Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990
CHARLES TILLY

Basil Blackwell
To the memory of Stein Rokkan
Intellectual enthusiast, impresario, creator, and friend
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Preface

Creative neurosis, I call it: the art of directing one’s compulsions and fears to productive outcomes. This book illustrates its application to writing. In this case, my compulsion to discover or invent simple symmetry in complex events combined with an urge to escape a burdensome responsibility by taking on another task that was not quite as daunting. Any reader of this book will recognize the signs of my compulsion to order and simplify. The second urge, however, takes a little explaining. Many times before I have found myself plunging into difficult work in order to avoid other work that was proving painful or difficult. This time, having started to collaborate with Wim Blockmans in the recruitment of a collection of papers on interactions of cities and states in Europe, I began an extremely ambitious book comparing the articulation of particular cities and states in several parts of Europe since AD 1000.

I meant the book to respond adequately to Perry Anderson’s great challenge: “Today, when ‘history from below’ has become a watchword in both Marxist and non-Marxist circles, and has produced major gains in our understanding of the past, it is nevertheless necessary to recall one of the basic axioms of historical materialism: that secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political – not at the economic or cultural – level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist” (Anderson 1974: 11). The book, I hoped, would merge three of my career-long concerns: the history and dynamics of collective action, the process of urbanization, and the formation of national states.

Such a book, as I understood it, required a mastery of exotic sources and languages, not to mention the compilation of large catalogs and statistical series that would only fall into place at a time. I began writing, but soon found myself digging for new material in obscure places, and testing my ability both to
learn new languages and retrieve old ones. Cornell University gave me the chance to try out some of the book's organizing ideas as its Messenger Lectures for 1987; although the discussion in Ithaca proved how ragged those ideas were, it also convinced me that the topic was important, and worth the long effort it would demand.

As I was working on that book in February and March 1988, I gave a series of lectures at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris. (I am grateful to Alain Lancelot and Pierre Birnbaum for arranging that opportunity, and to Clemens Heller for the support of the Maisons des Sciences de l'Homme during my stay in Paris.) My plan was to work in Parisian archives in between the lectures. But early in the series I again lectured on European cities and states. As I reflected on the lively questioning that presentation had provoked, I suddenly realized that I had another book well underway: a much more schematic, synthetic, concise, and feasible book than the one I had already begun. Writing that book would allow me an honorable, if temporary, exit from the formidable big project. Instead of going to the archives, I stayed home at my keyboard and began tapping away excitedly at the new volume. Reworked versions of my Cornell and Institut lectures fitted into the plan, so that when I returned to New York at the end of March I had drafted major chunks of the book.


During the ensuing months many friends and colleagues read or heard various segments of the book; my compulsion to talk about it and to revise incessantly kept them very busy. Janet Abu-Lughod, Wim Blockmans, Bruce Carothers, Samuel Clark, Brian Downing, Carmenza Gallo, Thorvald Gran, Marjolein 't Hart, Peter Katzenstein, Andrew Kirby, John Lynn, Perry Mars, Maarten Prak, Sidney Tarrow, Wayne te Brake, and Bin Wong gave me an inestimable gift: they critcized early drafts of the whole manuscript thoughtfully, while Richard Bensel, Robert Jervis, Jo Husbands, and David Laitin added sharp comments on particular sections. I owe Adele Rotman warm thanks for suggestions on how to get my ideas across. Nikki Aduba edited the manuscript with consummate care and intelligence. Louise Tilly was busy finishing her own books as I worked on this one, but she generously tolerated my obsession and offered strategic advice.

Audiences at the Universities of Bergen, California-Irvine, Chicago, Geneva, Leiden, and Western Ontario, at the City University of New York, Columbia University, Harvard University, and the Estonian Academy of Sciences asked pointed questions about parts of the analysis. The New School's proseminar on state formation and collective action helped me repeatedly in formulating the book's arguments. I am deeply indebted to Harrison White and his co-conspirators at Columbia University's Center for the Social Sciences (notably Lisa Anderson, David Cannadine, Martin Gargiulo, Denise Jackson, Gerald Marwell, Salvatore Pitruzzello, Kate Roberts, Hector Schamis, Kamal Shehadi, Jack Snyder, Claire Ullman, and Ronan Van Rossem) for a delightful seminar they organized to scrutinize draft chapters from this book. None of these helpful critics has seen a complete draft of the book's current version, and none therefore bears responsibility for my mistakes.

Mistakes there surely are. Stretching across a millennium, I have undoubtedly failed to consider major ideas, missed crucial events, ignored important contradictions, gotten significant facts wrong, and explained some changes incorrectly. I hope only that readers will inform me of any errors or omissions, and that they will reflect on how greatly my mistakes affect the overall argument before rejecting it out of hand. In my optimistic moods, I hope that this book will continue the work begun by the late Stein Rokkan, that it will build on the strengths and correct the errors of a work on which Stein and I collaborated, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, that it will exemplify the program of historically-grounded inquiry into large-scale processes of change I have advocated in earlier books such as Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons and As Sociology Meets History, and that it will contribute to the effort to work out theories of historical contingency exemplified by recent writings of Anthony Giddens, Allan Pred, Arthur Stinchcombe, and Harrison White. If so, compulsion and phobia will once again have made a constructive contribution to knowledge. Now, of course, I face a problem: that big book still awaits me.

Charles Tilly
Cities and States in World History

States in History

Some 3,800 years ago, the ruler of a small Mesopotamian city-state conquered all the region's other city-states, and made them subject to Marduk, his own city's god. Hammurabi, ruler of Babylonia, became the supreme king of Mesopotamia. By conquering, he gained the right and obligation to establish laws for all the people. In the introduction to his famous laws, Hammurabi claimed instruction from the great gods Anu and Enlil:

then did Anu and Enlil call me to afford well-being to the people,
me, Hammurabi, the obedient, godfearing prince, to cause righteousness to appear in the land
to destroy the evil and the wicked, that the strong harm not the weak
and that I rise like the sun over the black-headed people,
lighting up the land.

(Frankfort 1946: 193)

Wrapped in a divine calling, Hammurabi could confidently call those who opposed his rule "evil" and "wicked." Vilifying victims, annihilating allies, and razing rival cities, he claimed that divine justice stood behind him. Hammurabi was building the power of his city, and founding a state; his gods and their particular vision of justice would prevail.

States have been the world's largest and most powerful organizations for more than five thousand years. Let us define states as coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories. The term therefore includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and
many other forms of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms, and churches as such. Such a definition is, alas, controversial; while many students of politics use the term in this organizational way, some extend it to whatever structure of power exists in a large, contiguous population, and others restrict it to relatively powerful, centralized, and differentiated sovereign organizations – roughly to what I will call a national state. I will, furthermore, eventually compromise the definition by including such entities as today’s Monaco and San Marino, despite their lack of “substantial” territories, on the ground that other unambiguous states treat them as fellow-states.

For the moment, let us stick with the organizational definition. By such a standard, archaeological remains first signal the existence of states as of 6000 BC, and written or pictorial records testify to their presence two millennia later. Through most of the last eight millennia, states have only occupied a minority of the earth’s inhabited space. But with the passage of millennia their dominance has grown.

Cities originated in the same era. Some time between 8000 and 7600 BC, the settlement later called Jericho contained a temple and stone houses; within the next thousand years, it acquired a thick wall and differentiated buildings. By that time, one could reasonably call Jericho a city, and other Middle Eastern settlements were beginning to acquire the signs of urbanization as well. In Anatolia, Çatal Hüyük’s remains include rich houses, shrines, and works of art dating to well before 6000 BC. Full-fledged cities and recognizable states, then, appeared at roughly the same point in world history, a moment of great expansion in human capacity for creativity and for destruction. For a few millennia, indeed, the states in question were essentially city-states, often consisting of a priest-ruled capital surrounded by a tribute-paying hinterland. By 2500 BC, however, some Mesopotamian cities, including Ur and Lagash, were building empires ruled by warriors and held together by force and tribute; Hammurabi's unification of southern Mesopotamia came seven centuries after the first empires formed there. From that point on, the coexistence of substantial states and numerous cities has marked the great civilizations, from Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China to Europe.

Over the eight or ten millennia since the couple first appeared, cities and states have oscillated between love and hate. Armed conquerors have often razed cities and slaughtered their inhabitants, only to raise new capitals in their place. City people have bolstered their independence and railed against royal interference in urban affairs, only to seek their king’s protection against bandits, pirates, and rival groups of merchants. Over the long run and at a distance, cities and states have proved indispensable to each other.

Through most of history, national states – states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures – have appeared only rarely. Most states have been non-national: empires, city-states, or something else. The term national state, regrettably, does not necessarily mean nation-state, a state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity. Although states such as Sweden and Ireland now approximate that ideal, very few European national states have ever qualified as nation-states. Great Britain, Germany, and France – quintessential national states – certainly have never met the test. With militant nationalities in Estonia, Armenia, and elsewhere, the Soviet Union now lives the distinction painfully every single day. China, with nearly three thousand years’ experience of successive national states (but, given its multiple languages and nationalities, not one year as a nation-state), constitutes an extraordinary exception. Only during the last few centuries have national states mapped most of the world into their own mutually exclusive territories, including colonies. Only since World War II has almost the entire world come to be occupied by nominally independent states whose rulers recognize, more or less, each other’s existence and right to exist.

As this final partitioning of the world into substantial states has proceeded, two important counter-currents have begun to flow. First, speakers for many populations that do not form distinct states have made claims to independent statehood. Not only the inhabitants of former colonies, but also minorities within old, established Western states, have demanded their own states with surprising frequency. While I write, groups of Armenians, Basques, Utrechans, Kurds, Palestinians, Sikhs, Tamils, Tibetans, Western Saharans, and many more stateless peoples are demanding the right to separate states; thousands have died for claiming that right. Within a Soviet Union that long seemed an unbreakable monolith, Lithuanians, Estonians, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, Armenians, Jews, and numerous other “nationalities” are pressing for varying degrees of distinctness – and even, sometimes, independence.

