The rise of the modern state: II. The autonomy of military power

Chapter 11 shows that military activities dominated state functions in 1760 and still absorbed half of state resources in 1910. Militarism remained central to the modern state through 1914 – indeed, on into the twentieth century. Yet the unusual period of geopolitical and social peace dominating the West since World War II has led sociology to neglect the importance of military organization for modern society. This chapter shows the general relevance of three key issues of military power: who controlled the military, how it was internally organized, and what functions it served. 1

1. The control issue can be posed in terms derived from the main theories of the state discussed in Chapter 3. Were the armed forces controlled by the dominant classes, by pluralist party democracy, or by an autonomous state elite? Alternatively, were they institutionally autonomous from all external control as a “military caste”? A single answer might not suffice for all the diverse times, places, and regimes covered here.

2. Military organization comprised the interaction of two hierarchies – relations between officers and men and their external relations with social classes – and two modernizing processes – bureaucratization and professionalization. It is often argued that the rise of “citizen armies” weakened both hierarchies (e.g., Best 1982). Yet military organization is essentially “concentrated-coercive.” Soldiers need coercive discipline to risk their lives and take the lives of others in battle. Most armed forces are disciplined hierarchies. Because in this period most armies fought in poorly prepared formations and campaigns, military hierarchy was unusually pronounced. Military was segmental power organizations, undercutting and often repressing popular notions of class and citizenship. Yet military organization was transformed. It was bureaucratically absorbed into the state – yet this did not end its institutional autonomy. And it was professionalized while remaining entwined with classes and state bureaucracy.

3. Military functions, once they were monopolized by states, were


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what I term the state’s “militarist crystallization.” This was dual: geopolitical, prosecuting external war, and domestic, repressing discontent. Both remained, but they were also transformed. Overall, I trace a surprising paradoxical trend: Despite the formal incorporation of military power into the state, despite the growth of broad national citizenship, military caste autonomy and segmental power increased through the period, bringing profound consequences and some danger for Western society. Why do you separate political and military power? Critics have asked me (e.g., Runciman 1987 and Erik Wright in several friendly arguments). My answer is because they have been separated, autonomous, in our own era – with devastating consequences. This chapter ends as Western militaries geared themselves up for a “world-historical moment” of power demonstration.

Functions: I. Domestic militarism

Arms, rarely navies, remained essential for maintaining domestic order, yet their role changed greatly through the period. 2 I distinguish four levels of domestic repression. The least would be a state that solved public order by conciliation, arbitration, and persuasion alone, without any repression. Clearly, no state has ever been entirely pacific, and therefore all move occasionally or as a matter of routine to repression. The second level is policing in the modern sense – combating crime and disorder by a disciplined force possessing only simple weapons without recourse to a show of military force. This had rarely been a function of an army. Most eighteenth-century policing was by constables appointed and segmentally controlled by local notables. Even London, Europe’s biggest city, was policed by a patchwork of parish constables. But if trouble escalated to a third level of riot, beyond the resources of constables, then regular army troops, militia, and other essentially paramilitary formations were called in for a show of force.

Riots were essentially demonstrations of greater force, rioters normally dispersed. The authorities might then contemplate remedies. This was usually a ritual exchange of violence. When it did not work, there was escalation to the fourth level, of full-scale military repression: actual fighting and shooting, normally by regular troops. Neither regimes nor armies welcomed this state because it actually represented their failure to provide routinized order. Its instruments were also relatively uncontrollable. The behavior of rioters and soldiers once guns fired, horses charged, and sabers flailed, perhaps

2. I have relied extensively in this section on Emnely’s (1983) comparative study of policing.
in confined streets, could not easily be predicted. It could lead to even more disorderly outcomes – and regimes often jettisoned officials who ordered it.

Between 1600 and 1800, central states acquired more of the third and fourth levels of repression as the army took over from local notables and their retainers. Eighteenth-century absolutist regimes then added new paramilitary police organizations in their capitals and, occasionally, nationally. The most famous were the French Maréchaussée, more than three thousand men responsible to the minister of war. In the 1780s, a military police guard of more than three hundred men kept order in Vienna. These were paramilitaries whose routine presence was essentially a show of force, intended to increase general surveillance and to deter crime and disorder (Axtmann 1991). Constitutional regimes, wary of standing armies, developed militias but officered them with local gentry, loosely coordinating with the army.

The major nineteenth-century development was the emergence of municipal, regional, and national police forces with organizational abilities paralleling armies, though without their numbers, arsenals, or potential resort to the fourth level of violence. They were responsible not to army or parish but to broader civilian authorities. The British police force was at one extreme: unarmored, controlled locally-regionally by the borough and the county but coordinated from London in emergencies. Elsewhere civilian and paramilitary organizations developed alongside each other. In France the Gendarmerie Nationale, originally Parish and responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, absorbed urban police forces, and the Gendarmerie developed from the Maréchaussée, armed and responsible to the minister of war. The Prussian police retained the most military flavor, though formally separate from the army and under increasing civilian control from about 1900. The U.S. Army cooperated with state militias, becoming the national guard, which in turn cooperated with local police authorities. These varied police forces and paramilitaries tended to remove armies from the third level of enforcement. Armies now specialized in the fourth level, confining themselves to serious outbreaks of organized violence, in close coordination with other authorities.

Contemporary sociologists have interpreted these developments under the influence of the two dominant and relatively pacific theories of modern times, liberalism and Marxism. They have seen them, especially into the growth of routinized policing, a more profound and essentially diffuse social transformation: the “pacification” of civil society itself through routinized policing and “internalized discipline.” Foucault (1979) argued that punishment in society was transformed from authoritative, open, punitive, spectacular, and violent to diffuse, hidden, routinized, disciplinary, and internalized. His evidence concerned only prisons and mental asylums, of doubtful relevance to broader societies. Yet Giddens (1985: 181–92) and Dandeker (1989) extend his argument, arguing that broader “disciplinary power” came through the routinization and “surveillance” provided by the records and timetables of public and private administrations – the routines of factory production, offices and accountancy practices, the ubiquity of timetables, rationalized written law, the constraints of economic markets (especially the free labor contract), and the supervised routine of school instruction. Recalcitrance became disciplined into internalized compliance at the point of initial tension, before it might erupt into violence.

Giddens emphasizes the workplace, quoting Marx’s comment that industrial capitalism introduced “dull economic compulsion” into class relations. This fits well with the arguments of Marxists like Anderson and Brenner that whereas historic modes of production extracted surplus labor with the help of violence, capitalism does it through the economic process itself. Violence recedes from class relations, a point also emphasized by Elias (1983) in his account of the development of the Western “civilizational process.” Violence in modern society is hidden, institutionalized (though feminists insist family violence remains). We no longer count the bodies, we psychosocialize the victims.

Neither Elias nor the Marxists have shown interest in the consequences of this for the military, but Giddens and Dandeker have. Giddens suggested that “it involves . . . not the decline of war but a concentration of military power ‘pointing outwards’ towards other states in the nation-state system” (1985: 192). Tilly (1990: 125) supports this, but adds the rider that no such transition has occurred in the twentieth-century Third World. Its armed forces point enormous military firepower inward against their own subjects, with few of the inhibitions shown by historic Western regimes. This differs from Western history, which, Tilly agrees, witnessed a major transformation of military power – from dual function (war/repression) to singular (war), detaching militaries from class struggle.

Is this true? Substantially, yes – but not during this period or primarily for the reasons cited by Foucault, Giddens, Dandeker, and Elias. They are right that social order in contemporary Western society – apart from American inner cities – is buttressed by far less repression than in most historic societies and that this leaves the military largely pointing outward. But this has been achieved predominantly in the twentieth century, due mostly to two other power achievements: political and social citizenship and the institutional conciliation of labor relations.
Though these began in this period, they were mostly attained in the twentieth century, in fact, mostly in the second half of the twentieth century. Because political and military control was achieved in most of the Third World, this explains why militaries still point inward there. The evidence will show that neither “discipline” nor the removal of the military from domestic repression had got far by 1914.

To establish a decline in overt violence, Dandeker and Giddens rely on two sources of evidence: contemporary descriptions of eighteenth-century society as characterized by petty theft, rowdism, and unsafe highways, and the nineteenth-century reduction in common crimes of violence, evidenced, for example, by Gurr et al. (1977). Though criminal statistics are notoriously unreliable, the decline was probably real (though partly offset by a probable increase in nonviolent crimes against property; Emsley 1983: 115–31). Advanced capitalist society usually is more pacified in its interpersonal relations and everyday routines than were historic societies, and one stage of this transformation began in the eighteenth and continued through the nineteenth century as Dandeker, Foucault, and Giddens argue (Elias argues that it began much earlier). Yet common crime (my second policing level) was not the concern of the eighteenth-century army, except in backward areas of Europe with organized banditry. Theft and rowdism were suppressed by constables, magistrates, or the retainers of local notables, or they were tolerated as the normal condition of society. Armies and militias were called in only if violence escalated to the third level, to riots requiring a show of force — principally food riots, smuggling disturbances, labor disputes, and riots against military impressment (as we saw in Chapter 4).

Tilly (1986) has provided the best evidence for what then happened, in the case of France. He narrates not the decline of collective protest but its twofold transformation, from bread riot to labor strike, and from local to national organization — responses to the development of capitalism and national state. In the twentieth century, both became institutionalized so that labor union and political party agitation did not require suppression by the regular army. But before 1914 it was different. Strikers and political protesters were met by soldiers with the same frequency experienced earlier by bread rioters. More than 1,000 protesters were killed in fights with troops in 1830, 1848, and 1871. Though no later events matched these

revolutions,” Tilly says that on dozens of occasions hundreds of people seized public spaces and held them against troops for more than a day. One of the biggest occurred near the end of the period, in the worker and farmer disturbances of 1905–7. There were also coups in 1851 and 1889 (failed).

