domination and execution, which may take many, diverse forms, has to be resolved one way or the other, and it thus becomes an internal force for change within the state apparatus. This contradiction is in turn just one aspect of the general political dialectic of domination-execution, which is grounded in the fact that the state is a unification of a fundamentally divided class society. It is invested at one and the same time with the exercise of ruling class domination and the common tasks of society. The essay on state power will discuss these points further.

After these lengthy preliminary remarks, we must now look at the class character of various types of state, and suggest provisional answers to some of the questions that have arisen. Since the present text is a contribution to a debate that has been largely confined to Europe, these answers will refer mainly to the history and contemporary situation of that continent. Further specifications of a similar kind would be needed in order to deal adequately with the states of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

II

(Provisional) Answers

Inputs into the State

Technologies of Organization
The feudal polity was primarily a military institution, equipped for war and armed peace. Initially, its most distinctive technology of rule took the material form of the expensively armoured knight. However, by the fourteenth century, English longbowmen and Swiss pikemen were already rendering the cavalry obsolete. What then was the basic technology of the feudal state – the feudal technique of rule?

Feudal class relations were, as we have noted, characterized by a general hierarchy of rights and privileges, the holders of which were bound to one another by ties of personal loyalty. In a society where the vast majority of the population were kept in ignorance of almost everything outside the field of everyday work (except the other worlds of heaven and hell), the higher, aristocratic positions provided self-confidence, a relatively broad outlook, and, as the generations went by, a rounded upbringing and manners capable of ensuring obedience and respect.

This general noble authority, held together by hierarchical bonds of personal loyalty and classically expressed in a code of honour and fidelity, constituted the fundamental technology of feudal rule. It could function with reasonable efficiency in a social formation which

was largely governed by customary law, and which was circumscribed by rudimentary means of communication and slow-changing forces of production and destruction. On the basis of an amateur general authority, and with no special competence or training, the feudal nobleman could adjudicate disputes according to existing laws and customs, apply royal decrees, maintain the obedience of his peasants and retainers, and lead armies and diplomatic missions. The efficacy of this mode of state organization is illustrated by the figure of the justice of the peace, who, recruited from the local squirearchy, continued to dominate the British system of rural administration and judicature until as late as the second half of the nineteenth century. 36

Of all the complex transmutations of the feudal state, only two very important developments will be mentioned here. First, the king showed a marked tendency to convert the independent authority of the aristocracy into a delegated royal one, and to rule by means of non-noble or parvenu retainers. These efforts met with varying success, but no feudal state was ever reduced to a simple royal retinue. Such an outcome would, indeed, have signified the emergence of a non-feudal state.

Secondly, the rise of mercantile capital involved, in the ages of the Renaissance and Absolutist monarchies, the permeation of the system of feudal rule by commodity relations. The noble landowner, administering the state on his enfeoffed land, was supplemented and replaced by, for instance, the tax farmer, who retained as profit part of the state taxes which he extracted. The military service of noblemen who had been allotted tax-exempt land gave way to mercenary condottieri – entrepreneur-commanders who raised armies in return for the spoils of war. On the basis of their newly-acquired wealth, the tax farmer and the condottiere assumed positions of command which were marked by a general amateur authority and a contractual relationship to the head of state similar to those of the medieval nobleman. 37 The pattern which developed in the leading Absolutist state of late-feudal Europe – France – ultimately, as de Tocqueville observed in his writings on the revolution, undermined the position of the ruling aristocracy: not so much because of the influx of commoners into the state, but because the aristocrats were increasingly isolated from their local power base as a parasitic court nobility. 38

In most countries, feudal forms of rule survived in a number of state apparatuses – particularly local rural administration, the upper reaches of diplomacy, and the army – for a considerable period after the bourgeois revolution. However, they were confronted with national states newly established by the bourgeois revolution; with the creation of a free labour market; the general extension of commodity relations to all means of production; and the unprecedented economic pace of industrial capitalism. All these processes broke down the feudal polities, or defeated them on the battlefields of Jena and Austerlitz. Even the revenge of Leipzig and Waterloo could not halt the trend for long. (In fact, the most formidable enemy of the revolutionary French bourgeois state was another bourgeois state: Britain.)