In the recent past, Bretons, Flemings, French Canadians, Montenegrins, Scots, and Welsh have also made bids for separate power, either inside or outside the states that now control them. Minorities claiming their own states have, furthermore, regularly received sympathetic hearings from third parties, if not from the states currently governing the territories they have claimed. If all the peoples on behalf of whom someone has recently made a claim to separate statehood were actually to acquire their own territories, the world would splinter from its present 160-odd recognized states to thousands of statelike entities, most of them tiny and economically unviable.

The second counter-current also runs strong: powerful rivals to states – blocs of states such as NATO, the European Economic Community or the Warsaw Pact, world-wide networks of traders in expensive, illicit commodities such as drugs and arms, and financial organizations such as giant international oil companies – have emerged to challenge their sovereignty. In 1992, members of the European Economic Community will dissolve economic barriers to a degree that will significantly limit their ability to pursue independent policies in respect of money, prices, and employment. These signs show that
states as we know them will not last forever, and may soon lose their incredible hegemony.

In one of his sardonic "laws" of organizational behavior, C. Northcote Parkinson revealed that "a perfection of planned layout is achieved only by institutions on the point of collapse" (Parkinson 1957: 60). Cases in point include St Peter's basilica, and the Vatican Palace (completed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after the popes had lost most of their temporal power), the peacemaking Palace of the League of Nations (completed in 1937, just in time for the preliminaries to World War II), and the planning of colonial New Delhi, where "each phase of the [British] retreat was exactly paralleled with the completion of another triumph in civic design" (Parkinson 1957: 68). Perhaps a similar principle applies here. States may be following the old routine by which an institution falls into ruin just as it becomes complete. In the meantime, nevertheless, states remain so dominant that anyone who dreams of a stateless world seems a heedless visionary.

States form systems to the extent that they interact, and to the degree that their interaction significantly affects each party's fate. Since states always grow out of competition for control of territory and population, they invariably appear in clusters, and usually form systems. The system of states that now prevails almost everywhere on earth took shape in Europe after AD 990, then began extending its control far outside the continent five centuries later. It eventually absorbed, eclipsed, or extingushed all its rivals, including the systems of states that then centered on China, India, Persia, and Turkey. At the Millennium, however, Europe as such had no coherent existence; it consisted of the territory north of the Mediterranean once occupied by the Roman Empire, plus a large northeastern frontier never conquered by Rome, but largely penetrated by missionaries of the Christian churches which a disintegrating empire left as its souvenirs. At the same time Muslim empires controlled a significant part of southern Europe.

The continent we recognize today did have some potential bases of unity. An uneven network of trading cities connected much of the territory, and provided links to the more prosperous systems of production and commerce that extended from the Mediterranean to East Asia. The bulk of the region's population were peasants rather than hunters, pastoralists, or mercantile city-dwellers. Even in areas of urban concentration such as northern Italy, landlords ruled most of the population, and agriculture predominated among economic activities. Religion, language, and the residues of Roman occupation probably made the European population more culturally homogeneous than any other comparable world area outside of China. Within the area previously conquered by Rome, furthermore, traces of Roman law and political organization remained amid the splinters of sovereignty.

These features would eventually have a significant impact on Europe's history. Let us take AD 990 as an arbitrary point of reference. On the world stage the Europe of a thousand years ago was not a well-defined, unitary, independent actor. For that reason, any attempt to explain the continent's subsequent transformation in terms of its distinctive ethos or social structure runs a great risk of reasoning backwards. What is more, individual countries such as Germany, Russia and Spain simply did not exist as coherent entities; they took shape over succeeding centuries as a result of processes this book traces. Arguments that begin with the distinctive, enduring characteristics of "Germany" or "Russia" misrepresent the troubled, contingent history of European states.

So natural do the rise of national states, the growth of national armies, and the long European hegemony appear, indeed, that scholars rarely ask why plausible alternatives to them -- such as the systems of loosely-articulated regional empires that thrived in Asia, Africa, and the Americas well past AD 990 -- did not prevail in Europe. Surely part of the answer lies in the dialectic of cities and states that developed within a few hundred years after 990. For the coincidence of a dense, uneven urban network with a division into numerous well-defined and more or less independent states eventually set apart Europe from the rest of the world. Behind the changing geography of cities and states operated the dynamics of capital (of whose preferred sphere was cities) and of coercion (of which crystallized especially in states). Inquiries into the interplay between cities and states rapidly become investigations of capital and coercion.

A surprising range of combinations between coercion and capital appeared at one point or another in European history. Empires, city-states, federations of cities, networks of landlords, churches, religious orders, leagues of pirates, warrior bands, and many other forms of governance prevailed in some parts of Europe at various times over the last thousand years. Most of them qualified as states of one kind or another: they were organizations that controlled the principal concentrated means of coercion within delimited territories, and exercised priority in some respects over all other organizations acting within the territories. But only late and slowly did the national state become the predominant form. Hence the critical double question: What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different variants of the national state? Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so different? This book aims to clarify that problem, if not to resolve it entirely.

**Available Answers**

Established replies to the big question leave any serious student of European history unsatisfied. The alternatives now available differ especially with respect to their positions on two issues. First, to what extent, and how closely, did state formation depend on the particular form of economic change? The range runs
from straightforward economic determinism to assertions of the complete autonomy of politics. Second, how strong an influence did factors exterior to any particular state have on its path of transformation? Answers vary from strongly internalist accounts to those which attach overwhelming weight to the international system. Through no coincidence, theories of war and of international relations vary in exactly the same manner: from economically determinist to politically determinist, and from internal to internationalist.

Although very few thinkers station themselves at the extremes – derive the state and its changes, for example, entirely from the economy – differences among available approaches remain impressively large. Figure 1.1 schematizes available answers to the two questions.

![Figure 1.1 Alternative conceptions of state formation.](image)

**Statist analyses**

Thus a statist model of war, international relations, and state formation treats political change as proceeding in partial independence of economic change, and presents it chiefly as a consequence of events within particular states. Many analysts of international relations have often adopted a statist perspective, assuming that individual states act on their defined interests, that the international system is anarchic, and that interactions among states ultimately reduce to the parry and thrust of self-interested actors. These days the most popular theories of the classic type bear the labels “structural realist” or “rational choice”; they allow for the effects of a hegemonic, bipolar, or multipolar international system, but ground their analyses of states’ behavior in the interests and orientations of individual states (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 1988, Gilpin 1988, Waltz 1988; for explication and criticism, see Holsti 1985, Jervis 1988a).

Among historians, sociologists, and students of comparative politics, statist accounts of states’ transformations are by far the most popular. They inherit the now-discredited tradition of political development, searching for clues as to the conditions producing strong, effective, stable states, and assuming that only one such set of conditions exists. They typically take the individual state as their point of reference. When they do not reduce to particular histories of single states, they often posit a single, central path of European state formation and a set of deviations from the path explained by inefficiency, weakness, bad luck, geopolitical position, or the timing of economic growth and its concomitants; thus we have a few successful instances such as France or Britain and a great many failures, partial or total, such as Rumania or Portugal. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, for example, treat France as the most fully realized European state: “Prussia, Spain, and Italy followed various related paths, but the process of differentiation and institutionalization never went so far [as in France].” Great Britain they treat as “the model of under-statization” (Badie and Birnbaum 1979: 191, 217).

Samuel Huntington is a little more generous; considering Europe and the United States together, he distinguishes three patterns of modernization in governmental institutions: a Continental rationalization of authority and differentiation of structures within a unified sovereign body under the crown, a British centralization of power in a representative assembly, and an American fragmentation of sovereignty (Huntington 1968: 94–8). Soon, however, Huntington drops the distinction between Britain and the Continent in favor of a broad European–American comparison. In either analysis, Huntington singles out the effect of war on changes in state structure, but considers war to have roughly similar effects throughout Europe. His analysis emphasizes internal causes, and attributes little weight to economic determinants.

A second variant of the statist analysis stands closer to the diagram’s center. This locates states in an international environment, but still treats them as acting more or less individually; its answer to questions about the diverse paths of state formation begins with sociocultural variation among the various parts of Europe – Protestant or Catholic, Slavic or German, feudal or free, peasant or pastoral – and derives differences from rulers’ efforts to accomplish the same objectives in widely varying milieux. Thus in southeastern Europe theorists have repeatedly claimed to have discovered an indigenous Slavic, Magyar, or Roman village tradition distinguishing the fate of the region’s states from those of Russia to the east or of capitalist states to the west (Berend 1988, Hitchins 1988, Roksanđic 1988).

In a lucid and widely-read book, Paul Kennedy proposes a sophisticated variant of the statist argument, with significant economic overtones. His *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* resembles Mancur Olson’s *Rise and Decline of Nations* (which he does not cite) in more than title; both argue that the very process of economic and political expansion creates commitments that
eventually slow it down. Olson, however, concentrates on the contemporary
period, aims at building a general model, and singles out the coalitions – cartels,
labor unions, and others – that form within a state to capture benefits of growth.
Kennedy, in contrast, looks chiefly at a state’s international position, and marks
out a broad historical path.