Tilly labels the nineteenth “a rebellious century” (1986: 308–9, 358–66, 383–4). French armed forces were as active in repression in the nineteenth century as in the century before 1789. On the other hand, different departments of state also engaged in the opposite extreme, of conciliation. As we shall see in Chapter 18, French prefects and subprefects, aided at the end of the century by the Ministry of Labor, were attempting to defuse labor disputes before they escalated into violence. French domestic militarism was diversifying.

French history is distinctive, but its violence is not. In the United States, up to 1860, the army’s main task was to kill Indians; then it fought a civil war that smoldered on in an occupation of the South while the large, reconstituted national guard switched from suppressing Indians and slaves to occupying the South and then to breaking up strikes and urban riots (Hill 1964: chapter 4; Dupuy 1971, esp. 76). Goldstein (1978: 1–102, 548) documents “massive and continuous” repression of American labor from 1870 to the 1930s, including repeated deployment of the national guard, backed where necessary by the army. It peaked in the 1880s and 1890s and then declined a little. But this was because regime and employers had devised a dual strategy for labor — repress broad and socialist protest, conciliate the sectional protests of skilled workers (see Chapter 18). American domestic repression remained military and paramilitary, if becoming more selective. Only at the very beginning of the twentieth century were other government agencies beginning labor conciliation.

Austrian violence remained virtually unchanged. The army stationed garrisons in all major towns and repressed national disturbances in every decade. Though the Revolution of 1848–9 was not repeated, protest and repression did not decline, and the regime increasingly relied more on the regular joint army than on less reliable provincial paramilitaries (Deak 1990: esp. 65–7). There was little genuine labor arbitration by either the Austrian or Prussian-German states. Moreover, their militaries could also intervene in civil matters. German garrisons and citadel towns were the principal repressors of rioting right into the twentieth century. From 1820 on, local German army commanders had the right to intervene arbitrarily, without being asked by civilian authorities (though the two normally acted together). This culminated in the notorious Zabern incident of 1913, where a local colonel arbitrarily dispersed demonstrators and jailed their leaders. This stirred public

3 That the institutionalization of labor relations in the Third World has contributed less to demilitarization of society is probably due to the fact that industrialization is more narrowly based there than in the West. The industrial working class in countries like those of Latin America is far smaller proportionately than in their historical Western counterparts.
outcry and the colonel was court-martialed – but he was acquitted and arbitrary military power upheld. There was no secular decline in German army intervention. In 1891, soldiers with machine guns, live ammunition, and fixed bayonets were still intimidating striking miners. Yet, by now, the German army rarely had to use much actual violence. Mostly a rather ritualized show of what was essentially paramilitary force sufficed (R. Tilly 1971; Ludtke 1989: esp. 180–98; see also Chapter 18).

In most countries military repression continued but along with the growth of new police and paramilitary authorities – and in the party-democratic states also eventually along with state conciliation of class conflict. Thus armies did not routinely face intermediate disturbance levels. Riots were as common as in the eighteenth century, but regimes found more forms of repression specifically geared to the actual level of threat. Very few regimes or military commanders had ever liked charging or firing at crowds. Only in Russia did they do this at all frequently; only in the United States, with its traditional individual and local violence, did they routinely risk this (see Chapter 18). Repressive militarism remained in its three traditional forms – primarily a presence, secondarily a show, and only rather rarely actual violence – but it now had added a wider repertoire.

In fact, the British experience was the truly distinctive one, the one clear case of decline in military repression. During the eighteenth century the peacetime army, 10,000–15,000 strong, had been used repeatedly in riots, and the last major occasion, the Gordon riots of 1780, when an astonishing 285 persons were killed. The army was kept ready for repression during the French wars, most of its barracks no longer in the smuggling areas but distributed for use against the French and domestic radicals. It was joined by two gentry militias, the Volunteers and the Yeomanry. Rioters were then suppressed by soldiers in 1816, 1821, and 1830–32 and Chartists between 1839 and 1848. Ireland was throughout a rebellious exception being the Gordon rioter of 1781; there was relative peace until a series of strike waves between 1889 and 1912. But these were now handled differently.

From the 1840s on, the British authorities could also turn to borough and county police forces. If the large Manchester force (one constable per 633 of the population in 1849) could not cope with local strikers, the London Metropolitan Police and the Home Office could send ten times that number of policemen in a day. Though the army was used at least twenty-four times, probably more, between 1869 and 1910 (Emsley 1983: 178), most strikers were confronted by shows of strength from the boys in blue, not the redcoats (by now decked in khaki).

Military repression was still in evidence, but it had declined since 1848. It was also substantially supplemented by the most substantial state agencies for the conciliation of labor disputes (see Chapter 17). Why had this unique change from the military to policing (plus a conciliation common to the party-democratic states) occurred in Britain, and what kind of pacification did it represent? There were three main causes: 1. Capitalist urbanization stimulated the fears of proprietors classes, unable to control their localities by traditional segmental patronage power, bolstered by occasional resort to the army. They had to swallow their fear of centralized “despotical” police forces. They did this earlier than in other countries because the dislocations of urban, then industrial, capitalism uniquely coincided with the politicized rioting of the French wars and reform period through to Chartism (see Chapters 4 and 15). Moreover, a severe threat had already arisen in eighteenth-century Ireland. There the Protestant ascendency had swallowed its fears of centralization to devise the police force that became the model for mainland Britain (Axthmann 1991).

2. The military itself wished to withdraw from repression, believing it damaged the troops’ morale and interfered with Britain’s imperial commitments. Britain had proportionately the smallest, most professional home army. It had no border regiments or other forces specializing in low-intensity pacification tasks that could easily switch to riot control.

3. The collapse of Chartism in 1848–9 demoralized radical protesters and enabled the new police forces a period to establish themselves efficiently at the lowest level of threat, dealing with crime, before they were asked to move up to riot control. The new system worked. By the time of the London dock strike of 1889, the police had developed the “keep moving, please” tactics that enabled shoving and marching to continue without culminating in head-on confrontation (McNeill 1983: 187–8). Now the regime could avoid the destabilizing, delegitimizing effects of all-out violence, freeing the army to defend the empire.

Did the new policing also work because of diffuse internalized “discipline” sweeping society? Giddens correctly stresses the nineteenth-century development of administrative and communications power capacities. But this was more authoritative than diffuse and both sides could use it. While fairly spontaneous local violence might reduce, organized class war might increase – as in the Chartist period. Thereafter, authoritative organization benefited the sectional trade unionism emerging out of the ruins of Chartism. The police also gained authoritative powers, responding swiftly and with flexible numbers in shows of force adequate to the intermediate level riot. The gun and cavalry charge were abandoned with relief.
There are few signs that potential rioters were being "disciplined" in the Foucault-Giddens sense, or exploited by purely economic means, in the Marxian sense. Chartists experienced physical and organizational defeat (Chapter 15 explains this); farm workers were cowed by declining numbers and transportation into local, covert protest (Tilly 1982); capitalism provided adequate food to the towns, reducing bread riots; and skilled workers turned to sectional, responsible protest. (See Chapter 15.) These causes stem from the balance of authoritative organized power, not from more diffuse "discipline." Because other regimes lacked such organizational superiority over their domestic opponents, they needed more military force to back up their emerging police.

Looking at repression historically and by level generates more complex conclusions than the single world-historical transformation suggested by Foucault, Giddens, and the Marxists. We must include the particularities of military and police organization and of regime strategies, neglected in their accounts. Actually, the earlier period, from about 1600 to 1800, had probably seen the greater transformation, when state-controlled armies became primarily responsible for the second as well as the third level of repression. Yet armies later became recognized as inappropriate instruments, especially in cities and when gun technology began to deliver too little show and bang, too much death, on crowds. We shall see later in the chapter that war was also becoming more professional, more concerned with concentrated firepower, less with sabers.

War was becoming more different from domestic repression. Regimes saw that the two military functions were diverging in tactics, weapons, barracking, and discipline. This threatened army efficiency in what had always been its primary external role. Thus it was absolutist regimes — closer to the military, not ruling with greater diffuse discipline — which moved first to police their biggest cities (Chapter 13 shows that they moved first toward more bureaucratic administration in general) and to institute paramilitary national police. Britain moved to police forces, partly from its Irish experience, partly because its army was the most stretched by its two roles.

Then a second transformation began about 1800, as the inappropriateness of the military instrument was exposed by the seditions of the revolutionary period and industrialization. A three-part division of labor (which still exists) appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century, as police, the paramilitary, and the regular army coped with ascending levels of threats to order. Two "pacifications" then furthered this transformation. The lowest level threat, ordinary crime, probably began to diminish, partly owing to the authoritative efficiency of the new police forces and perhaps, also, to broader social and disciplinary processes of the Giddens-Foucault-Marxist type. Second, and later, higher force levels were needed less as citizenship and the conciliation of labor relations developed, though this varied among regimes. Goldstein (1983) shows that, after 1900, the military was still involved everywhere, but its interventions were declining in the more constitutional, party-democratic regimes of northwest Europe.

Goldstein notes the particular effect of a "safety valve" without which things might have been worse: forty million young, vigorous, perhaps discontented Europeans departed for the New World between 1850 and 1914. But he attributes most of the decline in repression to politics. Regimes had promoted industrialization, literacy, and urbanization, yet this created a dissident petite bourgeoisie and working class. Eventually, after fifty years of turmoil and repression, regimes changed tack and began to conciliate selectively and incorporate middle- and working-class demands compatible with good order. Military repression would now be reserved for genuine extremists — a selective policy with profound implications for working-class movements (explored in Chapter 18). Some decline in military repression occurred in the three party-democratic regimes once they institutionalized political citizenship and labor relations. The British middle classes were incorporated in midcentury; the French republic and the American Union were entrenched rather later. Britain's industrial relations were the most institutionalized, then the French, but the major changes only occurred after the war (see Chapters 17 and 18). As Germany and Austria had not solved their representative, nor Austria its national, crystallization, their militaries were required as before.

