Ke-Sook Kim, Linda Kiang, and Alisa Rabin in Los Angeles, have treated me and my work perhaps better than we deserve.

I owe the greatest intellectual debt to John A. Hall, who has continued for many years to provide me with perceptive criticisms entwined with warm friendship. To Nicky Hart and to our children, Louise, Gareth, and Laura, I owe love and perspective.

1 Introduction

This volume continues my history of power through the "long nineteenth century," from the Industrial Revolution to the outbreak of World War I. Focus is on five Western countries at the leading edge of power: France, Great Britain,1 Habsburg Austria, Prussia-Germany, and the United States. My overall theory remains unchanged. Four sources of social power — ideological, economic, military, and political — fundamentally determine the structure of societies. My central questions also remain the same: What are the relations among these four power sources? Is one or more of them ultimately primary in structuring society?

The greatest social theorists gave contrary answers. Marx and Engels replied clearly and positively. In the last instance, they asserted, economic relations structure human societies. Max Weber replied more negatively, saying "no significant generalizations" can be made about the relations between what he called "the structures of social action." I reject Marxian materialism, but can I improve on Weberian pessimism?

There is both good news and bad news. I want you to read on, so I start with the good news. This volume will make three significant generalizations concerning primacy. I state them outright now; the rest of the book will add many details, qualifications, and caveats.

1. During the eighteenth century, two sources of social power, the economic and the military, preponderated in determining Western social structure. By 1800, the "military revolution" and the rise of capitalism had transformed the West, the former providing predominantly "authoritative" power and the latter predominantly "diffused" power. Because they were so closely entwined, neither can be accorded a singular ultimate primacy.

2. Yet, into the nineteenth century, as military power was subsumed into the "modern state" and as capitalism continued to revolutionize the economy, economic and political power sources began to dominate. Capitalism and its classes, and states and nations, became the decisive

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1 I discuss only mainland Britain, excluding Ireland, which Britain ruled throughout this period. After hesitation I decided to treat the only major European colony as I treat other colonies (except for the future United States) in this volume: excluding them except as they impacted on the imperial country.
power actors of modern times— the former still providing more diffuseness and ambiguity; the latter, most of the authoritative resolution of this ambiguity. Again, because they too were entwined, neither can be accorded a singular ultimate primacy.

3. Ideological power relations were of declining and lesser power significance during the period. Medieval Europe had been decisively structured by Christendom (as Volume I argues); in 1760, churches were still (just) revolutionizing the means of discursive communication. No comparable ideological power movement appeared later in this period, although churches kept many powers and literacy had considerable impact. The most important modern ideologies have concerned classes and nations. In terms of a distinction explained later, ideological power (except in rare revolutionary moments; see Chapters 6 and 7) was more “immanent” than “transcendent” in this period, aiding the emergence of collective actors created by capitalism, militarism, and states.

Now for the bad news, or, rather, complicating news from which we can actually construct a richer theory more appropriate to deal with the mess that constitutes real human societies:

1. The four power sources are not like billiard balls, which follow their own trajectory, changing direction as they hit each other. They “entwine,” that is, their interactions change one another’s inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories. The events discussed here—the French Revolution, Britain near hegemony, the emergence of nationalism or of socialism, middle-class or peasant politics, the causes and outcomes of wars, and so forth—involved the entwined development of more than one power source. I criticize “pure” and monocausal theories. Generalizations cannot coalesce in a simple statement of “ultimate primacy.” The three statements I made earlier turn out to be rough and “impure” generalizations, not laws of history.

2. My rough and impure generalizations also fail to distinguish between Parsons’s (1960: 199–225) distributive and collective power; yet their histories differ. Distributive power is the power of actor A over actor B. For B to acquire more distributive power, A must lose some. But collective power is the joint power of actors A and B cooperating to exploit nature or another actor, C. In this period Western collective powers grew simply and dramatically: Commercial capitalism, then industrial capitalism, enhanced human conquest of nature; the military revolution enhanced Western powers; the modern state fostered the emergence of a new collective power actor, the nation. Though other sources of social power helped cause these developments, these three “revolutions” in collective power were primarily (and respectively) caused by economic, military, and political power relations (the “revolution” in ideological power— the expansion of discursive literacy— was less “pure”). Distributive power changes were more complex and “impure.” The growing collective powers of states actually lessened the powers of political elites over their subjects, as “party democracies” began to displace monarchies. Nor did military or ideological elites generally enhance their distributive power over others. Yet two major and impure distributive power actors, classes and nations, did emerge—first in response to military and economic power relations, then as institutionalized by political and economic power relations. Their complex history requires more than a few sentences to summarize.