Uneven economic growth, according to Kennedy, causes the world’s leading
states to acquire and lose advantages relative to other states, advantages they
ordinarily seek to secure with the support of military power. States that win out
in such contests, however, find that they have to commit increasing shares of
their resources to armies and navies. “If, however, too large a proportion of the
state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to
military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power
over the long term” (Kennedy 1987: xvi). Meanwhile, other states are amassing
wealth, reinvesting in the creation of new wealth, and benefiting from their
lesser obligation to pay for military force. Although Kennedy’s initial statement
renders the decline and fall merely possible, all the cases he analyzes – early
imperial China, the Mughal Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs,
Great Britain, and the United States – make it seem inevitable. In the pursuit of
this argument, Kennedy provides a useful chronology of the European state
system since 1519: a Habsburg bid for mastery (1519–1659), a great power
struggle without primacy (1660–1815), a period of uncertain British hegemony
(1815–85), another period of uneasy balance (1885–1918), the rise of the
United States to temporary supremacy (1918–43), a bipolar Soviet–US
system (1943–80), and another period of shifting struggle (1980–?). While
Kennedy’s analysis provides only vague indications of the origins of different
kinds of state organization, its emphasis on the interaction of war, economic
power, and international position points to factors that no treatment of the
subject can afford to neglect.

William McNeill’s *Pursuit of Power* brings out even more dramatically the
centrality of changing forms and scales of warfare in the transformation of the
European state system. McNeill’s *tour de force* presents an overview of warfare –
and especially its technological leading edge – in the world as a whole since
AD 1000. With great clarity he traces the impact of gunpowder, siege artillery,
antisiege fortifications, and other great technical innovations not only on
warfare itself, but also on state finances, the introduction of time-discipline into
civilian life, and much more. McNeill underestimates, I believe, the importance
of such organizational innovations as the commodification of military service as
well as the influence of changes in naval warfare, but he produces insight after
insight into the significance of a given kind of warfare for social life and state
structure. He does not, however, attempt a systematic analysis of relations
between military organization and different types of state formation.

With McNeill, we reach the boundary of statist and geopolitical analyses of
state formation; the sheer centrality of war in his account makes position within
the international system a critical determinant of any particular state’s
organizational history. Most statist treatments of the subject fit the conventional
use of the term much more comfortably, explaining the transformation of the
French, Ottoman, or Swedish state as an outcome of events and processes
within its own perimeter.

Such statist accounts of state formation – both monographic and synthetic –
provide much of the raw material from which I have manufactured the
argument of this book. Nevertheless, in themselves they provide no effective
answer to the book’s master theme: Why European states followed such diverse
paths but eventually converged on the national state. They dissolve into
particularisms and teleologies, explaining why the “modern” form of a given
state emerged on the basis of the special character of a national population and
economy. They neglect, furthermore, the hundreds of states that once
flourished but then disappeared – Moravia, Bohemia, Burgundy, Aragon,
Milan, Savoy, and many more. For systematic explanations, we must look
beyond the statist literature.

**Geopolitical analyses**

If most students of state formation have adopted a statist perspective,
considering the transformation of any particular state to result chiefly from
noneconomic events within its own territory, each of the other three per
perspectives has had influential advocates. Geopolitical analyses of state formation
attach great importance to the international system as the shaper of states within it. Geopolitical arguments ordinarily claim that interstate
relations have a logic and influence of their own, and that state formation
therefore responds strongly to the current system of relations among states. In a
characteristic effort, James Rosenau distinguishes four “patterns of national
adaptation” to international politics: acquiescent, intransigent, promotive, and
preservative. The intransigent state, for example, “can seek to render its
environment consistent with its present structures” while the promotive state
“can attempt to shape the demands of its present structures and its present
environment to each other” (Rosenau 1970: 4). Each of these patterns,
according to Rosenau, has distinctive consequences for the character of the
executive, the character of the party system, the role of the legislature, the role
of the military, and much more (Rosenau 1970: 6–8). Similarly, what William
Thompson calls a “global society” perspective on war and international
relations attributes considerable autonomy to politics, and regards individual
states as responding strongly to the structure of relations among all states; it
therefore falls clearly into the geopolitical quadrant. Unsurprisingly, then, we
find that geopolitical models of state formation, war, and international relations
articulate closely with each other (Thompson 1988: 22–7; see also Waltz
1979). This body of work, as I read it, provides a valuable corrective to the
internalism of statist analyses, but gives unclear guidance to the search for
mechanisms that link particular forms of state to specific positions within the international system.

**Mode of production analyses**

Mode of production analyses typically spell out the logic of feudalism, capitalism, or some other organization of production, then derive the state and its changes almost entirely from that logic, as it operates within the state's territory (Brenner 1976, Corrigan 1980). "We conceive of the state, as deriving equally from the economic and political imperatives of capitalist commodity production. The state is ultimately implicated in the generation and distribution of surplus value as it seeks to sustain its own power and wealth" (Clark and Dear 1984: 4). It follows that explanations of state structure derive largely from the interests of capitalists who operate within the same state's jurisdictions. Marxist and *marxians* analysts of war and international relations likewise generally deploy some version of theories of imperialism, an extension of national economic interest to the international sphere, which places them toward the diagram's mode-of-production corner.

In one of the most comprehensive and persuasive Marxist treatments, Perry Anderson proposes this formula:

The typical Western constellation in the early modern epoch was an aristocratic absolutism raised above the social foundations of a servile peasantry and ascendant towns; the typical Eastern constellation was an aristocratic absolutism erected over the foundations of a servile peasantry and subjugated towns. Swedish absolutism, by contrast, was built on a base that was unique, because . . . it combined free peasants and nugatory towns; in other words, a set of two "contradictory" variables running across the master-division of the continent. (Anderson 1974: 179–80)

Anderson similarly grounds the absence of well-developed absolutism in Italy in the relation of town aristocracies to surrounding tributary territories in which they acted both as rulers and as predatory landlords. He complicates the picture by insisting that "It was the international pressure of Western Absolutism, the political apparatus of a more powerful feudal aristocracy, ruling more advanced societies, which obliged the Eastern nobility to adopt an equivalently centralized state machine, to survive" (Anderson 1974: 198). Thus on either side of the Elbe the full-fledged absolutist state reflected the use of state power to fortify the positions of great feudal landlords, but military threats impinged on those positions differently in the East and the West. Anderson concentrates on the stronger, most centralized states, and aims his attention at the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, but his general approach deserves careful attention at a European and millennial level. In the meantime, it falls far short of a comprehensive account of European state formation. While the mode-of-production literature as a whole contributes many insights into struggles for control of states, indeed, it offers only the faintest of clues to reasons for variations in form and activity among states having similar modes of production.

**World system analyses**

World system analyses of state formation ground the explanation of diverse paths of state formation in a characterization of the world economy. Neo-Marxist theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein and André Gunder Frank extend the classic Marxist division between capital and labor to a world scale, thus pushing their analyses toward the world system quadrant — still deriving relations among states from economic structure, but regarding the structures of individual states as consequences of their positions within the world economy (see Taylor 1981). Wallerstein's grand survey of European history since 1500 (Wallerstein 1974–88) generally follows a spiral with respect to state formation: the mode of production in a given region creates a certain class structure, which emanates in a certain kind of state; the character of that state and the relations of the region's producers and merchants to the rest of the world economy determine the region's position — core, peripheral, or semiperipheral — in the world economy, which in turn significantly affects the state's organization. In this promising analysis, the state figures chiefly as an instrument of the national ruling class, an instrument that serves the interest of that class in the world economy. However, world system analyses have so far failed to produce a well-articulated theory linking the actual organizational structures of states to their positions within the world system. Thus Wallerstein's account of Dutch hegemony (volume II, chapter 2) in the seventeenth century provides no explanation of Dutch state structure — in particular, of the nation's prospering with a wispy national state at a time when its neighbors were creating massive civilian staffs and standing armies.

None of the four lines of explanation, much less their combination, yields a satisfactory set of answers to our pressing questions about European state formation. Most available explanations fail because they ignore the fact that many different kinds of states were viable at different stages of European history, because they locate explanations of state-to-state variation in individual characteristics of states rather than in relations among them, and because they assume implicitly a deliberate effort to construct the sorts of substantial, centralized states that came to dominate European life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Geopolitical and world-system analyses provide stronger guidance, but so far they lack convincing accounts of the actual mechanisms relating position within the world to the organization and practice of particular states. In particular, they fail to capture the impact of war and preparation for war on the whole process of state formation; on that score, statist analyses do much better.

In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, published in 1975, my
colleagues and I hoped to remedy these defects of the existing literature. In a series of historical studies emphasizing the extractive and repressive side of state formation, we looked self-consciously at war, policing, taxation, control of food supply, and related processes, and kept our distance from the models of political development that then prevailed. Our critique worked better, in retrospect, as a demonstration of the flaws in unilinear models of problem-solving political development than as an alternative account of European state formation. In fact, we implicitly substituted a new unilinear story—one running from war to extraction and repression to state formation—for the old one. We continued, more or less unthinkingly, to assume that European states followed one main path, the one marked by Britain, France, and Brandenburg-Prussia, and that the experiences of other states constituted attenuated or failed versions of the same processes. That was wrong. This book attempts to repair the errors of the previous one.

We have, fortunately, important models for the enterprise. Three great scholars—Barrington Moore, Jr, Stein Rokkan, and Lewis Mumford—escaped some of the standard literature's theoretical handicaps, even if they ultimately failed to fashion comprehensive accounts of variation in European state formation. In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore sought to explain (as his title implies) why in the twentieth century some states sustained more or less viable representative systems while others featured one form or another of authoritarian rule. Although his accounts of individual countries were all wide-ranging and nuanced, when it came to differences among national destinies Moore used as his points of reference the forms of government that existed in the 1940s and stressed as "origins" the class coalitions that prevailed when the country's agriculture began extensive commercialization. To the extent that great, exploitative landlords survived the transition to intensive cash-crop farming, according to Moore, authoritarian government persisted into the contemporary era. To the extent that the bourgeoisie predominated, some form of democracy existed.

