enterprises situated in various locations around the town. Despite the incidence of poverty and exclusion throughout Middlesbrough, there are currently only five such organisations operating there. In all but one case, that of a newly established New Deal for Communities project (which, at the time of writing, had not established any concrete organisation on the ground), these projects have had a very limited impact and are leading a very precarious existence.

Of the first group of organisations, the most successful based in Middlesbrough itself is the Community Campus '87 project for young people with special housing needs and young women needing secure sheltered housing. 11 Community Campus '87 provides a mixture of housing, holistic social support and work training, by using the refurbishment of its properties to provide work experience for its tenants. The work of the tenants increases the housing stock owned by the project which, in turn, provides more training places to fund and refurbish more properties. Community Campus has been able to grow in this way because the very depressed condition of the local housing market allows it to buy empty and often derelict buildings very cheaply.

As its name suggests, Community Campus '87 was founded in the late 1980s by a group of local housing officers who were increasingly dissatisfied with the poor service being given by the statutory agencies to those clients in the greatest need. Increasing numbers of people with severe needs were being referred back to the officers concerned because they did not have the resources to manage properties once they had been allocated to them. Community Campus was established to provide a more supported route into independent living for the most vulnerable local people, incorporating housing, work place training, and long-term social support. The self-generating process of using work experience to develop skills in clients and create further housing units is one that has since been adopted in other parts of the UK (for example, Project John in Cumbria) where similar conditions prevail. In this way people in housing need can acquire properties cheaply or even freely in a severely depressed housing market.

However, the success of Community Campus has not been repeated in some of Middlesbrough's other social enterprises, most notably in those situated on local social housing estates. The St Hilda's Partnership, for example, originated in 1993 when a group of concerned local residents and the local authority joined forces to examine the needs of the community living in a relatively small housing estate in the former ironmasters district of the town. The Partnership was intended to bring together representatives of statutory agencies, the local authority, Teesside TEC, church organisations, private sector bodies, and Teesside University to tackle the wide range of social and economic problems in the area. It originally targeted five main areas: Employment and Training, Youth and Leisure, Community Crime Prevention, Housing and the Environment, and Heritage and Tourism. These various priorities were to have been delivered through the Partnership itself and a series of small and community-owned businesses. There were also ambitious plans that the project would develop Middlesbrough's famous transporter bridge as a tourist attraction to bring additional resources into the area.
In practice the co-ordinated actions have not transpired and there is a general feeling among project staff that they have been let down. Far from creating more local services in the area, the local authority has closed down the only remaining local school, further isolating an already stigmatised community. This added to a sense of alienation from and mistrust of the local authority. On the St Hilda's estate empty houses are not being allocated to new tenants, repairs to housing have been halted and other empty buildings, including several important examples of the town's heritage of industrial architecture, are being allowed to rot or be demolished by vandalism. Despite a strong residual sense of community among local residents, the population of the area is falling sharply (Wood and Vamplew 1999). To compound problems of despair and disinvestment, the Partnership itself has suffered severe setbacks. Local youths have vandalised the youth training unit so repeatedly that it has been closed down for long periods. Sections of the local community feel that they are not adequately represented by the project and have ceased participating in its activities. The proposed tourism centre based around the transporter bridge has come to fruition but without the direct involvement of the St Hilda's Partnership. Despite its involvement in planning the centre, the Partnership was left out of the implementation of the project. All of these problems have combined to make it very hard for the project to achieve its outputs and, therefore, for managers to secure the funding to continue. There are severe doubts that existing funding will be renewed after 2003 even if the Partnership remains solvent until that point in time.

Although in better shape than St Hilda's, the Grove Hill 2000 project is also precarious. Grove Hill 2000 was established in 1996 by a group of local residents concerned at the lack of provision of social and training facilities in the area. Despite having a very poor relationship with the local authority from the outset, Grove Hill was able to raise funds from the City Challenge scheme to construct a purpose-built community centre, comprising a café, a child-care unit, and a small business space in a large housing estate. Because of a pervasive mistrust of the local authority among local residents, Grove Hill had tried to ensure its independence by completing its own funding bids without the help of the council's economic regeneration team. Although these bids were successful, it has been impossible to develop the degree of independence to which the project aspired. The local authority remains the 'accountable body' for funds coming into the area from national or European sources, and as such maintains very tight control over the ways in which the project can spend its income. In practice this means that although technically owned and run by local residents, Grove Hill 2000 can have any of its management decisions vetoed by the local authority or delayed by the bureaucratic way in which regeneration funds are administered. In the name of accountability, therefore, the local authority restricts the access of the project to its own funds. As a consequence it has deprived the project of the degree of flexibility and cash-flow that a private sector company might take for granted. Despite the difficult relations with the local authority, Grove Hill has managed to open a child-care facility employing local women, a small video-editing and printing unit, and a café run by and for local people. The project's more ambitious plans to develop a local television studio and editing suite have, however, been halted by the council after second-hand cameras and equipment were bought for the sum of £65,000 by Grove Hill without approval and without going through the correct purchasing procedures. This resulted in the council imposing even tighter restrictions on the project, further increasing tensions with staff and residents.

Although Grove Hill continues to employ local residents to run all aspects of the project, and sees this as a virtue of the local social enterprise, elsewhere the lack of management skills among local people has almost proved disastrous. Although now the largest and possibly most secure of the community-based projects in Middlesbrough, the Langridge Initiative Centre (LIC) was nearly closed down by the local authority because of the managerial inexperience of residents. Serving the Berwick Hills and Park End estates to the south east of the town, LIC was launched in 1992 by local residents and the local authority in an attempt to tackle the very high and persistent levels of unemployment among young people on the estates. LIC was intended to provide both formal training towards recognised qualifications as well as to establish a small ILM scheme and a range of community businesses. It quickly became apparent, however, that the original staff, all of whom were local residents, lacked the necessary management skills and the project failed to achieve output targets, in terms of the number of training places taken up and the number of qualifications obtained, and was losing money. Despite the number of changes in senior staff by 1998 the problems had not been resolved and the Langridge Centre was given one year to deal satisfactorily with these issues or face closure by the local authority.

A new non-resident professional manager was subsequently appointed, and has been able to reverse the fortunes of the Centre. New courses have been introduced using professional training staff and the number of local people taking up training places has increased, as has the number leaving with qualifications. The Centre has been able to generate income through the establishment of a café for local people, renting out workspace to small businesses that it has helped establish, and the provision of child-care. Although the Centre manager acknowledges that LIC will never be grant-free, the project is now able to generate enough income, much of it from the local authority in the form of service level contracts, to cover its running costs. New capital projects, however, still have to be funded through one-off grants from a range of funders including the EU, the National Lottery and Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) bids. The Centre has also recently been recognised as a Further Education college, giving it, as a result, access to more secure sources of funding. The residents of the estates served by the project are now finally seeing the development of a more viable (if not independent) social enterprise. The troubled history of LIC suggests, as was evident with many Scottish community businesses, that expecting the residents of impoverished communities spontaneously to develop a range of skills and competencies in the running of social enterprises is unrealistic and can place severe burdens on those people as a result. It is, of course, difficult to see how local people are to acquire managerial skills other than via learning-by-doing and this inevitably has risks attached to it.

That said, the project still faces familiar problems concerned with the
bureaucratic handling of funding. For particular projects or training courses, for example, the local authority will only provide up to 50 per cent of the dedicated funds in advance. The remainder is retained by the council and only becomes available to LIC once the 'need' for the course or project has been proven, a proof based wholly on quantitative outputs. This means that planning for growth and investment is made even more problematic since LIC cannot guarantee that it will even get the funds already set aside for it, let alone renew them in the future. It also raises the possibility that if the council unilaterally deems that need has not been proven, projects and courses in the early stages of their development will simply be scrapped with potentially negative consequences for both local residents and the credibility of the project.

In addition to the heavy bureaucratic burden and tight monitoring that Middlesbrough Council imposes on the few independent social enterprises in the town, it has also sought to spawn its own version of the social economy. In 1997 Middlesbrough Council established its own organisation managed by its regeneration team with the specific remit to establish community businesses. Combiz was intended to work:

"with the Private Sector to identify potential business ideas and Combiz will conduct market research and feasibility studies, and help with the production of business plans and cashflows to ensure that only ideas which have long-term viability are established."

(Middlesbrough Council undated internal policy document)

This plan was developed in 1995 partly because resources available to the regeneration team were being reduced and it needed to find more cost-effective ways of using those that remained. Research by the Council brought them into contact with Tayside Community Business (TCB) in Scotland, which was at that time being heralded as a new model of social enterprise development (Hayton 2000). Once the core enterprises had been established by Combiz, ownership of the firms would pass to local people and employees assisted by both Combiz, acting as a form of public sector management consultant, and non-executive directors co-opted from participating private sector companies. To date, Combiz has established eight such 'community businesses' accounting for approximately thirty jobs held by previously long-term unemployed people. However, although these are claimed to be social enterprises, in practice they are conventional small private sector companies that have had little or no community involvement. Indeed, when asked how much community participation there had been in the establishment and running of these 'community enterprises', one council officer happily stated, with a silent cheer, that there had been none – the implication being that involving local people would have been deeply problematic.13 The companies in question produce a variety of goods and services and have not all survived. A company providing maintenance of vertical access platforms was sold by the Council to a private sector company. Nortech, which fitted and repaired garage doors, was unprofitable and closed down. Of the others, only Telebiz Training,
Conclusion: the powers of place and scale

Both Glasgow and Middlesbrough suffer from problems caused by the collapse and/or withdrawal of long-standing and ingrained industrial cultures. This has left large groups cut off from both traditional sources of employment but also, and perhaps more importantly in the longer term, from those institutions that most served to shape community identity. In both places the role of the local state - by default or design - has become important, though the outcome has been different. In the case of Glasgow, earlier experiments with a strongly localised and independent form of social enterprise - the community business - came to a halt because of failure and the changing fashions of regeneration thinking and funding. It has been replaced by a highly organised, city-wide and area-based network of semi-public sector organisations. This form of professionalised and carefully controlled social economy differs sharply from the sort of community-based and animated vision that most contemporary theorists and politicians have in mind and which, ironically, is most commonly attributed to Glasgow itself.

In Middlesbrough the local state itself has occupied the social and economic space that elsewhere might be used by local people to develop a more autonomous social economy. But this has not meant sustained or serious commitment. By using regeneration funds to establish the council-run Combiz over more independent organisations, by imposing onerous accountability structures and by diverting council spending to the private sector rather than the Third Sector, the local authority in Middlesbrough has shown lacklustre commitment to the social economy. Importantly, however, there is still some evidence of 'social entrepreneurship' among local people, albeit infrequently and typically on a small scale. In Middlesbrough, which has not been overwhelmed by the slick professionalism of much that takes place in Glasgow, those setting up and running social enterprises are often local residents - Grove Hill 2000 and the St Hilda's Partnership are both examples of this. Even in circumstances in which those running the projects are not local to the area, as in the case of the Langridge Centre, there is a high degree of commitment to developing local capacity for local communities (Wood and Vamplow 1999). However, the enthusiasm of social economy activists is being placed under considerable strain by the interventionist attitudes of the local authority and, as in Glasgow, also by changes in socio-economic structure that are creating a declining generation of community activists.

The very different structure of the social economy in these two former industrial areas suggest that, even for places where the patterns and causes of social need are apparently similar, local institutional and civic cultures are very important in shaping outcomes. That said, the relationship between the social economy and place is very ambiguous in both. On the one hand, the local context of the particular urban area, its particular industrial, political, and social history and the spatial legacy of that, has clearly influenced the structure of social economy provision. In the case of Middlesbrough, the fragmented nature of local communities and the top-down approach to regeneration adopted by the town council means that whatever limited capacities might exist at grass-roots level, there is little opportunity for them to develop. In the case of Glasgow, the corporatist style of the city council (in contrast to the more dispersed and experimental approach of the Strathclyde Regional Council), combined both with a constraint of available resources and a recent history of community business failure, has produced a tightly controlled and prescribed form of social economy which operates at only a very small remove from the public sector. In both cases, the nature and structure of the local social economy has in large part been a product of the specificities of place. As we saw in the case of the East End of Glasgow where ostensibly local decision making was, in practice, centralised, and in Middlesbrough where the local authority has effectively tried to run the social economy from its own offices, the scale at which control is exercised also matters. The point is not that the local state has in some sense misappropriated the idea of the 'local' social economy because, as was seen, particularly in the case of Glasgow, independent social economy organisations themselves may have to operate on a large scale to compete and survive, a tendency reinforced by the failure to establish very localised social enterprises in the 1980s. Rather, our argument is that the scales at which Third Sector interventions are appropriate, as well as the nature of the way in which they operate and their relationship to the local state, will necessarily vary between places. While the corporatist nature of the social economies in both Glasgow and Middlesbrough undoubtedly leads to problems, it is important to understand why the Third Sector should come to operate at a city- or even region-wide scale rather than that of the local community. Why, in other words, should social economy practices so clearly rooted in place be apparently so blind to the specificities of the communities they are supposed to serve?

One answer to this may be that social enterprise solutions as prescribed by the localist agenda outlined above are simply not possible or relevant in some places. Ironically given the UK government's insistence on the greater use of self-help regeneration strategies for the very poorest communities, including the greater development of social economy organisations, it may be advocating a solution that relies on the existence of those features of local political, economic, and social life that the so-called 'worst estates' and most excluded people and places most significantly lack. But there is more. In places in which the institutions of civil society are poorly developed, all too often the local state, in pursuit of accountability and accepted notions of value for money or because of ingrained bureaucratic practices, has tended to close down the spaces within which the social economy might develop as an independent and community-controlled alternative. In Glasgow, despite its reputation for Third Sector innovation, the consequence of recent changes in the structure of the local state, the move away from the community business model and the controlling influence of the city council, has effectively removed the space opened up by the development of the community business model. In Middlesbrough the traditional political culture of the town council - based on top-down service delivery to deferential voters - never allowed such space in the past and there is little evidence of any likely change in the immediate future.