Let me also draw attention to the biased nature of my own sample of states. They were all major Powers, wielding more military force than minor Powers. Most minor Powers of the West have shared many similarities — low regime capacity to repress, low levels of actual repression, early transition to full representative democracy (including early woman suffrage), early institutionalization of labor relations, and early transition to welfare states. It is difficult to believe that inhabitants of Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, and (after 1830) the Low Countries better internalized the "coercive disciplines" of modern society than did Germans or Americans. It is more likely they had less military coercion oppressing them and so were able to achieve greater citizen rights (as Stephens 1989 argues).

Most Great Power armies still pointed inward as well as outward, but they were now supplemented by police and paramilitary organizations and a few by conciliation. If society was becoming a little more disciplined, most of the discipline was still authoritatively imposed by
hierarchical coercive organizations, not diffusely internalized by the citizens themselves. In the long run the development of the modern state was to “civilize” more of the state, reducing its domestic militarism to lower levels. More of its staff were “conventionally attired, conventionally mannered people who operate in a most un-military fashion” and who pushed brute force into the background (Poggi 1990: 73–4). But in this period civilian officials pushed the brutes into a more specialized role, alongside a specialized “seminbrutish” police role and (in some cases) a few “civil” conciliators – and with the compliance of the brutes themselves. This remained true in most countries until after 1945. Most domestic militarist crystallizations had declined toward lower force levels, but domestic militarism remained.

If some social groups in some countries now compiled a little more actively and voluntarily, this resulted primarily from their attaining valued citizen rights, not from unconscious routinization of modern social life. Because both the balance of authoritative powers and the attainment of citizen rights varied, so did levels and types of military repression. For their part, regimes faced no less disorder from dissidents but possessed repressive resources with greater precision than musket volleys and flailing sabers. This left most militaries able to concentrate more on external war, modifying rather than ending their dual role. Domestic military repression remained directed against varied crystallizations of classes and ethnic, regional, and religious minorities fighting for greater citizenship rights. Thus the two hierarchies of army stratification – their class composition and their officer-men relations – remained relevant to their function of domestic repression. I show later that geopolitical militarism led to caste tendencies inside the military, but this was restrained by close relations with conservatives and proportioned classes in domestic repression.

Functions: II. Geopolitical militarism

War and preparation for war had long been the predominant state function. Chapter 11 shows that this remained so until the mid-nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century the threat and use of military force was an unquestioned part of foreign policy. War is not the everyday stuff of foreign policy, and diplomats often avoided it. But eighteenth-century Great Powers were at war in 78 percent of years and nineteenth-century ones in 40 percent (Tilly 1990: 72). Because war is perhaps the most ruthless competition known to human societies, there was a continuous learning process – being at war or watching one closely, learning its lessons, modernizing the military, facing a threat, going to war or closely observing it, and on and on. A regime that did not pay close attention and was not modernizing its military would not survive long. Militarism also pervaded more pacific diplomacy – negotiating alliances, royal marriages, and trade treaties. Virtually no diplomatic arrangements were entered into without considering the military balance of power and the security of one’s own state. War and the military were central to state leadership and foreign policy. All states crystallized as militaristic – as almost all do today.

Who controlled their geopolitical militarism, making decisions of war and peace? Traditional practices, enduring into the late eighteenth century in absolute regimes, were very clear. Foreign policy, including war, was the monarch’s own private prerogative. Frederick II of Prussia described how in 1740 he came to win Silesia – crucial in the world-historical rise of Prussia:

At my father’s death, I found all Europe at peace. . . . The minority of the youthful Tsar Ivan made me hope Russia would be more concerned with her internal affairs than with guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction [the treaty allowing a woman, Maria Theresa, to succeed to the Austrian throne]. Besides, I found myself with highly trained forces at my disposal, together with a well-filled exchequer, and I myself was possessed of a lively temperament. These were the reasons that prevailed upon me to wage war against Theresa of Austria, queen of Bohemia and Hungary. . . . Ambition, advantage, my desire to make a name for myself – these swayed me, and war was resolved upon. [Ritter 1969: 1, 19]

Subtracting the affection from Frederick’s account still leaves formidable personal discretion to conduct wars. He also names his enemies personally, another attribute of dynastic diplomacy. This constitutional prerogative was buttressed by a second. The monarch had become commander in chief of the armed forces. Maria Theresa (r. 1740–83) was the first Austrian ruler to obtain the final seal of authority: Austrian soldiers now swore an oath of allegiance to her rather than to their individual commander. She did not lead her soldiers into battle; no more did French or British kings; and Prussian kings soon ceased to. They needed hierarchical chains of command, (described later).

How did nineteenth-century democratization fare against these monarchical prerogatives? In a word – badly. Monarchs held out successfully on the conduct of foreign and military policy. As Chapter 10 shows, when in 1867 the Habsburgs conceded substantial autonomy to the Hungarian Reichsrat, foreign policy was still largely reserved as Franz Joseph’s prerogative and the army was his. He was supposed to consult over commercial treaties, but he evaded this by dismissing foreign ministers who disagreed with him. Military affairs and budgets were under his personal control in his long reign and he put them first,
above domestic considerations (Macartney 1971: 565–7, 586, passim). Of course, Austria was a distinctive, gigantic protection racket actually centered on the arbitrary dynastic, military powers of the Habsburgs to defend all their squabbling peoples from greater powers around. But Habsburg powers were not unified. In the German Reich the Prussian king remained commander in chief. He did not need to consult the Reichstag over foreign policy or war. He required the consent of other German rulers in the Reichsrat, but his dominance ensured this was mere form. In these countries (and in Russia) a vigorous monarch could exercise close control of foreign policy or delegate it to counselors and foreign ministers with his confidence.

We might assume things change as regimes democratized, but not so. Consider first one of the most democratic constitutional monarchies in Europe, Norway after independence in 1905. The constitution typically reserved for the royal prerogative the executive and emergency powers to mobilize troops, declare war, make peace, enter and dissolve alliances, and send and receive envoys. In all respects he formally had to consult parliament but in practice parliament seemed indifferent. The Foreign Ministry had “hardly any strong feeling that foreign policy in a democratic society also concerns the people,” concludes Riste (1965: 46). Norwegian classes and other interest groups were indifferent because they were nationally organized and preoccupied – as we shall see was (and still is) the nineteenth-century norm.

As nation-states emerged, classes and other major interest groups became nationally confined, leaving the conduct of foreign policy to supposedly “democratic” chief executives who in this respect actually resembled the old absolute monarchs. In mostly democratic Italy, the monarch had lost most domestic powers by 1900, but not his control over diplomacy. Bosworth (1983: 97) says, “Foreign policy was a matter for the King and his closest advisers. Nationalist ‘public opinion’ was tiresome, although, if organized and directed, it might have positive virtues. But it must never make decisions.”

Because Britain was the greatest party democracy of the age, its decision making is of special significance. Its foreign policy plus “the government, command and disposition of the army” remained royal prerogatives, as was normal in constitutional monarchies. Yet, since 1688, military implementation had been severely constrained. Parliament determined army and navy size, funding, and internal regulations. Parliamentary assent was required to bring foreign troops into Britain and to maintain a peacetime standing army (Brewer 1989: 43–4). “Ultimate” decision making in foreign policy formally rested with Parliament.

Yet routine foreign policy did not require the consent of Parliament unless it broke the law of the land or incurred new financial obligations (Robbins 1977a). In 1914, Parliament had to approve the declaration of war (as in France, but unlike the other combatants), but everyday foreign policy during the crisis of July-August remained largely private. The foreign secretary ranked second only to the prime minister. Parliament did not exercise much control over him. Normally a hereditary peer, he sat in the Lords, not the Commons – a deliberate device for avoiding public discussion. Commons requests for information were regularly repulsed with the formula “not in the public interest.” The foreign secretary consulted regularly the prime minister and intermittently at his discretion with relevant cabinet colleagues and experienced statesmen. He rarely consulted full cabinet. A commanding figure like Lord Rosebery ran his own foreign policy (Martel 1985), a moderately lazy one like Sir Edward Grey steered its general drift and did not bother to consult “outsiders.” The few persons styling each other “statesmen” communicated through letters sent between country houses and conversations in gentlemen’s clubs. In liberal diplomacy the court had been replaced by the club, not by the Commons (evidence from Steiner 1969; Steiner and Cromwell 1972; Robbins 1977a; Kennedy 1985: 59–65). In contrast to this tightly knit private group, public opinion was amorphous, disunited, and difficult to bring to bear on particular issues (Steiner 1969: 172–200; Robbins 1977b). An essentially old regime executive remained insulated in foreign policy even while worker MPs were crowding into the Commons. British classes were nationally pre-occupied. They left routine foreign policy to the experts.

In the most advanced party democracy of the age, the United States, we might expect things to be different. After all, the Revolution had been squarely aimed against such practices – and specifically at executive taxes for foreign policy without consent. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly deprived the executive of taxation powers and vested war- and treaty-making powers with Congress. However, Article II of the Constitution vested in the president all executive powers not explicitly limited in other articles. These residual powers were assumed at the time, and were confirmed by nineteenth-century Supreme Courts, to center on the routine conduct of foreign policy. In practice this meant the president could conduct his own foreign policy as long as he did not declare war, make treaties, or need monies additional to those already slushing around the administration. This still seems the situation – and was roughly agreed on by all sides during the 1990–1 run-up to the Gulf War – though it can still occasion controversy. (See the exchange between Theodore Draper and President Bush’s legal adviser in The New York Review of Books, March 1 and March 17, 1990.)

