States and their Citizens

FROM WASPS TO LOCOMOTIVES

Over the last thousand years, European states have undergone a peculiar evolution: from wasps to locomotives. Long they concentrated on war, leaving most activities to other organizations, just so long as those organizations yielded tribute at appropriate intervals. Tribute-taking states remained fierce but light in weight by comparison with their bulky successors; they stung, but they didn’t suck dry. As time went on, states — even the capital-intensive varieties — took on activities, powers and commitments whose very support constrained them. These locomotives ran on the rails of sustenance from the civilian population and maintenance by a civilian staff. Off the rails, the warlike engines could not run at all.

A state’s essential minimum activities form a trio:

* **statedaking**: attacking and checking competitors and challengers within the territory claimed by the state;

* **warmaking**: attacking rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state;

* **protection**: attacking and checking rivals of the rulers’ principal allies, whether inside or outside the state’s claimed territory.

No state lasts long, however, that neglects a crucial fourth activity:

* **extraction**: drawing from its subject population the means of statedaking, warmaking, and protection.

At the minimum, tribute-taking states stayed close to this indispensable set of four activities, intervening in the lives of their nominal subjects chiefly to impose ruling-class power and to extract revenues. Beyond a certain scale, however, all states found themselves venturing into three other risky terrains:

* **adjudication**: authoritative settlement of disputes among members of the subject population;

* **distribution**: intervention in the allocation of goods among members of the subject population;

* **production**: control of the creation and transformation of goods and services by members of the subject population.

The major connections among these activities run roughly as shown in figure 4.1. Warmaking and statedaking reinforced each other, indeed remained practically indistinguishable until states began to form secure, recognized boundaries around substantial contiguous territories. Both led to extraction of resources from the local population. The play of alliances and the attempt to draw resources from relatively powerful or mobile actors promoted the state’s involvement in protection, checking the competitors and enemies of selected clients. As extraction and protection expanded, they created demands for adjudication of disputes within the subject population, including the legal regularization of both extraction and protection themselves.

![Figure 4.1 Relations among major activities of states.](image)

Over time, the weight and impact of state activities standing lower in the diagram — adjudication, production, and distribution — grew faster than those at the top: warmaking, statedaking, extraction, and protection. The sheer volume most European states invested in warmaking (attacking rivals outside the territory claimed by the state) or statedaking (attacking and checking competitors and challengers within the territory) continued to increase irregularly into the twentieth century; but adjudication, production, and distribution went from trivial to tremendous. Even those non-socialist states that maintained wide private ownership, for example, eventually invested large sums in the production and/or regulation of energy, transportation, communication, food, and arms. As rulers drew more and more resources for war and other coercive enterprises from their local economies, the major classes within those economies successfully demanded more and more state intervention outside the realm of coercion and war. Over the thousand-year span we are surveying here, nevertheless, coercive activities clearly predominated.
Warmaking frequently involved European states in the production of arms, and extraction in the production of goods (e.g., salt, matches, and tobacco) whose monopolies fed state coffers. Later, all states intervened more generally in production as demands from workers and intellectuals for the checking of capitalist excesses became effective; socialist states merely represent the extreme of a general tendency. Extraction, protection, and adjudication intertwined, finally, to draw states into control of distribution—first as a way of assuring state revenues from the flow of goods, then as a response to popular demands for correction of inequities and local shortages. Again socialist states mark but the extreme version of a very general expansion in state activity outside the military realm.

In the course of extracting resources and pacifying the population, every European state eventually created new administrative structure at the local and regional levels as well as on a national scale. The treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559), for example, created the kingdom of Savoy-Piedmont, and placed Emmanuel-Philibert on its throne. Soon the quest for funds drove the new king to innovate: first a profitable forced sale of salt, second a census to determine who was taxable, then a tax based on each community’s productive area. The tax forced adjacent communities to delineate their boundaries precisely, which drew them into preparing cadasters and creating officials to administer them (Rambaud and Vincenne 1964: 11). Everywhere extractive efforts not only withdrew valuable resources from their customary uses but also created new forms of political organization.

State activities therefore had profound implications for the interests of the general population, for collective action, and for the rights of citizens. As rulers and agents of states pursued the work of warmaking, statemaking, protection, extraction, adjudication, distribution, and production, they impinged on well-defined interests of people who lived within their range of control; the impact was often negative, since states repeatedly seized for their own use land, capital, goods, and services that had previously served other commitments. Most of the resources that kings and ministers used to build armed might came ultimately from the labor and accumulation of ordinary people, and represented a diversion of valuable means from pursuits to which ordinary people attached much higher priority. Although capitalists sometimes invested gladly in state finances and in the protection that state power gave to their business, and although regional magnates sometimes allied themselves with kings in order to hold off their own enemies, most people who had an investment in the resources that monarchs sought to seize resisted royal demands tenaciously.

The labor, goods, money, and other resources demanded by states were, after all, typically embedded in webs of obligation and committed to ends that households and communities prized. From the short-run perspectives of ordinary people, what we in blithe retrospect call “state formation” included the setting of ruthless tax farmers against poor peasants and artisans, the forced sale for taxes of animals that would have paid for dowries, the imprisoning of local leaders as hostages to the local community’s payment of overdue taxes, the hanging of others who dared to protest, the looting of brutal soldiers on a hapless civilian population, the conscription of young men who were their parents’ main hope for comfort in old age, the forced purchase of tainted salt, the elevation of already arrogant local propertyholders into officers of the state, and the imposition of religious conformity in the name of public order and morality. Small wonder that powerless Europeans so often accepted the legend of the “good tsar” who had been misled, or even held captive, by bad advisors.

Both the character and the weight of state activity varied systematically as a function of the economy that prevailed within a state’s boundaries. In coercion-intensive regions, rulers commonly drew resources for warmaking and other activities in kind, through direct requisition and conscription. Customs and excise yielded small returns in relatively uncommercialized economies, but the institution of head taxes and land taxes created ponderous fiscal machines, and put extensive power into the hands of landlords, village heads, and others who exercised intermediate control over essential resources. In capital-intensive regions, the presence of capitalists, commercial exchange, and substantial municipal organizations set serious limits on the state’s direct exertion of control over individuals and households, but facilitated the use of relatively efficient and painless taxes on commerce as sources of state revenue. The ready availability of credit, furthermore, allowed rulers to spread the costs of military activity over substantial periods rather than extracting in quick, calamitous bursts. As a result, states in those regions generally created slight, segmented central apparatuses. In regions of capitalized coercion, an intermediate situation prevailed: however uneasily, rulers relied on acquiescence from both landlords and merchants, drew revenues from both land and trade, and thus created dual state structures in which nobles confronted—but also finally collaborated with—financiers.

**BARGAINING, RIGHTS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION**

State intervention in everyday life incited popular collective action, often in the form of resistance to the state but sometimes in the guise of new claims on the state. As authorities sought to draw resources and acquiescence from the subject population, state authorities, other powerholders, and groups of ordinary people bargained (however lopsidedly) new agreements concerning the conditions under which the state could extract or control, and the kinds of claims that powerholders or ordinary people could make on the state. The bargaining and the claims changed fundamentally with the movement from patrimonialism to brokerage to nationalization to specialization; under patrimonialism, for example, bargaining often occurred in regional rebellions.
led by magnates who advanced their own claims to independent statehood, while under brokerage, as former patrons sided with the state, magnate-led rebellions gave way to popular insurrections against taxation or conscription.

The actual forms and sequences of state impact on interests, collective action, bargaining, and establishment of rights varied greatly as a function of the relative salience of coercion and capital as the basis of state formation. In coercion-intensive regions such as Poland and Russia, control over land and labor attached to the land long remained the central object of struggle, while in regions of capital intensity, such as the Low Countries, capital and marketable commodities occupied a more salient position with respect to the bargaining that created state structure and citizens’ claims on states. In capital-intensive zones, furthermore, states acted earlier and more effectively to establish bourgeois property rights — to reduce multiple claims on the same property, to enforce contracts, and to strengthen the principal owner’s capacity to determine the property’s use. Everywhere, nevertheless, the state’s creation of military might involved its agents in bargaining with powerholders and with groups of ordinary people. The subject population’s class structure therefore helped determine the state’s organization: its repressive apparatus, its fiscal administration, its services, its forms of representation.