Our aim is not to suggest that the local state is necessarily inimical to the
5 The distributed social economy
Bristol and Tower Hamlets

Introduction
The experience of the social economy in Bristol and Tower Hamlets has been quite different from that in Glasgow and Middlesbrough. It is less state dependent, more organisationally distributed, and able to draw on a wider base of opportunity. Although these two urban areas are very different in terms of their size and structure – the former is a large, prosperous city in its own right while the latter is only one part of a much larger metropolitan area, a global city – there are important similarities between them. Both contain very varied populations, some elements of which, particularly ethnic minority communities, have suffered disproportionately from problems of poverty and social exclusion. Although both places, like Glasgow and Middlesbrough, have experienced the contraction of mass-employment industries and the cultural and social systems that developed around them, these have been more extensively replaced by new industries and/or new social structures which have had important transformative effects.

As a consequence, both places have a much more varied and fluid civil society, comprising a mixture of different cultures, languages and traditions, different and changing economic classes, and old and new communities. This, we will argue, has had an important impact on defining needs as well as capabilities in the social economy. A further similarity between Bristol and Tower Hamlets is the close proximity of small areas of severe deprivation to larger areas of extreme wealth, in contrast to Glasgow and Middlesbrough where small areas of affluence are adjacent to much larger areas of poverty. Bristol is prosperous, with poverty clustered in small pockets of the inner-city and some peripheral housing estates. Tower Hamlets is a borough marked by extremes of poverty and exclusion (albeit in different ways in different communities), but increasingly integrated into the buoyant economy of London. We argue that this adjacency has helped to cushion and nurture the social economy. A final similarity between the two urban areas is the historically secondary role of local state involvement in the development of Third Sector activities, in sharp contrast to Glasgow and Middlesbrough. This has influenced the types of Third Sector activity that have evolved and the balance of responsibility between different types of agency in the social economy.

This chapter, therefore, continues our exploration of the powers of context, by examining the effect of social and cultural heterogeneity, institutional pluralism,
and mainstream economic vitality, on the form and potential of the social economy. Both places are host to a range of social enterprises that have developed and survived for a variety of reasons of which the role of local state is just one. Bristol, for example, has a long history of non-mainstream movements with strong roots in community and social development. Similarly it has a long-established environmental movement which has spawned some of the more enduring and successful social enterprises in the city. In Tower Hamlets, although there is a long history of voluntary sector activity within the borough, reflecting the persistence of poverty in the area, the nature and context of civil society is very different. Not only is Tower Hamlets home to a wide variety of ethnic communities and different class identities, but it is also part of the wider society of London as a whole. This offers organisations operating within the borough the opportunity to draw on the resources of social and political networks from many different spatial scales that are not available to smaller, more isolated or less varied places.

We begin the chapter with an account of the local context in which social economy projects have developed in Bristol and Tower Hamlets. This includes the nature of the local economy, the geography of social deprivation, the nature of the local society, and the specific political culture in each place. While the context of place has helped shape the social economy, so too, reciprocally, has the character of the social economy influenced the nature of place. The second part of the chapter examines the nature of the local social economy in each to illustrate the ways in which these various factors have contributed to or hindered its development. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of how the social economies of Bristol and Tower Hamlets differ from each other and from those in Glasgow and Middlesbrough.

The economic context

Whereas the current problems of Middlesbrough and Glasgow can in large part be attributed to the demise of old industrial economies, the economic evolution of Bristol and Tower Hamlets has been rather different. Both have certainly seen the demise of older, mass-employment industries (the docks and associated industries in Tower Hamlets, tobacco, confectionery and engineering in Bristol) but these have been replaced by other growth industries and much greater rates of new firm formation, as indicated by net VAT registrations in the second half of the 1990s (Figure 5.1).

However, the fruits of economic success have not been distributed evenly throughout the resident population. Consequently, in both places, albeit in different ways and on a different scale, economic change has produced areas of poverty and social exclusion cheek-by-jowl with areas of considerable wealth.

In the case of Bristol, following from its early prosperity as a trading port, manufacturing industries grew up to process incoming commodities from the colonies. The chocolate and tobacco industries were the most prominent of these, supported by ancillary industries such as printing and packaging and light engineering. The engineering capacity of the city contributed to renewed growth.

![Figure 5.1 Net VAT registrations, (a) Tower Hamlets and (b) Bristol, 1994–8. Source: National Online Manpower Information Service (NOMIS).](image-url)
and change during the early twentieth century with the development of defence-related manufacturing, particularly of aircraft (Boddy et al. 1986). The strength of the city's industrial base and the growing significance of military production from the 1930s onwards meant that Bristol was to a large extent protected from the main periods of decline in UK manufacturing during the depression of the 1930s and, subsequently, during the recessions of the 1980s (Boddy et al. 1986; Bassett 1996: 532–3). As a centre of defence aviation technology and production Bristol and its hinterland benefited considerably from the high defence spending during the 1980s. As Bassett notes, while manufacturing industry and the economy in general were in sharp decline throughout the UK in the 1980s as a consequence of general recession, overall employment in Bristol continued to grow in both the manufacturing and services sectors (1996: 543). According to Boddy et al., Bristol's rapid decline of older forms of manufacturing was offset by newer industries and the equally rapidly growing services sector (1986: 19). This long period of relatively stable prosperity in Bristol was broken only in the early 1990s with the scaling back of the military aerospace industry as part of the 'peace dividend' following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between 1989–91 employment in the aerospace industry fell by 23 per cent accompanied by a growing realisation that Bristol no longer had the industrial diversity nor growth potential that had sustained it during earlier periods of crisis (Bassett 1996).

During the 1980s it became apparent that the general prosperity of Bristol was not shared equally or equitably among the population as a whole. Parts of the inner-city, particularly the areas around St Pauls, Easton, and Lawrence Hill to the east of the centre and which are the main centres for Bristol's Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities, had been deprived of both public and private sector investment over a long period. As a result, they became effectively cut off from the rest of the city as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination, crime, and drugs. While the rest of the local economy was booming during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the officially registered unemployment rates in St Pauls among the ethnic minority communities were as high as 42 per cent. This, accompanied by active and systemic racial discrimination and police harassment, sparked riots in St Pauls in the early 1980s which brought the plight of the inner-city communities to the attention of the city as a whole for the first time.

Uneven development was also experienced outside of the city centre. The main areas of economic growth in the Bristol area, in the electronics and service sectors, are located to the north and east of the city and along the M4 corridor. The south of the city, by contrast, steadily lost employment with the closure of some traditional industries, most notably the twenty-nine-acre Wills cigarette factory site in 1989 with the loss of 4000 jobs. Poor transport planning left much of the south of the city effectively cut off from the new industries concentrating around the motorway network to the north of Bristol. Although this has changed in more recent years, with even the south of Bristol experiencing effective full-employment, it has left its mark in the form of a significant legacy of social problems on the housing estates there. For example, on the Hartcliffe and Withywood Estate, although unemployment is low, the problems of low educational attainment, crime and, in particular, drug and substance abuse remain high.1

Similarly, in Tower Hamlets the highest levels of economic deprivation are still to be found in the borough's large ethnic minority populations and in areas of social housing formerly associated with the docks (Eade 1997; Foster 1999). None the less, the evolution of the local economy has been fundamentally different. This is partly because of its own particular industrial history associated with the London Docks and their demise during the 1970s and 1980s, but also because Tower Hamlets is a part of the wider London economy. With the increasing encroachment of the financial services industries of the City of London upon its western margins, Tower Hamlets has also become host to new elements of the global economy (Eade 1997). Historically, the main source of employment in the borough had been through the London Docks and associated industries such as warehousing, timber, potteries, and engineering (Foster 1999: 17). Although the local economy was often very prosperous because of the docks, this was a fragile prosperity because of the casual and precarious nature of employment in the docks, with the area being struck by periods of severe recession during the nineteenth century. Even when this occasional prosperity did appear, it was unevenly distributed among the local population. Until 1967 labour in the docks was hired on a casual daily basis and that had the effect of keeping wage rates low and inculcating a culture of competition between individuals and working class communities. As in Middlesbrough, housing in the borough was constructed around the major sources of employment, often at the behest of the dock companies, but the employment available was much more fragmented, poorly paid, and uncertain. This not only contributed to the prevalence of poverty throughout the London Docks, but has, until recently, continued to affect the attitudes of the local population towards work. As Foster notes,

The casual system had become so ingrained in people's thinking about dock work that it was not simply the employers who allowed it to continue for so long but the dockers themselves had 'a fatalistic acceptance of the system', believing that the nature of the work required, as employers' argued, 'the need for a margin of surplus labour to be hired or fired according to fluctuations in trade'. Even after casual labour was abolished, the hardships created by the system and the alienation of the workers subjected to it, remained in the form of a pervasive negativity and hostility among many local people through to the 1990s.

(1999: 15, quoting Hill)

Following the Second World War the docks benefited from the boom in the UK national economy and levels of poverty in the East End of London as a whole fell. However, when structural decline set in, starting in the mid 1960s, problems of local over-provision by the dock companies, low levels of profitability, and general world-wide over-capacity in the shipping industry ensured that it was steep. By 1981 there were only 4100 dock workers employed in the London yards, down from 25,000 in 1960, a fall compounded by the decline in the many other local industries dependent on supplying the docks (Foster 1999: 41).

Efforts to rebuild the economy of the East End, and particularly that of
Docklands, began even before the docks finally closed, with a succession of 'dreams and schemes' being imposed on the area from the early 1970s (Foster 1999: 47). From the outset, however, many of the proposals recognised that the proximity of such a large area of real estate to the centre of London, and in particular the Square Mile of the City, offered a unique set of opportunities for a property-led regeneration strategy. The culmination of this process was the formation in 1981 of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) which was given sweeping powers to circumvent planning regulations and award tax and rates concessions in order to redevelop the docks as a site for international business and private sector housing. The creation of the LDDC created a new set of problems for a number of East End boroughs, including Tower Hamlets, which fell only partially within LDDC boundaries. In Tower Hamlets, the planning powers of the LDDC split the north of the borough, under the control of the local authority, from the south, including the very poor Isle of Dogs, which came under the LDDC. In economic terms the divisions created by the LDDC were far-reaching. Although the LDDC was nominally responsible for the development of the entire area and its resident population, in practice development activities were focused almost exclusively on the creation of office space for City firms and very expensive waterside housing developments for their employees. The early years of the LDDC’s operations were marked by a speculative property boom. The ensuing frenzy of speculative development failed to take the interests of local residents into account, or benefit them in any significant way (the LDDC did nothing to improve the very dilapidated state of local social housing, for example). The recessions of the late 1980s had an immediate impact on the speculative developments in Docklands, many of which collapsed as over-inflated property prices plummeted. As the first wave of investors was swept away, however, the second and third waves – those that would build the more lasting developments such as Canary Wharf – were moving in to capitalise on the potential that was again being opened up (Foster 1999), but once again, ignoring the economic and social needs of local residents. The one or two attempts by the LDDC to fund community and housing projects were dwarfed by the wholesale transformation of the local economy brought about by major infrastructural investment to attract new private sector businesses.

The economic context of the social economy in Bristol and Tower Hamlets, therefore, has been marked first by high levels of disparity within and between local communities, and second by poverty in both places existing in close proximity to areas of prosperity. These characteristics have had an important formative influence upon the character and dynamics of the social economy there.

The geography of social exclusion

In Bristol there are some pockets of very severe and persistent deprivation among those areas and communities that have been excluded from the overall success of the 'sunbelt' city. As we noted above, these take two main forms: inner-city, predominantly ethnic minority, communities; large peripheral housing estates, particularly to the south of the city.

Figure 5.2 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) map of Bristol.²

The problems of the inner-city areas of Bristol were graphically highlighted following the riots which swept through the St Pauls area in the early 1980s. Following the riots greater attention was paid to the area and a number of schemes was put in place, including several social economy organisations to attempt to tackle the worst of the problems. Although much has been achieved, the inner-city still has pockets of extreme poverty and exclusion which have remained largely unaffected because regeneration policies were either under-funded and short-term or oriented towards attracting major private sector investors. Although no area of Bristol ranks as highly across the aggregated indicators of deprivation as many of the wards in Glasgow, Middlesbrough, and Tower Hamlets, four outer-city wards – Filwood, Bishopsworth, Knowle, and Hartcliffe – rank among the worst 100 areas for education deprivation in the UK (Filwood is the 7th most deprived). All four of these wards are adjoining, spread across the large housing
proximity to parts of London's prosperous economy, the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) rankings on employment reveals a gulf in terms of social distance between the residents of Tower Hamlets and the surrounding buoyant labour market. Again it is the predominantly Bangladeshi wards that have the highest concentrations of unemployment, but throughout the rest of the borough the situation is comparable to that in Middlesbrough and, in some cases, worse.

The nature and scale of deprivation in Bristol and Tower Hamlets, therefore, is very different (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Bristol's problems may be long-standing and intractable, but they are at least identifiable and localised. In addition, they exist within the context of an area with a strong civic tradition of alterity and dissent (which we discuss below), much of which has been focused on issues of community and poverty. The situation in Tower Hamlets is different. With poverty and exclusion endemic across an array of fragmented and often hostile or defensive ethnically-defined communities, the complexity and magnitude of the task facing the social economy is that much greater. Despite this, by virtue of its location within the wider context of London, and in part because of the long tradition of welfare innovation in the borough, social economy organisations have none the less developed in Tower Hamlets. They are, however, as we see below, located in a divided civic and political culture marked by interest preservation and competition.

Civic resources

As noted above, the traditional working patterns of the London Docks left an enduring mark on the local community. Although they produced in many cases a strong sense of community centred on the shared identities of the working culture of the East End and the docks, in some parts of the area they also produced very insular and conservative forms of community. This became increasingly marked during the 1970s and 1980s when employment opportunities were beginning to dry up in the area and there were large influxes of refugees from the Indian subcontinent, particularly from Bangladesh, and latterly from parts of Africa, particularly Somalia. Immigration was not, however, new. The East End in general and Tower Hamlets in particular had long been host to ethnic minority communities (for example, the Huguenots in the eighteenth century, the large ethnic Chinese population of Limehouse and the Jewish immigrant communities in Stepney and Whitechapel during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). However, so long as local employment was secure, and so long as such communities remained relatively small and contained, they were not perceived as a threat. As the scale of the influx into parts of Tower Hamlets during the 1970s increased and as ethnic minority families began to be placed in social housing in parts of the borough which had formerly been exclusively white, there was, however, a strong racist backlash (Foster 1999: 249). Parts of the Isle of Dogs and the east of the borough, which still contain large, predominantly white populations, produced particular hostility, with one ward on the Isle of Dogs briefly electing Britain's only British National Party (BNP) councillor on an openly racist platform in 1993 (Eade 1997). The short-lived success of the BNP represents the more extreme end of

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**Figure 5.3** Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) map of Tower Hamlets.
racism in local politics. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that other, more mainstream political parties in the borough were also deploying race as a means of garnering support in certain wards. The result of these various processes was to reinforce social division and insularity among the various ethnic groups that reside in Tower Hamlets.