3. Classes and nation-states also emerged entwined, adding more complexity. Conventionally, they have been kept in separate compartments and viewed as opposites: Capitalism and classes are considered “economic,” nation-states “political”; classes are “radical” and usually “transnational,” nations “conservative,” reducing the strength of classes. Yet they actually arose together, and this created a further unresolved problem of ultimate primacy: the extent to which social life was to be organized around, on the one hand, diffuse, market, transnational, and ultimately capitalist principles or, on the other, around authoritative, territorial, national, and statist ones. Was social organization to be transnational, national, or nationalist? Should states be authoritatively weak or strong, confederal or centralized? Were markets to be left unregulated, selectively protected, or imperially dominated? Was geopolitics to be peaceful or warlike? By 1914, no simple choice had been made—nor has one yet been made. These considerations remain the key ambiguities of modern civilization.

4. Classes and nation-states did not go unchallenged throughout the history of Western civilization. “Sectional” and “segmental” actors (rivals to classes) and transnational and “local-regional” actors (rivals to nations) endured. I treat such organizations as notable political parties, aristocratic lineages, military command hierarchies, and internal labor markets as segmental power organizations. I treat such social movements as minority (and some majority) churches, artisanal guilds, and secessionist movements as essentially local-regional alternatives to national organizations. All affected the makeup of classes and nation-states, reducing their power and their purity.

5. The cumulative effect of all these interactions—among the sources of social power, between collective and distributive power actors, between market and territory, and among classes, nations, sectional, segmental, transnational, and local-regional organizations—produced an overall complexity often exceeding the understanding of contemporaries. Their actions thus involved many mistakes, apparent accidents, and unintended consequences. These would then act back to
change the constitution of markets, classes, nations, religions, and so forth. I attempt to theorize mistakes, accidents, and unintended consequences, but they obviously provide yet more complexity.

Thus the discussion in this volume will broadly push forward my three rough, impure generalizations while recognizing these five additional complications. They cope with the patterned mess that is human society, as must all sociological theory.

I discuss sociological theories in this and the next two chapters. Then follow five groups of narrative chapters. Chapters 4–7 cover the period of the American, French, and Industrial revolutions, which I situate amid transformations of all four sources of power. Two had begun far earlier – capitalism and the military revolution – but during the eighteenth century they helped foster ideological and political transformations, each with its own partly autonomous logic – the rise of discursive literacy and the rise of the modern state. I take all four “revolutions” seriously. From the Boston Tea Party to the Great Reform Act, from the spinning jenny to George Stephenson’s “Rocket,” from the Tennis Court Oath to the Karlsbad Decrees, from the field of Valmy to that of Waterloo – events were impure, presupposing varying combinations of the four power revolutions, carrying classes, nations, and their rivals forward in complex forms that often escaped their own control. Chapter 7 presents my overall account of power developments during this early part of the period, putting final causal emphasis on military states and commercial capitalism.

Chapters 9 and 10 focus on Prussian-Austrian rivalry in Central Europe and on the complex developing relations between class and national actors. They explain the eventual triumph there of relatively centralized nation-states over more decentralized confederal regimes. The conclusion to Chapter 10 summarizes the arguments of these two chapters and discusses whether Central European resolutions were general across Western civilization.

Chapters 11–14 analyze the rise of the modern state. I present statistics on the finances and personnel of the five states, and I disaggregate state growth into four distinct processes: size, scope, representation, and bureaucracy. The massive growth in size was military-led, occurring up to 1815, politicizing much of social life. It fostered extensive and political classes, as well as nations, at the expense of local-regional and transnational actors. Contrary to general belief, most states did not grow again until World War I. But after 1850, states – mainly responding to the industrial phase of capitalism – vastly extended their civilian scope and, quite unintentionally, this integrated the nation-state, fostered national classes, and weakened transnational and local-regional power actors.

Introduction

Most functionalist, Marxian, and neo-Weberian theories of the modern state emphasize its increasing size, scope, efficiency, and homogeneity. Yet, as states grew and then diversified, their two emerging control mechanisms – representation and bureaucracy – struggled to keep pace. Representative conflicts centered on which classes and which religious and linguistic communities should be represented and where they should be represented; that is, how centralized and national should the state be? Although the “who” has been much theorized, the “where” has not. True, there are many empirical studies of states’ rights in the United States and of nationalities in Habsburg Austria. But struggle between the centralized nation and local-regional power actors was actually universal, and the representative and national issues were always intertwined. Because neither issue was resolved during this period, as states grew they became less coherent. This became glaringly evident in the disjunction between domestic and foreign policy: Classes became obsessed with domestic politics while political and military elites enjoyed privacy in foreign policy. Marxism, elite theory, and pluralist theory see states as too coherent. I apply my own “polyphormous” theory, presented in Chapter 3, to show that modern states “crystallized,” often messily, in four main forms – as capitalist, as militarist, and with differing solutions to the representative and national issues. The conclusion of Chapter 14 summarizes my theory of the rise of the modern state.