Moore's insightful analysis left important problems unsolved. It focused on explaining conditions of government at a single historical moment, and thus failed to explain the different forms of government experienced by the same peoples before and after the critical moment. It deliberately ignored smaller states, dependent states, and states that did not survive. It said little about the actual mechanisms that translated a certain form of class power into a specific mode of government. But it posed this book's problems with great force. It pointed toward solutions taking serious account of changes and variations in the class coalitions dominating the states of different European regions.

Early in his career, Stein Rokkan became obsessed with the variability of European political systems, and with the tendency of adjacent states to develop similar political arrangements. Eventually he came to represent variation among European states in schematic maps which included a north–south dimension reflecting the variable influence of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, an east–west separation of seaward peripheries, seaward empires, a city-state band, landward empire–nations, and landward buffers, plus finer variations within those two dimensions.

Rokkan died before he produced a satisfactory version of his conceptual map. As he left it, his scheme called attention to marked geographic variation in the forms of European states, singled out the distinctiveness of state-formation in Europe's central urbanized band, and hinted at the importance of long-term changes in relations among rulers, neighboring powers, dominant classes and religious institutions. But it left a muddled idea of the actual social processes connecting these changes with alternative state trajectories. It is hard to see how Rokkan could have gotten much farther without laying aside his maps and concentrating on the analysis of the mechanisms of state formation.

Lewis Mumford made a less obvious contribution. Implicitly, he fashioned a threshold-and-balancing theory of urbanism. For Mumford, two great forces drive the growth of cities: the concentration of political power, and the expansion of productive means. Below a threshold combining minimum levels of power and production, only villages and bands exist. Above that threshold, the character of cities depends on the levels of power and production, relative and absolute: modest and balanced levels of power and production gave the classic polis and the medieval city their coherence; an excessive growth of political power informed the baroque city; the hypertrophy of production created the nineteenth century's industrial Cocetowns, and huge concentrations in both directions have produced the overwhelming cities of today. Figure 1.2 diagrammatically represents the argument.

Mumford pointed to similar effects on a national scale. "There is little doubt," he wrote in 1970, "that at least in most industrially developed countries..."
the Megatechnic Complex is now at the height of its power and authority, or is fast approaching it. In objectively measurable physical terms – units of energy, output of goods, input of ‘bads,’ capabilities for mass coercion and mass destruction – the system has nearly fulfilled its theoretic dimensions and possibilities; and if not judged by a more human measure, it is an overwhelming success” (Mumford 1970: 346). Mumford’s prescriptions followed directly from that analysis; reduce the scale of both production and political power, he argued, and a more humane city would result.

Since Mumford never quite explicated the analytic argument, he did not spell out its implications for the formation of states. Most of the time, he treated forms of rule as outgrowths of the prevailing technology, especially the technology of war. But the logic of his analysis clearly points to alternative trajectories of state formation depending on the prevailing combination of production and power.

This book, then, takes up the problem where Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan, and Lewis Mumford left it: at the point of recognizing decisive variations in the paths of change followed by states in different parts of Europe during successive epochs, with the realization that the class coalitions prevailing in a region at a given point in time strongly limited the possibilities of action open to any ruler or would-be ruler, and with the specific hypothesis that regions of early urban dominance, with their active capitalists, produced very different kinds of states from regions in which great landlords and their estates dominated the landscape. It goes beyond Moore, Rokkan, and Mumford most emphatically in two ways: first by placing the organization of coercion and preparation for war squarely in the middle of the analysis, arguing in its rasher moments that state structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers’ efforts to acquire the means of war; and second by insisting that relations among states, especially through war and preparation for war, strongly affected the entire process of state formation. Thus in this book I derive alternative histories of state formation from continuously-varying combinations of concentrated capital, concentrated coercion, preparation for war, and position within the international system.

This book’s central argument does not so much synthesize as echo the analyses of Moore, Rokkan, and Mumford. Even in its simplest form, the argument is necessarily complex; it says that in European experience:

Men who controlled concentrated means of coercion (armies, navies, police forces, weapons, and their equivalent) ordinarily tried to use them to extend the range of population and resources over which they wielded power. When they encountered no one with comparable control of coercion, they conquered; when they met rivals, they made war.

Some conquerors managed to exert stable control over the populations in substantial territories, and to gain routine access to part of the goods and services produced in the territory; they became rulers.

Every form of rule faced significant limits to its range of effectiveness within a particular kind of environment. Efforts to exceed that range produced defeats or fragmentation of control, with the result that most rulers settled for a combination of conquest, protection against powerful rivals, and coexistence with cooperative neighbors.

The most powerful rulers in any particular region set the terms of war for all; smaller rulers faced a choice between accommodating themselves to the demands of powerful neighbors and putting exceptional efforts into preparations for war.

War and preparation for war involved rulers in extracting the means of war from others who held the essential resources – men, arms, supplies, or money to buy them – and who were reluctant to surrender them without strong pressure or compensation.

Within limits set by the demands and rewards of other states, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structures of states.

The organization of major social classes within a state’s territory, and their relations to the state, significantly affected the strategies rulers employed to extract resources, the resistance they met, the struggle that resulted, the sorts of durable organization that extraction and struggle laid down, and therefore the efficiency of resource extraction.

The organization of major social classes, and their relations to the state varied significantly from Europe’s coercion-intensive regions (areas of few cities and agricultural predominance, where direct coercion played a major part in production) to its capital-intensive regions (areas of many cities and commercial predominance, where markets, exchange, and market-oriented production prevailed). The demands major classes made on the state, and their influence over the state, varied correspondingly.

The relative success of different extractive strategies, and the strategies rulers actually applied, therefore varied significantly from coercion-intensive to capital-intensive regions.

As a consequence, the organizational forms of states followed distinctly different trajectories in these different parts of Europe.

Which sort of state prevailed in a given era and part of Europe varied greatly. Only late in the millennium did national states exercise clear superiority over city-states, empires, and other common European forms of state.

Nevertheless, the increasing scale of war and the knitting together of the European state system through commercial, military, and diplomatic interaction eventually gave the war-making advantage to those states that could field standing armies; states having access to a combination of large rural populations, capitalists, and relatively commercialized economies won out. They set the terms of war, and their form of state became the predominant one in Europe. Eventually European states converged on that form: the national state.

Some of these generalizations (for example, the tendency for war to build state structure) hold through much of world history. Others (for example, the sharp contrast between coercion-intensive and capital-intensive regions) distinguish
Europe from many other world regions. We are pursuing a history that oscillates between the somewhat particular and the extremely general. In both regards, I will try to present enough concrete historical evidence to make the principles comprehensible and credible, but not so much as to bury them in detail.

If we explain the various paths taken by European states, we will better understand today's non-European states. Not that the states of Africa or Latin America are now recapitulating the European experience. On the contrary: the fact that European states formed in a certain way, then imposed their power on the rest of the world, guarantees that non-European experience will be different. But if we pinpoint the durable characteristics of the system Europeans first built, and identify the principles of variation within European experience, we will be better placed to specify what is distinctive about contemporary states, under what historically-imposed constraints they are operating, and what relationships among characteristics of states are likely to hold in our own time. With exactly that aim in mind, the book's final chapter turns from analyses of European experience to an examination of military power in today's Third World.

What happened in history? For the first few centuries of their existence, European states multiplied in the space left them by the large Muslim powers that ringed the Mediterranean and by the nomadic conquerors who thundered west from the Eurasian steppe. When they won territory, Muslims, Mongols, and other outsiders typically set up military rulers and systems of tribute that produced important revenues; they did not, however, intervene decisively in local social arrangements. Within their own space, Europeans farmed, manufactured, traded and, especially, fought each other. Almost inadvertently, they thereby created national states. This book tells how and why.

**LOGICS OF CAPITAL AND COERCION**

The story concerns capital and coercion. It recounts the ways that wielders of coercion, who played the major part in the creation of national states, drew for their own purposes on manipulators of capital, whose activities generated cities. Of course the two interacted; figure 1.3 represents the general condition.

Although states strongly reflect the organization of coercion, they actually show the effects of capital as well; as the rest of this book will demonstrate, various combinations of capital and coercion produced very different kinds of states. Again, cities respond especially to changes in capital, but the organization of coercion affects their character as well; Lewis Mumford's baroque city lived on capital like its cousins, but showed a clearer imprint of princely power—in palaces, parade grounds, and barracks—than they did. Over time, furthermore, the place of capital in the form of states grew ever larger, while the influence of coercion (in the guise of policing and state intervention) expanded as well.

**Capital — Cities — Exploitation**

Before entering into these complexities, however, it will help to explore the capital–cities and coercion–states relationships separately. Let us think of capital generously, including any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable claims on such resources. Capitalists, then, are people who specialize in the accumulation, purchase, and sale of capital. They occupy the realm of exploitation, where the relations of production and exchange themselves yield surpluses, and capitalists capture them. Capitalists have often existed in the absence of capitalism, the system in which wage-workers produce goods by means of materials owned by capitalists. Through most of history, indeed, capitalists have worked chiefly as merchants, entrepreneurs, and financiers, rather than as the direct organizers of production. The system of capitalism itself arrived late in the history of capital. It grew up in Europe after 1500, as capitalists seized control of production. It reached its apex—or, depending on your perspective, its nadir—after 1750, when capital-concentrated manufacturing became the basis of prosperity in many countries. For millennia before then, capitalists had flourished without much intervening in production.

The processes that accumulate and concentrate capital also produce cities. Cities figure prominently in this book's analyses, both as favored sites of capitalists and as organizational forces in their own right. To the extent that the survival of households depends on the presence of capital through employment, investment, redistribution or any other strong link, the distribution of population follows that of capital. (Capital, however, sometimes follows cheap labor; the relationship is reciprocal.) Trade, warehousing, banking, and production that depends closely on any of them all benefit from proximity to each other. Within limits set by the productivity of agriculture, that proximity promotes the formation of dense, differentiated populations having extensive outside connections—cities. When capital both accumulates and concentrates within a territory, urban growth tends to occur throughout the same territory—more intensely at the greatest point of concentration, and secondarily elsewhere (see figure 1.4). The form of urban growth, however, depends on the balance between concentration and accumulation. Where capital accumulation occurs
agriculture and transportation were becoming relatively efficient or when powerful pressures were driving people off the land.