Early nineteenth-century presidents were in practice restrained by
the fact that most foreign and military issues – relations with Britain, France, Spain, Mexico, and Indians – impacted directly on the territory of North America and on the lives of American settlers and interest groups. But as the continent was filled, foreign policy turned toward more distant imperialism, away from the predominantly national (or continental) preoccupations of Americans. Executive autocracy grew. After 1900, Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt manipulated Congress and public opinion into following foreign policies that were essentially made by executive actions. In 1908, Woodrow Wilson argued that imperialism had changed constitutional practice: “The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction whatsoever, is virtually the power to control absolutely” (LaFeber 1987: 708, on whom this paragraph relies). Even in this, the most constitutional state, once classes and other interest groups became nationally organized, foreign policy could be dominated by a fairly insulated state executive – with the formal backing of the Constitution. Public opinion and political parties played only a small part in formulating foreign policy before World War I (Hildreth nd 1983). Foreign policy remained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus special interest groups advising the few politicians who aspired to be “statesmen” (discussed further in Chapters 16 and 21). A state elite retained routine diplomatic autonomy in party democracies as well as in semiauthoritarian monarchies. If a crisis reared, this changed. In the United States, major decisions of war and new taxes went (and still go) to Congress. In Britain, they went (and still go) to full party discussion (and are) discussed there in terms of what party, Parliament, or public opinion might wear. And if war loomed, there arose the one fundamental constraint on all regimes’ freedom of action: money. If an absolutist proposed a costly foreign policy, then whoever provided taxes or loans must normally consent. Public opinion among other power actors now became important. But control only in crises or war is limited. Diplomacy is less regulated and predictable than domestic politics. Multistate diplomacy involves autonomous states with only limited normative ties, continuously recalculating geopolitical options. The actions of one – in rattling sabers, entering a new alliance, flouting army or fleet exercises, increasing troop numbers beyond those required to enforce an existing policy of economic sanctions or mere defense of territory, privately offering support to aggressive pressure groups of merchants or white settlers – may seem provocative to other Powers. The reverse might indicate weakness to them. Either may set up unpredictable ripple reactions among the Powers. Regimes find that routine diplomacy boxes them into a corner in an emerging crisis, facing them with unwelcome enemies or allies, or with a Hobson’s choice between backing down or acting aggressively. Secret diplomacy further restricts options.

The crisis then suddenly confronts parliaments, dominant or taxing classes, and public opinion with potentially devastating but restricted policy choices. As we shall see in Chapter 21, in 1914, governments generally presented only two alternatives to parliaments and public opinion – to go to war or to back down and be humiliated, a boxed-in choice we have grown used to (and which recently occurred disastrously again in the Gulf War for both the United States and Iraq). It helps explain why regimes get support for war. State elite control over routine diplomacy and military deployments thus outflanks democratic checks. In fact, chief executives, not nations or classes, remained primarily responsible for American, British, and French diplomacy, just as monarchs decided Austrian and Prussian. Constitutions and representative crystallizations mattered less in foreign than in domestic policy. Citizenship proved national, narrow, blinkered. It still is.

But monarchs and executives did not alone decide routine foreign policy. They took advice from professional diplomats. These diplomats were drawn from a narrow social base, overwhelmingly from the old regime: monarchs’ kin, aristocracy, gentry, and old money capitalists (for a general discussion, see Palmer 1983). In Austria and Germany, where the old regime survived best, the diplomatic service was dominated by aristocrats into the twentieth century. Preradovich (1955) attempted a standardized comparison of the two countries from 1804 to 1918. He found that the proportions of nobility among Prussian “high diplomats” fluctuated only between 68 percent and 79 percent (ending the period at 71 percent). In Austria it fluctuated between 63 percent and 84 percent (ending at 63 percent). The trends were similar for the old nobility alone (this controls for the possibility that diplomats might have been enabled for their services). In 1914, the German corps of ambassadors consisted of eight princes, twenty-nine counts, twenty barons, fifty-four untitled nobles, and only eleven commoners. The lower-ranking consular service was mostly staffed by commoners, though usually wealthy and from the right universities and fraternities. But of the entire 548 Foreign Ministry officials 69 percent bore titles of nobility and they monopolized higher grades. The only discernible change between 1871 and 1914 was a decline in Junkers and in titles awarded before 1800, as opposed to more western and recent nobles. Both trends resulted from a shortage of Prussian and older nobles as the service expanded, not from an attempt to open up the service. Group solidarity was enhanced by kin connections, membership in reactionary fraternity organizations, and a preponderance of Protestants and total
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In France the old regime suffered revolutions, yet its diplomats survived. Of all the ambassadors between 1815 and 1885, 73 percent had aristocratic surnames. During the Second Empire (1851–71) about 70 percent of senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose backgrounds are known came from landed, banking, or higher functionary backgrounds, a higher proportion than in any other government department (Wright 1972; Charle 1980a: 154, 172). Then, finally, a decline set in: Whereas 89 percent of accredited envoys were aristocrats in the period 1871–78, only 7 percent were during 1903–14, a rather remarkable change. Unfortunately, no details are given of this cohort. I would bet they represented the Republican equivalent of aristocracy, old money, but have no evidence to hand (the unpublished study cited by Cecil 1976: 67 may give this). Throughout the period, the British Foreign Office and diplomatic service remained dominated by the old regime. It was staffed at the top by the second sons of the aristocracy and wealthy gentry, educated at top public schools (especially Eton), and increasingly at OXbridge (Cromwell and Steiner 1972).

The United States differed little, despite having lost its aristocracy in its revolution and despite having a foreign service of rather lower prestige than that of other countries. Its diplomats and State Department represented American old money, the Eastern Establishment—perhaps its more cultured, less dynamic scions (it was dismissed at Princeton, that the ablest children went into banking). Even into the twentieth century entrants to the diplomatic corps were required to have a private income, ostensibly because the pay was low. Ichelman (1961) says that the corps was staffed with sons of old, wealthy families throughout the period. Though personal patronage was replaced by qualifying examinations, “good breeding” was still considered essential: Between 1888 and 1906, at least 60 percent had attended Harvard, Yale, or Princeton and 64 percent were from the Northeast (by then providing only 28 percent of U.S. population).

In all countries such class imbalance was defended on supposedly technical grounds: The old regime spoke foreign languages, traveled extensively abroad, married foreign wives, and were cultural cosmopolitans. They would understand one another. There was little protest against this. This was—and still is—a bizarre feature of the modern state. At a time when the state’s domestic activities were under attack from subordinate classes and others, when most domestic ministries and parliamentary assemblies were staffed by a broader cross section of bourgeois and professional classes (see Chapter 13), foreign policy was little scrutinized and narrowly staffed. It remained quite insulated and private, controlled by a particularistic alliance between a state executive elite and an old regime party whose economic power was in decline.

Thus the primary geopolitical function of the military pulled it in a slightly different direction to its secondary domestic function. The importance of militarism to foreign policy pushed it into close private relations with the state’s old regime core, whereas repression pushed it toward the interests of the propertied classes as a whole, especially toward protecting the interests of modern industrial and landowning capitalists against discontented labor. The military might prove an important link between these formerly and presently dominant economic classes. I now turn to dissect the military itself.

The military: class, bureaucratization, and professionalization, 1760–1815

I first examine the social composition of the eighteenth-century officer corps. This was simple: Virtually all higher officers were noble; so were the vast majority of lower officers, except for navies, artillery, and in Britain (with the largest navy and the smallest nobility). The officer was noble, as he had long been. Only 5 percent to 10 percent of French army officers were non noble. Yet most nobles were not officers, except in Prussia (at some time in their lives). Elsewhere, officer corps had become a specialized noble network, and not its most socially powerful one. As Chapter 6 shows, in France this had been a controversial development, solved by privileging the older, often poorer noblesse de l’Êpée. In Austria, Maria Theresa attempted, with only limited success, to upgrade the aristocratic titles conferred on her officers, usually drawn from the poorer service nobility. War was no longer the central role of the nobility. The military, though still overwhelmingly old regime, was no longer quite at its core.

Britain had ostensibly the least militarized old regime. Yet the officer corps of the home army was almost entirely old regime: its highest ranks predominantly aristocratic; its lower, country gentry (Razzell 1963). Wealth was needed to purchase the commission and to afford regimental life. Life was cheaper and less desirable in the more marginal Indian army, whose officers were mostly from merchant and professional families. The navy was even more open, drawing officers from gentry, merchant, professional, and seafaring groups from coastal districts (as did the French navy). The navy required no prior wealth. Officers could live on their pay plus their distinctive bonus, prize money. Many were younger sons from respectable though not rich
families. All officers served for two years as seamen, though with distinct rank as midshipman or master's mate. About 10 percent of officers came from "nonrespectable" families, including the famous son of a farmhand, Captain James Cook (Rodger 1986:252–72). His mobility would have been impossible in the army — and perhaps in the armed forces of any other country.

All armies and some navies also still contained elements of an international "service" mercenary nobility — from émigré families and from "marcher" or marginal areas like smaller German states, Scotland, or Ireland. These often moved around — Frederick von Schomberg served in five foreign armies (Brewer 1989: 55–6). Even in 1760, the officer corps was showing signs of being a distinct social group, not a caste still embedded in the old regime, but a professionalizing corps whose practices were no longer those of the upper classes as a whole.