The translation from class structure to state organization occurred through struggle. The tax rebellions of the seventeenth century sprang from the competing claims of kings, regional powerholders, local communities, and individual households to land, labor, commodities, cattle, tools, credit, and household wealth that could not serve all ends at once. When resistance to taxation aligned the claims of great lords with those of local communities, as it often did in early seventeenth-century France, it threatened the very viability of the crown. But even on a smaller scale, day-to-day individual and collective action against the growing state’s extractive efforts posed serious challenges to every ruler.

To the extent that a state’s population was segmented and heterogeneous, the likelihood of large-scale rebellion declined, but the difficulty of imposing uniform administrative arrangements increased. In a homogeneous, connected population, an administrative innovation installed and tested in one region had a reasonable chance of working elsewhere, and officials could easily transfer their knowledge from one locality to another. In the period of movement from tribute to tax, from indirect to direct rule, from subordination to assimilation, states generally worked to homogenize their populations and break down their segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transportation, and communication. When those standardizing efforts threatened the very identities on which subordinate populations based their everyday social relations, however, they often stirred massive resistance.

Resistance to state demands usually occurred covertly, on a local scale, employing the “weapons of the weak” James Scott has described — sabotage, foot-dragging, concealment, evasion (Scott, 1985). It compounded into mass rebellion chiefly when (1) the state’s demands and actions offended citizens’ standards of justice or attacked their primary collective identities, (2) the people touched by offensive state actions were already connected by durable social ties, (3) ordinary people had powerful allies inside or outside the state, and (4) the state’s recent actions or interactions revealed that it was vulnerable to attack. Under these circumstances, popular rebellion not only was likely to occur, but also had some chance of success.

The 1640s combined all these conditions in a number of European states, and one of the most rebellious decades in European history resulted. The nasty tangle of struggles we now remember as the Thirty Years’ War taxed the capacities of most western European states, revealing their vulnerability at the very time when they were demanding unprecedented sacrifices of their subjects. England went through a civil war, France entered the turmoil of the Fronde, Scotland almost shook itself free of England, Catalonia and Portugal broke loose (the former provisionally, the latter definitively) from the control of the composite Spanish crown, while in Naples the fisherman Masaniello led a great popular revolt.

In Catalonia, for example, royal demands for increased war taxes brought the king (or, rather, his minister Olivares) into bitter conflict with the Cortes. In 1640, the crown dispatched 9,000 troops into the province to enforce its claims for payment, reduce the likelihood of organized resistance, and apply a kind of blackmail (since the Catalans had to support the troops and endure their depredations so long as their obligations remained unpaid). The stationing of troops without provincial consent violated established Catalan rights. A broad popular rebellion followed. As it began to spread, the Diputació — loosely speaking, the Cortes’ executive committee — placed itself at the revolt’s head, and went so far as to call France’s Louis XIII to assume sovereignty in Catalonia. Profiting from France’s distraction by the Fronde, a French army finally reconquered Barcelona, and hence Catalonia, in 1652. At that point, “Philip IV granted an amnesty and vowed to respect Catalonia’s traditional liberties” (Zagorin 1982: II, 37).

When faced with resistance, dispersed or massive, what did rulers do? They bargained. Now, you may object to using the word “bargain” for the sending in of troops to crush a tax rebellion or capture a reluctant taxpayer. Nonetheless, the frequent use of exemplary punishment — hanging a few ringleaders rather than all the rebels, jailing the richest local taxpayer instead of all the delinquents — indicates that the authorities were negotiating with the bulk of the population. In any case, bargaining took many other forms: pleading with parliaments, buying off city officials with tax exemptions, confirming guild privileges in return for loans or fees, regularizing the assessment and collection of taxes against the guarantee of their more willing payment, and so on. All this
bargaining created or confirmed individual and collective claims on the state, individual and collective rights vis-à-vis the state, and obligations of the state to its citizens. It also created rights—recognized enforceable claims—of states with respect to their citizens. The core of what we now call "citizenship," indeed, consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.

Bargaining was obviously asymmetrical: at the showdown, cannon versus staves; the state's steady disarmament of the general population compounded the asymmetry. Yet even forceful repression of rebellions against taxation and conscription ordinarily involved both a set of agreements with those who cooperated in the pacification and public affirmation of the peaceful means by which ordinary citizens could rightfully seek redress of the state's errors and injustices. Those means commonly included petition, suit, and representation through local assemblies. As workers and bourgeois (or, less often, peasants) organized, they took advantage of the permitted means to press for expanded rights and direct representation. During the age of specialization, states preempted or responded to the growing demands of bourgeois and workers by committing their agents to such programs as social insurance, veterans' pensions, public education, and housing; all of these programs added bureaus, bureaucrats, and budget lines to increasingly civilian states.

Through struggle, negotiation, and sustained interaction with the holders of essential resources, states came to reflect the class structures of their subject populations. The dominant classes had the largest effects, so that states dominated by great landlords developed very different structures from those controlled by capitalists (Moore 1966). But the sheer necessity of dealing with peasants, or artisans, or landless laborers, also marked a state's fiscal organization, controls over trade, police forces, and much more. Specifically negotiated agreements that ended sustained resistance or facilitated popular assent created a significant share of those state institutions.

Again we must imagine a continuum of experiences. At one extreme, these bargains struck with powerful organizations that existed before the great expansion of state power, and survived the expansion, notably the governing bodies of capitalist municipalities such as Amsterdam. Those bargains generally incorporated the governing bodies into the state, and turned them into representative institutions. On a larger scale, rulers in areas having prosperous cities often treated with councils representing the urban powerholders. Thus the early princes of Catalonia admitted delegates of Barcelona and other Catalan cities into their councils beside nobles and clergy, and thereby established the predecessor of the tricameral Catalan Corts (Vilar 1962: 1, 439).

At the other extreme stand bargains struck with large blocs of the population, such as all landowners, especially in the form of legislation establishing rules for taxation, conscription, and other extractive activities.

Thus when Britain's prime minister William Pitt sought to pay part of the cost of warring with France by means of Britain's first general income tax (1799), he struck implicit bargains with landholders, capitalists, and wage-earners alike: he engineered a bill permitting redemption of the inequitable old land tax (Watson 1960: 375–6). When peace with France returned (abortively) in 1802 and (definitively) in 1815, Parliament soon took steps to repeal the tax; although Prime Minister Liverpool tried in 1816 to retain the income tax to help pay off Britain's huge accumulation of war debt, Parliament clearly read the bargain as tying the tax to the war emergency (Levi 1988: 140–3).

In between the extremes we find bargains struck with defined groups of powerholders such as church officials, who when defeated and dispossessed customarily acquired state-guaranteed claims to stipends and protection, and who, when effective in their resistance to extraction, often forced the creation or recognition of representative bodies such as church assemblies. England's Henry VIII stripped his country's church of its lands and its ties to Rome, but thereby took on the obligation to provide stipends forever to all priests who accepted his version of Reform.

On the whole, the officials of states that grew up amid the network of trading cities stretching from northern Italy to Flanders and the Baltic found themselves near the first extreme, bargaining with municipal oligarchies that had their way, survived, and became major components of the state; city-empires such as that of Venice mark the extreme case. Agents of states-in-the-making that formed outside the city-state band more often found themselves bargaining with great landlords and their clientele, and creating new representative institutions in the process. In those larger states, nobles often gained confirmations of their privileges and monopolies of higher military offices in return for their collaboration with royal attempts to build national armies. But all along the continuum bargaining over the state's extractive claims produced rights, privileges, and protective institutions that had not previously existed.

THE INSTITUTION OF DIRECT RULE

A widespread movement from indirect to direct rule occurred with the nationalization of military power. It offered a seductive but costly opportunity to ordinary people. After 1750, in the era of nationalization and specialization, states began moving aggressively from a nearly universal system of indirect rule to a new system of direct rule: unmediated intervention in the lives of local communities, households, and productive enterprises. As rulers shifted from the hiring of mercenaries to the recruitment of warriors from their own national populations, and as they increased taxation to support the great military forces of eighteenth-century warfare, they bargained out access to communities,
households, and enterprises, sweeping away autonomous intermediaries in the process.