The sheer growth of cities, however, produced a spiral of change in all these regards. In the vicinity of active cities, people farmed more intensively and devoted a higher proportion of their farming to cash crops; in Europe of the sixteenth century, for example, highly productive agriculture concentrated in the two most urbanized regions, northern Italy and Flanders. Similarly, urban growth stimulated the creation and improvement of transportation by water and land; the Netherlands’ superb system of canals and navigable streams brought down the cost, and brought up the speed, of communication among its swarm of cities, thus serving as both cause and effect of urbanization (de Vries 1978).

The pressures that drove people off the land, furthermore, often resulted in part from urbanization, as when urban landlords drove smallholders from the hinterland or urban demand fostered the capitalization of the hinterland’s agriculture. Accumulation and concentration of capital fostered urban growth, while transforming the regions surrounding new clusters of cities.

Coercion – States – Domination

What of coercion? Coercion includes all concerted application, threatened or actual, of action that commonly causes loss or damage to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who are aware of both the action and the potential damage. (The cumbersome definition excludes inadvertent, indirect, and secret damage.) Where capital defines a realm of exploitation, coercion defines a realm of domination. The means of coercion center on armed force, but extend to facilities for incarceration, expropriation, humiliation, and publication of threats. Europe created two major overlapping groups of specialists in coercion: soldiers and great landlords; where they merged and received ratification from states in the form of titles and privileges they crystallized into nobilities, who in turn supplied the principal European rulers for many centuries. Coercive means, like capital, can both accumulate and concentrate; some groups (such as monastic orders) have few coercive means, but those few are concentrated in a small number of hands; others (such as armed frontiersmen) have many coercive means that are widely dispersed. Coercive means and capital merge where the same objects (e.g. workhouses) serve exploitation and domination. For the most part, however, they remain sufficiently distinct to allow us to analyze them separately.

When the accumulation and concentration of coercive means grow together, they produce states; they produce distinct organizations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organizations operating within those territories (see figure 1.6). Efforts to subordinate neighbors and fight off more distant rivals create state structures in the form not only of armies but also of
War Drives State Formation and Transformation

The deployment of coercive means in war and domestic control presents warriors with two dilemmas. First, to the extent that they are successful in subduing their rivals outside or inside the territory they claim, the wielders of coercion find themselves obliged to administer the lands, goods, and people they acquire; they become involved in extraction of resources, distribution of goods, services, and income, and adjudication of disputes. But administration diverts them from war, and creates interests that sometimes tell against war. We can see the dilemma in the five-century conquest of Muslim Spain by Christian warriors. Starting with the taking of Coimbra in 1064, standard siege practice ran like this:

Residents of a town under siege who surrendered promptly could remain with full freedoms after the conquest. If the Muslims surrendered after having been under siege for some time, they could leave with only those goods they could carry. If they waited for the town to fall by force, they faced death or enslavement.

(Powers 1988: 18)

Any of the three responses set a problem for conquerors. The first imposed the obligation – at least temporarily – to establish a system of parallel rule. The second called for a redistribution of property as well as the settlement and administration of a depopulated town. The third left slaves in the hands of the victors, and poscd even more sharply the challenge of reestablishing production and population. In one way or another, conquest entailed administration. On a larger scale, these problems dogged the whole reconquest of Iberia. In different forms, they marked the history of conquest throughout Europe.

The second dilemma parallels the first. Preparation for war, especially on a large scale, involves rulers inextricably in extraction. It builds up an infrastructure of taxation, supply, and administration that requires maintenance of itself and often grows faster than the armies and navies that it serves; those who run the infrastructure acquire power and interests of their own; their interests and power limit significantly the character and intensity of warfare any particular state can carry on. Europe’s Mongol and Tatar states resolved the dilemmas by raiding and looting without building much durable administration, but their strategy put inherent limits on their power, and eventually made them vulnerable to well-financed mass armies. In contrast highly commercial states such as Genoa resolved the dilemmas by borrowing or contracting out the structure necessary to extract the means of war. Between the two extremes, European states found a number of other ways of reconciling the demands of war making, extraction, and other major activities.

European states differed significantly, indeed, with respect to their salient activities and organizations. Three different types of state have all proliferated in various parts of Europe during major segments of the period since 990: tribute-taking empires; systems of fragmented sovereignty such as city-states and urban federations, and national states. The first built a large military and extractive apparatus, but left most local administration to regional powerholders who retained great autonomy. In systems of fragmented sovereignty, temporary coalitions and consultative institutions played significant parts in war and extraction, but little durable state apparatus emerged on a national scale. National states unite substantial military, extractive, administrative, and sometimes even distributive and productive organizations in a relatively coordinated central structure. The long survival and coexistence of all three types tells against any notion of European state formation as a single, unilinear process, or of the national state – which did, indeed, eventually prevail – as an inherently superior form of government.

Over the centuries, tribute-taking empires have dominated the world history of states. Empires appeared mainly under conditions of relatively low accumulation of coercive means with high concentration of the available means. When anyone other than the emperor accumulated important coercive means, or the emperor lost the ability to deploy massive coercion, empires often disintegrated. For all its appearance of massive durability, the Chinese Empire suffered incessantly from rebellions, invasions, and movements for autonomy, and long spent a major part of its budget on tribute to Mongols and other nomadic predators. Nor did Europe’s empires enjoy greater stability. Napoleon’s 1808 invasion of the Iberian peninsula, for instance, shattered much of the Spanish overseas empire. Within months, movements for independence formed in most of Spanish Latin America, and within ten years practically all of the region had broken into independent states.

Federations, city-states, and other arrangements of fragmented sovereignty differed from empires in almost every respect. They depended on relatively high accumulations, and relatively low concentrations, of coercion; the widespread urban militias of fourteenth-century western Europe typify that combination. In such states, a relatively small coalition of nominal subjects could equal the ruler’s forces, while individuals, groups, and whole populations had abundant opportunities for defection to competing jurisdictions.
Fourteenth-century Prussia and Pomerania offer a telling contrast: in Prussia, then dominated by the Teutonic Knights, no great princes rivalled the Knights' Grand Master, and towns wielded little power. But the landlords installed by the Knights had wide discretion within their own extensive domains, just so long as revenues flowed to the Knights. In nearby Pomerania, a duchy established simultaneously by smaller-scale German conquests and alliances, many armed rivals to the duke arose, and smaller lords took to outright banditry, as towns dominated the duchy's Estates and provided major military forces in time of war.

During the 1326–8 war between the dukes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, Pomerania's towns generally sided with their duke while nobles aligned themselves with Mecklenburg. When the Pomeranian house won, the Estates, in which the cities had much say, "were granted far-reaching privileges: the guardianship over minor dukes, the decision whether new ducal castles should be built or pulled down, the right to choose a new master if ever the duke broke his promises or wronged his subjects" (Carsten 1954: 90). The cities' ability to give or withhold support afforded them great bargaining power.

In between tribute-taking empires and city-states stand national states – built around war, statemaking, and extraction like other states, but compelled by bargaining over the subject population's cession of coercive means to invest heavily in protection, adjudication, and sometimes even production and distribution. The later history of Prussia illustrates the process by which national states formed. During the fourteenth century, as we have seen, the Teutonic Knights established a centralized empire there. During the fifteenth century, the Knights, shaken by plague, out-migration of peasants, and military defeat, began to disintegrate, and the regional magnates they had previously controlled became Prussian political powers in their own right. They used their power to impose greater and greater restrictions on the peasants who remained on their estates; with coerced labor the increasingly powerful landlords shifted toward demesne farming and the export of grain to western Europe.

At the same time, the rulers of Brandenburg and Pomerania, previously weakened by alliances of their dukes with prosperous burghers, began to win their incessant struggles with the towns, as the towns' position in international trade declined and the ability of the Hanseatic League to intercede on their behalf weakened. The rulers then had to bargain with noble-dominated Estates, which acquired the fundamental power to grant – or deny – royal revenues for war and dynastic aggrandizement. Over the next few centuries the Hohenzollern margraves of Brandenburg fought their way to pre-eminence in what became Brandenburg-Prussia, absorbing much of old Pomerania in the process; they contracted marriage and diplomatic alliances that eventually expanded their domains into adjacent areas and into the capital-rich areas of the lower Rhine; and they negotiated agreements with their nobility that ceded privileges and powers to the lords within their own regions, but gave the monarch access to regular revenues.

Out of battles, negotiations, treaties, and inheritances emerged a national state in which the great landlords of Prussia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania had great power within domains the crown had never wrested from them. During the eighteenth century, such monarchs as Frederick the Great locked the last pieces of the structure into place by incorporating peasants and lords alike into the army, the one under the command of the other. Prussia's army mimicked the countryside, with nobles serving as officers, free peasants as sergeants, and serfs as ordinary soldiers. Peasants and serfs paid the price: many peasants fell into serfdom, and "In war and peace Old Prussia's military obligations weakened the social position, the legal rights, and the property holding of serfs vis à vis the noble estate" (Bosch 1962: 68). In this respect, Prussia followed a different path from Great Britain (where peasants became rural wage-workers) and France (where peasants survived with a fair amount of property into the nineteenth century). But Prussia, Great Britain, and France all trembled with struggles between monarch and major classes over the means of war, and felt the consequent creation of durable state structure.