The new political technology that emerged comprised at least two important novel elements: 1) bureaucracy – that fitting object of the most famous analysis of the greatest social scientist since the classical economists, Max Weber; and 2) parliamentary politics – the force shaping the legislative and supreme executive apparatuses of the new representative state.

Max Weber’s presentation of modern bureaucracy stressed its foundation upon specialized knowledge (Fachwissen). In order to grasp the class character of Weberian bureaucracy, we must first identify the kind of specialization and knowledge involved in the phenomenon.

The bureaucratic ideal type is actually an amalgamation of several distinct modes of organization, run by professionals utilizing a highly specific technology. First of all, the knowledge of the bureaucrat is of a particular intellectual variety: it refers to rules, especially legal ones. In Weber’s clear formulation, the efficiency of the bureaucracy turns upon its treatment of issues according to calculable rules, and ‘without regard to individual persons’. The ‘specific nature’ and ‘special virtue’ (die eigentlich beherrschende

36 The administrative duties of the feudal justices of the peace were eventually transferred to elected county councils when they were set up in 1888. (D. Thompson, England in the Nineteenth Century, London 1950, p. 179.) Max Weber paid some attention to the extraordinary longevity and vitality of this feudal institution: Economy and Society, New York 1968, III, pp. 109ff.


Bedeutung) of bureaucracy can be attributed to its application of this principle.39

In the ideal type of rational bureaucracy, this kind of knowledge is connected with the unproblematic combination of specialization, hierarchy and knowledge. The speed and predictability with which given rules are applied, is enhanced by specialization, whilst uniformity is increased if complicated cases are referred upwards in a hierarchical order. The impersonal formal rationality of capitalist bureaucracy takes as given both the content and the enforcement of the rules to be applied.

Weber's sociology of Herrschaft is, as I have noted elsewhere40, essentially a sociology from above, which focuses almost exclusively on how domination is justified and administered. There is, however, a basis in reality for the presuppositions of the operational code of the capitalist state. The market sets the rules of bourgeois society and provides the economic constraint for their enforcement, even if ideological socialization proper, and in the last instance coercive violence, are also always necessary. The social dynamic is located in the realm of private enterprise and capital accumulation, and it is the common public needs of these that are ensured by the 'calculable rules' of the state.

However, the differences between the capitalist state and the bureaucratic enterprise should not be neglected. The entrepreneur has to confront the risks and uncertainties of a fluctuating competitive market and cannot work only according to fixed, calculable rules. Bureaucracy is above all an organization for legal regulation of the market and of the problems it engenders; but it is not suited for active intervention on the market. Weber's analysis naturally focussed on the post-Jena Prussian-German Rechtsstaat, or legal bureaucracy, under which specialized knowledge and strict hierarchy fitted with each other. In 20th-century monopoly capitalism, a new technology of bourgeois state organization has arisen.

Before we turn to these later phenomena, we must briefly consider the other political technique of competitive capitalism: namely, parliamentary politics. The bourgeois revolution split into two the feudal unity of government, legislation, administration, and judicature, each regulated by a specific technology. Government and legislature now had to represent the nation, not the hierarchical orders of the realm. The king, his retainers, the aristocrats and the spokesmen of the other estates were superseded by politicians owing their position to personal abilities (although it was understood that to possess any political ability at all, the individuals concerned had to be members of the ruling class, its allies or clientele). The parliamentary politician governed above all by skilful mediation between fellow MPs of his class, each with his idiosyncrasies and immediate economic and social preoccupations: by playing them off against one another, creating heteroclite and shifting coalitions, and by persuading and cajoling with a peculiar kind of abstract oratory. Famous examples of such a figure are Guizot and Thiers, Disraeli and Giolitti, and, an apparently older type of statesman, Bismarck.