The Bangladeshi community, for example, partly because of its own cultural needs, partly because of a genuine need for self-protection, and partly because of racialised housing allocations, formed a majority of the population around Spitalfields and Whitechapel, now often referred to as 'Banglatown' (Eade 1997). In 1991 the Bangladeshi community comprised 61 per cent of the local population in Spitalfields but only 4 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, of the populations of Millwall on the Isle of Dogs and Bow on the eastern fringe (figures cited in Eade 1997). Other Bangladesh communities also developed in estates to the north of the borough alongside existing white and Afro-Caribbean populations, latterly joined by Somali, Vietnamese, and other ethnic minority communities. There is, therefore, a particular ethnic geography within Tower Hamlets that is a product of successive waves of immigration, housing policies, and practices of resistance and discrimination. The differing needs of the various communities spread across the borough have contributed to the local Third Sector having distinctive differences between areas and communities. The insularity of many communities has created in some, notably parts of the Bengali and Somali communities, a degree of self-reliance that has provided fertile ground for the development of Third Sector activities. The Spitalfields Small Business Association and Account 3 projects detailed below, for example, have both developed successful niche markets for the Third Sector within ethnic minority communities. These have not necessarily grown out of the capacities of the communities themselves, but the communities do provide opportunities for outsiders to mobilise capacities within them to develop organisations that meet the targeted needs of local people. The communities that have proved more resistant to the development of local capacity have been the estates to the east of the borough. In these places of traditional white working class culture, there is a pervasive dependence upon local authority welfare provision.

In addition to the various working class and ethnic minority communities within Tower Hamlets, other groups have developed a significant presence in the area that is reflected in some of the activities of the social economy. Tower Hamlets is, along with Hackney to the north, reputed to have the highest concentration of visual artists of any comparable urban area in Europe. The effect of this on local civil society has been very varied. On the one hand some of the wealthier elements of the artistic community in the borough have contributed to particular forms of gentrification. Certain streets and squares have become almost entirely populated by artists and their studios (the best known of these is Beck Road in Hackney which has been largely occupied by artists since the 1970s). In Tower Hamlets many of the former dockyard buildings and empty wharves, especially around Limehouse and Wapping, were occupied by artists' studios prior to their redevelopment for housing and offices during the 1980s and 1990s. While the presence of these groups has never been as exclusionary as the more conventional forms of gentrification, the extent to which they have become integrated with other elements of the community has been varied. One of the main sources of interaction has been through some of the many outreach programmes run by local arts organisations. The Whitechapel Gallery at Aldgate East was established, along with a neighbouring library, in the 1890s as an educational establishment for the poor of the East End, and has been particularly important in forging such connections. These outreach programmes, whether organised through large organisations such as the Whitechapel or more informally, as in the case of the early stages of the Bromley-by-Bow project (p. 112) have often overlapped with the Third Sector, for example, through artists providing innovative arts-based training programmes. The Whitechapel Gallery runs a number of community-based education and outreach programmes which place artists, writers, and other creative workers in local schools and community centres. The Gallery works in association with local arts groups throughout Tower Hamlets and the East End more generally. Much of its work is concerned with inner-city problems and their exploration through the creative arts. As in the case of the Bromley-by-Bow Centre, visual artists have been involved in social economy and voluntary sector projects, in this case providing arts classes for people with learning disabilities and other mental health problems in exchange for studio space.

The association between Tower Hamlets and innovation in the voluntary sector is well-established, with a very long history, a reflection of the long history of poverty and inequality in the area. Toynbee Hall, which still operates as a voluntary sector centre in the borough, was the first 'university settlement' in the UK established in Whitechapel in the 1884. This, and other inner-city missions (such as the Whitechapel Mission set up in 1876) were philanthropic church-based organisations committed to the improvement and relief of the poor and dispossessed of the East End, a role they continue to perform. By providing services such as free legal advice and other social experiments, organisations such as Toynbee Hall prefigured many aspects of the post-war welfare state. They also served as a focal point for people wishing to help the inner-city poor, often for religious or political reasons, who came into the borough to work with local communities. It is partly because of this history that the recently established School for Social Entrepreneurs has been established in Tower Hamlets at Bethnal Green.

Poverty has been and is pervasive among almost all the various communities that constitute the long-resident elements of the local population in Tower Hamlets, producing a strong sense of competition for influence, resources, and territory. The middle classes that have been moving into Tower Hamlets since the early 1980s have been from elsewhere and have indirectly caused the displacement of poor people and communities. It is also the case that the pervasive poverty of the borough has meant that Third Sector organisations that have been able to develop have done so through the efforts of people from outside the borough who are committed to community-based regeneration (for religious, political or cultural reasons). This is in part a consequence of the fact that social economy networks in London have long transcended the political boundaries of individual boroughs and, indeed, have recently been formalised as Social Enterprise London.
The distributed social economy

SEL, in large part through the efforts of Tower Hamlets-based activists. The character of civil society in Bristol, although to a degree also fragmented along social and ethnic lines, is very different to that of Tower Hamlets. Undoubtedly, there is poverty in Bristol but it occurs on a much smaller and more localised scale than in Tower Hamlets. Consequently, in Bristol, the relatively small pockets of poverty within the inner-city and the peripheral housing estates have a different relationship to the social whole. People may be poor and marginal, but they are nevertheless seen to be part of a wider social and political entity, which includes different social classes, ethnic identities, and territorial communities. This implies that while there may be differences between the many social and ethnic groups that constitute Bristol, there is also a sense of common identity, however minimal. This gives people a sense of belonging to the city in a way not possible in a place such as Tower Hamlets which is part of a much larger metropolitan area.

Bristol is also recognised as a place of cultural alterity. One social economy activist attributed this sense of alterity and willingness to experiment to Bristol's 'yeoman spirit'. More generally, it can be linked to the long association of the city with alternative lifestyles, cultures, and politics. In religious terms, for example, Bristol has long been a centre of dissenting Christian cultures, both in the form of the powerful Quaker families which dominated the confectionery industry in the city and as a centre of Methodism. Both the Quakers and Methodists have strong traditions of social involvement and anti-poverty activity and, particularly in the latter case, have recently had direct involvement in the promotion and development of Third Sector activities. Partly related to this history of religious dissent, Bristol also has a strong tradition of environmental activism, which again has been instrumental in developing some of the more vigorous local social enterprises. The Bristol Green Party was established in 1975 as the People's Party, later becoming the Ecology Party before taking on its current identity. The Bristol Green Party is now divided into three linked parties covering different areas of the city. Bristol is home to one of the largest and longest established Friends of the Earth (FoE) groups in the UK, which has enjoyed strong support from people throughout the city from the early 1970s. Since the establishment of the FoE office in Bristol in 1971, the organisation has been involved in several projects that can be seen as precursors to current social economy activities. Many of these projects were based on materials recycling and the reduction of energy consumption, replacing services withdrawn by the council. Some of these, particularly a project which used money from recycling to provide insulation for elderly people and provide youth training, predate some of the better-known social enterprises, such as the Wise Group, by some years.

Political culture

In both Middlesbrough and Glasgow a strong corporatist political culture has had a direct impact on the development of Third Sector activities. Even though the outcomes in terms of the form, character, and vitality of their social economies are very different, in both places local government is pivotal involved. In contrast, the picture in Bristol and Tower Hamlets is one of more distributed capacity and a much less state-centred social economy. This is a consequence of the ways in which the different actors within each place have come to influence local political practices and, as a consequence, to affect the nature of the relationship between the state, civil society, and the social economy.

Tower Hamlets has long been marked by a fragmented political culture. On occasion, this has been exacerbated by institutional and policy changes. The creation of the LDDC, for example, bifurcated political control over significant aspects of the borough and effectively denied the population of the Docklands areas, particularly the Isle of Dogs, the same degree of political accountability and dialogue available outside the LDDC-controlled area (Foster 1999). Tower Hamlets Council was still responsible for the provision of services within the LDDC area, particularly in the form of the existing provision of social housing, but in practice did little for these communities for the first few years of the LDDC's existence. In any event it had no powers to veto the planning decisions taken by the development corporation, regardless of the views of local residents. The construction of Canary Wharf, for example, was vehemently opposed by local people but their views were simply disregarded as the decision to proceed with the scheme was taken (Foster 1999).

The ethnic diversity of the borough too has had an important impact on the nature of local politics, particularly as sections of the Bangladeshi community have grown in influence. At various times the balance of power between the main parties competing for control of the borough council (which, in Tower Hamlets, is between Labour and the Liberal Democrats) has been held by a small group of Bangladeshi councillors whose allegiance has been actively sought over various contentious issues. Given the racial tensions that have long been a feature of the local civil society, this is perceived by some as giving some parts of the borough and their communities a disproportionate influence in policy decisions. Allegations of corruption among a small minority of these councillors have only heightened these tensions. The racial dimension to the political culture in Tower Hamlets and other areas of East London has had, according to Eade, profound consequences:

Different scapes have been created as these localities have become increasingly economically, socially and culturally both heterogeneous and highly fragmented. Despite the sharp disparities in wealth which have emerged in London's East End this heterogeneity has so far produced a situation where unequal social actors have looked past each other and kept their (social) distance. Conflict has usually occurred around a racialized boundary between working class whites and their Bangladeshi neighbours. The globalization of locality in Docklands and Spitalfields has not produced a new politics of place where social and cultural differences can be accommodated within a strategy of working-class resistance.

(1997: 144)
Eade’s contention that the encroachment of global forces into Tower Hamlets has not produced a new politics of place is important. It does not support claims about the emergence of a new and progressive ‘global sense of place’ in sites of cosmopolitan mixture (Massey 1991). What we find in Tower Hamlets is a defensive and regressive politics of turf, often mobilised through strong diasporic or other connections of closed cultural ties.

Bristol’s strong tradition of civic and environmental activism, in contrast, has fed into a more inclusive, albeit demarcated, politics of place. For it is important to distinguish between the place politics of the city council and those of local and community political activists, with important consequences for the development of the local social economy. As one current Third Sector activist in Bristol put it:

There is no real commitment to the social economy outside of the sector itself. The local authority does have a political voice loud enough to get the message out that this is an opportunity and that this is going to be the culture of the city. But it is not going to be the culture of the city because it is not even the culture of the local authority. It is probably more the culture of the citizens of Bristol than it is of the local authority.10

Until very recently Bristol City Council has avoided direct involvement in non-mainstream regeneration strategies. The unwillingness of the entrenched Labour establishment in Bristol to be dictated, during the 1980s and early 1990s, by the Conservative government (Malpass 1994) led to the rejection of the inner-city regeneration schemes introduced by the Conservatives. Ironically this refusal to engage in mainstream regeneration activities is in part a consequence of the culture of dissent and independence that has produced a strong civic base for the social economy. This ‘municipalism’, however, has fallen well short of ‘radical’ development strategies, including, until quite recently, the encouragement of community enterprises:

Most of Bristol’s policies have fitted within the traditional type of strategy, involving a heavy reliance on site assembly, support for small firms and promotional activities [. . .] The guiding of investment to areas of high unemployment, and the targeting of job creation towards particularly vulnerable groups, has tended to be a secondary objective . . . many of the workshops and small firm projects in inner-city areas have been small in scale and are best characterized as ‘mopping up’ policies, easing the impacts of decline rather than laying the basis for economic regeneration. . . .

(Boddy et al. 1986: 196–7)

This rather bleak analysis of the situation in the late 1980s led Boddy et al. to the conclusion that the role of locally-based regeneration strategies in Bristol, such as they were, had been of scarcely any importance in addressing the needs of the city’s poor and marginal communities.

Bristol’s reticence to develop active regeneration programmes for the city’s poor and marginal communities has been compounded, until very recently, by an inability to bid for the sort of mainstream regeneration funds that have contributed to the development of social economy activities in other cities. Because of its relative overall wealth, Bristol was also often not eligible for particular regeneration funds, notwithstanding acute problems in inner-city and peripheral wards. When the local authority did finally begin to apply for such funds, Bristol notoriously failed to win money from two successive City Challenge rounds (Punter 1993). More recent bids have been more successful, helped in part by a change in the make-up of the City Council and an influx of younger officers and councillors, particularly following the abolition of Avon County in 1996 and the restoration of Bristol City Council as a unitary authority.

The election in 1997, however, of George Micklewright (a former officer with the Bristol Co-operative Development Agency) as Leader of the City Council marked a significant change in the Council’s attitude towards the Third Sector. This was partly a consequence of Micklewright’s personal commitment to community-based economic development and partly because it was becoming increasingly evident that local social enterprises in Bristol were far from irrelevant by the late 1990s. Shortly after taking office, at a workshop organised by the Bristol Area Community Enterprise Network (BACEN), Micklewright asserted his belief in the role of the social economy at both local and national levels and announced his intention to make its development a key theme of his leadership. This led to the establishment of a three-year, £400,000 evaluation project, headed by a social economy activist seconded into the Council’s regeneration team. This project had two main aims: first, to assess the current extent and effectiveness of the Third Sector in the city; second, to identify possible ways in which the local authority could help it to develop further. This marked a watershed in the attitude of the local authority towards the social economy.