Throughout the millennium we have been surveying, city-states, autonomous bishoprics, petty principalities, and other microstates ruled in a relatively direct way. Agents who were immediately responsible to the crown and served at the monarch’s pleasure collected taxes, administered courts, tended crown property, and maintained day-to-day contact with local communities falling under the crown’s jurisdiction. Larger states, however, invariably opted for some form of indirect rule, co-opting local powerholders and confirming their privileges without incorporating them directly into the state apparatus.

Before the seventeenth century, every large European state ruled its subjects through powerful intermediaries who enjoyed significant autonomy, hindered state demands that were not to their own interest, and profited on their own accounts from the delegated exercise of state power. The intermediaries were often privileged members of subordinate populations, and made their way by assuring rulers of tribute and acquiescence from those populations. In southeastern Europe especially, the presence of multiple populations mixed by centuries of conquest and Mediterranean trade combined with the characteristic forms of Muslim rule through semi-autonomous subordinates to produce a vast zone of indirect rule whose traces remain today in the region’s cultural heterogeneity and its continuing struggles over the rights of minorities. Crucial intermediaries included clergy, landlords, urban oligarchies, and independent professional warriors, in proportions that varied along the continuum from capital-intensive to coercion-intensive regions. The centrality of these various intermediaries identified alternative systems of indirect rule.

Any system of indirect rule set serious limits on the quantity of resources rulers could extract from the ambient economy. Beyond that limit, intermediaries acquired an interest in impeding extracting, even in allying themselves with ordinary people’s resistance to state demands. In the same circumstances, however, rulers developed an interest both in undermining the autonomous powers of intermediaries and in making coalitions with major segments of the subject population. As war demanded greater resources, emphatically including manpower, and as the threat of conquest by the largest states grew more serious, ever more rulers bypassed, suppressed, or co-opted old intermediaries and reached directly into communities and households to seize the wherewithal of war. Thus national standing armies, national states, and direct rule caused each other.

Before then, how much autonomy powerholders enjoyed varied significantly from state to state; after its early phase of conquest and military administration, the Ottoman Empire installed two successive forms of rule in the Balkans, the second even more indirect than the first. Into the seventeenth century, sultans drew tribute from their vassal states but within their own domains divided substantial parts of their lands into timars, grants held by warriors so long as they continued to serve in the armed forces. The timars (grant-holders) drew their own revenues from the land, collected taxes for the sultan, ran the civil administration, and controlled the Christian serfs, but gained no right to alienate the land or pass it on to their children. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars, however, killed off many timars, and the demand to collect more and more taxes for increasingly expensive warmaking made the grants less attractive to warriors. Sultans turned increasingly to tax farmers, who used their leverage to convert the lands they taxed into their own property. As that happened, other groups demanded and received the right to buy and own lands that paid taxes; çiftlikler, private lands, displaced timars (Roide 1987: 133–4).

Thus the Ottomans inadvertently installed a classic system of indirect rule. That system later turned against both subjects and rulers by virtue of the power it put into the hands of semi-independent warriors. At the peace of Sistova between the Ottoman and Austrian empires (1791), for example, the janissaries and the irregular military units [in Serbia] found themselves unemployed. They thus turned and preyed on the population. Bands of these men seized villages and their lands and converted the property into their own estates. Others joined rebel avans or bandit organizations and plundered peaceful Muslims and Christians alike.

(Jelavich and Jelavich 1977: 27)

The autonomy and predation of the janissaries eventually hindered Ottoman rule so seriously that in 1826 the sultan's troops, at his behest, joined with the crowds of Constantinople in slaughtering the remainder of their corps. The great risks of indirect rule were predation by intermediaries, which incited resistance to the intermediaries by the general population, and resistance by the intermediaries, which incited recalcitrance of whole regions to national rule.

Most of the time, however, local rulers governed in a relatively stable fashion, and bought insulation for the local population through the timely payment of tribute to the Ottoman state. Meanwhile, Prussian Junkers served simultaneously as masters of their own great estates, judges, military commanders, and spokesmen of the crown, as the English gentry, nobility, and clergy divided the work of civil administration outside of the capital. Under favorable circumstances, the middlemen thus empowered mitigated the effects of state expansion on the social organization and wealth of their subjects. The nature of their mediation differed significantly between two types of regions: those having an indigenous nobility and those dominated by aliens. Where the nobility shared religion, tongue, and tradition with the peasantry (as in Austria and Bohemia), some possibility of regional solidarity against the crown’s demands existed. Where nobles were foreigners (as in the European portion of the Ottoman Empire through much of its history), village headmen and tribal elders frequently linked local people to national authorities. In such regions, the empire’s collapse left peasants, merchants, and professionals in direct contact with the state (Berend and Ránki 1977: 29–36).
Whether indigenous or alien, muddle men were usually tyrants within their own zones of control. As the chufilik system displaced the timars in Ottoman territory, even the appeal to Muslim courts and officials disappeared as a resource, and absentee landlords frequently pressed their peasants harder than their military predecessors (Roider 1987: 134). When the center’s power declined – as it did generally during the nineteenth century – landlords acquired increasing control of local affairs. In nineteenth-century Bosnia and Serbia, Muslim landlords drove their Christian tenants into serfdom (Donia 1981: 4–5). In those circumstances, banditry became rampant in the Balkans. As a result of exploitation by muddle men, an alliance with the distant king or his agents often seemed an attractive alternative to exploitation close at hand; villagers then appealed to royal agents, took their cases against landlords to royal courts, and cheered the curtailment of urban privileges. In the short run, they sometimes gained by these choices. But in the long run, the destruction of intermediate barriers made them more vulnerable to the state’s next round of war-generated demands.

The growth of domestically recruited standing armies offered a strong stimulus to direct rule. Although rented troops persisted in some armies through the eighteenth century, rulers in regions of capitalized coercion – especially in France, Prussia, and England – began to move away from wholesale engagement of mercenary armies during the seventeenth. Mercenaries had the severe drawbacks of being unreliable when poorly paid, seeking booty and rapine when not closely supervised, causing widespread trouble when demobilized, and costing a great deal of cash. The effort to maintain substantial armies in peacetime, pioneered by such rulers as Prussia’s Friedrich Wilhelm in the seventeenth century, exceeded most states’ ability to tax the essential revenues, especially in the face of competition from regional powerholders. These circumstances encouraged rulers to establish durable domestic military administrations, and then to conscript, co-opt, and penetrate. These steps bypassed intermediaries, and led the way from indirect to direct rule.

The domestic recruitment of large standing armies entailed serious costs. While discharged mercenaries had few enforceable claims on any states, veterans of a national force did, especially if they had incurred disabilities in the nation’s service. Families of dead or wounded warriors likewise acquired benefits such as preference in the state-run sale of tobacco and matches. The garrisoning of troops within the country involved military officials and their civilian counterparts in food supply, housing, and public order. Eventually the health and education of all young males, which affected their military effectiveness, became governmental concerns. Thus military reorganization entered a wedge for expansion of state activity into what had previously been local and private spheres.

In one of their more self-conscious attempts to engineer state power, rulers frequently sought to homogenize their populations in the course of installing direct rule. From a ruler’s point of view, a linguistically, religiously, and ideologically homogeneous population presented the risk of a common front against royal demands; homogenization made a policy of divide and rule more costly. But homogeneity had many compensating advantages: within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers, communication could run more efficiently, and an administrative innovation that worked in one segment was likely to work elsewhere as well. People who sensed a common origin, furthermore, were more likely to unite against external threats. Spain, France, and other large states recurrently homogenized by giving religious minorities – especially Muslims and Jews – the choice between conversion and emigration; in 1492, shortly after the completed conquest of Granada, for example, Ferdinand and Isabella gave Spanish Jews just that choice; Portugal followed suit in 1497. As it happened, Jewish exiles from Iberia, the Sephardim, then constituted a trade diaspora elsewhere in Europe, using their existing connections to set up a powerful system of long-distance credit and communication that allowed them to establish near-monopolies in precious stones, sugar, spices, and tobacco at various times in the succeeding centuries (von Greuerz 1980).