The further development of capitalism has brought to the fore two new techniques of bourgeois rule. To the extent that the popular masses could not be excluded from the politics of the 'legal nation', nor be kept isolated and encapsulated by local bosses and notables, the classical form of parliamentary politics was no longer an adequate instrument. It had to be supplemented or replaced by an original politics able to take hold of these new, partly-emaninated masses and keep them in a position of subordination. This new kind of bourgeois leadership may be termed plebiscitary politics. By means of mass appeals, the politician's message, and above all his image and attractive personal qualities, are conveyed to the people through public posters, mass-circulation newspapers, loud-speakers, and the television screen. pioneered by Louis Bonaparte in the middle of the nineteenth century, this type of politics has been taken up and massively developed during the present century. Except in the Fascist regimes, however, it has supplemented rather than replaced parliamentary politics. The French Fourth Republic, the parliamentary factionalism of Italian Christian Democracy, and, outside Europe, the functioning of the US Congress and the parliamentary style of the dominant Japanese Liberal Democratic party all bear eloquent witness to the continuing importance of the traditional skills: manipulation of agendas and procedures, horse-trading, formation of unstable coalitions on a clique basis, and monitoring of confidence votes.

Classical parliamentary politics developed out of the bourgeois 'public' of salons and clubs, and, with its internal rituals and particular rhetoric, served to insulate the legislative apparatus both

from the stable ceremony of the court and noble house, and from the experience and life-styles of the working classes. It is for this reason that it constitutes an enduring and central component of bourgeois political technology.

In the twentieth century and particularly the last few decades, a new mode of organizing the bourgeois state has developed alongside the legal bureaucracy. Like the latter, it is characterized by specialization, impersonality and stratified monopolization of intellectual knowledge by professionals. But it does not rely to the same degree upon calculable rules and fixed hierarchies. We may term this form *managerial technocracy*. Its rationality is substantive rather than formal; and, instead of juridical knowledge, it promotes technical and scientific expertise, applied with discretion and consideration of actual effects, rather than with calculable legal precision. The stable hierarchy is broken up by *ad hoc* committees, working parties, and special enquiries. Weber's assumption of a fit between competence and position on the administrative ladder no longer holds when what is at stake is not so much uniformity of regulation as effectiveness of state intervention. In the internal control system, cost-benefit analysis and budgetary policy have overtaken legal reviews in importance.

The new technology has emerged above all in connection with the increasingly social character of the productive forces and the rising challenge of the working class. These two processes also appear to be the most basic determinants of the growing state interventions on the market through countercyclical policies, state enterprises, and 'planning' for economic growth, technological development and environmental effect.

As we shall see below, the private-public distinction is a central feature of the bourgeois polity. However, it is becoming more and more blurred. Whereas, in the age of competitive capitalism, the legal state bureaucracy and private entrepreneurs occupied clearly demarcated functions, the present-day state goes far beyond mere regulatory activity to intervene massively on the market, affecting the supply and demand of commodities and money. In this respect, the state managerial technocracy is very similar to that of the modern giant capitalist corporation. Unlike the private entrepreneur, the latter is not confined to skilful adaptation to the vicissitudes of the market; it can act upon its parameters and engage in planning and prediction. Internal budget systems and operations analyses now move back and forth between the state and the corporations, as do management personnel.

The most important example of such managerial-technocratic administration is the system that has developed since the time of the New Deal in the United States—a country which never had a strong bureaucracy of the classical kind. In France, it first assumed importance with the postwar rise of planning—described by a well-informed liberal writer, Andrew Shonfield, as 'an act of voluntary collusion between senior civil servants and the senior managers of big business'. One advanced case, which is little known in the wider world, is that of post-war Norway. The country has been largely administered by means of a sophisticated national budgeting system, evolved by economists working within the econometric tradition of Ragnar Frisch.