The fourth group, Chapters 15–20, deals with class movements among middle and lower classes and with the emergence of popular nations after 1870. Commercial and industrial capitalism developed class, sectional, and segmental organizations simultaneously and ambiguously. I attribute outcomes mainly to authoritative political power relations. Chapter 15 discusses the “first working class,” in early nineteenth-century Britain. Chapter 16 treats three middle-class fractions – petite bourgeoisie, professionals, and careerists – and their relations with nationalism and the nation-state. Chapters 17 and 18 describe the three-way competition for the soul of the worker among class, sectionalism, and segmentalism, which was authoritatively resolved by the varying crystallizations of modern states. Chapter 19 analyzes a similar resolution of the competition for peasants’ souls among “production classes,” “credit classes,” and “segmental sectors.” Chapter 20 presents a generalization of all this material and summarizes the relations among the sources of social power throughout the “long nineteenth century.”

Thus Chapter 7, the conclusions to Chapters 10, 11, and 14, and Chapter 20 generalize the conclusions of this volume. But there was another conclusion, a truly empirical one, to the period. Western society
went over the top into the Great War, the most devastating conflict in history. The previous century had also culminated in a devastating sequence of wars, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and these culminations are discussed in Chapters 8 and 21. Chapter 21, explaining the causes of World War I, is a final empirical exemplification of my general theory. It rejects explanations predominantly centered on either geopolitics or class relations. Neither can explain why the actions taken were objectively irrational and were recognized as such by the protagonists amid calmer times. The entwining of classes, nations, and their rivals produced a downward spiral of unintended domestic and geopolitical consequences too complex to be fully understood by participants or controlled by polymorphous states. It is important to learn lessons from this decline and to institutionalize power so as not to repeat it.

The rest of this chapter and the next two explain further my IEMP model of power. I repeat my advice to the reader given at the beginning of Volume I: If you find sociological theory hard going, skip to the first narrative chapter, Chapter 4. Later, it is hoped, you will return to the theory.

The IEMP model of power organization

In pursuit of our goals, we enter into power organizations with three characteristics of form and four of substance that determine the overall structure of societies:

1. As noted earlier, organization involves collective and distributive power. Most actual power relations—say, between classes or between a state and its subjects—involve both, in varying combinations.

2. Power may be extensive or intensive. Extensive power can organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories. Intensive power mobilizes a high level of commitment from participants.

3. Power may be authoritative or diffused. Authoritative power comprises willed commands by an actor (usually a collectivity) and conscious obedience by subordinates. It is found most typically in military and political power organizations. Diffused power is not directly commanded; it spreads in a relatively spontaneous, unconscious, and decentered way. People are constrained to act in definite ways, but not by command of any particular person or organization. Diffused power is found most typically in ideological and economic power organizations. A good example is market exchange in capitalism. This involves considerable constraint that is yet impersonal and often seemingly "natural."

The most effective exercises of power combine collective and dis-
The rise of classes and nation-states

[...]
labor — and we can obviously go into more detail distinguishing further classes with more particular rights over economic resources. Such classes can also be broken down into smaller, sectional actors, like a skilled trade or a profession. Classes relate to each other vertically — class A is above class B, exploiting it. Yet other groups conflict horizontally with one another. Following anthropological usage, I term such groups "segments." The members of a segmental group are drawn from various classes — as in a tribe, lineage, patron-client network, locality, industrial enterprise, or the like. Segments compete horizontally with each other. Classes, sections, and segments all cross-cut and weaken one another in human societies.

Volume I showed that segments and sections had hitherto usually predominated over classes. Classes were generally only "latent": Owners, laborers, and others struggled, but usually seconverently, intensively, confined to an everyday, local level. Most extensive struggle was between segments. But if class relations begin to predominate, we reach a second stage: "extensive" classes, sometimes "symmetric," sometimes "asymmetric." Generally arrived first: Only owners were extensively organized, whereas laborers were locked into sectional and segmental organizations. Then, in symmetric extensive class structures, both main classes become organized over a similar sociospatial area. Finally we reach the "political class," organized to control the state. Here again we may distinguish symmetric and asymmetric (i.e., where only owners are politically organized) class structures. In his more grandiose moments Marx claimed that political, symmetric, extensive classes, and class struggle provided the motor of history. Yet, as discussed in Volume I (with the exceptions of classical Greece and early Republican Rome), classes were only becoming political and extensive just before the Industrial Revolution. In most agrarian societies a dominant class, organized extensively, "caged" subordinate latent classes inside its own segmental power organizations. This volume describes an uncompleted drift toward Marx's full, symmetric class struggle and the linked transformation of sections and segments.

3. **Military power** is the social organization of physical force. It derives from the necessary of organized defense and the utility of aggression. Military power has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns intense organization to preserve life and inflict death and can also organize many people over large sociospatial areas. Those who monopolize it, as military elites and castes, can wield a degree of general social power. Military organization is essentially authoritative and "concentrated-coercive." The military provides disciplined, routinized coercion, especially in modern armies. (Chapter 12 stresses the role of military discipline in modern society.) In its impact on the broader society, military power is sociospatially dual. It provides a concentrated core in which coercion ensures positive cooperation - for example, in slave labor in earlier historic societies or in ritualized "shows of force," as discussed in this volume. But it also provides a far larger military striking range of a more negative, terroristic form. Volume 1 stresses this especially in its Chapter 5, "The First Empires of Domination." In the modern West military power differs. It has been formally monopolized and restricted by states, yet military elites have kept considerable autonomy inside states, impacting considerably on society, as we shall see.