The social economy in Bristol

Despite the common expectation that the social economy flourishes in areas of marked social exclusion, paradoxically, of our four case areas, the prosperous city of Bristol has the most extensive and successful social economy. A recent survey of the local social economy conducted by Bristol City Council generated over 400 completed questionnaires from organisations throughout the city. Although only 17 per cent of these were social enterprises in the strict sense, this nevertheless...
implies a high level of Third Sector activity relative to the scale of need (in sharp contrast, for example, to the low level in Middlesbrough). In addition to a significant number of community-based organisations spread throughout the city, including social enterprises, some of which we examine in greater detail below, Bristol is also host to several national charities and environmental organisations, many of which are involved in aspects of social economy development on a national scale. These include the Single Parent Action Network, the National Federation of City Farms, the Soil Association, and Sustrans. Bristol also houses the UK headquarters of such organisations as the Dutch-founded Triodos Bank, an ethical bank which in addition to offering a range of banking services supports social and environmental improvement projects. The presence of such organisations helps create a supportive context for social economy initiatives and experiments.

Since the late 1970s, several social enterprises operating on a city-wide scale have developed based on the well-established environmental movements in the Bristol area. The most notable of these were established by FoE in association with Avon County Council. More generally, they have gradually developed into effective, self-sustaining social enterprises that have become firmly established as part of local anti-poverty strategies as well as influential elements in the local social economy as a whole. They also incorporate organisational principles based on altruism, equality, and equity, in strong contrast to firms in the mainstream economy. In this way, they help reproduce diversity and the exploration of alternative social relations to those of the mainstream economy. The SOFA and Children's Scrapstore projects, both of which are members of the wider Bristol Recycling Consortium, exemplify many of the features of these organisations. The SOFA project was founded with the help of FoE and the County Council in 1980 by two committed Christians to recycle and renovate second-hand furniture for resale to people on low incomes and living in poor-quality social housing. The purpose of SOFA was from the outset to combine the provision of environmentally friendly social services – reducing landfill and providing affordable furnishing for those on low incomes – with job creation and training. SOFA operates a transport network that collects used furniture and white goods throughout the city for refurbishment in its workshop and resale through its warehouse. At the time of writing, the warehouse itself was undergoing a £1.5 million refurbishment to provide purpose-built workshops and office space, situated in a run-down shopping street to the east of the city centre. In addition to expanding SOFA's own workshop and retail space, the new building will contain office space to be rented to other social enterprises working in the area. The long-term aim is to create a largely self-funding centre, a social economy 'one stop shop', in which a range of services, including SOFA, health-care, employment advice, and a credit-union are available in the same place. The project hopes that, by bringing clients, and ultimately tenants of the workspaces, into the area, other local businesses will benefit from increased spending and investment.

SOFA in 2000 employed fourteen people, and had a core of professional staff that ran the social enterprise with very tight financial management and a business-like approach. SOFA would not survive were it to pay staff, particularly the senior management, private sector equivalent wages (one reason why, as noted in Chapter 2, wage rates in the social economy more generally tend to be lower than private sector equivalents). The director of the project is not originally from Bristol, and could well find a better paid job in the private sector. However, his ethics, his network links in the Bristol social economy, and the personal satisfaction he derives from working with the local community, have kept him in the sector – one form of effective place ties in the social economy.

This type of local commitment is perhaps even more evident in another project established by FoE and Avon Council in 1982. Like SOFA, the Children's Scrapstore was established to combine ecological objectives (in this case, reductions in land-fill waste) with socially useful services and employment. Scrapstore collects clean scrap from local businesses – paper, textiles, plastics, cardboard tubes, and so on – which otherwise would be discarded. The materials collected are sorted in a warehouse and then resold, at very low cost, to child-care organisations throughout the Bristol area for use as art materials. To extend its revenue potential, Scrapstore opened part of its floorspace as a conventional retail art shop, selling a variety of proprietary paints, glues, tools, and other materials and equipment both to its members (the child-care organisations) and to the general public, but often at subsidised prices. Scrapstore has developed into one of the biggest social economy organisations of its type in the UK and is able to generate sufficient revenue to cover over 60 per cent of its £250,000 per annum running costs. A proposed move in 2000 to a new building, which the project would buy outright with the help of charitable donations and a mortgage, would remove some of the restrictions that currently constrain its ability to develop further revenue streams.

Like SOFA, the Scrapstore staff earn less than they would in the private sector. Instead, they have chosen to become involved in this workers' collective. Unlike a co-operative, which can operate as a normal private sector business except that it is owned by some of its employees, a workers' collective is owned in equal share by all of its employees. Furthermore, it is managed democratically and all employees are paid the same wage regardless of the task they perform. Scrapstore's seven full-time staff (in 1999/2000) come from all walks of life and are employed as much for their willingness to adhere to the principles of the collective as for their individual skills. Like SOFA, the motivation is less financial than that of job satisfaction, a personal commitment to a particular form of democratic enterprise, and response to a local need.

Based on a different kind of commitment – Christian Methodism – Aspire Community Enterprise Ltd was established in 1998 by two young men to create employment opportunities for homeless people in the city. Homeless clients deliver a catalogue to areas of the city, advertising products from 'fair-trade' and/or renewable sources, including greetings cards, candles, ornaments, gifts, and jewellery. Aspire's 'employees' call at houses to collect orders or unwanted catalogues, and to deliver goods purchased. Profits are ploughed back into the
project. The purpose of Aspire is to give homeless people a sense of belonging and purpose as well as income and work training. Although Aspire will take on anyone regardless of their personal history, which often involves drug and/or alcohol abuse and other offences, clients are expected to be punctual and sober when carrying out their work for the project. No attempt is made to proselytise, though project leaders are explicit in their desire to demonstrate the foundations of their faith by example. Aspire also, however, has the aim of educating the general public about homeless people, much in the same way that Gabalfa (discussed in Chapter 3) does with regard to people with learning disabilities, by breaking down barriers and bringing people into direct contact.

All three of these projects have become or are becoming (Aspire) established social enterprises. All three derive their success as social enterprises from a combination of the particular niche markets they have identified, the availability of funding, even if only to establish the project, but above all the personal commitment of the individuals running them. Importantly, none of these projects are neighbourhood or community-based, in the sense that they are owned by or operate solely within a particular area of Bristol (all have a city-wide remit). Rather, they rely on the capacity of committed and skilled people willing to work for relatively low wages (and/or able to absorb low wages) to establish services which are then made available to the excluded. Significantly, this commitment underpins a form of social enterprise that bears only a passing resemblance to a concept of social enterprise as the spontaneous product of poor people developing latent capacities in poor places. If place matters, here it is as a site of professional and ethical commitment.

There is also, however, some, albeit rare, evidence of grass-roots activism. South Bristol Community Builders Ltd, for example, was established in 1998 to redevelop run-down and empty council houses on the Knowle estate in the south of Bristol. Knowle is a large, sprawling low rise estate built mainly in the 1940s
and 1950s to provide housing for workers in the tobacco and manufacturing industries. Knowle’s problems are particularly those associated with crime and drug abuse, which is rife on the estate, and with the gradual depopulation of the estate, which has left empty houses that are squatted and/or vandalised. South Bristol Community Builders was established by the wife of a local builder, to upgrade the local housing stock. Using her own savings, and with the help of other local women, she purchased and refurbished (with the help of her husband builder) a house on the estate, which was then sold on the market and sold. Proceeds from sales are being used to develop other properties. This social entrepreneur has been responsible for developing other projects in the past, including an anti-drug abuse project run by local women, local health provision, and more generally with activities aimed at generating a positive image for the area. In this case the enthusiasm and commitment is born of a stubborn belief in the local community and a desire to restore to it a sense of pride in place. Place clearly matters in this case as a site of attachment, commitment, and social obligation.

A similar sense of community obligation can be found in two other projects, both of which were established primarily to meet the particular needs of Bristol’s ethnic minority groups in the inner-city. The Aashyana Housing Association was founded in 1992 after research carried out by local Asian community and business leaders demonstrated that available housing was often too small for traditional extended families or was too far from friends, family, and other members of the Asian community. Many Asian people in the area were found to be living in poor or overcrowded housing and had difficulties finding appropriate help and advice. Language problems and alleged discrimination on the part of some local housing associations compounded these problems. Aashyana offers housing advice in Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi, as well as English, and manages a much wider range of property types than most housing associations, so that it can accommodate both single people of all ages and, where necessary, large, extended families. As it developed, Aashyana commissioned further research from the University of the West of England into the housing conditions of the local Asian community. The research showed that the approximately 8000 people of Asian descent, living in sixteen wards in Bristol and three in South Gloucestershire, were in areas that suffered a disproportionately high incidence of housing problems, illness, and low incomes. Aashyana has been able to use such information both to target its existing services and to demonstrate to funders the continued need for the project. Aashyana in 2000 managed thirty-one homes for general clients, five more specifically for young single people, and four purpose-built flats for Asian elders – the first scheme of its kind in the South-West of England. A further twenty-four homes had been renovated and transferred to Aashyana from the City Council and there were plans for further expansion through the transfer of management of dwellings to Aashyana from local housing associations. Somewhat unusually, Aashyana has become largely independent of external funding for its running costs, which are generated through rents from its clients. The City Council agreement gives Aashyana the collateral for loans to buy and renovate or build more homes for the Asian community. Aashyana’s success lies in the combination of its director’s professional capabilities, coupled to the support it receives among ‘elders’ within the community it serves, and its power of leverage over other key players such as the City Council.

The second example rooted in target community commitment (but perhaps with less input from the community itself at the level of resources) is the St Pauls-based Centre for Employment and Enterprise Development (CEED). CEED was founded in 1987 as one of thirteen Positive Action Training for Housing (PATH) schemes throughout the UK which were established to provide training for housing officers in the needs of ethnic minority communities. While the Bristol PATH project was successful in meeting its targets, subsequent evaluation of the project concluded that its aims were too limited. In 1990 it was renamed as the Positive Action Consortium and appointed its first director, who until then had been running a successful community enterprise in Toxteth on Merseyside. The renamed organisation extended the principle of Positive Action training from housing to all business sectors, offering training courses to employers throughout the Bristol area as well as to individuals within the immediate community. Renamed as CEED in 1995, under its charismatic and entrepreneurial director, the project has developed and grown, to cover a variety of training needs and work-experience opportunities (e.g. in its media unit and restaurant). CEED has moved from being 100% dependent on grant funding in 1982 to obtaining only 2% income from the government in 2000. The bulk of its income comes in the form of fees, rents, and service contracts and it generates an annual surplus of as much as £170,000 (1999) all of which, as a community enterprise, is ploughed back into provision of services. Like Aashyana, CEED is unusual in its capacity to fund its activities in this way.

Although the vast majority of CEED’s clients are from the local Afro-Caribbean community, the project director is convinced that the success of CEED is rooted in its professional approach as a high quality enterprise. A fundamental aspect of CEED’s approach is to treat all members of the client community, regardless of their background, as having particular needs and capacities in terms of business development and expansion, rather than as ‘special cases’ or ‘victims’. In similar fashion, CEED itself is therefore keen to be held up as an example of a good business, rather than labelled as a good ‘ethnic minority’ business. CEED’s director is also somewhat dismissive of other social enterprises in Bristol, including those in the black community, that fail to develop through entrepreneurship and sustained growth and promote themselves as fundamentally different from the private and/or public sectors. In his own words:

Whether people fully understand the concept of the social enterprise is another thing. I personally don’t think they do. My opinion is that any voluntary sector organisation must operate along business lines. The only difference between a social enterprise and normal enterprise is simply that there are no shareholders that receive a dividend, but there are ‘shareholders’ in terms of the members and the community at large who may benefit from the initiatives that are put together. […] have to say that I don’t meet
members of the voluntary sector in smoke filled rooms myself... primarily because it is not other voluntary sector organisations that can enable me to achieve what I want to achieve. It is in linking with the private sector and the statutory sector and raising their awareness levels to such an extent that I am able to persuade them to support what we are doing.14

While CEED stands as an example of an extraordinarily successful social enterprise in Bristol, therefore, it also represents something of a challenge to the image of the Third Sector as a radical alternative. CEED does not seek to create an alternative to capitalism – quite the opposite. What CEED seeks to demonstrate is that anyone, regardless of their ethnic background, gender, or postcode can develop successful careers, given the appropriate level of training and support. As much as this turns the notion of the social economy on its head, it also suggests something important about the particular reasons why so many social enterprises have been able to develop so successfully in Bristol. CEED’s success in part can be attributed to its capacity to involve the private sector and, in turn, to combine private and public sector funds. CEED is able to tap Bristol’s vibrant private sector economy for ideas, resources, partnerships, and new markets. Furthermore, the buoyancy of the local economy generates sufficient local labour-market capacity to absorb trained clients (assuming barriers of race and culture have been broken down) and start-up businesses. Indeed, for all the claims to alterity, many of Bristol’s social enterprises also to some degree rely on the strength of the local mainstream economy for their survival.15

But there is more. A striking feature of the social economy in Bristol (notwithstanding the director of CEED’s misgivings) is that it is well organised and networked (independently of the state). Bristol has a number of intermediate, networking and consultancy organisations established specifically by and for the support of the Third Sector. These include Voluntary Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration (VOSCUR), which provides networking and co-ordination for the Bristol voluntary sector as a whole, and BACEN, an SRB-funded project which provides start-up advice for community enterprises (defined in the strict sense) on a city-wide and potentially regional scale. These organisations in turn overlap with other networking bodies on a local and national level (most notably, FoE), the local authority and, to some extent, with the private sector. The result is a high degree of co-ordination, discussion, and debate among different organisations about the nature and role of the social economy as well as the routine dissemination of information as to best practice. This contrasts strikingly with the situation in Glasgow, where the social economy is managed not by the Third Sector itself, but by career professionals supported by the local state. This contrast was alluded to by the director of BACEN who, in 1998, had organised in a ‘roving conference’ including a range of social economy activists from the Bristol area, which travelled to Glasgow to learn from its the much vaunted success. As she put it:

The view from the outside was always that the Scots were very good at it, that there was a lot of expertise there, that it was very innovative, that it was very people led and so on. The people we took were from Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures and a number of the other trusts in Bristol and community enterprises and voluntary organisations and so on. They were all really struck by the lack of [Third Sector] control. In some areas particularly in the north of Glasgow, they were also struck by the lack of community activism... We were just meeting with these community partnership people which had no contact with the local people and they couldn’t even wheel anyone in from the local community to meet us because they didn’t know any of them. In every project or initiative that we went to see we met a professional, a man in a suit. We went to a health project in Castlemilk and we did meet some of the partners there but they were so depressed and disillusioned – completely disempowered.16

To be sure, social economy projects in Bristol are not necessarily community-owned or run by local people. Indeed, with the sole exception of South Bristol Community Builders, all the projects we studied in the area were run by middle class professionals who were delivering the social economy on behalf of local people. What then differentiates the professional social entrepreneur in Bristol from the ‘man in a suit’ in Glasgow? A significant part of the answer seems to lie in the nature of the relationship between the individuals involved and the communities in which they work. In Bristol the social economy is organised by middle class professionals who have chosen to work in and for the values of the social economy. In Glasgow there is a commitment on the part of the city council to the idea of business success in certain markets for ‘social’ goods. It is, in this sense, not rooted in the day-to-day realities of the communities in which the enterprises operate (not least because of the way funding is targeted). In Bristol the opposite is the case. Professionals who make the choice to work in the social economy do so because of their personal religious, political or environmental commitments. As such, the focus tends to be more one of how the social economy can serve the particular community than one of the community fitting into a particular model of business enterprise, as tends to happen in Glasgow.