Between officers and men lay a great gulf. Ordinary soldiers and sailors were portrayed by literate contemporaries as the dregs of society, the "scum" (Brodsky 1988). The label has stuck among scholars today (Jany 1967: 619ff.; Rothenberg 1978: 12; Balfour 1989: 79; Holsti 1991: 102, 104; Berryman 1988 contests it for the United States), but its accuracy is questionable. Literate contemporaries were biased. As we have just seen, officers were drawn from unusually elevated strata. To them quite ordinary men might seem "dregs," especially conscripted and impressed men, trapped unwillingly, like caged animals, and held by cruel discipline. Civilians’ contact with the military was mainly when impressment or quartering threatened them, or when they were hunted down, too. Up to one-third of soldiers were foreign mercenaries, sharing few values with local civilians. Civilians understandably hated soldiers and sailors, who stood somewhat apart from society.

We have reasonable data on two armies in the second half of the eighteenth century, French and British. French studies reveal its soldiers to be no dregs but disproportionately urban, artisan, and literate, peasants and farm workers being substantially underrepresented. By 1789, 63 percent of those with recorded occupations were artisans and shopkeepers (Corvisier 1964: 1, 472–519; Scott 1978: 14–19; Lynn 1984: 46–7). The towns could release young men, probably surplus younger sons trained in their fathers’ trades, and the army was happy to take skilled, literate men. British army recruits were mostly from manufacturing and laboring classes. They were slightly more urban and more Scottish, and perhaps slightly less literate, than the overall British population. This made them working class but hardly scum (see the data in Floud et al. 1990: 84–118; as the authors note, the apparently lower literacy of army recruits may be an artifact — individual officers made their own assessments of recruits’ literacy, but were probably looking for more than mere signing ability). Central European armies were probably less skilled and literate than the French and British, for their conscription systems generally exempted skilled trades (and Austria’s at first exempted peasant proprietors), and the ability to buy oneself out by paying for a substitute also depressed social levels. Yet some main recruiting areas, in the smaller German states, had high literacy rates. In the British and French peace-time navies, the sailors were largely a cross section of seafaring trades, though wartime impressment brought in poorer landlubbers (Hampson 1959; Rodger 1986). Perhaps the French and British armed forces had become more elevated than the rest, but I suspect officers, more than men, were from extreme social backgrounds.

The crucial mediating link between extreme ranks was the noncommissioned officer, who was almost always literate and usually was drawn from the middling classes. NCOs were recruited from the ranks and really formed the upper ranks of the soldiery, as promotion even to the junior levels of the officer corps was rare. Officers played little role in their regiments during peacetime: French officers took seven and a half months’ leave every two years; British leave was generous and abused. NCOs were in close relations with soldiers while army officers were not. Navies differed, while at sea, where officers and men were in close living and working contact. Rodger (1986) portrays British ships as having relaxed discipline in which officers persuaded rather than commanded their men and in which professional skills mattered as much as the power of rank. Either this is a romantic view or conditions had changed by 1797, for the naval mutinies of that year revealed deep hostility toward discipline that was highly punitive.

Given such social distance and limited contact, all states and officer corps believed discipline must be punitive. Mid-eighteenth-century tactics required soldiers to stand exposed for long periods under fire that was not accurate but that was erratically and cumulatively lethal. Sailors in naval engagements had to take murderous short-range bursts of firepower. But at least they were kept busy while under fire. Soldiers were often standing passively waiting or walking slowly forward. Constant repetitive drilling to drive understandable terror to the fringes of consciousness might be required in any armed forces facing comparable danger. Such drilling was a notable feature of eighteenth-century armies. But even so, "discipline" was not fully internalized. Soldiers deserted en masse, not in battle, as this was difficult and conspicuous, but in peacetime. It was said that one-third of the Prussian army — a highly effective one — was employed rounding up another third deserting (leaving a third ready for war). Eighteenth-century officers coped by
addition to drilling brutal, arbitrary corporal punishment and precious little humanity, as did many naval commanders whose authority at sea was quite arbitrary. Scott (1978: 35) says that many French soldiers had their first personal contact with their officer when facing disciplinary action from him.

Military society was thus distinctively, cruelly hierarchical, two-class, linked by arbitrary, punitive power. In this sense it was a segregated institution, no longer reflecting the more complex civil society outside. This distinctively hierarchical military society then confronted three processes of change: bureaucratization, professionalization, and democratization. The first two impacted fairly continuously, right through the period, the last suddenly impacted through the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, and was later supposedly reinforced by the nineteenth-century development of industrial society (Huntington 1957 and Janowitz 1960 provide the classic accounts; Dandeker 1989, the best update).

I present my model of bureaucracy at the beginning of Chapter 13. Bureaucracy comprises five elements: two of personnel, two of office arrangements, and one of general structure. Bureaucratic personnel are salaried, without ownership or appropriation rights over administration; and they are appointed, promoted, and terminated according to impersonal measures of competence. Offices within bureaucratic departments are rationally arranged by function and hierarchy; and departments are similarly arranged into a single, centralized administration. Finally, the whole is insulated from the political/top level of civil society, except at the top where it receives political direction. Military bureaucratization from the beginning was directed by the state.

Professionalism is a general attribute of modernization, not confined to armed forces. But Teitler (1977: 6-8) observes that the military added a third professional element to two more general ones. Just like other professionals, soldiers and sailors acquired a monopoly of specialized skills, removing all others to the level of incompetent amateurs; and second, this specialized body acquired a distinct esprit de corps, anchored in tradition and a sense of honor. But third, military services were distinctively rendered to the state. Professionalization, like bureaucratization, developed within states.

Sociologists have often observed that bureaucracy and profession are intimately yet contradictorily connected (e.g., Parsons 1964). In particular, bureaucracies develop a professional esprit de corps and distinct ethos as they become insulated from society. This may then conflict with the formal rationality of bureaucracy. In the case of the modern military, this entwined bureaucratic-professional ethos also involved distinctive class solidarity. The combination of the three encouraged the creation of a distinct officer caste.

Bureaucratization is ancient, though its main history occurred in my present period. It had mostly originated outside the state, first in the church, then in the private India companies — though the earliest of these, the Casa de Contratación de las Indias in Seville, was a monopoly controlled by the Spanish state. Their orderly accounting systems, specified chains of command, and salaried civilian and military officials were responses to the difficulties of moderate-size administrations coping with a broad scope of functions spread over enormous geographic areas. Perhaps there was some pressure exerted by size, some threshold level beyond which administrative control became difficult without greater rationalized standardization. But in a study of ten modern organizations ranging in size from 65 to 3,096 employees, Hall (1963-4) found no significant relationship between their size and six measures of bureaucratization which are quite similar to my own measures. Similarly, in the premilitary period, the main functional pressure for bureaucratization was less size than the problem of organizing diverse functions spread over large spaces.

The military revolution of 1500—1640 brought bureaucratization into the state. By 1760, armies and navies were divided into units of standardized size and specialized functions, related to each other and to headquarters through two linked chains of command. One, appearing in the eighteenth century, was that staple of modern business organization, the division between staff and line. The other was an integrated hierarchy, with standardized ranks running down from general officers, colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants to noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers. The two command chains were integrated by the division (an army unit containing all the specializations, coordinated by a staff, subordinated to a single commander), coordinated with other divisions by a “general” staff under a “general” officer. Navies also tightened coordination to overcome tactical difficulties presented by the dispersion of ships over vast oceans. Specialized standardized supply, artillery, and marine corps developed, as did signaling and manuals — all integrated into a formal “command, control, communication and intelligence” system (Dandeker 1989: 77). Offices were arranged bureaucratically, though at the very top monarchs and parliaments remained reluctant to entrust total operational command to one general

4 Indeed, the seventeenth-century Spanish state may have some claim to have anticipated innovations I ascribe to my eighteenth-century states — though it seems to have had curiously little influence on them. Concentrating on a few country cases, as this volume does, carries the danger of exaggerating their collective significance.
officer. They preferred to divide and rule. Army (not usually navy) entrepreneurs survived; wealthy nobles funded and operated their own regiments. But mid-eighteenth-century monarchs and war ministers in Austria, Britain, France, and Prussia enacted centralization against them. When Maria Theresa secured control of army promotions in 1766, she eliminated the remaining proprietors, perhaps the last Western monarch to do so (Kann 1979: 118–9; cf. Scott 1978: 26–32; Brewer 1989: 57–8).

Military administration was relatively centralized, routinized, disciplined, homogeneous and bureaucratic – by far the most “modern” eighteenth-century power organization (Daudeker 1989: chapter 3). These characteristics emerged directly from the logic of efficiency of military power, the requirements of war conducted between functionally varied and geographically dispersed armed forces. Again, size mattered less than functional and geographic scope, for the military revolution had centered on the emergence of clear-cut, formalized divisions between infantry, cavalry, and artillery and their engineering and supply departments. Specialization required new means of coordination over greater distances, especially for navies. Greater army and navy size was more product than cause: Bureaucratization enabled armies to grow. Bureaucratization won out as informal, looser military organization perished on the battlefield.

Personnel policy was less bureaucratized. True, salaries became normal. Sailors and soldiers were paid “employees,” subordinated to an officer chain of command. Officers’ status still varied, but most were state employees on fixed salaries, yet they also bought their initial commission and their subsequent promotions. Prussian officers were still entitled to appropriate fiscal resources flowing through their commands. Still, such practices were being phased out.

Bureaucratization lagged on the second personnel criterion, standards of competence. Literacy was required, but other formal qualifications and extensive training were rare, except among artillery and naval officers. The first general cadet academies were founded – the Maria Theresa Military Academy in 1748, the Ecole Militaire in 1751 (copied in twelve French provinces in 1776), many Prussian cadet schools throughout the century, with Sandhurst bringing up the British rear in 1802. But the main recruitment criterion was social background. It was assumed that an aristocratic or gentry upbringing produced officer potential – experience with physical exertion (especially riding), bravery, dignity, familiarity in giving orders to the lower classes, and a sense of honor. An Austrian field marshal once singled out his bourgeois officers for bravery in combat. He refused to praise his noble officers because, he said, a nobleman’s bravery should be taken for granted (Kann 1979: 124). Most officers learned on the job, helped by drill books and simple manuals, and were plunged, young and inexperienced, into battle. Promotion would then be decided by a mixture of connections (important in terms of ease with rank) and performance under fire.