4. **Political power** derives from the usefulness of territorial and centralized regulation. Political power means state power. It is essentially authoritative, commanded and willed from a center. State organization is twofold: Domestically, it is "territorially centralized"; externally, it involves geopolitics. Both have impact on social development, especially in modern times. Chapter 3 is devoted to theorizing about the modern state.

The struggle to control ideological, economic, military, and political power organizations provides the central drama of social development. Societies are structured primarily by entwined ideological, economic, military, and political power. These four are only ideal types; they do not exist in pure form. Actual power organizations mix them, as all four are necessary to social existence and to each other. Any economic organization, for example, requires some of its members to share ideological values and norms. It also needs military defense and state regulation. Thus ideological, military, and political organizations help structure economic ones, and vice versa. Societies do not contain autonomous levels or subsystems, each developing separately according to its own logic ("from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production," "from the dynastic to the nation-state," etc.). In major transitions the fundamental interrelations, and very identities, of organizations such as "economies" or "states" became metamorphosed. Even the very definition of "society" may change. Throughout this period the nation-state and a broader transnational Western civilization competed as basic membership units. Sociology's master concept, "society," kept metamorphosing between the two.

The power sources thus generate overlapping, intersecting networks of power relations with different sociospatial boundaries and dynamics;
and their interrelations produce unanticipated, emergent consequences for power actors. My IEMP model is not one of a social system, divided into four “subsystems,” “levels,” “dimensions,” or any other of the geometric terms favored by social theorists. Rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with mess. The four power sources offer distinct, potentially powerful organizational means to humans pursuing their goals. But which means are chosen, and in which combinations, will depend on continuous interaction between what power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among them. The sources of social power and the organizations embodying them are impure and “promiscuous.” They weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, interstitial forces.

A revolutionary long century?

We have an obvious discontinuity from Volume I: Whereas it covered 10,000 years of human social experience and 5,000 years of civilized history worldwide, Volume II covers a mere 154 years and only the core area of a single civilization, Western Europe and its principal white colonial offshoot. Many broad-ranging issues discussed in Volume I are outside the scope of this volume. I cannot chart further (except in limited ways) one of its principal themes, the dialectic between empires of domination and multi-power-actor civilizations, since my civilization was merely an example of the latter. This volume replaces the macro with the micro.

There are good reasons for narrowing the scope. Western civilization now transformed the globe, and its wealth of documentation allows a finer grained narrative, linking macrostructures, group decision making, and individual human agency. I can also assay more comparative analysis. Some reviewers of the first volume assumed I opposed comparative analysis on principle. I do not. The more the cases and the closer they are in world-historical time, the more we can compare them. Provided we remember that my five cases were merely “countries” or “Powers,” and not total “societies,” they can be fruitfully compared. Most historians and sociologists also regard this period as essentially discontinuous from earlier history. They believe overall social development was ultimately determined by a singular, usually an economic, revolution. This is a simpler explanation than my IEMP model: not four sources but one fundamental source of power; not impure, interstitial entwining and metamorphosing, but a single dialectical system. Is their model of a single revolution useful?

Introduction

Within about seventy years, first in Great Britain between about 1780 and 1850, then in Western Europe and America over the next seventy years, occurred what is generally acknowledged as the most momentous revolution in human history, the Industrial Revolution. It transformed the power of humans over nature and over their own bodies, the location and density of human settlement, and the landscape and natural resources of the earth. In the twentieth century all of these transformations spread over the globe. Today, we live in a global society. It is not a unitary society, nor is it an ideological community or a state, but it is a single power network. Shock waves reverberate around it, casting down empires, transporting massive quantities of people, materials, and messages, and, finally, threatening the ecosystem and atmosphere of the planet.

Most sociological and historical theory considers such changes “revolutionary” in the sense of their being qualitative, not merely quantitative. It dichotomizes human history around 1800. Classical sociological theory arose as little more than a series of dichotomies among societies existing before and after then, each considered to have a unitary, systemic character. The main dichotomies were from feudal to industrial society (Saint-Simon); from the metaphysical to the scientific stage (Comte); from militant to industrial society (Spencer); from feudalism to capitalism (Smith, the political economists, and Marx); from status to contract (Maine); from community to association (Tonnes); and from mechanical to organic forms of the division of labor (Durkheim). Even Weber, who did not dichotomize, saw history as a singular rationalization process, although he traced its development back farther.

There has been no letup. In the 1950s, Parsons identified a fourfold dichotomy revolutionizing interpersonal relations. These shifted from being particularistic to universalistic, from ascriptive to achievement-oriented, from affective (i.e., emotion-laden) to affectively neutral and instrumental, from being specific to a particular relationship to being diffuse across most relations. Preindustrial relationships were dominated by the former qualities; industrial societies, by the latter. Then the ghosts of Comte and Marx reappeared in Foucault’s (1974, 1979) distinction between the classical and the bourgeois age, each dominated by its own “episteme” or “discursive formation” of knowledge and power. Giddens (1985) draws on all these writers in his avowedly “discontinuist” distinction between premodern societies and the modern nation-state.