In the present discussion, we have dealt only with administrative technology. But a similar trend can probably be discovered in the military sphere, where the new forces of repression and destruction have generated novel forms of military rule. The army bureaucrat, charged with application of the rules of strategy in a strict hierarchy of command, has been supplemented with staffs of weapons specialists, war economy planners, intelligence officers, and directors of subversive operations.

Managerial technology supplements, and in some cases overshadows, legal bureaucracy; but it does not replace it. The two co-exist within the modern bourgeois state, often in uneasy relationships of conflicting competence, procedure and status. Italy presents a particularly striking contrast between a highly archaic bureaucracy and a dynamic technocracy rooted in the economic sector of the state and represented by managers such as Mattei and Cefis. The

---

43 Writing with a conservative conception of bourgeois administrative law, the West German jurist Ernst Forsthoof has advanced some sombre reflections on the problem of the compatibility of classical bureaucracy and managerial technocracy: *Rechtstaat im Wandel*, Stuttgart 1964; *Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft*, Munich 1971.
combination of the two techniques has not overcome the intrinsic divisions of the bourgeois state or its incapacity to engage in comprehensive planning. Moreover, the new technology of rule has generated problems of its own. When the higher education system is no longer completely reliable (as has been the case since the upheavals of the late sixties) some state technocrats will cease to regard application of their knowledge and execution of their tasks as automatically synonymous with the maintenance of capitalist domination. However, in their technocratic myopia, state managers may miscalculate the political impact of their measures. Thus, the French Barre Plan aroused a general strike in May 1977 which was supported by forces ranging from the very respectable CGC to the Communist-led CGT.

From his own class standpoint, Max Weber was convinced that bureaucracy was the most efficient form of organization, surpassed only by that of the capitalist entrepreneur within the specific market sphere. Lenin, in *State and Revolution*, seemed to think that no special political technology was necessary in the socialist state: the running of the state had been simplified to the point where it could be subsumed under the functions of accounting and control practised by 'the armed workers, by the whole armed population'. The later development of the USSR and the other socialist countries pointed in rather a different direction, and has often been depicted in terms of the rise of bureaucracy. Were Weber and all his bourgeois successors perhaps right after all?

Now, however the Stalinist form of authoritarian organization should be grasped, the type of administrator which it produced was certainly not that of the specialized bureaucrat, stably perched on a rung of the hierarchical ladder and impersonally applying calculable rules. The peculiar Stalinist technology of rule cannot be examined here. But we shall argue that one of its central components was an authoritarian and brutal variant of a genuinely working-class technique of organization – one which long predated Stalin and which constitutes the specific technology of the proletariat as the ruling class, that is, of the socialist state.

This mode of organization is as old as the labour movement itself; but it was Lenin who made one of the most important single contributions to the new technology with his theory and practice of the formation of professional working class revolutionaries. He thus helped to demonstrate the unquestionable incorrectness of Weber’s position.

In its trade unions and parties the proletariat has developed an unprecedented political form – that of collective mass organization. This differs from both the feudal manor and the capitalist enterprise; from the various state machines and the churches; and from the conspiratorial group and the bourgeois political club. The central figure is not the priest shepherding his flock towards salvation, nor the feudal seigneur, capitalist manager-technocrat or rule-applying bureaucrat, but the organizer. His principal ability is that of ideological and practical mobilization for common goals. He also has a special kind of knowledge which has as its object class organization and class struggle; or, to put it more generally, social organization and the social struggle of which he is himself part. Such scientific knowledge of the class struggle was of course made possible by the historical union of Marxism and the labour movement.