The social economy in Tower Hamlets

The fragmented nature of economic, social, and political change in Tower Hamlets during recent decades has not unsurprisingly left its mark on the nature and distribution of the local social economy. The uneven geography of its various regeneration schemes has also influenced the location of Third Sector activity (Figure 5.4).18 Given this degree of variability, it is problematic to conceptualise Tower Hamlets as a single and unified social economy. The different projects relate to local and non-local institutional structures, funding sources, communities and wider networks in very different ways. The examples below illustrate the widely differing conditions under which social enterprises in different parts of
the borough operate and the ways in which the social economy is shaped by this local context.

There are no data on the total number of social enterprises currently operating in Tower Hamlets. A very large number and varied range of voluntary sector organisations are present in the borough, ranging from small community centres and arts groups to long established organisations, such as the Whitechapel Mission and Toynbee Hall. However, there are relatively few genuine social enterprises. These include the Spitalfields Small Business Association (SSBA) and Bridge Project to the west of the borough, Account 3 which is based in St Margarets House in Bethnal Green to the north, Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association (HARCA) and the Bromley-by-Bow Centre to the east, and the Cedar Centre on the Isle of Dogs. This relatively small number of social enterprises is to some extent a product of the scale on which they operate. All cover significant parts of the borough, are engaged in providing a range of services for local people, and absorb a large proportion of available funding. This affects the capacity of the borough to support large numbers of smaller, very local Third Sector organisations, which would have to compete with these for funds. In addition, the development of two large-scale regeneration partnerships led by the local authority and the private sector, the Cityside and Lea Valley projects, has had the effect of deterring smaller social enterprises lacking the resources to cover a larger scale of need. This is one reason why the chances of many new, smaller-scale Third Sector projects developing in Tower Hamlets (ironically, precisely the highly localised Third Sector organisations based in one ‘neighbourhood’ expected by many Third Sector promoters) are restricted.

The part of Tower Hamlets with the most acute problems of poverty and exclusion, however, namely Spitalfields and Whitechapel (Banglatown), is also the site of some of the borough’s oldest and best established social enterprises. This is in large part a consequence of the conditions in which many of the immigrant communities coming into the area found themselves and which prompted concerned organisations and individuals to establish welfare and support organisations. The best known of these is the SSBA which was established in 1979 to improve housing conditions for the local Bengali community. SSBA was not established by members of the Bengali community itself, but by a small group of women who had been politically active, as councillors, officers, and activists throughout the East End of London for some years. SSBA was an expedient response to two related problems: first, the slum housing conditions of the Bengali community; and second, the terrible conditions in workshops established in the same buildings to make a living through making clothes, light engineering activities, printing, and so on. Although SSBA had originally intended to take over only the local housing, it found it in practice impossible to separate living and work spaces. But since the Housing Corporation was unwilling to cover costs to refurbish the workshops, SSBA bought the properties and split the deeds between the housing and business units. The housing units were then leased to a specially established housing co-operative which could then, because these sections of the buildings were no longer of mixed
use, apply for refurbishment grants. This left SSBA in possession of a large number of small business units, which has gradually refurbished and leased to local firms as managed workspace. As the project has grown, SSBA has also come to offer a range of business development, training, and consultancy services. SSBA currently manages over 65,000 square feet of workspace, housing around sixty small and medium enterprises. By controlling rent rises carefully, SSBA has also insulated vulnerable local businesses from the very high rises in commercial rents in the area during the 1980s and 1990s.

Another project in the same area – the Bridge Project – has worked with SSBA and a number of other local agencies to target employment training at particular groups within the local community and to help them set up their own businesses. This project (so called because it was originally housed in the Shaftesbury Society-owned, Bridge House which provides low-rent space for local charities and social enterprises) was formally incorporated in 1987, having been run on a wholly voluntary basis by a group of local Christians since 1982. At the outset the Project aimed to promote self-employment and business development among young people. After moving out of the Bridge House, the Project occupied the crypt of a local church in which it offered small amounts of workspace through a joint Community Service Volunteers and Employment Agency scheme. After 1988 the Project broadened its remit to include all people facing discrimination and exclusion, especially recent Somali refugees requiring language support and help with the bureaucratic process of seeking asylum in the UK. The Project has had considerable difficulty in securing long-term funds because refugees entering into this laudable initiative still leave with so few skills that achieving the minimum outputs in terms of qualifications and employment sought by funders has been very difficult. The Bridge Project gets no direct support from the borough council. Although its work has produced outputs considered successful in its own terms, and is certainly seen as such by its client group, the Bridge Project’s viability is compromised by its precarious financial situation. Project leaders blame the culture of accountancy among funders, the competitive nature of funding in general, and the demarcated nature of local regeneration funding. For example, although the many of the Project’s clients are housed within the Objective 2 funding area in Tower Hamlets, because the Project is situated on the other side of the road from the boundary, it has been unable to secure grants from that source. Although the Project would like to become a self-funding social enterprise, the very uneven playing field in which it operates makes it in practice impossible for it to develop sufficient capacity for that to happen.

Both SSBA and the Bridge Project highlight the significance of shifting local funding priorities for the success of social enterprises. Regeneration activity within Tower Hamlets has shifted from one area to the next, and from smaller to larger organisations. In both cases, and particularly in that of SSBA, relations between the project and the local authority are poor. This is also due to the complex and shifting political agenda of the council, which creates an uneven and uncertain funding regime. There is, for example, considerable pressure from the Bengali community which feels that it is represented neither by the conventional political establishment nor by its own, often self-appointed, representatives. While SSBA has been able to develop a secure asset base over the long period in which it has been operating, the Bridge Project, in spite of its success in developing new services and in securing short-term finance, finds itself unable to compete for funding with other social economy activities.

Elsewhere in the borough, other projects have in contrast benefited from the shifts in regeneration priorities. Of these, the largest and most successful has been Account 3 Women’s Consultancy Service Ltd, established in 1991. Account 3 was set up by three professional women (an accountant, a personnel manager, and a marketing manager), all of whom had worked in the private sector and were at the time temporarily unemployed. Having come together originally as a self-help group on an informal basis, they began to identify the particular needs of local Somali women who were excluded from employment and other forms of social interaction by virtue of language difficulties, skills deficits, and cultural differences. With the support of the local authority, the women conducted a survey of women from the Somali and Bengali communities living on estates in Bethnal Green. This highlighted a marked need for English language education. Following this, the three women formalised the organisation as Account 3 and were awarded a contract to provide basic language education on the estates in question. In the process of providing this, it became apparent that the problems faced by the women were not confined to those of language, but also related to confidence, skills, and social and cultural capabilities.

In its second year of operation, therefore, Account 3 expanded its services to offer a range of structured courses, at varying levels and with flexible content, depending on the needs of the client group in question. These courses have continued to form the core of Account 3’s activity. One of Account 3’s more innovative and successful courses, for example, trains local women as driving instructors. For cultural and religious reasons many Somali women in particular were prevented from taking driving lessons because the instructor was usually male. By training local women as instructors in their own right, Account 3 has enabled many local women to gain access to the freedom accorded by driving as well as access to job opportunities outside the immediate area. In addition to these various skills training courses, Account 3 has developed a range of business support programmes which offer training in accountancy and marketing to small businesses and in 2000 it was planning to develop a workspace scheme to help long-term unemployed women to set up their own businesses.

Unlike the older projects in the east of the borough, the relationship between Account 3 and the local authority has been generally positive and supportive. Nearly all of Account 3’s £500,000 annual turnover comes in the form of local authority contracts (it has avoided grants wherever possible) which its founders believe, lends them credibility as a social enterprise. Account 3 has been able to develop close working relationships with council officers to whom it can go both to iron out problems and to develop new projects. Project leaders attribute their ability to do this in large part to their business-like approach to the organisation of the project, which is based on a realistic assessment of what they want to achieve.
and the best way to achieve it within available resources. Everything that Account 3 does is 'research led' so that it can demonstrate to funders that a real need and/or demand for project activities exists. This is distinctly different from the more politicised, activist approach of some of the older projects and reflects, as Account 3's leaders acknowledge, a generational difference. The link with the council, however, makes the organisation highly vulnerable to political changes within the council. As such Account 3 takes a deliberately entrepreneurial approach and has cultivated extensive private sector links through Women's Enterprise, as well as forging wider links with the Government Office for London.

The more recently established projects in Tower Hamlets are located to the east of the borough, in estates which have often been most resistant to outsiders, particularly ethnic minorities, and to 'outside' interference in the form of the voluntary sector. There are two major social economy projects in this part of Tower Hamlets, each generated by very different dynamics. The first we report is illustrative of a new state-led thrust to the social economy, and for that reason, contested. The second underscores the powers of possibility resulting from imaginative and energetic social entrepreneurs/professionals, network links beyond the locality, and a holistic approach to social exclusion.

The larger of the two, Poplar HARCA, was established in 1998. It was one of the first of a new generation of Third Sector housing associations set up to manage large areas of social housing that were passing out of the direct control of local authorities throughout the UK as part of the government's stock transfer scheme. The HARCA was established by the borough council as an independent social enterprise, which will eventually manage eleven blocks of housing containing over 7000 homes. It has a ten-year business plan and considerable resources (a combination of grants from the council and loans from a consortium of commercial banks) with which it will refurbish the estates under its control and develop a range of integrated and holistic social and environmental services. Many of these will be social enterprises in their own right, as the HARCA plans to develop estates as largely self-managed 'resident service organisations' (Saunders 1997) which will employ local people to carry out basic maintenance, cleaning, and security work. The HARCA has already established project offices in all the housing blocks it controls, each staffed by a development officer, and is using them to identify the particular needs of each estate.

Significantly, though, the establishment of Poplar HARCA has not been universally welcomed by the residents of the estates, despite a very long history of chronic under-investment and neglect by the local authority. As in other parts of the UK, a vociferous campaign has been fought by a section of the local community that is politically opposed to what it sees as 'privatisation'. Although investment is now being put into the estates and the HARCA rents are lower than those of the local authority, the campaign against the project has been sufficiently successful to prevent the transfer of a third tranche of housing. The tradition of resistance to outside interference has also contributed to the HARCA's problems. Campaigners have argued that rents would rise very quickly as the project's private sector lenders called in their debts and that levels of maintenance and repair would fall. Paradoxically, although the HARCA's constitution stops either of these things from happening, a sufficiently large minority of the local community voted against the third phase of the transfer to prevent it. The HARCA is a good example of how top-down solutions, even excellent ones, are dependent on community endorsement for local viability.

The second major social economy project in the east of Tower Hamlets is the Bromley-by-Bow Centre which, although it originated in 1984, has only expanded relatively recently and gained national recognition. The Centre was established by a local minister who offered space in his church hall to local artists who in turn offered art classes to residents of the surrounding estates and people with mental health problems. Over time new activities developed, including a day nursery, which occupies the main body of the church when it is not being used for services, a garden for people with disabilities, and a café. SRB money was raised to buy a neighbouring building which allowed space to expand the café into a restaurant run by members of the local Bengali community as a separate enterprise. This has given them a springboard to expand their business by providing outside catering services for functions throughout the area. The aspect of the project that has attracted the greatest attention, however, has been the integrated healthy living centre, which was built by the Centre in 1996. The health centre comprises a medical practice, housing four general practitioners (GPs) (intended to expand to six), with a range of other health and welfare services under the same roof. Patients visiting the doctors can also get advice on alternative remedies (such as acupuncture and aromatherapy), use the baby-care clinic, have access to healthy living advice (exercise is available on prescription), advice on diet (the project includes a kitchen to demonstrate healthy food), and have access to the gardens behind the centre which have been designed as a space for relaxation for local people. The health centre was built with a combination of a health authority grant and a £700,000 commercial loan and then 'sold' to Bromley-by-Bow itself for a token ninety-nine pence. The loans will be paid off over time by the GP's practice. Since the centre was built, Bromley-by-Bow has won another £200,000 grant with which it is developing a specially designed children's garden to the rear of the centre and is planning to buy a further building to house offices and further projects.

The success of Bromley-by-Bow at developing innovative and integrated services for local people has been brought about as a result of local people working with Third Sector entrepreneurs from elsewhere. Bromley-by-Bow has been able to develop a very wide range of connections with other organisations, in large part through the efforts of some of its supporters and staff. One of the main participants in the development of the project, for example, is both a consultant surgeon at Guy's Hospital and a councillor in the neighbouring borough of Newham. This has not only influenced the health-oriented activities of the Centre but, through the various networks to which such individuals have access, it has facilitated some unlikely partnerships. The children's garden, for example, is part funded by the UK Atomic Energy Establishment at Aldermaston, which organised a visit by local school children to its laboratories, and helped them to design the various sculptural elements within the garden around the theme of
nuclear energy. Bromley-by-Bow has also benefited from seconded staff from the Ministry of Defence and from several other central government departments which has allowed the project to enhance its profile on a national basis. More recently, the Centre has been able to secure work placements for local people in firms in Canary Wharf, a development which project leaders feel demonstrates the beginnings of ‘reciprocity’ between local residents and the businesses that have come into the borough as part of the regeneration schemes.