The increased intensity of war then expanded a battle-hardened officer corps. Its experience was the core of a new professionalism. Amatuer warriors were disappearing and despised: Only we professionals know what war is like. A distinct professional ethos, still noble, yet less particularistic and genealogical, was emerging.

The Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars impacted massively, reinforcing and reinforcing and profession and introducing limited democratization that seemed to threaten both noble domination and punitive discipline. Greater war intensity increased experienced professionalism. Amateurs perished before Bonaparte’s troops while book learning and schooling made little progress. Connections remained important but fewer aristocratic dilettantes and incompetents or intellectuals of war were promoted. The rivalries and jealousies of officer corps, which, as any reader of military autobiographies knows, center on who gets promoted to command over whom, turned less on family connections, not yet on formal qualifications, more on job performance.

The impact was naturally greatest on the French revolutionary army. The Revolution brought noble emigration and purges. Opportunities for promotion suddenly expanded for NCOs, for the few promoted officiers de fortune, and even for ordinary soldiers. By 1793, 70 percent of officers had served some time as enlisted men, compared to 10 percent in 1789, though they were mostly in the lower officer grades. The highest grades still contained many former nobles: 40 percent to 50 percent of colonels and lieutenant colonels of the line army, compared to 10 percent to 20 percent of captains and lieutenants. But they shared rank with middle-class professionals, officials, businessmen, and bourgeois rentiers, comprising 40 percent of the higher grades and 30 percent of the lower. Artisans, shopkeepers, wage earners, and small peasants made up most of the remainder, providing 5 percent and 3 percent. Among the soldiers, bourgeois, middling groups, and artisans declined and peasants increased, though still underrepresented (Scott 1978: 186–206; Lynn 1984: 68–77).

Suddenly this army resembled the new society, rather than being a caricature of a very old one. Discipline was codified and applied to all ranks: French officers were now more likely than their men to go before a firing squad. It balanced punishment with enthusiasm, its high standard of combat performance, individualized and partially internalized. The rank and file, concludes Lynn (1984: 118), were treated “as citizens and not as subjects.” I find all such statements about
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armies somewhat exaggerated. Troops facing the distinct possibility of death almost never fully internalize discipline; it has to be supplemented by forms of concentrated coercion, compelling them to stand upright under fire or to charge, rather than to cower or flee. But as a statement of trend, from eighteenth-century to revolutionary armies, Lynn's will suffice.

Over the next two decades, the officer corps became more bourgeois, as mobility through the ranks increased. In 1804, only three of Napoleon's eighteen marshals were former nobles, and half the officers were from the ranks (Chandler 1966: 335–8; Lefebvre 1969: 219). After Napoleon's fall, social background varied between subsequent regimes. The Bourbon monarchy, restored in 1815, increased nobles at the highest levels, but could not thoroughly purge a bourgeois army of its Republican sympathies. After two decades of trouble, expedients were found. Repression of army Republican clubs was coupled with three incentives – opportunities for promotion provided by the Algerian conquest, an increase in army pensions, and the end of the ministerial right to dismiss an officer. The French army remained divided, unable to move against revolution in 1848 or against Louis Bonaparte in 1851; but its radical "citizen" character was much diminished (Porch 1974: esp. 115–7, 138–9). Would the revolutionary wars transform other militaries?

Toward a military caste

The revolutionary wars transformed control over the rank and file and integrated and modernized officer corps. But this proved to contain fewer concessions to "national citizenship" than regimes and commanders had first feared.

Relations between officers and men were gradually transformed. The effectiveness of mass-mobilized morale and less cruel discipline was too striking to ignore. It actually reinforced the beliefs of "enlightened" factionalism in all officer corps. Naval and colonial campaigns had also repeatedly showed that when officers and men shared similar material hardships they fought better. Three years after its humiliation at Jena, the Prussian army abandoned arbitrary corporal punishment, extended the rule books, and began to write humanitarian injunctions into them. In 1818, they referred for the first time to the necessity to make discipline consonant with the sense of "honor" of the private soldier – a radical notion indeed (Craig 1955: 48; Demeter 1965: 178–80).

Under Maria Theresa, an enlightened code had been introduced in the artillery as early as 1759. It urged that the men be encouraged "through love of honor and good treatment than through brutality, untimely blows and beatings." But not until 1807 was the code extended to the infantry masses and not until late in the nineteenth century was it implemented frequently enough to deter brutal treatment (Rothenberg 1982: 117–8; Deak 1990: 106–8). Discipline remained essentially coercive – as it does today – but it gradually became rationalized and rule-governed. Officers and men were no longer so segregated; they were becoming subject to the rationality of a single emerging military caste.

During 1805–7 and 1813–14, it seemed that Austria and Prussia might go much farther than this, to become also "nations in arms," mobilizing patriotic enthusiasm and allowing freer relations between officers and men. The recruitment of foreign mercenaries dropped off so that armies became "national" in a minimal sense. Both regimes initiated reserve forces, the Landwehr. But after 1815, all regimes backed away from the citizen army, frightened by the notion of placing arms in the hands of a free people. The Archduke Charles, the great Austrian general, modestly suggested enlarging the pool of recruits while reducing the years of army service to eight (in many regiments it was lifelong). His scheme was rejected because discharged soldiers might contribute expert leadership for revolts. Count Collerrodo clinched the argument at court by observing: "I can at any time stuff the mouth of a victorious enemy with a province, but to arm the people means literally to overturn the throne" (Langsam 1930: 52; Rothenberg 1982: 72). The Austrian Landwehr was abandoned in 1831. The Prussians retained their Landwehr, but they kept it disciplined. Throughout the nineteenth century, Prussians and other Germans debated the merits of "professional" versus "citizen" armies. The professionals always won if the debate was posed in these terms.

Yet the compromise notion of a "military citizenship" disciplined from above made some progress. In Germany it was influential in the granting of universal male suffrage (under controlled conditions) in return for their contribution of military service (Craig 1955; Ritter 1969: 1, 93–119). The French definition of citizenship as the "blood tax" resonated across Europe and America. No country sustained popular citizen armies of the type that had worsted the Prussians at Valmy (see Chapter 6). Instead, mass armies embodied a more segmental form of participation, defined by their ruling regimes and disciplined by a rationalized military hierarchy. As we shall see, under arms they were not really "citizens" but "nation-state loyalists."

Within military hierarchies nineteenth-century professional officers
certainly treated their men better than their ancestors had done. Changes occurred in two phases, as army size declined after 1815, then after midcentury as it expanded again. In the first phase, budgetary constraints lessened. Welfare programs to buy the loyalty of officers and noncommissioned officers became general, including pensions and the offer of civilian state employment for veterans (discussed further in Chapter 14). Wages mostly kept pace with the civilian occupations that discharged officers and soldiers (except perhaps Austrian officers) might have undertaken. Armed forces also offered more secure employment, trapping most into long service (Porch 1974, 1981: 89; Berryman 1988: 26–7; Deak 1990: 105–6, 114–25). Then, as the second expansionary phase hit, states coped by expanding their reserve forces. Long-service professionals at all levels became a cadre, leading and training the flood of conscript reservists who passed through for short terms (three years in Prussia) and then passed into reserve and territorial formations under regular-army supervision. Mobilized reservists now made up the bulk of armies when war actually threatened. Through the middle of the nineteenth century, armies recruited their soldiers more from the agrarian population, giving exemptions to skilled urban and industrial trades — and were more confident of their loyalty. As short-term conscription broadened in continental Europe, this bias declined. Nonetheless, major war would tend not to call up the organized core of the working class. In World War I, the working class “vanguard” — skilled workers in mining, transport, and metal manufacturing — were required to produce, not to fight. Only navies sought recruits from this background. Thus the soldiers, especially high-caliber frontline troops, tended to be recruited either from rural areas or from small towns or industries where working-class identities were weaker. Working class disloyalty affected armies less than either Engels or many conservative commentators had anticipated.

Giddens (1985: 230) argues that at the very time officers were becoming segregated specialists, soldiers became mass citizens. But they did not. Commanders were actually tightening military organization over their soldiers, reducing their ability to identify themselves as citizens or as members of classes. The lesson of the midcentury wars was that loose divisional coordination (developed by Bonaparte, as we saw in Chapter 8) was made obsolete by meticulous planning and coordination of maps and timetables. Prussian innovation had destabilized French élan in 1870. This enabled the generals to tighten discipline even over soldiers who were drilled less than their eighteenth-century forbears. Broader authoritative organization replaced narrower direct drilling. Railways, telegraph (eventually wireless telegraph), and

staff systems enabled commanders to coordinate many units, each of which represented the individual soldier’s far horizon. Most army units were regimented territorially, their unit morale based on local-regional solidarities and camaraderie.

The power of local morale was especially demonstrated in the American Civil War, when local recruitment ensured that most soldiers fought and died believing they were defending the integrity or values of their home community rather than larger units like the South or the Union (or the values with which these were associated). Six hundred thousand dead and low desertion rates testify to the astonishing power of this discipline, even over soldiers who had been rushed to the front with little training.

But other than the mass mobilization of the American Civil War and the overwhelmingly urban-industrial Britain, regional recruitment was also biased toward the most backward and conservative agrarian regions, able to provide surplus labor used to segmental discipline from above. After the Franco-Prussian War, a political battle was fought in France over the issues as Republicans sought to replace the regional recruitment system. But they lost before the combined weight of the conservatives and the army high command. Armies stayed regional and reactionary.