Recently, some trichotomies have appeared, that is, arguments for a third type of society in the late twentieth century. These all suggest two transitions – from feudal to industrial to postindustrial; from
feudal to capitalist to monopoly capitalist, disorganized capitalist, or postcapitalist; and from premodern to modern to postmodern. Postmodernism is now rampaging through academe, although it only scuttles through sociology. Its vitality depends on whether there was indeed a preceding "modern" era. These third stages are outside the scope of this volume (they will figure in Volume III). But the revisions do not question the revolutionary, systemic nature of the first transition; they merely add a second one.

I begin to unravel these dichotomies and trichotomies by critiquing their two main assumptions and their one internal disagreement. First, they assume that this period qualitatively transformed society as a whole. Second, they locate the transformation in an economic revolution. Most are explicit; a few, covert. For example, Foucault never explained his transition, but he repeatedly described it as a "bourgeois" revolution in an apparently Marxian sense (but because he had no real theory of distributive power, he never made clear who is doing what to whom). I contest both assumptions.

But the unraveling can start with the disagreement between the dichotomies. Whereas some see the essence of the new economy as industrial (Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Bell, Parsons), others label it capitalist (Smith, the political economists, Marx, neo-Marxists, Foucault, Giddens, most postmodernists). Capitalism and industrialism were different processes occurring at different times, especially in the most advanced countries. Britain had a predominantly capitalist economy long before the Industrial Revolution.

In the 1770s, Adam Smith applied his theory of market capitalism to an essentially agrarian economy, apparently with little inkling that an industrial revolution was in the offing. If the capitalist school is correct, we must date the English revolutionary transformation from the eighteenth or even the seventeenth century. If the industrial school is correct, we may retain an early nineteenth-century dating. If both are partly correct, however, then there was more than one revolutionary process, and we must unravel their entwinings. Actually, economic transformations may have been even more complex. Current economic historians downplay the impact of the (first) Industrial Revolution, whereas others emphasize a "Second Industrial Revolution" that affected the leading economies from about 1880 to 1920. Relations between capitalism and industrialization also differed between regions and countries, and I shall show that economic transformation was not singular or systemic.

Was it a qualitative change? Yes on collective power, but no on distributive power. There was now indeed an unparalleled, truly exponential transformation in the logistics of collective power (as Giddens 1985 emphasizes). Consider three measures of collective powers: the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people, the capacity to extract energy from nature, and the capacity of this civilization to exploit others collectively.

Population growth measures the increasing capacity to mobilize people in social cooperation. In England and Wales the entire process of human development had achieved 5 million population by 1640. After 1750, growth curved upward, reaching 10 million by 1810 and 15 million by 1840. What had first taken millennia now took thirty years. Across the globe the first billion of world population was not reached until 1830; the second took a century; the third, thirty years; and the fourth, fifteen years (McKeown 1976: 1–3; Wrigley and Schofield 1981: 207–15). During the previous millennia life expectancy mostly stayed in the 30s, then it improved through nineteenth-century Europe to fifty years and in the twentieth century to more than seventy years, a massive change in human experience (Hart, forthcoming). Similar acceleration occurred in virtually all forms of collective mobilization. Between 1760 and 1914, statistics on the communication of messages and goods, gross national product, per capita income, and weapon-kill ratios reveal a takeoff beyond all known historical rhythms. The growth of collective power mobilization, of what Durkheim called "social density," became truly exponential.

The ability of humans to extract energy from nature also greatly increased. In the agrarian societies discussed in Volume I, energy output depended overwhelmingly on human and animal muscle. Muscles required calories provided by agricultural produce, which required almost everyone’s labor. There was an energy trap, with little left to spare for nonagricultural activity beyond supporting small ruling classes, armies, and churches. Landes (1969: 97–8) points out the difference coal mines and steam engines made: By 1870, British coal consumption exceeded 100 million tons. This generated about 800 million calories of energy, enough to supply the energy requirements of a preindustrial society of 200 million adults. The actual British population in 1870 was 31 million, but this energy was generated by only 400,000 miners. Humans’ current ability to extract energy even threatens to exhaust the earth’s reserves and destroy its ecosystem.

In historical terms, this rate of energy extraction is simply staggering. Agrarian societies might occasionally match the energy concentration of a coal mine or a large steam engine – for example, a Roman legion building a road or Egyptians constructing a pyramid – but these sites would be teeming with thousands of men and beasts. The approach roads, ending at great storehouses, would be choked with supply wagons. For miles around agriculture would be organized to deliver its
Introduction

Increasing self-consciousness and reflectiveness bring feedback effects. If social actors become aware of ongoing structural transformations, they may seek to resist them. But if, as here, transformations enhance collective powers, they are more likely to seek to harness modernization to their own interests. Their ability to do so depends on their distributive power.