As military allies and rivals, Prussia, Great Britain, and France also shaped each other's destinies. In the nature of the case, national states always appear in competition with each other, and gain their identities by contrast with rival states; they belong to systems of states. The broad differences among major types of state structure are schematized in figure 1.7. Well developed examples of all four kinds of state existed in different parts of Europe well after AD 900. Full-fledged empires flourished into the seventeenth century, and the last major zones of fragmented sovereignty only consolidated into national states late in the nineteenth century.

Figure 1.7 Alternative conditions of state growth as functions of accumulation and concentration of coercion.
Rulers of the three types faced some common problems, but faced them differently. Of necessity, they distributed means of coercion unevenly through the territories they sought to control. Most often they concentrated force at the center and at the frontiers, attempting to maintain their authority in between by means of secondary coercive clusters, loyal local wielders of coercion, roving patrols, and widespread collection of intelligence. The Ottoman Empire, for example, created two overlapping systems, one consisting of the kazas and other units of civil administration, governed by kadis, the other composed of sanaks and other districts of the feudal cavalry, governed by a military commander; in time of conquest, the military system tended to absorb the civilian, at the cost of losses in revenue (Pitcher 1972: 124).

The larger the state and the greater the discrepancy between the distribution of coercion and that of capital, however, the stronger the incentives to resist central control, and for alliances to form among different enemies of the state, whether inside or outside its territory. In the sanak of Belgrade, part of nineteenth-century Ottoman Serbia, the empire-serving notables (avan) logically concluded that they could enrich themselves more easily by creating their own redistributive system than by serving simply as the stewards of redistribution. They seized a share in the production of the peasantry, levied illegal tolls on the passage of livestock, and retained a portion of the fees collected at the customs stations of the Sava and Danube entrepôts, especially Belgrade, through which passed the cotton exports of Serres and Salonika destined for Vienna and Germany. In particular, they asserted their right to the destro, ostensibly an illegal tribute of one-ninth of a peasant's harvest after the collection by the timarist (in return for cavalry service to the state) of the destro or tenth. By this action and other acts of violence against person or property, the dues in kind exacted from many Serbian peasants were suddenly doubled, sometimes tripled. (Stoianovitch 1989: 262–3)

This sort of devolution of power occurred widely in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century. But in one version or another, agents of indirect rule everywhere in Europe faced temptations to emulate their Serbian cousins. Given the costs of communication and the advantages regional agents of the crown could gain by evading demands from the center or by using delegated national means for local or individual ends, all rulers faced repeated challenges to their hegemony.

Rulers of empires generally sought to co-opt local and regional powerholders without utterly transforming their bases of power and to create a distinctive corps of royal servants—often present or former comrades in arms—whose fate depended on that of the crown. Mamluk sultans, to take an extreme case, maintained a whole caste of enslaved foreigners who became warriors and administrators; except for feuds directly supporting officials, however, the Mamluks left local magnates in place within their domains. With such a system, slaves actually ruled Egypt and adjacent areas of the Middle East from 1260 to 1517 (Garcin 1988). Rulers of national states usually tried harder to create a complete administrative hierarchy and to eliminate autonomous bases of power. The Electors and kings of Brandenburg-Prussia, for example, ceded great power to the landholding Junkers, but tied them closely to the crown by means of offices, tax exemptions, and military service.

Those who ruled, or claimed to rule, in city-states, federations, and other states of fragmented sovereignty often managed to exercise right control over a single city and its immediate hinterland. Beyond that scale, however, they had no choice but to bargain with the authorities of competing centers. The local control usually depended not only on the city’s coercive forces, but also on extensive rural landholding by the urban ruling class. Once Florence began its aggressive expansion beyond the municipal level during the fourteenth century, its tyrants replaced the rulers of conquered cities with their own men as much as possible, but selected the replacements from among the local patricians.

All these arrangements left considerable power and discretion in the hands of local potentates, just so long as they contained the monarch’s enemies and kept the revenues flowing to the national capital. On a national scale, in fact, no European state (except, perhaps, Sweden) made a serious attempt to institute direct rule from top to bottom until the era of the French Revolution. Before then all but the smallest states relied on some version of indirect rule, and thus ran serious risks of disloyalty, dissimulation, corruption, and rebellion. But indirect rule made it possible to govern without erecting, financing, and feeding a bulky administrative apparatus.

The transition to direct rule gave rulers access to citizens and the resources they controlled through household taxation, mass conscription, censuses, police systems, and many other invasions of small-scale social life. But it did so at the cost of widespread resistance, extensive bargaining, and the creation of rights and perquisites for citizens. Both the penetration and the bargaining laid down new state structures, inflating the government’s budgets, personnel, and organizational diagrams. The omnivorous state of our own time took shape.

It is all too easy to treat the formation of states as a type of engineering, with kings and their ministers as the designing engineers. Four facts compromise the image of confident planning.

1 Rarely did Europe’s princes have in mind a precise model of the sort of state they were producing, and even more rarely did they act efficiently to produce such a model state. As the Norman Roger de Hauteville wrested Sicily from Arab control between 1060 and 1075, for example, he improvised a government by incorporating segments of the existing Muslim administration, drew Muslim soldiers into his own army, and maintained Muslim, Jewish, and Greek Christian churches, but took over large tracts of land as his own domain and parcelled out other lands to his followers. Calabria, which belonged to Sicily, remained very Greek in culture and political style, with Byzantine offices and rituals brought wholesale into Norman government. But Arab institutions also had their place: Roger’s chief minister bore the wonderful title Emir of
Emirs and Archonte of Archontes. The resulting state was certainly distinctive and new, but it did not emanate from a coherent plan. Roger de Hauteville and his followers created a mosaic of adaptations and improvisations (Mack Smith 1968a: 15–25).

2 No one designed the principal components of national states – treasuries, courts, central administrations, and so on. They usually formed as more or less inadvertent by-products of efforts to carry out more immediate tasks, especially the creation and support of armed force. When the French crown, greatly expanding its involvement in European wars during the 1630s, stretched its credit to the point of bankruptcy, the local authorities and officeworkers on whom the king’s ministers ordinarily relied for the collection of revenues ceased cooperating. At that point chief minister Richelieu, in desperation, began sending out his own agents to coerce or bypass local authorities (Collins 1988). Those emissaries were the royal intendants, who became the mainstay of state authority in French regions under Colbert and Louis XIV. Only in faulty retrospect do we imagine the intendants as deliberately designed instruments of Absolutism.

3 Other states – and eventually the entire system of states – strongly affected the path of change followed by any particular state. From 1666 to 1815, great wars with French monarchs formed the English state, French intervention complicated England’s attempts to subdue Scotland and Ireland, and French competition stimulated England’s adoption of Dutch fiscal innovations. From the sixteenth century onward, settlements of major wars regularly realigned the boundaries and the rulers of European states, right up to World War II; the division of Germany, the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and the dismantling of most European overseas empires all stemmed more or less directly from the settlements of World War II. In none of these cases can we reasonably think of a self-guided state acting on its own.

4 Struggle and bargaining with different classes in the subject population significantly shaped the states that emerged in Europe. Popular rebellions, for example, usually lost, but each major one left marks on the state in the form of repressive policies, realignments of classes for or against the state, and explicit settlements specifying the rights of the affected parties. During the fierce revolt of the Florentine workers (the Ciompi) in 1378, two of the three new woolworkers’ guilds formed during the rebellion defected to the government and thereby destroyed a front that had seized effective power in the city; in the settlement, the still-insurrectionary (and more proletarian) guild lost its right to exist, but the two collaborators joined the guilds that paraded and deliberated as part of the official municipal government (Schevill 1963: 279; Cohn 1980: 129–54).

On a smaller scale, both the resistance and the cooperation of knights, financiers, municipal officers, landlords, peasants, artisans, and other actors created and recreated state structure over the long run. Thus the class structure of the population that fell under the jurisdiction of a particular state significantly affected the organization of that state, and variations in class structure from one part of Europe to another produced systematic geographic differences in the character of states. Not only the ruling classes, but all classes whose resources and activities affected preparation for war, left their imprint on European states.

Twin facts, for example, strongly affected the path of Swedish state formation: first, the overwhelming presence of a peasantry that held plenty of land well into the eighteenth century; second, the relative inability of landlords either to form great estates or to coerce peasant labor on their lands. That exceptional rural class structure prevented the royal strategy of granting nobles fiscal and judicial privileges and assistance in bending peasants to their will in return for collaboration in extracting revenues and military service from the peasantry – even though such a strategy prevailed in nearby areas such as Prussia and Russia. It also helps explain the survival of a separate peasant estate which actually had some power over governmental action, and the fact that its period of imperial expansion Sweden turned rapidly from the hiring of mercenaries on the European market to the creation of militias whose members received land, or the income from land, in return for their service. In Sweden as elsewhere, the ambient class structure constrained rulers’ attempts to create armed force, and therefore left its impact on the very organization of the state.

Figure 1.8 Relations among coercion, capital, states, and cities.

A more general and schematic statement of the essential relationships is given in figure 1.8. The diagram takes this shape for the reasons we surveyed earlier: war and preparation for war involved rulers in extracting the means of war from others who held the essential resources – men, arms, supplies, or money to buy them – and were reluctant to surrender them without strong pressure or compensation. The organization of major social classes within a state’s territory, and their relations to the state, significantly affected the strategies rulers employed to extract resources, the resistance they met, the struggle that resulted, the sorts of durable organization extraction and struggle laid down, and therefore the efficiency of resource extraction. Within limits set
by the demands and rewards of other states, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structures of states. The organization of major social classes, and their relations to the state varied significantly from Europe’s coercion-intensive regions (areas of few cities and agricultural predominance, where direct coercion played a major part in production) to its capital-intensive regions (areas of many cities and commercial predominance, where markets, exchange, and market-oriented production prevailed). Demands major classes made on the state, and the influence of those classes over the state, varied correspondingly. The relative success of different extractive strategies, and the strategies rulers actually applied, therefore varied significantly from coercion-intensive to capital-intensive regions. As a consequence, the organizational forms of states followed distinctly different trajectories in these different parts of Europe. Such circumstances belie any idea that European monarchs simply adopted a visible model of state formation and did their best to follow it.