The Protestant Reformation gave rulers of smaller states a splendid opportunity to define their nations’ distinctness and homogeneity vis-à-vis the great empires, not to mention a chance to co-opt the clergy and their administrative apparatus in the service of royal ends. Sweden set an early example, with large chunks of public administration placed in the hands of Lutheran pastors. (Today’s Swedish historians still benefit from the long series of parish registers, complete with information about literacy and changes of residence, those pastors prepared faithfully from the seventeenth century onward.) Over and above any possible influence on beliefs about the state’s legitimacy, a shared clergy and a common faith linked to the sovereign provided a powerful instrument of rule.

**The French Revolution: From Indirect to Direct Rule**

European states began forcing the choice between local and national loyalties during the eighteenth century. Although Enlightenment “reforms” often had the effect of reinforcing direct rule, the most sensational move in that direction was no doubt the work of the French Revolution and Empire. French actions from 1789 to 1815 forwarded the general European transition from indirect to direct rule in two ways: by providing a model of centralized government that other states emulated, and by imposing variants of that model wherever France conquered. Even though many of the period’s innovations in French government emerged from desperate improvisations in response to threats of
rebellion and bankruptcy, their battle-tested forms endured beyond the Revolution and Empire.

What happened to France’s system of rule during the revolutionary years? Before 1789 the French state, like almost all other states, ruled indirectly at the local level, relying especially on priests and nobles for mediation. From the end of the American war, the government’s efforts to collect money to cover its war debts crystallized an antigovernmental coalition that initially included the Parlements and other powerholders, but changed toward a more popular composition as the confrontation between the regime and its opponents sharpened (Comninell 1987, Doyle 1986, Egret 1982, Frêche 1974, Stone 1981). The state’s visible vulnerability in 1788–9 encouraged any group that had a stifled claim or grievance against the state, its agents, or its allies to articulate its demands and join others in calling for change. The rural revolts – Great Fear, grain seizures, tax rebellions, attacks on landlords, and so on – of spring and summer 1789 occurred disproportionately in regions with large towns, commercialized agriculture, and many roads (Markoff 1985). Their geography reflected a composite but largely bourgeois-led settling of scores.

At the same time, those whose social survival depended most directly on the Old Regime state – nobles, officeholders, and higher clergy are the obvious examples – generally aligned themselves with the king (Dawson 1972: 334–46). Thus a revolutionary situation began to form: two distinct blocs both claimed power and both received support from some significant part of the population. With significant defections of military men from the crown and the formation of militias devoted to the popular cause, the opposition acquired force of its own.

The popular bloc, connected often by members of the bourgeoisie, started to gain control over parts of the state apparatus. The lawyers, officials, and other bourgeois who seized the state apparatus in 1789–90 rapidly displaced the old intermediaries: landlords, seigneurial officials, venal officeholders, clergy, and sometimes municipal oligarchies as well. “[It was not a rural class of English-style gentlemen,” declares Lynn Hunt, “who gained political prominence on either the national or the regional level, but rather thousands of city professionals who seized the opportunity to develop political careers” (Hunt 1984: 155; see also Hunt 1978, Vovelle 1987). At a local level, the so-called Municipal Revolution widely transferred power to enemies of the old rulers; patriot coalitions based in militias, clubs, and revolutionary committees and linked to Parisian activists ousted the old municipalities. Even where the old powerholders managed to survive the Revolution’s early turmoil, relations between each locality and the national capital altered abruptly. Village “republics” of the Alps, for example, found their ancient liberties – including ostensibly free consent to taxes – crumbling as outsiders clamped them into the new administrative machine (Rosenberg 1988: 72–89). Then Parisian revolutionaries faced the problem of governing without intermediaries; they experimented with the committees and militias that had appeared in the mobilization of 1789, but found them hard to control from the center. More or less simultaneously they recast the French map into a nested system of departments, districts, cantons, and communes, while sending out représentants en mission to forward revolutionary reorganization. They installed direct rule.

Given the unequal spatial distribution of cities, merchants, and capital, furthermore, the imposition of a uniform geographic grid altered the relations between cities’ economic and political power, placing insignificant Mende and Niort at the same administrative level as mighty Lyon and Bordeaux (Lepeit 1988: 200–37; Margadant 1988a, 1988b; Ozouf-Marignier 1986; Schulz 1982). As a result, the balance of forces in regional capitals shifted significantly: in the great commercial centers, where merchants, lawyers, and professionals already clustered, departmental officials (who frequently came, in any case, from the same milieu) had no choice but to bargain with the locals. Where the National Assembly carved departments out of relatively uncommercialized rural regions, the Revolution’s administrators overshadowed other residents of the new capitals, and could plausibly threaten to use force if they were recalcitrant.

But in those regions, they lacked the bourgeois allies who helped their confreres do the Revolution’s work elsewhere, and confronted old intermediaries who still commanded significant followings.

In great mercantile centers such as Marseille and Lyon, the political situation was very different. By and large, the Federalist movement, with its protests against Jacobin centralism and its demands for regional autonomy, took root in cities whose commercial positions greatly outpaced their administrative rank. In dealing with these alternative obstacles to direct rule, Parisian revolutionaries improvised three parallel, and sometimes conflicting, systems of rule: the committees and militias; a geographically-defined hierarchy of elected officials and representatives; and roving commissioners from the central government. To collect information and gain support, all three relied extensively on the existing personal networks of lawyers, professionals, and merchants.

As the system began to work, revolutionary leaders strove to routinize their control and contain independent action by local enthusiasts, who often resisted. Using both co-optation and repression, they gradually squeezed out the committees and militias. Mobilization for war put great pressure on the system, incited new resistance, and increased the national leaders’ incentives for a tight system of control. Starting in 1792, the central administration (which until then had continued in a form greatly resembling that of the Old Regime) underwent its own revolution: the staff expanded enormously, and a genuine hierarchical bureaucracy took shape. In the process, revolutionaries installed one of the first systems of direct rule ever to take shape in a large state.

That shift entailed changes in systems of taxation, justice, public works, and much more. Consider policing. Outside of the Paris region, France’s Old Regime state had almost no specialized police of its own; it dispatched the
Maréchaussée to pursue tax evaders, vagabonds, and other violators of royal will and occasionally authorized the army to quell rebellious subjects, but otherwise relied on local and regional authorities to deploy armed force against civilians. The revolutionaries changed things. With respect to ordinary people, they moved from reactive to proactive policing and information-gathering: instead of simply waiting until a rebellion or collective violation of the law occurred, and then retaliating ferociously but selectively, they began to station agents whose job was to anticipate and prevent threatening popular collective action. During the Revolution's early years, Old Regime police forces generally dissolved as popular committees, national guards, and revolutionary tribunals took over their day-to-day activities. But with the Directory the state concentrated surveillance and apprehension in a single centralized organization. Fouché of Nantes became minister of police in the year VII/1799, and thenceforth ran a ministry whose powers extended throughout France and its conquered territories. By the time of Fouché, France had become one of the world's most closely-policed countries.

Going to war accelerated the move from indirect to direct rule. Almost any state that makes war finds that it cannot pay for the effort from its accumulated reserves and current revenues. Almost all warring states borrow extensively, raise taxes, and seize the means of combat — including men — from reluctant citizens who have other uses for their resources. Pre-revolutionary France followed these rules faithfully, to the point of accumulating debts that eventually forced the calling of the Estates General. Nor did the Revolution repeal the rules: once France declared war on Austria in 1792, the state's demands for revenues and manpower excited resistance just as fierce as that which had broken out under the Old Regime. In overcoming that resistance, revolutionaries built yet another set of centralized controls.

The French used their own new system as a template for the reconstruction of other states. As revolutionary and imperial armies conquered, they attempted to build replicas of that system of direct rule elsewhere in Europe. Napoleon's government consolidated the system and turned it into a reliable instrument of rule. The system survived the Revolution and Empire in France and, to some degree, elsewhere; Europe as a whole shifted massively toward centralized direct rule with at least a modicum of representation for the ruled.

Resistance and counter-revolutionary action followed directly from the process by which the new state established direct rule. Remember how much change the revolutionaries introduced in a very short time. They eliminated all previous territorial jurisdictions, consolidated many old parishes into larger communes, abolished the tithe and feudal dues, dissolved corporations and their privileges, constructed a top-to-bottom administrative and electoral system, imposed expanded and standardized taxes through that system, seized the properties of emigrant nobles and of the church, disbanded monastic orders, subjected clergy to the state and imposed upon them an oath to defend the new state church, conscripted young men at an unprecedented rate, and displaced both nobles and priests from the automatic exercise of local leadership. All this occurred between 1789 and 1793.