Just in case this was not enough, command structures reinforced conservatism. Local-regional unit organization was staffed by noncommissioned and officers recruited from the same territorial pool. They welded local unit camaraderie into hierarchical discipline. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers thus developed fairly successful segmental and local-regional power relations at the heart of expanding and supposedly “class” and “national” citizen militaries. Outside of their immediate relations with their own officers, soldiers were organizationally outfanked. Their units and ships moved by higher line and staff commands for broader purposes that remained hidden from them. Soldiers now had little capacity for collective action outside their own unit or ship. As we shall see in Volume III, they had little organizational alternative to compliance even under the horrendous conditions of World War I, even if ineptly commanded — unless their officers also lacked loyalty. Both regular and reserve forces proved overwhelmingly loyal in war during this period.

McNeill (1985: 260) argues that a society that was becoming industrial was also enshrining the “primacy of the command principle.” This is a little overgeneralized if referring to civil society, but is dead-on in describing its expanding armed forces. These were only deceptively “citizen,” “national,” or “class” armies. They were really segmental power organizations disciplined by social conservatives. By 1910,
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perhaps 20 percent of adult males in most countries had been so disciplined. The figure was to rise still further in World War I. Modern states were creating mass loyalists in their militaries (as in their administrations; see Chapters 13 and 16). Between 1848 and 1917, virtually no armed force wavered in its segmental loyalties. That proved important, often decisive, in both principal military functions, war and repression, during the twentieth century.

There was also a lasting change within the officer corps, as notions of experienced competence continued to develop. Gradually the educational component of skill was upgraded. Cartography, logistics, and the comparative and historical study of tactics became a part of cadet and general staff training, emerging in the early nineteenth century. Then the massive increase in firepower under the industrialization of war required that some basic engineering knowledge be extended beyond the artillery branch. Prussian victories had clear technological lessons, learned especially quickly by the French. After about 1870, passing out from cadet college became necessary to entry, and extending further courses became a usual part of promotion, especially on the elite staff side. Files were routinely kept on officers’ service record and qualifications, as patronage further declined in the face of universal technocratic criteria.

Britain and Austria lagged somewhat, for different reasons. As we shall see soon, the social composition of the British officer corps remained rural and reactionary and was out of sympathy with the early industrial society in the world. That led the British army to remain conservatively spurning staff colleges and the efforts of a reform faction, until disasters in the Crimean and Boer wars forced laggard professionalization (Bond 1972; Harries-Jenkins 1977; Strachan 1984; Brodsky 1988: 72–82). Austria lagged because of political turmoil. Its main role being internal security, it was conservative, suspecting professionalization as “liberal” (Rothenberg 1976), but after 1870 it also moved. By 1900, its elite military schools and postgraduates training courses dominated long-range promotion chances (Deak 1990: 187–9).

In the end, reactionaries had little to fear. Education did not replace older, noble criteria or radicalize military politics. It was fused into them. In anticipation of more general twentieth-century mobility trends, as education became the principal avenue of upward mobility, direct promotion from the ranks actually was reduced. In the French army, 14 percent of division generals had coining on the ranks in 1870, but less than 3 percent in 1900 (Sertman 1978: 1325; Charle 1980b). Nobles had no choice but to give some ground, for a different reason – once armies began their late nineteenth-century expansion, there were simply not enough nobles to go around. They hung on remarkably well under the circumstances. Even in Republican France the highest ranks remained fairly aristocratic. In 1870, 39 percent of division generals were of noble origin; in 1901, they were still 20 percent. Lower down there was necessarily greater embourgeoissement, yet also greater recruitment from Roman Catholic rather than state schools. This officer corps remained socially and politically reactionary. Repeated clashes with Republican governments culminated in the Dreyfus affair, and not until just before 1914 were political compromises made that would shortly save the Republic (Girardet, 1953; Charle 1980a).

One military had no nobles, of course. The United States also had another unique feature: a major civil war that rapidly expanded both sides’ officer corps to being representative of property and educated white males in general. But once settled back into small peacetime formations, American officers were less representative. Naval officers were overwhelmingly from the modern urban upper classes, that is, from capitalist and professional middle classes in the Northeast. They were disproportionately the sons of (in descending order) military officers, bankers, attorneys and judges, manufacturers, officials, “scientific” professionals (physicians, druggists, engineers), and merchants (Karsten 1972: table 1-2).

In contrast, army officers were strikingly – in view of the result of the American Civil War – southern and from the rural, perhaps decaying, old regime. Thirteen of the fourteen highest-ranking officers in 1910 were Southerners, mostly from rural areas. Although broader data are scanty, most officers appear to have been either children of officers or of farmer-planter or of those professionals found in small towns as well as large – lawyers, doctors, teachers, officials, and ministers. Janowitz sums up the army officer corps as “old-family, anglo-saxon, Protestant, rural, upper-middle-class” – as close to being an old regime as the United States provides. But because such a class no longer ruled America (outside of the South), it was a somewhat segregated group. According to a northern account of 1890, the army was a “domain of its own, independent and isolated by its peculiar customs and discipline; an aristocracy by selection and the halo of traditions” (quotations from Janowitz 1960: 90, 100; cf. Huntington 1957: 227, Karsten 1980) (Skelton 1980).

This small castelike corps also controlled its men distinctively. They were not conscripts, but professional volunteers, predominantly immigrants, especially from Ireland and Germany (descendants of earlier mercenaries?), but also blacks. They were content that the army gave them secure entry to (white) American society (Berryman 1988: chapter 2). Though not large or influential, the U.S. Army was loyal to its conservative masters, as we shall see in Chapter 18.
Elsewhere, noble and reactionary dominance remained impressive. Britain and Prussia were still the most extreme, with Austria at first similar. Razzell (1965) shows how little the social backgrounds of British army officers changed. Aristocrats and landed gentry (fewer than 1 per cent of the population) supplied 40 percent of officers in the home army in 1780 and 41 percent in 1912. In the highest ranks (major generals and above), their dominance fell slightly, from 89 percent in 1830 to 64 percent in 1912; but this was countered by increasing stratification between regiments, as elite regiments became the even more old regime in composition and socially reactionary in tone. At higher ranks the Prussian army also remained noble. In Preradovic's (1955) comparison of Prussian and Austrian general staffs from 1804 to 1918, nobles comprised about 95 percent of Austrian generals between 1804 and 1859, then the proportion plummeted to 41 percent by 1908. But in Prussia they held steady at about 90 percent until 1897 and then fell only to 71 percent in 1908. (Among enlarged general staffs during World War I both figures fell further.) Lower down the hierarchy, noble dominance dropped, and it dropped farther with expansion about 1900 - as we should expect, given the fixed numbers of nobles. Of generals and colonels, 86 percent were noble in 1860, and 52 percent in 1913. The integration of the more bourgeois Landwehr reserve force in 1860 made a big difference in the lower officer ranks. By 1873, only 38 percent of lieutenants were noble, down to 25 percent by 1913 - this was also the only drop in absolute numbers. Among all officers, nobles dropped from 65 percent to 52 percent (Demeter 1965: 28-9).

Thus the German and British pattern was late, forced decline of noble-gentry domination as officer numbers increased and nobles-gentry did not; a hierarchy still dominated at the top by the old nobility; and an almost total absence of sons of manufacturing or commercial capitalists. The dominant economic class left the army to the old regime. The army (along with diplomacy) gave the old regime a bridgehead into the core of the German state, ensuring more militarism in foreign policy and in class relations than would otherwise have occurred.

But the meaning of “nobility” also changed, becoming less particularistic as it merged into a distinct professional ethos, shared in common by officers. Rank within the German nobility had played a lesser role as early as the late eighteenth century, enabling poorer, lesser nobles, like Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Clausewitz, to move to the top. Early nineteenth-century reforms and the strengthening of military education institutionalized professional equality within the corps. Education in the university student corps,dueling fraternities, and staff colleges reinforced the ethos. The word Bildung did not just mean “education” but cultivation – in the military, the cultivation of honor. As a moral quality “nobility” now meant “honor,” the distinctive attribute of officers.

The consequences can be seen in the rapidly expanding German navy, ostensively the most bourgeois military branch. The navy required extensive technical training and recruited heavily from urban ports. Being recent, it lacked traditions and status. Thus it attracted few nobles. Of sea-cadet executive classes between 1890 and 1914, only 10 percent to 15 percent were from noble families, although this was more than the percentage from industrial or commercial capitalist backgrounds. In the well-documented class of 1907, professional backgrounds dominated: forty-five percent being sons of academics and 26 percent sons of nonmilitary army or navy officers. The navy still wanted well-educated young men from “good families” and explicitly rejected applicants from lower social classes because these might deter good families from applying. Service experience was not bourgeois, however. Nobility was valued most, affluence came next. Successful executive officers were ennobled. Officers modeled their treatment of sailors on arrogant Prussian forms - costing them dearly in naval revolts at the end of World War I. Engineer-officer cadets came from somewhat lower backgrounds, primarily the lower or middle civil service. They were treated as “practical” personnel, unsuited to “command” positions. As in the army, Jews (unless baptized) and Socialists were anathema. Though army and navy ethos was not identical - navy militarism was more anti-British and imperialist - “the navy showed the way towards ‘feudalizing’ the upper bourgeoisie” (Herwig 1973: 39-45, 57-60, 76-8, 92, 103-4, 132). In armed forces dominated by reactionary nobles, even bourgeois branches imitated them. At a time when Germany was leading industrial capitalism, its industrial and commercial capitalists were shunning, and being shunned by, its armed forces.