The Centre’s networking also extends deeply into the wider social economy of London. Its leaders were very influential, along with the Tower Hamlets Cooperative Development Agency and the borough’s Community Organisations Forum, in establishing the pan-London body, SEL, in 1999. This new body, which has close links to the government, is intended to work closely with the new London Assembly to ensure that social economy issues are properly represented within the capital as a whole. This change represents a shift in the governance and regulation of the social economy away from borough level. The Centre has been trying to establish a community health centre in a part of Bow which now lies within the boundaries of Newham, but has been hampered by the differing regeneration priorities of the two councils in question. Newham was felt to have a clear vision of its regeneration agenda, which includes stimulating social economy organisations, whereas Tower Hamlets did not. The Centre has also developed close links with Poplar HARCA with which it is helping local residents to create small businesses as part of a supply chain both for the HARCA estates and for firms in Canary Wharf.

Plate 5.3 Bromley-by-Bow Centre’s new café.

What is interesting about the experience of Tower Hamlets is that while all of the projects cited above are ‘local’ in that they serve the needs of specific areas within the borough, they rely on inputs from activists, networks, and other resources from outside the immediate area. While this has long been the case with some projects – SSBA was started by non-locals in the late 1970s – the practice of external networking seems to be growing. This is in part a consequence of the changing political structure of the capital, which is moving back to a London-wide rather than borough-based or local approach to development. This is reflected in the formation of SEL to represent London’s social economy as a whole. It is also the product of the non-localised practices of individual social enterprises. Bromley-by-Bow, for example, which is seen by many as a model of future social enterprise development, does not see itself as a local community project in the strict sense. It is not community-owned, it was set up and is run by professionals from elsewhere and it provides high level, integrated services which could not possibly have been developed using local capacities alone. Indeed, as

Plate 5.4 Canary Wharf from the Barkantine Estate, Isle of Dogs.
many of the projects operating in Tower Hamlets have recognised, many of the problems in the borough stem precisely from the isolated and defensive nature of its very varied communities. Success has often come when projects have been able to transcend localness. In some cases, as in that of SSBA and Bromley-by-Bow, this has meant circumventing the existing political structures of the borough, which both see as a hindrance to regeneration and to the exploitation of opportunities that lie elsewhere in London. In that sense the relative absence of the local state in Tower Hamlets from direct involvement in the social economy has prompted the more successful organisations to look beyond local administrative boundaries to find the sort of supportive structures and networks that enable social enterprises to develop and thrive. This raises an important policy question as to whether Third Sector organisations operating in much smaller, and therefore much more limiting, urban environments which lack the economic capacity and diversity and the political variety of London can take advantage of non-local resources in quite the same way.

Conclusion

Although Bristol and Tower Hamlets share some features in common, the nature of the social economy that has developed in each is significantly different. This is a product of the differing needs and geographies of the various communities in both, and the resources available there, both in terms of funding and human capabilities. Whereas Bristol has been able to develop an integrated and co-ordinated social economy that has a certain degree of coherence and self-awareness, the Third Sector in Tower Hamlets is more fragmentary and competitive. This is partly a consequence of how the particular social, political, and economic geography of the borough has historically worked against a borough-wide solidarity. Rapid change and the varying geography of funding regimes has also encouraged competitive rather than co-operative approaches. It is also partly a consequence of the access to wider networks in London, in the form of markets, expertise, and resources. This has reduced the need for local cohesion.

But there are also strong similarities of place. In both, successful social enterprises have been able to develop because opportunities exist for committed individuals and groups to develop innovative Third Sector projects. Whereas in economically and socially evacuated cities such as Glasgow and Middlesbrough the local state has taken the lead in the social economy, in Bristol and Tower Hamlets the role of the state has been almost diametrically opposite. The space created by the Third Sector has, perhaps because of this institutional presence, generated a distance on the part of the local state in community-based regeneration. It is, however, the balance between the local state and civic capital that has worked in favour of the social economy.

Moreover, in both Bristol and Tower Hamlets, although in different ways, there is a pool of people with the necessary resources and skills to identify local needs and potential mechanisms for meeting them and the willingness and capacity to get involved in animating activities. Much of the lead has come from faith-based organisations, from environmental groups, and from other activists. But this is not a communitarian leadership, rooted in the energies of the excluded. In both cases, with very few exceptions, those developing and leading Third Sector projects are not members of the local community that they seek to serve, but social entrepreneurs who have made a conscious decision to do so, eschewing the higher salaries and job security of the formal public and private sectors. Crucially, this presupposes the availability of a civic culture and economic capacity which enables them to make such altruistic choices. In Bristol, a long history of alternative and oppositional politics and dissenting religion has created a ready source of people willing to participate in the Third Sector. The prosperity of the city too has generated a certain capacity for the donation of voluntary labour and stints of work in the lower paid social economy. Whereas in Bristol, these conditions exist across the city, with small areas of poverty surrounded by more prosperous communities, in the case of Tower Hamlets projects are having to look beyond the immediate locality. The size of London’s economy, society, and polity, including the social economy, has added a huge range of potential contacts, funders, volunteers, and other resources on which a social enterprise can draw. This ‘outreach’ is also a market for peripatetic social entrepreneurs and professionals, who, as a result, have looser ties than in Bristol within the communities they serve.

Thus, oddly, the success of the social economy in Tower Hamlets and Bristol is a play on a non-local localness. Social enterprise relies to a large extent in breaking down the kinds of intractable localness – born of poverty, racism, discrimination, physical isolation or insularity – which confine poor communities to existing politically within territorially demarcated local social and institutional structures. It is by going against the grain and challenging the dynamics that create such insular communities, by linking local needs to resources available at other spatial scales and within other economic and political circuits, that the social economy in such places is able to transcend the limitations of place. While place based, they are certainly not place bound. Of course, it helps if those social entrepreneurs are already part of wider networks and if those networks are accessible or proximate. Where such alternatives are not readily available, and where the Third Sector has no choice but to rely on the limited resources of poor people living in poor places, the development of such successful projects is all the more difficult.

Just as social exclusion can be seen to have a distinct geography tied to particular places, so we can conclude that the social ‘inclusion’ represented by the social economy also has a distinct, though different, geography, one that does not match that of social exclusion. The social economy, despite being routinely linked in policy discourses to poor places, seems to require resources, outlets, and capabilities that typically do not correspond to the geography of social need. They go beyond the local community. Where such access does not exist, the task may well fall to local authorities and local communities, both of which, however, seem ill-equipped to mobilise the social economy in a significant way.
In this final chapter, we evaluate the prospects of the social economy in light of the evidence gathered. The case histories tell a story of enormous variety within and between places to the point of questioning the very meaning of the term 'the social economy'. At one extreme, some initiatives, though formally non-profit-based, are only marginally different from small private sector enterprises in terms of their business organisation and market practices. Their 'social' commitment lies in facilitating the reinsertion of the socially excluded into the mainstream economy, through support for entrepreneurship (e.g. low-cost premises) or direct employment and schemes to improve employability. At the other extreme, other initiatives are wedded to an alternative economic culture that differs sharply from the market philosophy, centred instead around the provision of socially useful services, meeting needs, ethical trade, and social/community empowerment and democratisation.

The evidence also tells a story of struggle and limited achievement, set against the high policy expectations outlined in the opening chapters which place the social economy at centre stage in the battle against social exclusion. We have come across some wonderful examples of imaginative provision, ethical commitment, and social entrepreneurship. These initiatives should be celebrated. But, they have struggled to get where they are, and they stand out as exceptions in a sector marked by high failure rates, low-quality entrepreneurship, dependence on public sector funding, chronic under-capitalisation, modest job generation, unstable and under-paid employment, and limited community involvement. The powers of the UK social economy taken as whole do not stack up to anywhere close to the policy desiderata we outlined in Chapter 3.

What are the implications of this evidence? We do not wish to claim that the contrast between limited success and widespread failure justifies abandonment of a policy commitment to the social economy. This would do injustice to the achievements of the most successful examples as well as to the very real question of how to meet social needs circumvented by the welfare state and the market. Instead, we wish to use the evidence to sharpen the discussion on what to expect from the social economy, both in terms of realistic goals, and its relationship to the mainstream (state and economy). This discussion is taken up in the second part of the chapter.

In the first part, we identify the factors that seem to have facilitated or hampered the success of social economy. Our aim is not to look for best practice, because our argument is that success and failure are to varying degrees a product of context, and therefore not readily separable or transferable from local and non-local social and institutional settings. The purpose of the discussion, thus, is to shift the policy debate away from a decontextualised, one-fit-for-all approach, towards one that explicitly aligns expectations to contextual variations, local and beyond.

Influences on performance

Given the variety of experience in the social economy, it makes no sense to look for universally valid factors cutting across varied initiatives, especially given the policy interest today in handbook prescriptions. It is, however, legitimate to ask if there is a recurring set of influences with a decisive impact on performance. Our evidence allows us to identify five factors, with clear implications for what might be considered as the framework conditions for a vibrant social economy.

The first concerns the quality of leadership of the social entrepreneurs and intermediaries. Evidence of the involvement of communities and the socially excluded in establishing initiatives and in driving their success has been most notable by its absence. This is no surprise, given the complex privations of skill, know-how, capability, and confidence which mark the socially excluded. The successful ventures have in general been driven by committed professionals, experienced social entrepreneurs, community activists, and ethical leaders (e.g. in religious or environmental movements). Many are extraordinary individuals who have given up the option of lucrative careers, and who possess a complex array of skills and abilities, to mobilise resources, motivate people, identify under-met needs, make contacts, think laterally, and grasp opportunities. One commentator has described them as 'the research and development wing of the welfare system, innovating new solutions to intractable social problems' (Leadbeater 1997: 8). They are leaders and visionaries, and if not this, at minimum highly professional in their approach to social enterprises as business ventures.

The second, and related, factor is a clarity of goal. Many initiatives that flounder lack a clear sense of mission, and for that fail to align processes with aims. Typically, initiatives mixing business-driven aspirations and cohesion/empowerment goals, without a conscious understanding of the differences between them, have had to sacrifice one or the other or have come unstuck and fallen between two stools because of contradictory organisational arrangements. For example, ethical ventures have been forced to lower wages or quality of training because the product is non-viable, or business-driven ventures have been forced by funding agencies to change direction because of poor social achievements. As we noted, this kind of elision played a part in the decline of the community business movement in Scotland. In contrast, the experience of initiatives with clear aims has been different. Those with cohesion and empowerment as the main goal have consciously organised work, clients and products as means of meeting needs or developing capabilities, which, in turn, has focused effort. Similarly, business-driven ventures
run by professionals, as is the trend now in Glasgow, are clear that equity must follow business success, perhaps even at the expense of social objectives.

Third, there can be no doubt that success is related to systematic and careful market research. The initiatives that have failed or are struggling to survive are those with products and services that are of poor quality, restricted demand, or in competition with other outlets. Only too often they have been borne out of response to a highly localised problem, without analysis of the potential for sustained demand. In contrast, the successful ventures – either ethically or business-driven – offer a unique product, with potential beyond the local economy, and in markets of secondary interest to mainstream private sector firms or public welfare organisations. Typical niches include art materials for child-care organisations, recycled furniture for low-income groups, low-budget catering, shopping catalogues distributed by the homeless, and targeted services for ethnic minorities or particular disadvantaged groups. In all the cases, real under-met social needs have been identified, with potential for expansion out of the immediate neighbourhood as well as into related services. This said, it should be noted that in some instances, the local state has played an important role in underwriting demand as a contractor of the services provided. This highlights that for survival, beyond the important question of choosing the right product, there is a pressing need to secure recurring demand; a considerable challenge for the usually small social enterprise with fragile market expertise and thinly spread competencies.

This brings us to the fourth factor, which relates to the intermediation of risk. The limited resources of social enterprises are typically stretched to the full. Often, as we have seen throughout this book, this is because of their limited business expertise, their relative isolation from circuits of information, services, expertise, and finance, and the lack of involvement on the part of their client-groups and communities who face the worst deprivations of social capital. This insecurity is intensified by the culture of short-termism and bureaucracy that characterises public funding for the sector in the UK. Frequent complaints noted in our study include the absence of medium-term funding, unnecessary paper-work and red-tape, evaluations based primarily on quantified outputs (e.g. number of jobs), intrusive monitoring of performance, partnership with other organisations as a funding requirement, and, more generally, short-termism and frequently changing fashions in urban regeneration policy.

In contrast, the more successful initiatives seem to have benefited from sensitive risk mediation of different kinds. One is funding sensitive to the social targets of the initiatives. This includes recognising the need for balancing social objectives such as empowerment, advocacy, and capacity-building, with quantitative measures of success, recognising the time and resource difficulties posed by an audit-based funding culture, and providing financial latitude for product or process innovation, and, if necessary, failure. Another example is intermediation itself, in the form of conscious effort by enterprises to involve clients and employees, and importantly, the possibility of regular networking among social entrepreneurs and social economy professionals. Finally, within the local state, which continues to play a critical role in funding, enabling, and contracting services to the social economy, an attitude of recognition and partnership, rather than one of prescription or distance, has made a difference.

The fifth factor influencing performance – in many ways an obvious one – is the proximity of initiatives to mainstream economic dynamism. This factor affects both supply and demand conditions. There can be no doubt that social enterprises based in or close to areas of economic prosperity have benefited from better market opportunities linked to a higher and more varied elasticity of demand. There is a greater scope for niche products, sustained by a more varied pattern of consumer expenditure. On the supply side, potentially, the market for funding in prosperous areas is more specialised, affording some room for socially-based investment ventures, while the higher level of churning in the labour market appears to attract, even if only for short periods, a more varied and experienced set of professionals, employees, and clients into the social economy.

How place matters

The evidence that there is a positive correlation between the strength of social enterprises and the local mainstream economy poses an interesting problem for current policy which proposes the social economy as a solution for the economically most marginalised areas. As we saw in Chapter 2, UK government policies (as manifest in the recommendations of the Social Exclusion Unit, new welfare programmes, and neighbourhood regeneration policies) have come to equate the social economy with social exclusion.