Subsequent regimes added more ephemeral changes such as the revolutionary calendar and the cult of the Supreme Being, but the early Revolution's overhaul of the state endured into the nineteenth century, and set the pattern for many other European states. The greatest reversals concerned the throttling of local militiamen and revolutionary committees, the restoration or compensation of some confiscated properties, and Napoleon's Concordat with the Catholic Church. All in all, these changes constituted a dramatic, rapid substitution of uniform, centralized, direct rule for a system of government mediated by local and regional notables. What is more, the new state hierarchy consisted largely of lawyers, physicians, notaries, merchants, and other bourgeois.

Like their pre-revolutionary counterparts, these fundamental changes attacked many existing interests, and opened opportunities to groups that had previously had little access to state-sanctioned power — especially the village and small-town bourgeoisie. As a result, they precipitated both resistance and struggles for power. Artois (the department of Pas-de-Calais) underwent a moderate version of the transition (Jessenne 1987). Before the Revolution, Artoisian nobles and churchmen held a little over half of all land as against a third for peasants. Between 60 and 80 percent of all farms had fewer than 5 hectares (which implies that a similar large majority of farm operators worked part-time for others), and a quarter of household heads worked primarily as agricultural wage-laborers. Taxes, tithes, rents, and feodal dues took a relatively low 30 percent of the income from leased land in Artois, and a fifth of rural land went on sale with the revolutionary seizure of church and noble properties. Agricultural capitalism, in short, was well advanced by 1770.

In such a region, large leaseholders (fermiers) dominated local politics, but only within limits set by their noble and ecclesiastical landlords. The Revolution, by sweeping away the privileges of those patrons, threatened the leaseholders' power. They survived the challenge, however, as a class, if not as a particular set of individuals: many officeholders lost their posts during the struggles of the early Revolution, especially when the community was already at odds with its lord. Yet their replacements came disproportionately from the same class of comfortable leaseholders. The struggle of wage-laborers and smallholders against the coups de village that Georges Lefebvre discovered in the adjacent Nord was less intense, or less effective, in the Pas-de-Calais. Although the larger farmers, viewed with suspicion by national authorities, lost some of their grip on public office during the Terror and again under the Directory, they regained it later, and continued to rule their roosts through the middle of the nineteenth century. By that time, nobles and ecclesiastics had lost much of their capacity to contain local powerholders, but manufacturers, merchants, and other capitalists had taken their places. The displacement of the old
intermediaries opened the way to a new alliance between large farmers and bourgeoisie.

Under the lead of Paris, the transition to direct rule went relatively smoothly in Artois. Elsewhere, intense struggle accompanied the change. The career of Claude Javouhey, agent of the Revolution in his native department of the Loire, reveals that struggle, and the political process that incited it (Lucas 1973). Javouhey was a huge, violent, hard-drinking roustabout whose close kin were lawyers, notaries, and merchants in Fontevraud, a region not far to the west of Lyon. The family was on the ascendant in the eighteenth century, and in 1789 Claude himself was a well-connected thirty-year-old avocat at Montbrison. The Convention dispatched this raging bourgeois bull to the Loire in July 1793 and recalled him in February 1794. During those six months, Javouhey relied heavily upon his existing connections, concentrated on repression of the Revolution’s enemies, acted to a large degree on the theory that priests, nobles, and rich landlords were the enemies, neglected and bungled administrative matters such as the organization of food supply, and left behind him a reputation for arbitrariness and cruelty.

Yet Javouhey and his co-workers did, in fact, reorganize local life. In following his action in the Loire, we encounter clubs, surveillance committees, revolutionary armed forces, commissars, courts, and représentants en mission. We see an almost unbelievable attempt to extend the direct administrative purview of the central government to everyday individual life. We recognize the importance of popular mobilization against the Revolution’s enemies – real or imagined – as a force that displaced the old intermediaries. We therefore gain insight into the conflict between two objectives of the Terror: extirpation of the Revolution’s opponents and forging of instruments to do the work of the Revolution. We discover again the great importance of control over food as an administrative challenge, as a point of political contention, and as an incentive to popular action.

Contrary to the old image of a unitary people welcoming the arrival of long-awaited reform, local histories of the Revolution make clear that France’s revolutionaries established their power through struggle, and frequently over stubborn popular resistance. Most of the resistance, it is true, took the form of evasion, cheating, and sabotage rather than outright rebellion. Where the fault lines ran deep, however, resistance consolidated into counter-revolution: the formation of effective alternative authorities to those put in place by the Revolution. Counter-revolution occurred not where everyone opposed the Revolution, but where irreconcilable differences divided well-defined blocs of supporters and opponents.

France’s South and West, through similar processes, produced the largest zones of sustained counter-revolution (Lebrun and Dupuy 1987, Nicolas 1985, Lewis and Lucas 1985). The geography of executions under the Terror provides a reasonable picture of counter-revolutionary activity. The departments having more than 200 executions included: Loire Inférieure (3,548), Seine (2,639), Maine-et-Loire (1,886), Rhône (1,886), Vendée (1,616), Ille-et-Vilaine (909), Mayenne (495), Vaucluse (442), Bouches-du-Rhône (409), Pas-de-Calais (392), Var (309), Gironde (299), and Sarthe (225). These departments accounted for 89 percent of all executions under the Terror (Greer 1935: 147). Except for the Seine and the Pas-de-Calais, they concentrated in the South, the Southwest and, especially, the West. In the South and Southwest, Languedoc, Provence, Gascony, and the Lyonnais hosted military insurrections against the Revolution, insurrections whose geography corresponded closely to support for Federalism (Forrest 1975; Hood 1971, 1979, Lewis 1978; Lyons 1980; Scott 1973). Federalist movements began in the spring of 1793, when the Jacobin expansion of the foreign war – including the declaration of war on Spain – incited resistance to taxation and conscription, which in turn led to a tightening of revolutionary surveillance and discipline. The autonomist movement peaked in commercial cities that had enjoyed extensive liberties under the Old Regime, notably Marseille, Bordeaux, Lyon, and Caen. In those cities and their hinterlands, France fell into bloody civil war.

In the West, guerrilla raids against republican strongholds and personnel unsettled Brittany, Maine, and Normandy from 1791 to 1799, while open armed rebellion flared south of the Loire in parts of Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou beginning in the fall of 1792 and likewise continuing intermittently until Napoleon pacified the region in 1799 (Bois 1982, Le Goff and Sutherland 1984, Martin 1987). The western counter-revolution reached its high point in the spring of 1793, when the Republic’s call for troops precipitated armed resistance through much of the West. That phase saw massacres of “patriots” and “aristocrats” (as the proponents and opponents of the Revolution came to be called), invasion and temporary occupation of such major cities as Angers, and pitched battles between armies of Blues and Whites (as the armed elements of the two parties were known).

The West’s counter-revolution grew directly from the efforts of revolutionary officials to install a particular kind of direct rule in the region: a rule that practically eliminated nobles and priests from their positions as partly autonomous intermediaries, that brought the state’s demands for taxes, manpower, and deference to the level of individual communities, neighborhoods, and households, that gave the region’s bourgeois political power they had never before wielded. In seeking to extend the state’s rule to every locality, and to dislodge all enemies of that rule, French revolutionaries started a process that did not cease for twenty-five years. In some ways, it has not yet ceased today.

In these regards, for all its counter-revolutionary ferocity, the West conformed to France’s general experience. Everywhere in France, bourgeoisie – not owners of large industrial establishments, for the most part, but merchants, lawyers, notaries, and others who made their livings from the possession and
States and their Citizens

manipulation of capital—the mobilization of 1789 brought disproportionate numbers of bourgeois into political action. As the revolutionaries of Paris and their provincial allies displaced nobles and priests from their critical positions as agents of indirect rule, the existing networks of bourgeois served as alternative connections between the state and thousands of communities across the land. For a while, those connections rested on a vast popular mobilization through clubs, militias, and committees. Gradually, however, revolutionary leaders contained or even suppressed their turbulent partners. With trial, error, and struggle, the ruling bourgeoisie worked out a system of rule that reached directly into local communities, and passed chiefly through administrators who served under the scrutiny and budgetary control of their superiors.