At first sight, distributive power also seems to have transformed near the beginning of this period. Classes and nations appeared as relatively novel actors in power struggles, generating the sociopolitical events we call “revolutions.” Volume I demonstrated that both class and national organization had been rare in agrarian societies. Now, as Marx, Weber, and others noticed, class and national struggles became central to social development. Distributive power, like collective, moved from particularism toward universalism.

Yet the results were curiously unrevolutionary. Consider the first industrial nation, Great Britain. Many distributive power relations found in Britain in 1760 were still there in 1914 – indeed, they are still there. Where they have changed, the transition was usually under way long before 1760. Henry VIII had introduced state Protestantism, the Civil War confirmed it, and the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries half secularized it. Constitutional monarchy was institutionalized in 1688; the erosion of the monarchy’s powers, along with confirmation of its symbolic dignity, proceeded throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Agriculture and commerce early became capitalist; industry was molded by eighteenth-century commercial institutions, and modern classes have been absorbed into such capitalism. The House of Lords, the two ancient universities, the public schools, the City, the Guards, the London clubs, the administrative class of the civil service – all survive in power as a mixture of the old and of the nineteenth century. True, genuine power shifts also resulted – the rise of the middle class and of labor and the growth of party democracy, popular nationalism, and the welfare state – but the overall trend was less the qualitative transformation that dichotomous theories envisaged than more gradual changes indicating the massive adaptability of ruling regimes.

Perhaps Britain is extreme, in many ways the most conservative European country; but we find many similar patterns elsewhere. The religious map of Europe was settled in 1648, with no significant changes appearing since. The Christian religion has been half secularized ever since. True, there were two great overthrowers of monarchies near the beginning of our period; but the American and French revolutions occurred before industrialization in those countries, and (as we shall see) the French Revolution needed a whole century to achieve
rather more modest changes than it first promised, and the American revolutionaries' Constitution rapidly became a conservative force on later distributive power relations. Elsewhere capitalism and industrialism shocked but rarely overthrew old regimes – two sociopolitical revolutions in France and Russia, compared to a host of failed ones and of more limited reforms elsewhere. Old regime and new capital usually merged into a modern ruling class in the nineteenth century; then they made citizenship concessions that also partly domesticated middle and working classes and peasantry. There has been even greater continuity in the major non-Western capitalist country, Japan.

Perhaps I have been selective, downplaying genuine distributive power shifts. But the opposite case, for a transformation in distributive power – especially in the Marxian dialectical sense of opposites clashing head-on in social and political “revolution” – seems implausible.

This also seems true for power distributed geopolitically. States became nation-states but continued to rise and fall while a few remained to contest the leadership over many centuries. France and Britain remained contenders from the medieval period right through this period, whereas the success of Prussia, the emergence of the United States, and the decline of Austria were more novel. The post-sixteenth century trend toward fewer, larger Powers was actually slowed by the Industrial Revolution (Tilly 1990: 45–7). The Industrial Revolution privileged the nation-state over the multinational empire and it privileged those states with large economies. We shall see, though, that these trends also depended on noneconomic power relations.

There is one main exception to the surprising continuity of distributive power. Power relations between men and women began a rapid, even revolutionary, transformation during this period. I have briefly described elsewhere (1988) the end of “patriarchy,” its replacement by “neopatriarchy,” and then the emergence of more egalitarian gender relations. The simplest indicator is longevity. From the earliest prehistoric times until to the end of the nineteenth century, men outlived women, by about five years over a life span of thirty to forty-five years. Then the discrepancy was reversed: Women now outlive men by five years over a life span of seventy years, and the differential is still widening (Hart 1990). I have abandoned my original intent to focus on gender relations in this volume. Gender relations have their own history, currently being rewritten by feminist scholarship. Now is not the time to attempt grand synthesis – although I shall comment on the connections among gender, class, and nation during this period. Except for gender, however, distributive power was transformed less during this period than theoretical tradition suggested. Classes and nation-states did not revolutionize social stratification.

Some sociologists and historians have remarked this. Moore (1973) argues that political development was affected more by older land-holding patterns than by industrial capitalism. Rokkan (1970) distinguishes two revolutions, the national and the industrial, each generating two political cleavages. The national revolution involved center-periphery and state-church conflict, the Industrial Revolution brought land-industry and owner-worker conflicts. Rokkan unravels the revolutionary dichotomy into a complex combination of four struggles, earlier ones setting down parameters for later ones. Lipset (1985) believes variations in twentieth-century labor movements were caused by the presence or absence of earlier feudalism. Corrigan and Sayer note the durability of the British ruling class – its ‘supposed reasonableness, moderation, pragmatism, hostility to ideology, ‘muddling through,’ quirkiness, eccentricity” (1985: 192 ff.). Mayer (1981) argues that European old regimes were not swept away by industrialism: Only by perpetrating World War I and by overreacting to socialism by embracing fascism did they ensure their demise.