This has been achieved through a particularly superficial interpretation of the geographies of the two phenomena and their causes, an elision of the social with the spatial, as we suggested in Chapters 1 and 2. The localised manifestation of social exclusion in its varied forms (e.g. in 'sink' social housing estates and de-industrialised inner-cities) is increasingly read as evidence of the local causes of exclusion (e.g. ghetto cultures, spirals of multiple deprivation, local pathologies of life on the margins). As a corollary, there is a diminishing acknowledgement of wider causes such as the socio-spatial biases of national welfare and competitiveness policies, the positional weaknesses of particular groups in society (rather than just where they live), and opportunity structures adversely affected by international economic circumstances and intensifying competition in a globalising economy (Chatterton and Bradley 2000; Oatley 2000). This, in turn, has legitimated a shift to area-based solutions, including various sorts of community-based schemes incorporating the social economy, on the grounds that social enterprises are supposed to use local resources to respond to local needs. While it is recognised that the strength of the social economy varies from place to place, the logic of the new thinking is that a crystallisation of best practice from the experiences of the most successful ventures around the country can help to iron out 'local impediments' and produce generalised and transferable models of 'success'. Local potential can be realised, but only if cleansed of local noise.

Our city case studies, in contrast, have shown that the social economy is the product of local noise. It is a creature of social context, and therefore inseparable
from it, which is precisely why it is so varied from place to place. This implies that even if it were possible to identify the model social enterprise, its implantation in different places would be difficult, given the powers of context. The important question, however, is what does context mean? We have shown that social context and place are not one and the same, that is, reducible to each other. Instead, our case studies have revealed the centrality of the character of society-in-place (not just society-as-place), with all its varied geographies of local and global connection and being. Put differently, context matters in terms of how the social economy is locally instantiated, rather than as social context reduced to particular types of place (e.g. low- or high-trust environments, spaces of face-to-face familiarity, powers of community, circuits of local need). Places, in our study, have mattered as social formations with varying geographies of connectivity, not as spatial formations.

Indeed, we have seen very few examples of social enterprise rooted in so-called local society defined as community or local social capital, and we have seen few examples of success confined to local circuits of supply, connectivity, and provision. In Glasgow, the most enterprising initiatives have sought national markets, while the new culture of business professionalism in the governance of the sector is not reducible to ‘local culture’. Similarly, in both Bristol and Tower Hamlets, opportunities have arisen as a result of peripatetic professionals and mobile standards, together with connections into the wider formal economy. Local commitment and the response to local needs has not depended solely on local resources, nor, ironically, on local society. Here, place has mattered as a site of network connections, while elsewhere, for example in Middlesbrough, where such connections have been largely absent, the local social economy had had no choice but to rely on local links and capabilities. In neither case, however, can the ‘local’ be seen as pre-given in its character.

In what ways, then, has local context mattered in shaping the social economy? It has done so primarily as an institutional setting with its own peculiar history and character. The discussion in the preceding section on influences on the performance of individual social enterprises should not be detached from this aspect of place. This was amply confirmed in all the city case studies. For example, in the radically hollowed out neighbourhoods, where capabilities on the ground have been tested to the limit by poverty and alienation, the role of the state and top-down support in general, has become crucial. Elsewhere, as we saw in the examples of Bristol and Tower Hamlets, the presence of an active Third Sector, instituted cultural variety, and an ethical middle class, has played a determining role. The ‘instantiation’ of the social economy – successful or otherwise – has occurred through this institutional context.

Looking across these varied experiences, there are six aspects of local context which appear to have played an important part in influencing the formation of a developed, varied, and relatively independent social economy. They constitute a local cultural environment and support structure for social enterprises to develop without being forced to rely solely on their limited resources and capabilities. In no particular order of importance, these include, first, the presence of voiced minority cultures expressing non-mainstream needs and values. The presence, in different doses and mixes, of outreach artists, environmentalists, New Age groups, yeoman values, women’s groups, ethnic minority demands, Quaker, Methodist or other ethical organisations committed to social empowerment, has helped to legitimate and support bottom-up initiatives designed to meet social needs or harness alternative economic values (e.g. fair trade, reciprocity, profit-sharing).

A second aspect, which is in part a consequence of the above, is associational presence, or what Martin Evans (2001) describes as, in the context of the USA and France a market for welfare intermediaries in between the state and the private sector. These intermediaries are not Third Sector organisations plain and simple, but agencies like BACEN in Bristol that have emerged to handle contracted-out state welfare services, and which act as advocates for social enterprises, as a search engine for information, resources, and opportunities, and a contact base within and beyond the sector. The absence of local associations is not only an impediment to mobilisation and interest representation within the social economy, but also skew the balance of power in favour of mainstream organisations that have only a passing or instrumentalist interest in the social economy.

The behaviour of the local state, the third aspect, is a good example of this inter-institutional balance. In contexts of limited local institutional pluralism such as Glasgow and Middlesbrough, the state, with the help of career professionals, has acted as the major player in pursuing a particular model of the social economy, but one in which it can claim no special expertise. This has led to modest outputs, or a predictable alignment of the social economy to small business targets or intermediate labour market goals. In contrast, in settings of greater civic activism and institutional heterogeneity such as Tower Hamlets and Bristol, the local authorities have had to be more imaginative about the possibilities as well as their own role. At times, as Robert Putnam (1993) theorises in the context of regions rich in social capital, this has stimulated an openness to difference and a willingness to support, rather than direct, the effort of social enterprises.

As a consequence, a fourth influence on the social economy relates to the scope for agonism in the local political culture (Mouffe 2000). An agonistic political sphere is one that accepts difference and looks for agreement through vigorous discussion between opposed interests. It does not seek consensus if this means the suppression of plural and minority interests, but looks for a commons constructed out of debate and disagreement, a democracy based on the right of presence of diverse interests. Such a political culture – in part evident in Bristol – can be vital for the social economy for two reasons. First, because it gives space to what is normally considered a minority economic activity. Second, because it accepts the legitimacy of economic (as well as social and political) experimentation and novelty. Related to this openness is a readiness to avoid a politics of place based around an inward-looking local sense of place (e.g. a culture of ‘we have always done it this way’, or ‘our field of engagement ends at the city boundary’). Instead, we see a politics in place that is not reducible to a local sense of place, one that draws on a wider field of connections, resources, and ideas to vitalise the social economy in imaginative ways, among other things.
Thus, a fifth aspect of place that is of significance is connectivity. Localities such as Bristol and Tower Hamlets with more than just a handful of successful social enterprises are places of socio-economic mobility and external linkage. This is manifest in different ways including the to-and-fro between work and employment, informal meetings between social entrepreneurs and activists, the presence of peripatetic professionals, strong “movement” links beyond the locality, juxtaposition with the formal economy, and linkage between communities, local authorities, and intermediaries. These localities are like network sites, able to reach out to sustain the social economy, while localised clusters of activity such as Glasgow and Middlesbrough lack lateral connectivity or are characterised by connections established and/or appropriated by the state.

Finally, however, underpinning all of the above, is the extent of local socio-economic deprivation. There can be little doubt that the differences observed between the four cities examined here are linked to the depth and scale of deprivation. Places with large-scale and structural unemployment in a context of limited labour market vitality, evacuation of civil society, and reduced social heterogeneity, possess a restricted resource and opportunity base for social enterprise. The excluded are least equipped to participate and the institutional base to facilitate integration is deficient. The situation, as we have seen, is very different in places of relative prosperity, labour market churning, and socio-cultural heterogeneity, where the opportunity field is broader as is the base for sustaining economic variety.

The above six aspects of place overlap with the influences on individual performance that we identified earlier. The key point, however, is that the characteristics of place are not reducible local attributes, but in contributing to the culture of a place, they ensure that the social economy remains varied and unique in different locations. In this sense, current policy sensitivity to local effects in combating social exclusion is correct. However, this sensitivity, we have suggested, is not produced from an awareness of the powers and constraints of context, but a stereotyping of the places that suffer social exclusion, and of the requisite (social economy) solutions. In addition, the policy focus is primarily on individual-level interventions, not on the collective and at times intangible place aspects that we have identified. Yet, any committed attempt to build the social economy needs to take these aspects seriously.

What kind of social economy and for whom?

The fundamental normative question, however, is what do we want the social economy for? In the current excitement, at least three positions are evident, linked, respectively, to state welfare reform, business enterprise, and the economy of needs.

Regarding the first position, as we suggested in Chapter 1, much contemporary policy interest in the social economy, not just in the UK, is driven by concerns to reform the welfare state. Social enterprises have been welcomed as labour market intermediaries, facilitating the re-entry of the socially excluded into employment, because they are seen as resource-efficient and close to ‘communities’. They are also seen to help the contracting out of services traditionally offered by the welfare state, thereby reducing the cost of welfare provision and normalising a new culture of welfare pluralism. There is an odd consensus emerging between Third Way politicians interested in efficiency of delivery and reduced state expenditure/dependency, and social economy advocates thrilled by the prospect of becoming co-producers of welfare services and ‘putting the public back into public service’. Finally, the social economy – through its varied local powers ranging from the offer of work and services to empowerment and community/capability-building – is seen as a bottom-up way of combating social exclusion, now pathologised as the problem of particular types of people in particular types of location. Much of all this can be read as a subtle abandonment of the universal welfare state under the guise of partnership, efficiency of service delivery, and local targeting.

We have no quarrel with the idea that the Third Sector, and specifically social enterprises, have an important role to play in welfare provision through their expertise and commitment. We are not convinced, however, that this should amount to state welfare substitution. Our study tells a story of patchy and limited success in the social economy, hampered in many instances by poor funding, stretched resources, erratic and modest quality services, and limited survival prospects. It also tells the story of social enterprises simply plastering over the cracks of composite welfare deprivation in places of long-term decline, unable to cover the demand, sustain provision, and, most importantly, rebuild capabilities. In this context, it is not hard to conclude that the social economy could become, full circle back into the nineteenth century, a poor form of welfare for the poor, as the welfare state realigns to reproduce those most economically useful.

The risk is of ending one-nation politics and one-nation welfare society, in preference of a hot-spot geography of exclusion and inclusion that rarely finds its sources within the named places. To avoid this prospect requires continuation of a welfare culture of complementary support through a social economy funded properly by the state within a framework, as in the Scandinavian countries, of active state measures offering work opportunities to the excluded and welfare schemes of high quality designed to build the capabilities of all, not the few.

The second normative expectation from the social economy relates to the ethos of enterprise and business ingrained by neoliberalism in virtually every aspect of social life. This emphasis has grown within the sector itself, often as a means of selling social enterprises to government and other sponsors, but also, as we have seen in this study, as a means of legitimating social enterprise as a market-driven, revenue-seeking venture. There is growing unease with labels such as ‘not-for-profit’, ‘community business’, or ‘needs before profit’. This shift has occurred as a result of the perception as we saw in the case of Scotland that old-style community initiatives were not run as proper businesses (by poor product viability, no business expertise, lack of organisation, etc.) and therefore failed to survive or grow. The shift is also related to a new sense that commercial and social objectives can and must be reconciled, otherwise the reputation of social enterprises will remain that of ‘small, undercapitalised, commercially precarious enterprises
providing a limited number of poorly-paid, low-skilled jobs that are funded as an arm of social policy' (Hayton 2000: 205). For Keith Hayton:

If community business is to make a significant contribution then there is a need to adopt a more targeted development approach which could result in the setting up of a number of exemplar businesses that are commercially viable and are involved in mainstream competitive markets. (2000: 204)

Hayton goes on to recommend reforms to improve the business development skills of social entrepreneurs, recruit board members from the private sector, target support across the life of a business, and focus on targets such as increases in turnover and trading surpluses.

While we endorse the view that social enterprises should not become sites of economic misery or poor professional practice, we are sceptical about how far they can be seen as just another (mainstream) market venture. What makes them distinct from commercial firms is their commitment to social empowerment and meeting social needs. Commercial firms are successful as businesses in part because of the absence of such a commitment, which allows them to maximise profit and revenue to shareholders. Jobs and job satisfaction are a by-product, not the prime goal. Conversely, one reason why social enterprises fail as businesses is that their prime social obligations – which require care, spending time with clients, investing resources in people, involvement in the community – might conflict with the requirement of market efficiency and market-driven product viability. In short, failure may be a consequence of being forced to become commercial businesses in ways which compromise their original social objectives.

Our study has shown that when ventures have not been evaluated by sponsors on strict commercial criteria, and when there is a degree of financial security provided by funding agencies, the scope to develop as enterprises with a social remit has been considerably enhanced.

Our study has also shown that few social enterprises have managed to develop niche products with sustainable or growing demand, and that when they have, public sector support has not been far away. This raises the question of whether it is realistic to assume that the majority of social enterprises can become commercial enterprises, even with the kind of support Hayton recommends. The restricted commercial capabilities of the communities in which they are based, their severe resource, know-how, and size constraints, and the inelasticity of demand in their immediate local market, place them at the very jagged end of business viability. They are constrained by local circumstances and they lack the resources to connect into wider networks. In this context, talk of commercial viability and business potential seems somewhat wishful and potentially a distraction from the main purpose of social enterprises. A more sensible alternative, especially in areas of marked deprivation and isolation from economic opportunity, might be the renewal of effort by the state to increase job opportunities through incentives to the private sector or through public sector programmes, instead of passing responsibility on to the social economy.

It is the alterity of the social economy from the mainstream, rooted in the economy of social needs, that offers the greatest potential for the future. In the market society accompanied by waning state provision, the culture of economic organisation for competitiveness and consumerism is marginalising the idea of economic organisation for meeting social needs, fostering social solidarity, and developing human capabilities. Marx famously described this contrast as the opposition between production for exchange-value and production for use-value. Today, the dislocation is leaving vast sections of society without adequate welfare provision, under-nurt needs, a limited role as producers in the context of jobless growth, and alienation from full citizenship through entrapment in ghettos of social exclusion. And, the twist is that the pervasive reach of exchange-value society makes it increasingly difficult to imagine and legitimate non-market forms of organisation and provision. The elision between ethics, needs, and market performance in expectations from the social enterprise of the future is symptomatic of this turn.

Yet in our study what has marked the success and energy of enterprises such as the Arts Factory, Gabalfa, Masen, SOFA, FRC, Account 3, the Bridge Project, and the Bromley-by-Bow Centre is the legitimacy they give to the possibility of a different kind of economy. They are driven by an ethical commitment to social empowerment and to the welfare/developmental needs of marginalised groups, and it is through this commitment that they have fashioned products and services. They see what they do as advocacy for another way of life; one based on social commitment, ethical/environmental citizenship, and work as a vehicle for self and social enhancement. They have a clear sense of why they merit the label social enterprise, and they are part of a wider social desire for an alternative to market society.