Now, two points should be emphasized from the outset. First, the labour movement is organized in a fundamentally different way from a state bureaucracy or a capitalist firm. Secondly, however, there are different labour movements and different kinds of labour organizer. This diversity has given rise to, and provides an objective basis for, criticism of labour organizers on the grounds of conservatism, authoritarianism, sectarianism, adventurism, incompetence, privileged position, and so on. But they should not for all that be confused with officials of a bourgeois state or managers of a corporation. The so-called trade-union bureaucrat is little guided by precise rules in carrying out his job: in recruiting members, running the union, or bargaining with the employers. Even if indirectly, he must somehow gain collective acceptance of his decisions and of the results of negotiation; he cannot simply issue orders with calculable precision.

---

45 Lenin’s theory and practice of the party are often obscured by myths concocted out of superficial or unmittingly hostile readings of *What is to be Done?* For some references to the working-class character of Lenin’s conceptions, see *Science, Class and Society*, op. cit., p. 327n.
46 Sune Sunesson, a Swedish student of trade unions and a colleague of mine, has already presented similar considerations.
In the communist movement this working-class organizer is called a cadre. The distinctive political technology of the socialist state may accordingly be termed cadre administration or cadre leadership. But it is inherent in the contradictory character of socialism that this working-class form of organization coexists unpeacefully with both bureaucracy and technocracy.

Organizing a proletarian revolution and the socialist transformation of society is not the kind of task that can be handled primarily by the speedy and precise application of calculable rules. The overall goal is given to the individual cadre in the form of the party line, but the class struggle cannot be worked out with the same exactitude as market transactions. The party line changes often, mainly by a shift in the emphasis on existing rules and directives, and all the time these have to be applied to the concrete and changing situation in which the cadre works. As an organizer of men, he cannot carry out his instructions ‘without regard to the individual’. On the contrary, his ability to get things done depends greatly on his capacity to take into account the individuals with whom he has to work, and to establish a personal relationship with them. The means to enforce rules can be determined in advance even less than their content; it is largely a matter of inspiration, persuasion, intimidation, example and leadership.

The cadre is also a specialist in the mobilization of the masses. A handsome tribute has been paid to the efficiency of cadre administration and leadership, not only by those non-proletarian movements of national liberation that have tried to use them, but also by the imperialist specialists of counter-insurgency who have sought to imitate them again and again, though with little success.

The important difference between the capitalist bureaucrat and the East European cadre has been clearly expressed and critically examined in the remarkable work of Bálint Balla. Writing in Weberian language and from a left-Hegelian point of view, he says: ‘While bureaucracy is characterized by reliability, continuity, efficacy, precise application of prevailing instructions – yet also by pedantry, formalism, red tape and Vehlen’s “trained incapacity” – cadre administration is marked on the one hand by flexible, immediate, “line-oriented” dynamism, by superiority over formalities and pragmatic ability to adjust to changing situations, yet on the other hand by diffuse unreliability and dilettantism, amorphous aversion to responsibility, rigid authoritarianism, rule-resistant incompetence and emotional paternalism’ (sic).

An American China scholar, Franz Schurman, has tried to differentiate the cadre from the manager and bureaucrat in terms of their characteristic ‘leadership styles’. For this purpose, he uses two dimensions: orientation to stability or change, and mode of organizational integration, human or technical. Like the manager and unlike the bureaucrat, the cadre is ‘change-oriented’; but he alone leads by means of human organization – by welding men together for solidary achievement of certain goals. Schurman’s categories seem much too general and do not specify the kind of change and human organization involved. But he undoubtedly catches an important aspect of the cadre’s particularity. Schurman’s distinction between the cadre and both the manager and the bureaucrat is especially valuable, because the Stalinist critique of bureaucracy, which was directed primarily against its routinism, formalism and slowness, rather than its insulated hierarchy, could also be levelled by managerial technocrats.