LONG TRENDS AND INTERACTIONS

Another illusion must also disappear. So far I have presented the relationships as though capital and coercion always moved toward greater accumulation and concentration. For the thousand years that concern us here, those have been the main trends. Yet even within the European experience many states have undergone deflation in both regards; Poland endured many reversals in capital and coercion, successive Burgundian and Habsburg empires collapsed, and the sixteenth-century religious wars seriously depleted Europe’s stocks of capital and coercive means. The history of European state formation runs generally upward toward greater accumulation and concentration, but it runs across jagged peaks and profound valleys.

Accumulation probably made the larger long-term difference to the history of the European economy. But concentration, deconcentration, and recenteration of coercion mark off major chapters in the story of state formation; the concentration came to depend in important degree on the availability of concentrated capital. Exactly why and how that was so will preoccupy this book’s later sections and take us into complicated questions of fiscal policy. Yet the central link is simple: over the long run, far more than other activities, war and preparation for war produced the major components of European states. States that lost wars commonly contracted, and often ceased to exist. Regardless of their size, states having the largest coercive means tended to win wars; efficiency (the ratio of output to input) came second to effectiveness (total output).

Through the interplay of competition, technological change, and the sheer scale of the largest belligerent states, war and the creation of coercive means became immensely more expensive over time. As that happened, fewer and fewer rulers could create military means from their own routine resources; more and more they turned to short-term borrowing and long-term taxation. Both activities went more easily where concentrations of capital already existed. But everywhere they produced changes in governmental organization.

How did changes in warfare and state organization relate to each other? As a first approximation, we can divide the years since AD 900 into four segments, with varying temporal limits from one part of Europe to another:

1. **Patrimonialism**: a time (up to the fifteenth century in much of Europe) when tribes, feudal levies, urban militias, and similar customary forces played the major part in warfare, and monarchs generally extracted what capital they needed as tribute or rent from lands and populations that lay under their immediate control;

2. **Brokerage**: an era (roughly 1400 to 1700 in important parts of Europe) when mercenary forces recruited by contractors predominated in military activity, and rulers relied heavily on formally independent capitalists for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises, and for installation and collection of taxes;

3. **Nationalization**: a period (especially 1700 to 1850 or so in much of Europe) when states created mass armies and navies drawn increasingly from their own national populations, while sovereigns absorbed armed forces directly into the state’s administrative structure, and similarly took over the direct operation of the fiscal apparatus, drastically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors;

4. **Specialization**: an age (from approximately the mid-nineteenth century to the recent past) in which military force grew as a powerful specialized branch of national government, the organizational separation of fiscal from military activity increased, the division of labor between armies and police sharpened, representative institutions came to have a significant influence over military expenditures, and states took on a greatly expanded range of distributive, regulatory, compensatory, and adjudicatory activities.

Clearly the relations between capital and coercion changed significantly from one period to the next.

The transformation of states by war, in its turn, altered the stakes of war. Through the period of patrimonialism, conquerors sought tribute much more than they sought the stable control of the population and resources within the territories they overran; whole empires grew up on the principle of extracting rents and gifts from the rulers of multiple regions without penetrating significantly into their systems of rule. In the move to brokerage and then to nationalization, a closely administered territory became an asset worth fighting
for, since only such a territory provided the revenues to sustain armed force. But in the age of specialization, states accumulated claimants to their services so rapidly that war became, even more than before, a means of satisfying the economic interests of the ruling coalition by gaining access to the resources of other states. Since World War II, with the extension of the European state system to the entire world and the accompanying rigidification of national boundaries, that has increasingly meant exercising influence over other states without actually incorporating their territory into that of the more powerful state.

Those were the broad trends. Yet more than one combination of capital and coercion appeared at each stage in the growth of European states. We might distinguish a coercion-intensive, a capital-intensive, and a capitalized coercion path to state formation. They do not represent alternative "strategies" so much as contrasting conditions of life. Rulers pursuing similar ends – especially successful preparation for war – in very different environments responded to those environments by fashing distinctive relations to the major social classes within them. The reshaping of relations between ruler and ruled produced new, contrasting forms of government, each more or less adapted to its social setting.

In the coercion-intensive mode, rulers squeezed the means of war from their own populations and others they conquered, building massive structures of extraction in the process. Brandenburg and Russia – especially in their phases as tribute-taking empires – illustrate the coercion-intensive mode. At the very extreme of the mode, however, armed landlords wielded so much power that no one of them could establish durable control over the rest; for several centuries, the Polish and Hungarian nobilities actually elected their own kings, and struck them down when they strove too hard for supreme power.

In the capital-intensive mode, rulers relied on compacts with capitalists – whose interests they served with care – to rent or purchase military force, and thereby warred without building vast permanent state structures. City-states, city-empires, urban federations, and other forms of fragmented sovereignty commonly fall into this path of change. Genoa, Dubrovnik, the Dutch Republic, and, for a time, Catalonia, exemplify the capital-intensive mode. As the history of the Dutch Republic illustrates, at the extreme this mode produced federations of largely autonomous city-states, and constant negotiation among them over state policy.

In the intermediate capitalized coercion mode, rulers did some of each, but spent more of their effort than did their capital-intensive neighbors on incorporating capitalists and sources of capital directly into the structures of their states. Holders of capital and coercion interacted on terms of relative equality. France and England eventually followed the capitalized coercion mode, which produced full-fledged national states earlier than the coercion-intensive and capital-intensive modes did.

Driven by the pressures of international competition (especially by war and preparation for war) all three paths eventually converged on concentrations of capital and of coercion out of all proportion to those that prevailed in AD 990. From the seventeenth century onward the capitalized coercion form proved more effective in war, and therefore provided a compelling model for states that had originated in other combinations of coercion and capital. From the nineteenth century to the recent past, furthermore, all European states involved themselves much more heavily than before in building social infrastructure, in providing services, in regulating economic activity, in controlling population movements, and in assuring citizens’ welfare; all these activities began as by-products of rulers’ efforts to acquire revenues and compliance from their subject populations, but took on lives and rationales of their own. Contemporary socialist states differ from capitalist states, on the average, in exerting more direct, self-conscious control over production and distribution. As compared with the range of states that have existed in Europe over the last thousand years, nevertheless, they belong recognizably to the same type as their capitalist neighbors. They, too, are national states.

Before their recent convergence, the coercion-intensive, capital-intensive and capitalized coercion paths led to very different kinds of states. Even after convergence, states retained some features – for example, the character of their representative institutions – that clearly reflected their earlier historical experiences. All three types of state were quite viable under certain conditions that actually prevailed in Europe at various times before the present. Indeed, at the abdication of Charles V in 1555, the major part of Europe lay under imperial hegemony, rather than under the control of national states in any strong sense of the term.

At that point, Suleyman the Magnificent’s Ottoman Empire (in addition to dominating Anatolia and much of the Middle East) occupied most of the Balkans and held in vassalage states from the Volga to the Adriatic. Charles V, as Holy Roman Emperor, Emperor of Spain, and Elder of the Habsburgs, then claimed rule over Spain, the Netherlands, Milan, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Austria, Bohemia, Burgundy, Franche-Comté and (more contestably) the swarm of states in the territory we now call Germany. Further east, Poland, Lithuania, Muscovy, and the Don Cossacks also organized in imperial style. In 1555, northern Italy, Switzerland, and significant parts of the Holy Roman Empire remained areas of intensely fragmented sovereignty, while only France and England resembled our conventional models of national states. By that time, city-states and other small-scale organizations were losing ground relative to other forms of state. Yet the Dutch Republic was soon to prove that federations of cities and adjacent territories could still hold their own as world powers. Empires, furthermore, were advancing. Nothing then assured the ultimate victory of the national state.

The lesson is clear. To use twentieth-century strength as the main criterion
of effective state formation (as many analysts do) means succumbing to the temptations of teleology, misconceiving the relations among cities, states, capital, and coercion in the European past. We can avoid these pitfalls by following the choices of statemakers, and the consequences of those choices, forward from an early date – here set arbitrarily at AD 990 – to the present.

That forward-looking strategy will allow us to reach some tentative answers to this book’s crucial question: What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different variants of the national state? Although the question is formidably broad, it translates into narrower, more manageable problems such as:

1 What accounts for the roughly concentric pattern of state formation in Europe as a whole, with large but thinly-controlled states as the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy forming early around the periphery, smaller but more tightly governed states such as France and Brandenburg grouped in a rough intermediate zone, and a central bank of city-states, principalities, federations, and other varieties of intensely fragmented sovereignty that only after 1790 consolidated into larger states?

2 Why, despite obvious interests to the contrary, did rulers frequently accept the establishment of institutions representing the major classes within the populations that fell subject to the state’s jurisdiction?

3 Why did European states vary so much with respect to the incorporation of urban oligarchies and institutions into national state structure, with the Dutch Republic’s state practically indistinguishable from its cluster of municipal governments, the Polish state almost oblivious to urban institutions, and a dozen other variants in between those extremes?

4 Why did political and commercial power slide from the city-states and city-empires of the Mediterranean to the substantial states and relatively subordinated cities of the Atlantic?

5 Why did city-states, city-empires, federations, and religious organizations lose their importance as prevailing kinds of state in Europe?

6 Why did wars shift from conquest for tribute and struggle among armed tributetakers to sustained battles among massed armies and navies?