These writers make two points. First, tradition matters. Neither capitalism nor industrialism swept all away but were molded into older forms. Second, these writers go beyond the economy, adding various political, military, geopolitical, and ideological power relations to modes of production and social classes. Their arguments are often correct. Later chapters draw from them, especially from Rokkan, who perceived the significance of national as well as class struggles.

Nonetheless, distributive power relations were altered. First, classes and nations could not simply be ignored or repressed by old regimes. To survive, they had to compromise (Withnow 1989: III; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). But national struggles also entwined with classes, thus changing all power actors, not “dialectically,” systematically but in complex ways often having unintended consequences. Second, the traditional rival power organizations of classes and nations – segmental or sectional and transnational or local-regional – were not eliminated but transformed. Loose networks controlled particularly by old regime notables became more penetrative notable and clientalist political parties, keeping class parties at bay. Armed forces tightened from loose confederations of regiments “owned” by great nobles or mercenary entrepreneurs to modern, professional forces imposing highly centralized line and staff controls and discipline. The Catholic church buttressed its transnationalism with greater local-regional mobilizing powers to organize decentralizing power against the nation-state. All such organizations transformed the relations between regimes and masses.

In sum: Economic transformation was not singular but multiple;
collective power was revolutionized; most forms of distributive power were altered but not revolutionized; traditional dominant power actors survived better than expected; and power actors were aware of structural transformations but these were extremely complex. All of this carries implications for a theory of social change.

Social change: strategies, impure entwinings, unintended consequences

At the beginning of the period occurred three revolutions, all surprises to their participants. Britain’s Industrial Revolution, initiated by Adam Smith’s “hidden hand,” was intended by no one and would have astonished Smith himself. Second, British settlers in America stumbled unintentionally into the first colonial revolution. Third, the French old regime was surprised by a political revolution intended by few of its participants. Power actors now debated whether further revolutions were repeatable or avoidable. Colonial revolutions are outside the scope of this discussion, but I do consider industrial and political revolutions.

Industrialization had been hard to initiate but was easy to imitate and adapt, provided some commercialization existed already. The successful adaptors ranged across Europe from northern Italy and Catalonia to Scandinavia and from the Urals to the Atlantic, and across America and Japan. Regimes strove to maximize profits and minimize disruption. Industrialization was adapted according to local traditions. Political revolution was the opposite, seemingly easy to initiate, difficult to imitate — once old regimes were alerted to its dangers. The revolutionary program could be modified: Regime and emerging power actors could choose or drift between modernization paths placing differing emphases on monarchical rule, the rule of law, economic liberalism, democracy, and nationalism. Half-conscious incorporative-repressive strategies ensured varied nonrevolutionary patterns of development.

Thus traditions were neither overthrown nor merely reproduced. They were modified or amplified according to clashes between “regime strategies-drifts” and the strategies-drifts of emerging classes and nations. By “regime” I mean an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state. These rulers, as we see in Chapter 3, comprised both “parties” (in Max Weber’s sense) and “state elites” (in the sense used by elitist state theory). They sought a modernizing alliance to mobilize the emerging powers of classes and nations, or the state would fall to internal revolt or foreign powers. Regimes generally have greater lo-
gistical capacities than do those down below. However, their resilience depended on their cohesion. Party factionalism in an era of rising classes and nations encouraged revolution. I term their attempts to cope with the challenge of emergent social classes and nations “regime strategies.” Not all regimes possessed them, and even the most foresighted found themselves buffeted by complex politics into different tracks of which they were not wholly conscious. Thus most power actors drifted as well as schemed — hence strategies-drifts.

At first, almost all regimes ran along a continuum between despotic and constitutional monarchy. T. H. Marshall (1963: 67–127) argued from the British experience for a three-phase evolution toward fuller citizenship. The first involved legal and “civil” citizenship: “rights necessary for individual freedom — liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” British civil citizenship was obtained through a “long eighteenth century,” from 1688 until Catholic Emancipation in 1828. The second phase obtained “political” citizenship, comprising voting and participating in sovereign parliaments, over the century from the Great Reform Act of 1832 to the Franchise Acts of 1918 and 1928. The third, twentieth-century phase secured “social” citizenship, or the welfare state: “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to . . . share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”

Marshall’s theory has excited considerable interest in the English-speaking world (the best recent discussions are Australian: Turner 1986, 1990, and Barbalet 1988). Two of his types of citizenship turn out to be heterogeneous. Civil citizenship may be divided into individual and collective subtypes (Giddens 1982: 172; Barbalet 1988: 22–7). As we shall see, although most eighteenth-century regimes conceded individual legal rights, none yielded collective organizing rights to workers until the end of the nineteenth century or even until well into the twentieth. (See Chapters 15, 17, and 18.) I also subdivide social citizenship (Marshall’s “sharing in the social heritage”) into ideological and economic subtypes — rights to an education, allowing cultural participation and occupational attainment, and rights to direct economic subsistence. Through the long nineteenth century, ideological-social citizenship was attained by all middle classes (see Chapter 16), but economic-social citizenship remained minimal (as Marshall noted; see Chapter 14). Citizenship developed varied forms and rhythms, some of which undercut others. Citizenship perhaps has not been as singular a process as Marshall argues.