What differentiates the cadre from the manager seems to be two features in particular. First, cadre leadership is based primarily not upon universalistic intellectual knowledge – of engineering, sales, administration, and so on – but on commitment to the aims and ‘line’ of the organization and on experience of its struggles. (By contrast, feudalism rested upon personal loyalty to a superior.) Secondly, the cadre does not normally have at his disposal the kind of chain of command which is constituent both of bureaucracy and management and of the feudal hierarchy. The cadre typically has to lead rather than command. This is so because he is not (only) above the collective, but (first of all) a part of it. The characteristic problem of the working-class organizer is to unify a collective and to keep it united in solidarity and commitment.

In the socialist countries, this type of cadre leadership is to be found most clearly in the relationship of the party secretary and party committee to, on the one hand, the productive, administrative or military unit in which they operate, and, on the other, the ordinary party members and popular masses with whom they are concerned.

in the waging of mass economic, political or ideological campaigns. There may be manipulation, cajoling, intimidation, as well as persuasion and inspiration; but in both cases the mode of activation is not that of command. The principle of democratic centralism does provide a command structure; but at the two levels we are discussing, not even the Stalinist party functionary could carry out his tasks just by issuing orders according to the statutes of 'democratic centralism'.

What makes the cadre part of the collective is above all an ideological bond of solidarity, sustained by links of common organizational practice. In contrast to the manager or bureaucrat, the labour organizer does not organize the jobs upon which other people depend for a living. This line of demarcation is crossed when only a cash nexus links a group of people with their representative. Thus, many US business union leaders should probably be regarded as salesmen (managers of a kind) rather than as trade-union cadres.

The parliamentary politician and plebiscitary leader do not operate with a chain of command either. But they are not thereby collective organizers. The former is basically a middleman between individuals and groups; while the latter inspires a personal following which is typically much looser than a collective organization, and which, possessing only a rudimentary internal structure, has little capacity for endurance and sustained joint effort. Moreover, the bourgeois politician, of either type, usually owes his leadership position to diffuse personal abilities rather than to commitment to a precise political line.

Bourgeois Catholic and Fascist parties and unions, as well as modern bourgeois mass parties in general, have tried to imitate forms of labour organization in their struggle against the working class. But, in its state apparatuses, the bourgeoisie has generally ruled through bureaucrats, managers and parliamentary or plebiscitary politicians. The 1793–94 Jacobin government of revolutionary France seems to exhibit certain similarities with an authoritarian cadre state. However, to portray the CPSU of the twenties and thirties as an example of 'the Jacobin model', as does the Italian historian, Giuliano Procacci, in his penetrating book on the Soviet party, is in my opinion misleading. 51

Procacci focusses on the militarization of the party during the civil war and on the combination of centralized direction and mass enthusiasm. But the analogy with Jacobinism provides little insight into the enduring, pervasive and well-structured presence of ruling Communist parties at all levels of state and society – not only at peaks of crisis, but also during decades of peace. Indeed, analogical references to different historical and social contexts are always rather suspect.

Let us recall some general traits of Jacobin history. The movement originated as a parliamentary club – the Club Breton – at the National Assembly of Versailles in 1789. When the last moved to Paris, the club was housed in a Jacobin convent of the Dominican order (which gave it its name), functioning as a parliamentary party and pressure group. It soon received the affiliation of a large number of clubs from all over France, which had previously existed as intellectual societies of the local petty bourgeoisie or as masonic lodges. Though bound together by increasing revolutionary zeal and by extensive correspondence, this system of clubs never formed a united party in the modern sense of the term. (The famous, or infamous, Jacobin centralization affected primarily the state apparatus, and was in any case largely a conjunctural phenomenon, since a separation of powers was integral to the Jacobin political conception.) From the fall of the Gironde in June 1793 until Thermidor of the following year, this network formed the political backbone of the government. But this brief period was one of external war against a formidable coalition of all the forces of European reaction. The revolutionary government was led not by the Jacobin Club in Paris, but by two parliamentary committees invested with extraordinary powers by the Convention in a time of mortal danger: the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. The direct cause of the fall of Robespierre and the radical Jacobins was a conflict between the two committees combined with a parliamentary conspiracy in the Convention. Indeed, on the very eve of the Ninth of Thermidor, Robespierre had been enthusiastically applauded at the Jacobin Club. 52

We have argued that cadre organization is a genuinely working


class form of organization. This is tantamount to saying that it belongs to class society. In a classless communist society, Stalin's dictum of 1935, 'Cadres decide everything' is replaced by: 'The masses decide everything'. An advance towards that goal necessitates both a fight against bureaucracy and technocracy and a process of self-abolition of cadres.