This process of state expansion encountered three huge obstacles. First, many people saw the opening up of opportunities to forward their own interests and settle old scores in the crisis of 1789. They either managed to capitalize on the opportunity or found their hopes blocked by competition from other actors; both categories lacked incentives to support further revolutionary changes. Second, the immense effort of warring with most other European powers strained the state's capacity at least as gravely as had the wars of Old Regime kings. Third, in some regions the political bases of the newly-empowered bourgeoisie were too fragile to support the work of cajoling, containing, inspiring, threatening, extracting, and mobilizing that revolutionary forces carried on everywhere; resistance to demands for taxes, conscripts, and compliance with moralizing legislation occurred widely in France, but where preexisting rivalries placed a well-connected bloc in opposition to the revolutionary bourgeoisie, civil war frequently developed. In these senses, the revolutionary transition from indirect to direct rule embodied a bourgeoisie revolution and engendered a series of anti-bourgeois counter-revolutions.

Outside of France, finally, the imposition of French-style administrative hierarchies almost everywhere the revolutionary and imperial armies conquered, pushed the experiment yet another step, installing direct rule (mediated, it is true, by viceroyos and military commanders) in half of Europe. In mobilizing against the French, many German states likewise undertook extensive programs of centralization, nationalization, and penetration (Walker 1971: 185–216). If Napoleon's armies eventually lost and France's puppet states eventually collapsed, the administrative reorganization left a great impact on such countries-to-be as Belgium and Italy. The age of direct rule had begun.

STATE EXPANSION, DIRECT RULE, AND NATIONALISM

The most dramatic expansion of nonmilitary state activity began in the age of military specialization after 1850 or so. In that period, which extends to the recent past, military organization moved from a dominant, partly autonomous segment of state structure to a more subordinated position as the largest of several differentiated departments under control of a predominantly civilian administration. (That subordination was, of course, greater in peace than in war, greater in Holland than in Spain.) The nationalization of military forces during the previous century had already drawn most European states into bargaining with their subject populations over the yielding of conscripts, war materials, and taxes; immense citizen armies like those of the Napoleonic Wars entailed an unprecedented invasion of everyday social relations by the predatory state.

In the process of installing direct rule, European states shifted from what we might call reactive to proactive repression, especially with respect to potential enemies outside the national elite. Up to the eighteenth century, agents of European states spent little time trying to anticipate popular demands on the state, rebellious movements, risky collective action, or the spread of new organizations; their spies, when they had them, concentrated on the rich and powerful. When a rebellion or "sedition" occurred, governors brought in armed force as fast as they could, punishing in as visible and minatory a manner as they could devise. They reacted, but not by establishing continuous monitoring of potential subversives. With the installation of direct rule came the creation of systems of surveillance and reporting that made local and regional administrators responsible for prediction and prevention of movements that would threaten state power or the welfare of its chief clients. National police forces penetrated local communities (see Thibon 1987). Political and criminal police made common cause in preparing dossiers, listening posts, routine reports, and periodic surveys of any persons, organizations, or events that were likely to trouble "public order." The long disarmament of the civilian population culminated in tight containment of militants and malcontents.

In similar ways, European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions, install and regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and disabled, build and maintain communication lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of home industries, and the thousand other activities Europeans now take for granted as attributes of state power. The state's sphere expanded far beyond its military core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of protection, adjudication, production, and distribution. As national legislatures extended their own ranges well beyond the approval of taxation, they became the targets of claims from all well-organized groups whose interests the state did or could affect. Direct rule and mass national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily.

As direct rule expanded throughout Europe, the welfare, culture, and daily routines of ordinary Europeans came to depend as never before on which state they happened to reside in. Internally, states undertook to impose national languages, national educational systems, national military service, and much
more. Externally, they began to control movement across frontiers, to use tariffs and customs as instruments of economic policy, and to treat foreigners as distinctive kinds of people deserving limited rights and close surveillance. As states invested not only in war and public services but also in economic infrastructure, their economies came to have distinctive characteristics, which once again differentiated the experiences of living in adjacent states.

To that degree, life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states. National symbols crystallized, national languages standardized, national labor markets organized. War itself became a homogenizing experience, as soldiers and sailors represented the entire nation and the civilian population endured common privations and responsibilities. Among other consequences, demographic characteristics began to resemble each other within the same state and to differ ever more widely among states (Watkins 1989).

The later stages of European state formation produced both of the disparate phenomena we group together under the label “nationalism.” The word refers to the mobilization of populations that do not have their own state around a claim to political independence; thus we speak of Palestinian, Armenian, Welsh, or French-Canadian nationalism. It also, regrettably, refers to the mobilization of the population of an existing state around a strong identification with that state; thus, in the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War, we speak of clashing British and Argentinian nationalisms. Nationalism in the first sense ran throughout European history, whenever and wherever rulers of a given religion or language conquered people of another religion or language. Nationalism in the sense of heightened commitment to a state’s international strategy appeared rarely before the nineteenth century, and then chiefly in the heat of war. The homogenization of the population and the imposition of direct rule both encouraged this second variety of nationalism.

Both nationalisms multiplied during the nineteenth century, so much so that it might be better to invent a different term for their equivalents before 1800. As regions of fragmented sovereignty such as Germany and Italy consolidated into substantial national states and the whole map of Europe crystallized into 25 or 30 mutually exclusive territories, the two nationalisms incited each other. Great movements of conquest have typically aroused both nationalisms, as citizens of existing states saw their independence threatened and members of stateless but coherent populations saw possibilities both for extinction and for new autonomy. As Napoleon and the French reached out into Europe, national-state nationalism swelled on the French side and on the side of the states France menaced; by the time Napoleon lost, however, his imperial administrations had created the bases for new nationalisms of both types – Russian, Prussian, and British, to be sure, but Polish, German, and Italian as well – through much of Europe.

During the twentieth century, the two kinds of nationalism have increasingly intertwined, with one nationalism provoking the other – the attempt of rulers to commit their subjects to the national cause generating resistance on the part of unassimilated minorities, the demand of unrepresented minorities for political autonomy fostering commitment to the existing state on the part of those who benefit most from its existence. After World War II, as decolonizing powers started to map the entire remainder of the world into bounded, recognized, mutually exclusive states, the connection between the two nationalisms grew ever tighter, for the successful claim of one relatively distinct people to its own state usually spelled the rejection of at least one other people’s claim to a state; as the door closes, more peoples try to escape through it. At the same time, through implicit international compact, the boundaries of existing states have become less subject to alteration through warfare or statecraft. More and more, the only way minority nationalisms can achieve their goal is through the subdivision of existing states. In recent years, such composite states as Lebanon and the Soviet Union have felt acutely the pressure for subdivision. The pressure is still building.

**UNINTENDED BURDENS**

Struggle over the means of war produced state structures that no one had planned to create, or even particularly desired. Because no ruler or ruling coalition had absolute power and because classes outside the ruling coalition always held day-to-day control over a significant share of the resources rulers drew on for war, no state escaped the creation of some organizational burdens rulers would have preferred to avoid. A second, parallel process also generated unintended burdens for the state: as rulers created organizations either to make war or to draw the requisites of war from the subject population – not only armies and navies but also tax offices, customs services, treasuries, regional administrations, and armed forces to forward their work among the civilian population – they discovered that the organizations themselves developed interests, rights, perquisites, needs, and demands requiring attention on their own. Speaking of Brandenburg-Prussia, Hans Rosenberg says that the bureaucracy acquired an esprit de corps and developed into a force formidable enough to recast the system of government in its own image. It restrained the autocratic authority of the monarch. It ceased to be responsible to the dynamic interest. It captured control of the central administration and of public policy.

(Rosenberg 1958: vii-viii)

In similar ways, bureaucracies developed their own interests and power bases throughout Europe.

Response to the new interests brought more organization into being: niches for military veterans, orders of nobility for state officials, training schools, courts
with the going price for the staple grain. States that built substantial armies, administrative staffs, and capital cities thereby multiplied the number of people who did not produce their own food, and added to the demand for grain outside of the usual regional markets. Regional and national officials of the state found themselves spending large proportions of their time assuring and regulating the food supply.