Moreover, as I have already (1988) argued, Marshall’s evolutionism,
neglect of geopolitics, and Anglo centrism can all be faulted. Let us begin by asking a simple question: Why should classes — or indeed any other power actor — want citizenship? Why should they consider the state relevant to their lives? Most people had not hitherto. They had lived amid predominantly local or regional power networks, as influenced by transnational churches as by the state. We shall see that through wars eighteenth-century states enormously increased their fiscal and manpower exactions, caging their subjects onto the national terrain and thus politicizing them. Thus classes flexed their growing muscles on politics instead of concentrating as traditionally on fighting other classes in civil society. This “militarist” phase was then followed by other encouragements of the caged nation: office-holding disputes, tariffs, railways, and schools. As states transformed first into national states, then into nation-states, classes became caged, unintentionally “naturalized” and politicized. The nation was vital to citizenship (as Giddens 1982: 212–21 recognizes). We must theorize national as well as class struggle.

There were actually two citizenship issues: representation and the national question of who is to be represented and where. Where turned on how centralized and national or how decentralized and confederal the state should be. Despotism might be bought by decentralizing the state onto local assemblies, while linguistic, religious, or regional minorities normally resisted the centralized nation-state. Enlightenment modernizers believed the two issues went together: the future belonged to representative and centralized states. Later evolutionary theorists like Marshall believed the nation-state and national citizenship were inevitable. Indeed, most Western countries today are centralized, representative, and citizen nation-states.

But such “modernization” has not been one-dimensional or evolutionary. The Industrial Revolution did not homogenize; rather, it modernized disparate regime strategies. The boost to collective powers provided by the revolution could be used by any regime — party democratic or despotic, centralized or confederal — to amplify its initial characteristics. Outcomes depended on both domestic politics and geopolitics. So did the undoubted overall movement toward the centralized nation-state. Regimes competed, flourished, and perished according to domestic class and national power struggles, diplomatic alliances, wars, international economic rivalry, and ideological claims resonating across the West. As Powers rose, so did the attractiveness of their regime strategies; as Powers declined, so their strategies disintegrated. One Power’s successful strategy might then change subsequent industrialization. German semiauthoritarian monarchy and greater American centralization were both partly the result of war. They then fostered the Second Industrial Revolution, the large capitalist corporation and state regulation of economic development.

Finally “impure entwinings” also muddied contemporaries’ perceptions. Thus I edge away from “strategies” — from cohesive elites with transparent interests, clear vision, rational decisions, and infinite survival. Ideological, economic, military, and political transformations and class and national struggles were multiple, entwined, and developing interstitionally. No power actor could comprehend and take charge of all this. In acting they made mistakes and generated unintended consequences, changing their very identities below the level of consciousness. The whole was a nonsystemic, nondialectical process between historically given institutions and emergent interstitial forces. My IEMP model can confront and then begin to make sense of this mess; dichotomous theories cannot.

Bibliography


3 Turner (1990) rightly criticized my neglect of religion and ethnicity in my 1988 essay. I now seek to remedy this by taking seriously the national question. Turner also criticized my emphasis on ruling class at the expense of lower-class strategies. This volume considers both, but continues to stress the former.
2 Economic and ideological power relations

It became conventional in the eighteenth century – and it has remained so ever since – to distinguish between two fundamental spheres of social activity – "civil society" (or just "society") and "the state." The titles of this chapter and the next would seem to conform to that convention. Though Smith, other political economists, and Marx meant by "civil society" only economic institutions, others – notably, Ferguson, Paine, Hegel, and Tocqueville – believed it comprised the two spheres discussed in this chapter. For them, civil society meant (1) decentered economic markets resting on private property and (2) "forms of civil association... scientific and literary circles, schools, publishers, inns,... religious organizations, municipal associations and independent households" (Keane 1988: 61). These two spheres carried vital decentered and diffused freedoms that they wished secured against the authoritative powers of states.

Yet, such a clear distinction between society and state carries dangers. It is, paradoxically, highly political, locating freedom and morality in society, not the state (obviously Hegel differed in this respect). This was so among the eighteenth-century writers resisting what they saw as despotism, and it has recently been so again as Soviet, East European, and Chinese dissidents sought to mobilize decentralized civil society forces against state repression. Yet states are not as distinct from the rest of social life as these ideologies suggest. Volume I showed that civil societies had first risen entwined with modern states. This volume shows that through the long nineteenth century, civil society became more substantially, though far from entirely, the province of the nation-state. This had implications for both economic and ideological power relations, and this is the central theme of this chapter. Thus the actual text of this chapter and Chapter 3 often refutes the separation implied by their titles.

Economic power: capitalism and classes

By 1760, Western economic power relations were becoming dominated by capitalism. Following Marx, I define capitalism in the following terms:

1. Commodity production. Every factor of production, including labor, is treated as a means, not an end in itself, is given exchange value,