Organizational technology may be summarized as a combination of two variables. It involves, first, a directive dynamic: a mode of orientation and a basis of leadership; and secondly, a mode of activation of the members of the organization, whereby their contribution to its orientation is ensured. Both derive from the social relations of the prevailing type of society: from class relations. We may express this by means of the chart on pages 64–5.

The chart should not be seen as anything more ambitious than a kind of summary of the preceding argument. Two notes of caution may be necessary. The historical coexistence and interaction of different modes of production implies that several organizational technologies interpenetrate, under the domination of one of them, within a single state. Secondly, the empty boxes on the chart indicate the great number of possible 'aberrations' and 'deviations' from the modal types. This is further emphasized by the fact that no exhaustive logic underlies the combination system. There may be other directive dynamics and other modes of activation than the ones listed. Our aim has not been to present a theory of organizations, but to define the contours of the most important types of state organization in modern history: feudal, capitalist, and socialist. The empty boxes also conceal the coexistence of different technologies. Thus, the late feudal states contained elements of bureaucracy and sometimes even of parliamentary politics (as is illustrated by the Swedish eighteenth-century Age of Freedom); bureaucracy and parliamentary politics are normal aspects of monopoly capitalist states; and socialist states are also bureaucratic and technocratic, and, if 'Euro-communism' leads to socialism, will embrace aspects of parliamentary politics as well. As a comparison, the communist form of organization of society has been added, although it does not involve the existence of a separate state.

Now that we have completed this first general survey, we shall try to specify the fundamental input and output mechanisms and processes of transformation with regard to the tasks, personnel and material resources of the three main types of state. In order to facilitate an overall view, we present a summary of our findings in a chart at the end.

Tasks
At a very general and abstract level, the tasks of the state may be defined as internal and external defence of a social formation, and supreme rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication. The concrete content of these functions is so varied that an exhaustive description would be almost without end. Our aim here, however, is neither to provide such descriptive detail nor to discuss the functions of the state in general, but to grasp the specific mechanisms which filter the task inputs and thus define which issues are of relevance to the particular type of state. The basis of this structuring mechanism is the specific relation between state and society. Clearly this will vary with the mode of production—the capitalist state does not relate to its society in the same way as the feudal or socialist state.

The character of this state-society relation, then, is expressed primarily in those regulative principles which determine the form of the issues of concern to the state, but also in the relative weight of the diverse general functions of a state. In a third dimension, the quantitative role of the state is determined by the extent of social practice encompassed in its tasks.

A useful starting-point for our analysis will be an investigation of the qualitative form of the task inputs under capitalism. The issues with which the bourgeois state is concerned are, in fact, defined by the characteristic distinction between the private and public spheres: the state occupies itself only with the latter. In his What is the Third Estate?, Abbe Sieyès was already making the point in the following way: 'What does a nation require to survive and prosper? It needs private activities and public services.' Under the impact of the French Revolution, Hegel was later to develop this distinction into one between state and civil society.