Beholden to landlords who did not welcome state interference in their operations, European states concentrated their controls on distribution, not production. States such as Prussia and Russia, which ceded enormous powers to landlords and reinforced landlords’ domination of peasants in return for noble provision of military and administrative service, thereby affected the character of agriculture profoundly, but only indirectly. State-led redistribution of church lands, as in France, Italy, and Spain, impinged significantly on agriculture, but did not cause the states to supervise production as such. Not until the twentieth century, when some socialist regimes took over agricultural production and most capitalist regimes intervened in production by manipulating credit, prices, and markets, did states involve themselves heavily in that end of the food supply. Except for wartime rationing and occasional interdictions motivated by fiscal or political programs, states steered clear of consumption as well. But in the sphere of distribution, European states all found themselves dealing seriously with food.

Following decisively different timetables in different parts of Europe, the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries saw the interdependent expansion of international markets, rise of the wholesale food merchant, and increase in the number of wage-earners who depended on the market for food. At this point, the managers of states were balancing the demands of farmers, food merchants, municipal officials, their own dependents, and the urban poor – all of whom caused the state trouble when it harmed their particular interests. State and national officials developed the theory and practice of Police, in which the detection and apprehension of criminals played a minor part. Before the nineteenth-century proliferation of professional police forces as we know them, the word Police referred to public management, especially at the local level; regulation of the food supply was its single largest component. The great treatise of Nicolas de la Mare, *Traité de la Police*, first published in 1705, sums up that broad but food-centered conception of the state’s police powers.

To be sure, state approaches to food supply varied with the character of the state and its dominant classes. As Prussia built a standing army that was very large for the size of its base population, it also created stores and supply systems for the army, as well as encouragements for grain to flow into provinces where the army was concentrated; that system, like almost everything else in the Prussian state, depended on the cooperation of landlords and on the subordination of the peasantry. Despite intermittent national legislation on the subject, England generally left practical control over food supply in the hands of
its local magistrates, and only intervened actively in the shipment of grain into and out of the whole country; the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 marked the end of the long period in which the state restricted the importation of grain when prices were not very high, hence the period in which the state protected grain-growing landowners and their farmers against foreign competition. In Spain, the administrative effort to feed landlocked Madrid froze the food supply through much of Castile, and probably slowed the development of large-scale markets over the whole Iberian peninsula (Ringrose 1983).

Increasing state action caused a large expansion in the bulk of the national political apparatus devoted to regulation of flows of food, even when the avowed objective of state policy was to "free" the grain trade. That policy, increasingly adopted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consisted essentially of reinforcing the right of large merchants to ship food to where it would fetch the highest price. Eventually municipalities, urged on by state legislation, dismantled the old controls. In the long run, agricultural productivity rose and distribution improved sufficiently to reduce the vulnerability of cities, armies, and poor people to sudden food shortages. But along the way states created staffs that specialized in food, in surveillance and intervention to assure the flow of supplies to those whose action the state prized or feared. Indirectly, the pursuit of military power led to intervention in subsistence. Similarly, attempts to acquire men, uniforms, arms, lodgings and, above all, money to sustain military activity drew state officials into creating administrative structures they then had to supervise and sustain.

The forms of mass representation that European rulers bargained out with their subjects—become—citizens during the nineteenth century involved states in whole new arenas of activity, especially with respect to production and distribution. Characteristic bourgeois political programs — elections, parliaments, wide access to office, civil rights — became realities. Once citizens had enforceable claims on the state backed by popular elections and parliamentary legislation, the better organized among them demanded state action on employment, on foreign trade, on education, and eventually much more. States intervened in capital—labor relations by defining acceptable strikes and labor unions, by monitoring both of them, and by negotiating or imposing settlements to conflicts. On the whole, states that industrialized late committed more of the governmental apparatus — banks, courts, and public administrations — to the promotion of industry than did those that led the way (Berend and Ránki 1982: 59–72).

Table 4.1 shows how much state expenditures altered. Over these years, the Norwegian state's personnel expanded as well: in 1875, the central government employed about 12,000 civilians, about 2 percent of the labor force; in 1926, 54,000 (5 percent); in 1970, 157,000 (10 percent; Flora 1983: I, 228; see also Gran 1988b: 185). In Norway and elsewhere in Europe, central administration, justice, economic intervention, and, especially, social services all grew as an outcome of political bargaining over the state's protection of its clients and citizens.

The increase in social services occurred across Europe. Table 4.2 takes Austria, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany as exemplars, simply because Peter Flora has assembled comparable data on them. States that moved to centrally planned economies, such as the Soviet Union, surely saw even larger increases in the proportion of national income devoted to social services. Everywhere, especially after World War II, the state intervened in health, in education, in family life and finances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total government</th>
<th>military</th>
<th>Administration, justice</th>
<th>Economy, environment</th>
<th>Social services</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>&quot;Germany&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>&quot;Germany&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dates are approximate


As the availability of the figures itself suggests, all these interventions produced monitoring and reporting, so much so that the period from about 1870 to 1914 became a golden age of state-sponsored statistics on strikes, employment, economic production, and much more. Thus the state's managers became responsible for the national economy and the condition of workers to a degree unimaginable a century earlier. If the extent and timing of these changes varied dramatically from a resistant Russia to a volatile Great Britain, almost all nineteenth-century states moved in the same general direction.
MILITARIZATION = CIVILIZATION

The state-transforming processes we have surveyed produced a surprising result: civilizational of government. The result is surprising because the expansion of military force drove the processes of state formation. Schematically, the transformation occurred in the now-familiar four stages of patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, and specialization: first, a period in which major powerholders themselves were active military men, recruiting and commanding their own armies and navies; then the heyday of military entrepreneurs and mercenary troops in the hire of civilian powerholders; followed by the incorporation of the military structure into the state with the creation of standing armies; and finally, the shift to mass conscription, organized reserves, and well-paid volunteer armies drawn essentially from the state’s own citizenry, which led in turn to systems of veterans’ benefits, legislative oversight, and claims of potential or former soldiers to political representation.

We see the transition from patrimonialism to brokerage in the rise of the Italian condottieri. The shift from brokerage to nationalization begins with the Thirty Years’ War, which brought the apogee and self-destruction of such great military entrepreneurs as Wallenstein and Tilly – no relation of mine, so far as I know. One sign of that shift appears in the elimination of Prussian colonels from the clothing business, from which they once made handsome profits, in 1713–14 (Redlich 1965: II, 107). France’s levée en masse of 1793 and thereafter signals the shift from nationalization toward specialization. Elsewhere in Europe it became quite general after 1850. By the end of the process civilian bureaucracies and legislatures contained the military, legal obligations for military service extended with relative equality across social classes, the ideology of military professionalism restrained the involvement of generals and admirals in civilian politics, and the possibility of direct military rule or coup d’état declined greatly.

After 1850, during the age of specialization, civilizational of government accelerated. In absolute terms, military activity continued to grow in expense and importance. But three trends checked its relative importance. First, limited by the competing demands of the civilian economy, peacetime military personnel stabilized as a proportion of the total population while other government employment continued to expand. Second, expenditure on non-military activities grew even faster than military expenditure. Third, civilian production eventually grew quickly enough to outstrip military expansion, with the result that military expenditures declined as a share of national income. Non-military activity and expenditure captured a larger and larger part of governmental attention.

In the same states whose social expenditure we examined earlier, military personnel fluctuated as a percentage of the male population aged 20–44 (see Table 4.3). With important variations due to wartime deaths and war-related mobilizations, the western European states of 1970 were generally maintaining troops at around 5 percent of the male population aged 20–44. In 1984, the percentage of the total population in military service varied as follows (Sivard 1988: 43–4):

less than 0.5 percent: Iceland (0.0), Luxembourg (0.2), Ireland (0.4), Malta (0.3), Switzerland (0.3);

0.5 to 0.9 percent: Denmark (0.6), West Germany (0.8), Italy (0.9), Netherlands (0.7), Norway (0.9), Spain (0.9), United Kingdom (0.6), Poland (0.9), Rumania (0.8), Austria (0.7), Sweden (0.8);

1.0 to 1.4 percent: Belgium (1.1), France (1.0), Portugal (1.0), Czechoslovakia (1.3), East Germany (1.0), Hungary (1.0), USSR (1.4), Albania (1.4), Finland (1.1), Yugoslavia (1.0);

1.5 percent or more: Greece (2.0), Turkey (1.6), Bulgaria (1.6).