This seems to be the real strength of the social economy. It can never become a growth machine or an engine of job generation, or a substitute for the welfare state, but it can stand as a small symbol of another kind of economy, one based on meeting social needs and enhancing social citizenship. For this, the characterisation of the social economy as a 'localised' solution to the problem of 'local' social exclusion must be broken. Such a characterisation of the social economy rules out speculation of systemic alternatives to the mainstream economy. The key move is to 'de-localise' discourses around the social economy and to challenge the dominant conception of the mainstream, rather than to cast the social economy in the image of the mainstream and in the interstices that the mainstream has abandoned.
## Appendix: the sample projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bromley-by-Bow Centre</td>
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<td>Community Inclusion for Deaf and Hard of Hearing People</td>
<td>N Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Self-Build Agency</td>
<td>NE England</td>
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<td>N Ireland</td>
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<td>Community Work Training and Apprenticeship Project</td>
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<td>Midlands</td>
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<td>Scotland</td>
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<td>SW England</td>
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<td>London</td>
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<td>Merseyside</td>
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<td>N Ireland</td>
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<td>N Ireland</td>
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<td>N Ireland</td>
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1 The complete database went on-line in early 2001 and can be viewed at http://locin.jrc.it

1 See for example: The Emergence of Social Enterprises in Europe: http://www.emes.net
2 See 3rd system: Four Models for Four Realities: http://www.fondaziomecesar.it

2 Social economy, social exclusion, localisation

1 For example, EUROSTAT data reveal spatial concentrations of poor housing, unemployment and ill health throughout the EU (for example, see Commission of the European Communities 1996).
2 It is important to note, however, that there is no necessary reason as to why such organisations automatically have these attributes. There is evidence that often they reproduce rather than challenge inequalities integral to the formal economy (see Browning 1998). For example, Borzaga and Masiello (1998: 33) recognise that ‘social enterprises are characterized by wages lower than those paid by public production units’ but go on to assert that this is ‘offset by other aspects of the work.’ Borzaga (n.d.: 15–16) argues that these lower wages, plus ‘high flexibility in the use of their workforces’ are central to the way in which social enterprises can ‘curb costs’ and in this way match the efficiency of ‘for-profit firms’. This comes dangerously close to advocating super-exploitation as the basis of competing with mainstream enterprises.
3 Such views are by no means confined to the European Commission and are widely held in a variety of national Governments and international organisations. For example, in a speech to the World Bank’s annual meeting in Hong Kong in 1997, its President proposed that ‘meeting the challenge of social inclusion’ should be the Bank’s main priority:

our goal must be to reduce these disparities across and within countries, to bring more people into the economic mainstream, to promote equitable access to the benefits of development regardless of nationality, race, or gender. This ... Challenge of Inclusion ... is the key development challenge of our time.

(Wolfensohn 1997)

In the same year, the Director General of the International Labour Organization discussed the connection between exclusion and unemployment:

These phenomena [of social exclusion] are very often a reflection of exclusion from the world of work (long-term unemployment, termination of unemployment
benefits, poor level of training of young people, and single women, etc.) or precarious employment on the labour market (involuntary part-time work, fixed-term employment, 'odd-jobbing').

(Hansenne, 1997)

While he concedes that those in employment might also be subject to the many pressures that can contribute to exclusion, the emphasis is almost wholly towards unemployment as the cause and reemployment as the solution to social exclusion.

4 In a series of publications the European Commission (CEC 1996, 1998a,b) has compiled a list of nineteen areas of economic activity that it considers capable of generating 'tailor-made jobs' and laying the basis for creating local social economies across Europe (and by implication, more widely). These are: home-help services, childminding, new information and communication technologies, the improvement of the built environment, public and domestic safety, local public transport, the improvement of urban public areas, local shops, energy conservation, tourism, audio-visual, economic development of cultural assets, local cultural development, sport, waste management, water management, protection of rural areas, environmental regulation, and control of pollution.


6 From April 2001 New Deal was extended to people aged over 25 who had been out of work for more than 18 months.

7 PATs were established under the remit of government ministers in ten different Whitehall Departments covering: 1 - Jobs, 2 - Skills, 3 - Business, 4 - Neighbourhood management, 5 - Housing management, 6 - Neighbourhood wards, 7 - Unpopular housing, 8 - Anti-social behaviour, 9 - Community self-help, 10 - Arts and sport, 11 - 'Schoo's Plus', 12 - Young people, 13 - Shops, 14 - Financial services, 15 - Information technology, 16 - Learning lessons, 17 - Joining it up locally, and 18 - Better information.

8 The report was published to meet the SEU's remit to report to Prime Minister Blair on how to 'develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst housing estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, and bad schools, etc.' (SEU 1998: iv).

9 The remit of the SEU only covers England, with responsibility for related programmes in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland falling to the respective government offices and/or the devolved assemblies created in the summer of 1999. Parallel schemes have been put in place in Scotland and Wales. Locations of the thirty-nine current NDC projects can be found through the DETR website at http://www.regeneration.detr.gov.uk/ndc/overview/index.htm (11 May 2001).

10 It is worth recalling Conservative Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's oft-misquoted speech at a garden party in Bedford in 1957: 'Let us be frank about it. Most of our people have never had it so good' (emphasis added).

3 Policy and practice in the UK social economy

1 In addition to this primary and original research, we also draw selectively upon cases reported elsewhere in the literature, as well as other research by Ray Hudson, Huw Beynon, and Katy Bennett funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (see Bennett et al. 2000).

2 Note 4, Chapter 2 provides a full listing of these fields.

3 Although the Cesar Foundation estimates that 2-3 per cent of national employment in Europe is in the social economy: see Chapter 2.

4 Interview, September 2000.

5 These partnerships are discussed more fully in the next chapter in the context of the social economy in Glasgow.

4 The corporatist social economy: Glasgow and Middlesbrough

1 Indeed early in 2001 a series of closures and redundancy announcements emphasised the extent to which they remain a vulnerable branch plant economy, still susceptible to external control and dependency (cf. Firth 1975).

2 For the purpose of comparability, these graphs are shown on the same scale as those for Bristol and Tower Hamlets in Figure 5.1 on page 85.

3 The map for Middlesbrough (p. 57) is based on the DLTR's (1998) Index of Multiple Deprivation figures which employ a range of employment and lifestyle indicators to develop a ranking of English wards according to their relative deprivation. The ranking runs from 1 (most deprived) to 8414 (least deprived). The map of Glasgow (p. 58) is based on the Scottish Executive's (2000) figures for multiple deprivation in the 894 Scottish postcode districts (PDGs). The figures use a similar range of indicators to produce a ranking for PDGs in Scotland which ranges from 1 (most deprived) to 894 (least deprived).

4 Defined by the DETR as follows:

Local Concentration is the population weighted average of the ranks of a district's most deprived wards that contain exactly 10 per cent of the district's population. Local Concentration (formerly 'Intensity') is an important way of identifying districts 'hot spots' of deprivation. The Local Concentration measure defines the 'hot spots' by reference to a percentage of the district's population.

(DTLR 2000)

5 GEAR was one of the early high-profile projects of the Scottish Development Agency, following its establishment in 1975.

6 Scottish Enterprise Glasgow is the relaunched (2001) Glasgow Development Agency (GDA). While the GDA placed considerable emphasis on Third Sector development in all of its policy literature, the relaunched agency has noticeably shifted emphasis much more towards attracting and developing private sector activities and inward investment. The effects of this shift in emphasis on regeneration policy in the city remain to be seen.

7 The seven LDCs are: the Castlemilk Economic Development Agency, the Gorbals Initiative, the Govan Initiative, the Greater Easterhouse Development Company, Drumchapel Opportunities, the East End Partnership, and Glasgow North Ltd.

8 The only other of the original Community Businesses to have survived in Glasgow is the Possil Community Business Ltd.

9 The ILM model was one element used by the Labour government in the design of the Welfare-to-Work scheme (see Chapter 2). Although Wise acted as consultants to the policy design process, and despite close links between the Chief Executive and the Prime Minister's office, Wise has been highly critical of Welfare-to-Work, particularly with regard to the compulsory nature of the programme and because it only provides training for a maximum of six months.

10 The study examined attitudes of residents on two estates in Teesside; St Hilda's in Middlesbrough and Norton Grange in Stockton-on-Tees.

11 Although beyond the remit of our study, there is also the substantial A19 Credit Union, one of the largest in the UK, which operates throughout the former county of Cleveland.

12 Interview, Middlesbrough Council 13 October 1999

13 The same is true of the Tayside model on which Comibiz was based which has failed to produce any sustainable community enterprise, but has created a small private sector company (Hayton 2000).
The distributed social economy: Bristol and Tower Hamlets

1  Interview, Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures.
2  The maps for Bristol (p. 89) and Tower Hamlets (p. 90) are based on the DLTR's (1998) Index of Multiple Deprivation figures which employ a range of employment and lifestyle indicators to develop a ranking of English wards according to their relative deprivation. The ranking runs from 1 (most deprived) to 8414 (least deprived).
3  For example, the Artangel Trust's 'Inner City' project which worked with a number of artists and writers at the Whitechapel Gallery to produce images and words about the nature of the inner city and which included Augusto Boal who pioneered the use of drama and the arts as a tool of community political empowerment in Brazil and other parts of Latin America. See: http://www.innercity.demon.co.uk/index.htm
4  For further details see: http://www.whitechapel.org.uk/
5  Interview, Easton Workspace.
6  Quakerism took root in Bristol during the mid-seventeenth century. The world's first Methodist Chapel, John Wesley's 'New Room', was founded in Bristol in 1739 and ever since the city has been an important centre for Methodist training and practice.
7  For details see: http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/bgp/
8  Full details of the first twenty-five years of Bristol FoE's activities can be found at http://www.joolz.demon.co.uk/info/oc96/happybdy.html
9  Interview, Leader Tower Hamlets Council, 13 January 2000.
10  Interview, Helena Taggart, Bristol Area Community Enterprise Network.
11  http://www.tiodos.co.uk/
12  The name is derived from the acronym for Shifting Old Furniture About. Although there are many similarities between SOFA and the Furniture Resource Centre described in Chapter 3, there are no formal links between the projects.
13  Of approximately 2000 projects of all kinds considered during the course of our research into the social economy, Scrapstore is the only operational workers' collective that we have ever.
14  Interview, Ray Seifa, CEED, 9 July 1999.
15  Anecdotally, while waiting for an interview with one social enterprise and pondering the reason for Bristol's particular success in developing Third Sector enterprises, one of the researchers drew attention to the copy of the Bristol Yellow Pages which was being used to prop open the door of the office. It was fully three inches thick and seemed to provide in itself a significant part of the explanation.
16  Interview, Helena Taggart, 1999.
17  This contrasts strongly with the positive perception of the Castlemilk project held within Glasgow: see Chapter 4, pp. 67-8.
18  The authors would like to express their gratitude to the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH) council for their permission to reproduce this map. In doing so the council asked us to point out that it is making considerable efforts to counter the uneven distribution of regeneration activities in the Borough and, through a recently established voluntary sector network, is beginning to overcome the limitations of this fragmented picture. It should also be noted that such fragmented geographies of regeneration availability are by no means confined to Tower Hamlets, but are characteristic of most large conurbations in the UK.
19  St Margaret's House provides subsidised office space for voluntary and Third Sector organizations, often for short periods of time while they find their own premises or for the duration of fixed term projects.
20  Similar campaigns have been mounted in other UK cities, most notably Glasgow and Birmingham, where similar attempts to transfer housing stock to Third or private sector housing associations are under way.
21  Bromley-by-Bow has rapidly become very well known as a model social enterprise,

6 Prospects

1  To borrow a phrase from Ed Mayo of the New Economics Foundation, in a presentation to a conference launching The UK Social Economy Coalition, 31 May 2001, London.
Bibliography


142 Bibliography


Index

Aasiyana Housing Association, Bristol 102–3
Account 3 Women's Consultancy Service 92, 109–10 activism 80, 94, 96, 101–3, 121 advocacy 46–8, 71 aerospace industry 86 agonistic political sphere 121–2 alienity of social enterprises 42, 125–6 alternative currency systems 8 alternative politics 94, 98, 115, 121 alternative social services 31, 33, 42 Amman Valley Enterprises 34 Anglo-Saxon model of social economy 11 artistic community, in Tower Hamlets 92–3 Arts Factory (South Wales) 43–4, 49 Asian community 102–3 Aspire Community Enterprise Ltd (Bristol) 99–100 associative presence 121 associative democracy 8 autonomy 19

BACEN (Bristol Area Community Enterprise Network) 97, 104, 121 Bangladeshi community 92, 95, 107, 108–9 Barrowfield 63 Bassett, K. 86 Belfast, women's groups 33, 44, 47, 49 Belgium 10 Beynon, H. 59 Blair, T. 11, 23, 24, 48 Boddy, M. 86, 96–7 Borzaga, C. 9, 10, 18, 22 Bridge Project (Tower Hamlets) 108–9 Bristol 83, 84–6; civic resources 94; economic context 84; employment in social economy 32; political culture 96–7; social economy 97–105, 114–15, 120; social exclusion 88–90 Bristol City Council 96 Bristol Green Party 94 Bromley-by-Bow Centre 107, 111–12 Bucek, J. 7–8 business-driven goals 117, 118, 124 business ethos 123–5 Byrne, D. 19, 25

Calton Childcare (Glasgow) 33, 68 Canada 9 capacity building 1, 7, 19, 46–8, 49 capitalism 2–3; reaction against 8, 12 care sector 33, 71 Carmichael, P. 64 Castlefield Economic Development Agency 67–8 Castlefield Electronic Village 67–8 CEED (Centre for Employment and Enterprise Development, Bristol) 103–4 Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion 42 childcare services 33, 71, 76 children's garden 111–12 Children's Scrapstore (Bristol) 99 citizenship 3, 13, 14; employment and 24 City Challenge 73, 97 civic resources: Bristol 94; Tower Hamlets 91–4 civil society 3, 14, 83, 84, 94; New Labour and 23, 24