The questions remain large, but not so large as the demand for a general explanation of the alternative trajectories taken by European states. The challenge, then, is to address this huge problem and its more manageable subsidiaries by close examination of the various paths that states actually took in different parts of Europe after AD 990. That will involve identifying the main processes transforming states, and sorting them out into their coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion variants.

A book on these questions must steer a narrow road between randomness and teleology. On one side, the blank wall of randomness, in which every history seems sui generis, one king or battle after another. On the other, the crevasse of teleology, in which the outcome of state formation seems to explain its entire course. I will try to avoid the blank wall and the crevasse by pointing out that the paths of state formation were multiple but not infinite, that at any particular historical juncture several distinctly different futures were possible, that states, rulers, and citizens influenced each other profoundly, that systematic problems and processes connected the histories of all European states, hence the relations among them. If successful, the chapters to come will tell a tale of diversity in unity, of unity in diversity, of choice and consequences.

PROSPECTS

Let me confess at once: my reading of the European past is unconventional, unproved, and riven with gaps. On the whole, students of European states have prudently avoided syntheses on the scale of a thousand years. Those who have made the leap have generally either sought to explain what was distinctive about the West as a whole, or proposed a single standard path of state formation, or both. They have usually proceeded retrospectively, seeking the origins of the states we now know as Germany or Spain and ignoring states that disappeared along the way rather than trying to chart the whole range of state formation.

By claiming the existence of multiple paths as a function of the relative ease with which capital and coercion concentrated, in arguing a strong interdependence between the form of a state and its previous access to capital, and by seeking to replace a retrospective with a prospective analysis of transformations in state structure I am abandoning the solid ways of established scholarship for an adventure in rethinking the past. By discussing a thousand years in little more than two hundred pages, furthermore, I hope to do no more than identify some important relationships, and illustrate how they worked.

A fully expanded version of the book’s argument would give far greater weight to the dynamics of the European economy than the following pages do. First of all, I will say far too little about swings in prices, productivity, trade and population growth, neglecting among other things the probable importance of price rises in the thirteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries and of depressions in between for the viability of different kinds of states and the relative power of merchants, peasants, landlords, officials, and other social classes (Abel 1966, Frank 1978, Kriedte 1983, Wallerstein 1974–88).

Second, I will treat the changing organization of production and the resulting class structure only cursorily. That is not because I think it negligible. On the contrary: relations between landlords and cultivators made an enormous difference to the consequences of statemaking, protection, and extraction, as
contrasts among Hungary, Florence, and England instantly demonstrate. The
seventeenth-century Prussian state, for example, bore the marks of Prussia’s
earlier history: during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a crusading
order, the Teutonic Knights, extended military control over that thinly-settled
region, subdued the Slavs who had previously occupied it, induced German
knights to come in and organize large estates, and encouraged cultivation by
those knights’ recruitment of peasants to clear and farm land that would be
theirs in return for dues and service. Such arrangements at the level of
household, village, or region clearly affected the viability of different kinds of
taxation, conscription, and surveillance. But my assignment is already
complicated enough. In order to concentrate on mechanisms of state formation
I will repeatedly stereotype or take for granted the relations among landlords,
peasants, agricultural proletarians, and other major rural actors.

In attempting to close in on the crucial relationships, furthermore, I will
make no effort to review alternative theories of state formation, past or present.
Nor will I try to state the pedigrees of the book’s organizing ideas. Let us take
for granted the existence of analyses by Karl Marx, Max Weber, Joseph
Schumpeter, Stein Rokkan, Barrington Moore, Gabriel Ardant, and others that
obviously bear on the book’s subject matter; cognoscenti will surely notice their
influence on almost every page, and reviewers will no doubt waste many of their
words trying to pigeonhole the book into one school or another. To deal with
those analyses, the theories behind them, and the historical phenomenon of
state formation at the same time would blunt the analysis and double its length
without advancing it greatly. Instead, the book will focus on the actual processes
of state formation.

In the interests of compact presentation, I will likewise resort to metonymy
and reification on page after page. Metonymy, in that I will repeatedly speak of
“rulers,” “kings,” and “sovereigns” as if they represented a state’s entire
decision-making apparatus, thus reducing to a single point a complex, contingent
set of social relations. Metonymy, in that cities actually stand for regional networks of production and trade in which the large settlements are
focal points. Reification, in that I will time and again impute a unitary interest,
rationale, capacity, and action to a state, a ruling class, or the people subject to
their joint control. Without a simplifying model employing metonymy and
reification, we have no hope of identifying the main connections in the complex
process of European state formation.

Most of the time the implicit model will contain these elements: a ruler
summing up the joint decision-making of a state’s most powerful officers; a
ruling class allied with the ruler and controlling major means of production
within the territory under the state’s jurisdiction; other clients enjoying special
benefits from their association with the state; opponents, enemies, and rivals of
the state, its ruler, its ruling class, and its clients, both within and outside the state’s
own area; the remainder of the population falling under the state’s jurisdiction; a
coercive apparatus including armies, navies, and other organized, concentrated
means of force that operate under the state’s control; and the civilian apparatus
of the state, consisting especially of distinctive fiscal, administrative, and judicial
organizations that operate under its control.

Most of the arguments to come entail the description and explanation of the
different ways that rulers, ruling classes, clients, opponents, general populations,
coercive organizations, and civil administrations articulated in European history
from AD 990 onward. Occasionally they unpack one or another of these reified
categories – most notably by specifying when, why, and with what effects
capitalists (themselves, to be sure, a reified class of people) fell into one or
another of the categories. But usually the arguments proceed as if each category
were real, unitary and unproblematic. We pay that price for operating on the scale
of a continent and a thousand years.

A final apology. On such a scale, I must deal with historical facts like a rock
skipping water; spinning quickly from high point to high point without settling
for more than an instant at a time. I do not know all the history one would need
to write this book fully, and to supply all the documentation for the history I
think I do know would burden the text immeasurably. On the recent growth of state
activity, for example, any responsible author would want to cite Reinhard
Bendix, Walter Korpi, Theda Skocpol, Goran Therborn, and many more. I do
nothing of the sort, generally reserving citations for direct quotations and
esoteric or controversial information. Clearly, experts will have to scrutinize my
rendering of European histories, and ponder whether its errors vitiate its
arguments.

Given their broad, synthetic, and speculative character, this book’s arguments
do not lend themselves immediately to verification or refutation. Yet we can
judge them wrong to the degree that:

1. Rulers having very different relations to capital and coercion nevertheless
pursued similar strategies, with similar effects, when they tried to build
armed force and state power;

2. Major moments in the growth and transformation of particular states, and of
the European state system as a whole, did not correspond to war
and preparation for war;

3. Efforts to amass the means of armed force did not produce durable features
of state structure;

4. Rulers deliberately set out to construct states according to preconceived
designs, and succeeded in following those designs;

5. Some or all of the empirical regularities I have claimed – especially (a)
state formation’s geography, (b) differential incorporation of urban oligarchies and
institutions into national state structure, (c) development of representative
institutions despite rulers’ contrary interests, (d) movement of political and
commercial power from Mediterranean to Atlantic, (e) decline of city-
states, city-empires, federations, and religious organizations, and (f) shift of
war to sustained battles among massed armies and navies – do not, in fact,
hold up to historical scrutiny;

alternative explanations provide more economical and/or convincing
accounts of those empirical regularities that do hold up to scrutiny.

If any of these holds true, my argument faces a serious challenge. If all of them
hold true, it is clearly wrong.

Important theoretical issues are at stake. One might expect a follower of
Joseph Strayer, for example, to hold that the domestic peacemaking activities of
monarchs began much earlier and played a much larger part in people’s
acceptance of the state than my account implies, and therefore to uphold most
of the checklist’s charges against the book’s analysis. One might expect a
follower of Douglass North to claim that the state’s construction and protection
of property rights underlay many of the changes I have attributed to preparation
for war. One might expect a follower of Immanuel Wallerstein to insist that the
activities of states forwarded the interests of capitalists to an even larger degree
than I have allowed, and a follower of Perry Anderson to counter (at least for
the middle period of my analysis) that the argument greatly underestimates the
weight of European nobilities in the creation of bulky “absolutist” states. Thus
the ways in which my arguments are right or wrong bear on widely-discussed
disagreements concerning European state formation.

The checklist provides a means of sorting possible criticisms of the book into
legitimate, semi-legitimate, and illegitimate. It would be fully legitimate, and
quite illuminating, to establish that one of the conditions just listed, or a similar
condition implied by the book’s arguments did, indeed, hold for some
substantial block of European experience. It would be semi-legitimate to show
that the argument did not account for certain major, durable features of
particular states. (The criterion would be only semi-legitimate because it would
show that the argument was incomplete – which I concede readily in advance –
but not that it was wrong.)

It would be illegitimate to complain that the argument neglects variables the
critic happens to regard as important: physical environment, ideology, military
technology, or something else. The missing-variable criticism only becomes
legitimate when the critic shows that neglect of the variable causes a false
reading of relationships among variables that do appear in the argument. The
point is not to give a “complete” account (whatever that might be), but to get the
main connections right.

In pursuit of that goal, the next chapter concentrates on the changing
geography of cities and states in Europe over the inquiry’s thousand years.
Chapter 3 takes up the mechanisms by which the rulers of states acquired the
means to carry on their major activities – especially the creation of armed force
– and the implications of those mechanisms for state structure. Chapter 4
concentrates on relations between states and citizens, tracing the formation
through bargaining of massive, multi-function states. Chapter 5 deals with
alternative paths of state formation, tracing out the effects of varying
relationships to capital and coercion. Chapter 6 examines European states as a
set of interacting parties, a system whose operation constrains the actions of its
members. Chapter 7 brings the story up to the present, reflecting on
contemporary relationships between capital and coercion in an effort to
understand why military men have gained power in so many states since World
War II, and in the hope of discerning in what ways European experience helps
us understand the troubled states of our own time.