A few essentially demilitarized states now have less than 0.5 percent of their population under arms, and a few militarized ones run above 1.4 percent, but the bulk of European states lie in between. All of these shares – even those of semi-belligerent Greece and Turkey – run far below the 8 percent of its population Sweden placed in its military at its peak toward 1710. With high proportions of their able-bodied populations already at work and low proportions in agriculture, furthermore, European states now face severe limits to the number of additional troops they can mobilize in wartime without major reorientations of their economies.

Meanwhile, non-military activities were ballooning so fast that military expenditure declined as a share of most state budgets, despite the great expansion of those budgets. Taking the same countries as before, we find the decreasing trends in percentage of budget devoted to military expenditure shown in Table 4.4. In every state, the long-term trend led to a declining proportion of expenditure on military activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>“Germany”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Boundaries and identities of these states varied significantly with the fortunes of war
Source: Flora 1983: I, 251–3
Table 4.4Military expenditure as a percentage of state budget 1850–1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>“Germany”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>23.2</td>
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<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<td>19.1</td>
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<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dates are very approximate.

Source: Flora 1983: 1, 355–449

Eventually, indeed, national income rose faster than military expenditure. In 1984, the proportion of Gross National Product devoted to military expenditure varied in a pattern similar to that of men under arms (Sivard 1988: 43–4):

less than 2 percent: Iceland (0.0), Luxembourg (0.8), Rumania (1.4), Austria (1.2), Finland (1.5), Ireland (1.8), Malta (0.9);

from 2 to 2.9 percent: Belgium (3.1), Denmark (2.4), West Germany (3.3), Italy (2.7), Netherlands (3.2), Norway (2.9), Portugal (3.5), Spain (2.4), Hungary (2.2), Poland (2.5), Sweden (3.1), Switzerland (2.2), Yugoslavia (3.7);

from 4 to 5.9 percent: France (4.1), Turkey (4.5), United Kingdom (5.4), Bulgaria (4.0), Czechoslovakia (4.0), East Germany (4.9), Albania (4.4).

6 percent or more: Greece (7.2), USSR (11.5).

The standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union helped create this distribution of expenditures. In 1984, the United States was spending 6.4 percent of its own enormous GNP on military activity to match the 11.5 percent the Soviet Union was squeezing from its significantly smaller economy. Nevertheless, the general European trend ran downward: smaller proportions of the population under arms, smaller shares of state budgets devoted to the military, smaller percentages of national income spent on soldiers and weapons. These changes resulted from, and reinforced, the organizational containment of military men. At each step from patrimonialism to brokerage, from brokerage to nationalization, and from nationalization to specialization, then, new and significant barriers arose to limit the autonomous power of military men.

Deviations from the idealized sequence confirm its logic. Spain and Portugal escaped the civilianization of government by drawing on colonial revenues for a major share of military expenditures, continuing to recruit officers from the Spanish aristocracy and foot soldiers from the poorest classes, and maintaining military officers as the crown’s representatives in provinces and colonies (Ballbé 1983: 25–36; Sales 1974, 1986). All these factors minimized the sort of bargaining for warmaking resources with the subject population that elsewhere built up rights and restraints. Spain and Portugal may also have caught themselves in the “territorial trap” – the conquest of so much dependent territory, relative to their means of extraction, that administrative costs ate up their gains from imperial control (Thompson and Zuk 1986). Spain and Portugal thus anticipated, in some regards, the situations of many contemporary Third World states in which military men hold power.

Behind the differentiation of civilian from military organization, and the subordination of the military to the civilian, lay a fundamental geographic problem. Under most circumstances, the spatial distribution of state activity that serves military purposes well differs sharply from the spatial distribution that serves the production of revenues. So long as a state is operating through conquest and tribute in a contiguous territory, the discrepancy need not be large; occupying soldiers can then serve as monitors, administrators, and tax collectors. Beyond that point, however, four interests pull in different directions: the placement of military forces between their likely sites of activity and their major sources of supplies; the distribution of state officials who specialize in surveillance and control of the civilian population in a pattern that compromises between spatial completeness and correspondence to the population distribution; the apportioning of state revenue-collecting activities to the geography of trade, wealth, and income, and finally, the distribution of state activities resulting from bargaining over revenues according to the spatial structures of the parties to the bargains.

Obviously the resulting geography of state activity varies with its relation to all four of these forces; navies concentrate in deep-water locations along a state’s periphery, while post offices distribute in close correspondence to the population as a whole and central administrative offices cling to each other. The bigger the military establishment, the greater its orientation to war outside the state’s own territory, and the more extensive the apparatus of extraction and control that grows up to support it, the greater is the discrepancy between their geographies, and the more distant the ideal military geography from one that gives the armed forces substantial day-to-day control over the civilian population.

The geographic discrepancy encourages the creation of separate organizations for each activity, including the division of armed force into armies and police forces. The distribution of police forces comes to approximate the geography of the civilian population, while the distribution of troops isolates them from civilians and places them where international strategy dictates. Indeed, the French model divides land forces into three parts: soldiers grouped into garrisons located for administrative and tactical convenience; gendarmes (remaining under military control, and mobilizable into the military in wartime) spread across the communications lines and thinly-settled segments of the territory; and police stationed in the country’s larger agglomerations. Soldiers then patrol the frontiers, protect the sites of national power, intervene overseas, but rarely take part in control of crime or civilian conflicts.
Except for highways, gendarmes deal chiefly with those portions of the territory in which private property occupies most of the space, and therefore spend most of their time patrolling communication lines and responding to calls from civilians. Urban police, in contrast, crisscross territories dominated by public space and having valuable property within reach of that public space; they correspondingly spend more of their effort reaching out to control and apprehend without calls from civilians. Ultimately, any such geographic division separates the military from political power and makes it dependent for survival on civilians whose preoccupations include fiscal soundness, administrative efficiency, public order, and the keeping of political bargains as well as (perhaps even instead of) military efficacy. This complex logic strongly affected the spatial differentiation of European states.

To be sure, the discrepancy was more than geographic. As we have seen, the people who ran the state’s civilian half had little choice but to establish working relations with capitalists, and to bargain with the rest of the population over the yielding of resources for an expanding range of state activities. As they pursued revenue and acquiescence, officials built organizations that grew quite distinct from the military, and for most purposes became increasingly independent of it. In Europe as a whole, these processes did not prevent steadily increasing military expenditure or ever more destructive wars, but they did contain domestic military power to a degree that would have astonished a European observer of AD 990 or 1490.

5

Lineages of the National State

G. William Skinner portrays the social geography of late imperial China as the intersection of two sets of central-place hierarchies (Skinner 1977: 275–352; see also Wakeman 1985, Whitney 1970). The first, constructed largely from the bottom up, emerged from exchange; its overlapping units consisted of larger and larger market areas centered on towns and cities of increasing size. The second, imposed mainly from the top down, resulted from imperial control; its nested units comprised a hierarchy of administrative jurisdictions. Down to the level of the hsien, or county, every city had a place in both the commercial and the administrative hierarchy. Below that level, even the mighty Chinese Empire ruled indirectly via its gentry. In the top-down system, we find the spatial logic of coercion. In the bottom-up system, the spatial logic of capital. We have seen two similar hierarchies at work repeatedly in the unequal encounter between European states and cities.

In some Chinese regions, imperial control was relatively weak and commercial activity relatively strong; there, cities generally occupied higher ranks in the order of markets than in the imperial order. Elsewhere (especially at the empire’s periphery, where regions were typically more valuable to the center for security than for revenue), imperial control placed a city higher than did commercial activity. Skinner sketches some critical correlates of a city’s relative position in the two hierarchies; for example, imperial administrators assigned to cities occupying relatively high positions in the market hierarchy accomplished more of their work by dealing with “parapolitical” networks of merchants and other prospering notables than did their colleagues in less well-favored areas, while the regions including those major market cities financed more than their share of candidates for the imperial examinations that led to