World War I demonstrated that Germany had the best army in the world; 1860 and 1870 had already probably made this clear. Its navy was also technically excellent, though too small for the role asked of it. But the paradox is that its extraordinary professional modernity was essentially old regime. It was certainly technical, with a high standard of qualifications for officers, and, according to contemporary statistics, the only universal literacy of any army (Annaire Statistique de la France, 1913: 181). Its staff had an advanced understanding of the industrialization of war, including the best use of railway logistics. Because its officer and NCO corps was socially cohesive, officers were trusted to use their own initiative - more so, for example, than were officers in the stirke-Torn French army. This disparity was especially evident in the campaigns of 1870-1 (Gooch 1980: 107). Common
speech has long understood the paradox in the expression “Prussian efficiency,” for this officer corps was technically advanced and socially reactionary. The combination was a highly developed caste ethos, with the best NCO cadre in the world to segmentally instill its values below. But this was just the extreme version of a more general paradox: These socially reactionary officer corps were mobilizing the most advanced instruments of industrial capitalism, wielding the most advanced technocratic skills.

The Austrian officer corps was also socially conservative, but it also had unique qualities derived from the crystallizations of its state (discussed in Chapter 10). It remained dynastic and (unevenly) multinational. As late as 1839, a slight majority of its officers were recruited from abroad, especially from Germany but with a substantial British from it. The dynasty also relied somewhat on Roman Catholics and contingent. The dynasty also relied somewhat on Roman Catholics and contingent. The dynasty also relied somewhat on Roman Catholics and contingent.

The social isolation of Austrian officers was not unique. In the Russian army, the proportion of nonnoble officers also increased, from 26 percent in 1895 to 47 percent in 1911, while the remaining nobles were not tied to the great Russian aristocracy. By 1903, 91 percent of those with at least a major general’s rank possessed no land or property, not even an urban dwelling (Wildman 1980: 23–4). This officer corps was also becoming segregated from class structure.

But Austrian officers were also more segregated from their men. Because the soldiers were recruited roughly proportionately and territorially from all nationalities, and because the monarchy was wary of homogeneous national regiments, officers and their men rarely shared a language. Thus the army’s command structure got little reinforcement from social hierarchies provided either by class structure or local-regional linguistic community. Otto Bauer, the Socialist leader, describes what he believed were the effects of bourgeoisie (though not of nationality, for he appears to be describing an all-German regiment) in his own officer training. The army’s professional ethos required the officer to treat the private first class with respect. But

the class hierarchy . . . distinguishes between a class of gentlemen and a class of workers and peasants. . . . The entire structure of the old army was to mark this separation between the class of gentlemen and the working class so clearly that it sometimes appeared not as a separation of classes but as one of castes. [But unlike the Russian soldier confronting his Junker officer, the] Austrian officer was required to see the son of the petty bourgeois with his sabre as an individual of exalted order. Particularly absurd was this . . . in relationship to the reserve officers. [Kann 1979: 122–3]

Absurd or not, the Austrian military hierarchy – viewed by contemporaries as the weakest among those of the Great Powers – still worked terrifyingly. Nothing testifies better to the castelike professionalism and segmental disciplinary powers of this bourgeoisie-dynastic officer corps and its client noncommissioned officers than their ability to lead those peasants in the repeated suicidal infantry charges on Russian artillery positions that destroyed half the Austrian army in the first year of the Great War.

Military old regimes were successfully absorbing all that the Age of Revolution and Industry could throw at them, yielding little to democratic citizenship. Bourgeois sons needed their manners smoothed to become officers; talented petit bourgeois, peasants, and workers
needed noncommissioned officers’ privileges; other ranks needed rule- governed rather than arbitrary discipline. Were those much of a concession? They were far less significant than they were in civilian power networks in modernizing countries. This very difference added to the distinctive segregation and growing segmental power of nineteenth-century armed forces. An officer caste reached down through noncommissioned-officer and long-service cadres to segmentally disciplined mass citizens, converting them into state loyalists. “Citizenship” was not merely the attainment of Marshall’s universal rights; nor did it inaugurate pacific internationalism. It came entwined with military power relations. The “nation” was partially segmentally organized, statist, and violent.

Toward autonomous military power

Perhaps such forms of professional autonomy, approaching near to a distinct military caste, with excellent cadre and segmental control over its men, might not matter. Many historical societies and some contemporaries (like Britain) possess a professional military caste without great social harm. True, if war breaks out, their power over society may be considerable, but in peacetime they may have autonomy from, but little power over, civil society. Yet, in peacetime nineteenth-century Europe “autonomy from” could lead to “power over.” We saw earlier that diplomacy was largely a private matter for state executives, dominated by similar old regime personnel as officer corps. This was not necessarily disastrous. Commanders are often cautious in their geopolitics, knowledgeable about the chaos and devastation of war, experienced in the fear of death. Officer corps often favored colonial ventures to play real war games and to open up promotion prospects. But they were cautious about war among the Great Powers. The industrialization of war brought another reason for caution as the increasing firepower available to the lightly trained soldier greatly increased the size of mobilizable armies. This meant going beyond peasants and marginal areas to arm the working class, a dangerous course of action – or so reactionary officer corps (largely unnecessarily) suspected.

Yet industrialization increased the technocratic powers and danger of the military. This happened in two ways. First, officer corps came at the forefront of nineteenth-century scientific and industrial development, using capitalism’s most advanced products and forms of organization, sharing its positivistic optimism. The military came to believe that meticulous planning and coordination could give exact results and, in calculable conditions, victory. Although modernization benefited militaries, it could also induce overconfidence. Perhaps the lesson of war, the prediction that is possible about the next war, is that it is unpredictable. Because weaponry and tactics change between wars, because none is fought over precisely the same terrain as the last, and rarely against the same enemy, the fortunes of the next war are uncertain. A truly sensible military – concerned with whether devastating war can attain a precise policy objective – would only counsel war if possessing great apparent superiority over the enemy. Such superiority is usually provided by diplomacy, yielding powerful allies or depriving the enemy of allies. Yet the most “modern,” technocratic, self-absorbed militaries were most apt to scorn foreign allies and rely on their own internal resources. Though diplomats and commanders were recruited from the same class, their training and professional experience diverged. Diplomats knew little of the new technocratic warfare, generals virtually nothing of alliance building. In the late nineteenth century the most modern, technocratic, self-absorbed, and politically ignorant army was the German army. It forgot that Bismarck’s diplomacy had contributed as much as its own competence to the victories of 1865–7 and 1870–1 (see Chapter 9), and it neglected subsequent changes in other countries that were not purely technocratic, especially the consolidation of the French republic and of its new military discipline. Its self-absorbed militarism was to be its hubris.

Second, in the late nineteenth century, military technocracy privileged attack over defense. “Going to war” had traditionally involved three phases: mobilizing one’s forces, concentrating them into campaign order, and marching them into actual battle. But industrialization, gunnery, and railways enabled an enormous weight of men and firepower to be delivered to the front. This advantaged swift, coordinated attack from railheads. The first to attack could achieve greater concentrated firepower, but defense must also be swift and coordinated, to concentrate fire on the attackers. General staff plans became complex and aggregative, detailing three preemptive moves in emergencies: mobilizing reservists, taking over the rail network, and using forward land and sea space, sometimes regardless of state frontiers or territorial waters. Seizing forward control of railway lines into neighboring states was the most provocative because it constituted actual invasion, though without a declaration of war. The Russian General Obruchev deemed mobilization tantamount to war. In his famous 1892 memorandum, he argued that in modern war victory goes to the side that achieves the most rapid deployment, “beating the enemy to the punch.” He concluded: “Mobilization can no longer be considered as a peaceful act; on the contrary it represents the most decisive act of war.” Blurring the line between defensive preparedness and aggression
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also preempted diplomacy. The Franco-Russian alliance in 1894 gave the high commands autonomous powers. If Austria, Germany, or Italy mobilized against either of them, they would both immediately mobilize. In 1900, the alliance was restricted to the case of German mobilization, and this agreement was actually implemented in 1914. Important aggressive steps, short of war but likely to precipitate war, were out of the hands of civilian politicians and diplomats (Kennea 1984: 248–53; he reproduces Obruchev's memorandum on p. 264). Similarly, the independent 1909 discussions between Generals Mollek (of Germany) and Conrad (of Austria) threatened to convert Bismarck's defensive alliance between the old regime and capitalist hostility to urban riots and labor unrest. Yet, as rural reactionsaries, officers were not mere stooges of modern industrial capitalists. Their professionalism also made them reluctant to employ their highest force levels beyond carefully managed shows of force into actual use of guns and sabers. Reluctance led them to collaborate with the expanding police and paramilitary institutions of the state. Professional caution often made them favor compromise between urban classes. For this pragmatic, moderated level of repression, their segmental disciplinary structures almost always provided loyal soldiers. In their repressive functions, the military thus represented an integration between old and new dominant classes. By 1900, military power networks had mediated and helped integrate two state crystallizations of class, as old regime and as capitalist. Their caste-like cohesion and their segmental control over their men made dominant classes much more secure.

To some degree these close relations among military, old regime, and capital also permeated their primary function, war. They collaborated in foreign policy with the chief executive and its coterie of essentially old regime diplomats and statesmen, fairly independently of mass political parties or public opinion (I document this further in Chapters 16 and 21). They also collaborated technocratically with industrial capitalists whose products were their weapons, communications, and supplies (discussed in Chapter 14). This "military-industrial complex" sometimes also included broader relations with the state and with mass middle-class "statist" pressure groups (discussed in Chapter 21). But in other war-making respects the military were also private. Military technocracy encouraged caste privacy and insulated over-confidence. It also contributed its own secret time bomb the internal development of tactics favoring attack over defense, especially escalated mobilization. These entwinings fueled a dualism within the military crystallization – caste autonomy along with defense of old regime and capitalism. The autonomy came home to roost in 1914. The combination of bureau-
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