35 I have analysed the emergence of this distinction in Science, Class and Society, op. cit., pp. 155–6.
### Characteristic Technologies of State Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feudal:</th>
<th>Directive dynamic</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Mode of Activation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>Mediatery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social superiority and/or personal confidence-loyalty</td>
<td>Seigneurial (independent delegated or bought)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitalist:</strong></td>
<td>Stratified monopolization of intellectual knowledge: formal-legal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive market and ‘factory despotism’</td>
<td>Personal qualities of national representativeness and mass appeal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plebiscitary politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socialist:</strong></td>
<td>Stratified monopolization of intellectual knowledge: substantial-technical</td>
<td>Uneven degree of political commitment and experience</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective appropriation and individual subordination (to managers and bureaucracy)</td>
<td>Personal qualities of national representativeness and mass appeal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Communist)</strong></td>
<td>(Everyday collective experience)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Collective)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This opposition between what is private and what is public is rooted in the class relations of capitalist society; it is continually reproduced by competition between individuals on the market and by the command of private capital over labour. The formal equality of buyers and sellers appears in the ‘public’ domain of politics as the common ‘interest’ of independent and equal individuals. The polity has a necessary but separate role, and it is this separation that is clearly expressed in the private-public distinction.

The struggle of the rising bourgeoisie centered on issues concerning both the state and society. It demanded that the state be separated from the private realm of aristocratic lineage and be firmly based on ‘public opinion’; it should be concerned only with matters subsumable under general principles, and not with the material or legal interests of particular individuals or categories of individuals. The distinction was intrinsically related to the concept of bureaucracy – of the bureau as a public office separated from the household of the king and the aristocrats. As regards society, the conception of the private was directed against the estates, guilds, village communities, royal charters and all other quasi-public corporations that restricted the action of the individual.

The location and sharpness of the line of demarcation between private and public has varied considerably with the conjuncture of the class struggle. Generally speaking, the private sphere has extended to the choice of occupation and place of work, the choice of marriage-partner, and the ideological convictions, consumption habits and life-style of the individual. In other words, it has comprised the labour market, capital accumulation, the bourgeois nuclear family, and the whole field of bourgeois ‘individualism’. Sexual morality, religion and the public expression of political ideology have at times been matters for state repression, although in principle they form part of the private sphere of bourgeois democracy. (Once ideological non-conformism reaches the level of collective organization, however, it invariably becomes the concern of the bourgeois state’s forces of intelligence and repression.)

Three major trends of capitalist development have had a considerable influence on the private-public distinction. Two of these have substantially expanded the public sphere of state tasks, whereas on another level the third has separated the private sphere more sharply. Firstly, the increasingly social character of the forces of production has established a new kind of connection between the state and the processes of production and exploitation. State intervention has grown in order to meet the need for large-scale, long-term investment that is too risky for private capital to undertake, and the need for a degree of economic coordination that cannot be realized by the market. The dependence of monopoly capitalism upon a few giant corporations has further encouraged ad hoc state action to rescue ailing companies. A second trend – which is largely a consequence of the increasingly social character of the productive forces – is the growth and strengthening of the working class itself. Directly or indirectly, this has focused public concern on new issues: the content and effects of centralized wage deals, job safety, the length of the working day, the power of command in the workplace, the distribution of income, and social security.

On the other hand, a strong tendency towards the privatization of life has appeared with such phenomena as increasing horizontal mobility, the growth of city suburbs, the intensification of labour through speed-up, and the development of new consumer goods, particularly the motor-car and television. The private sphere has become more isolated from the public, the nuclear family more secluded from society as a whole.

Feudal and socialist states are organized around definitions of tasks that are quite different from the private-public principle, even though they themselves stand at opposite poles to each other. Under feudalism the state is ‘privatized’, whereas under socialism it is private life that is ‘made public’. However, such a characterization remains within the frame of reference of capitalism and does not identify even the general distinctive patterns of the two systems.

The feudal state and feudal society were not the private property of the king. The polity was not based on the Gefolgschaft – the armed retainers of the ruler and military commander – which was the form prevalent among Germanic ‘barbarian’ tribes. It rather expressed a fusion of this institution with the appropriation of the means of production (land) by individual lords, of whom one rose to the position of king.\(^{56}\) Feudal social relations were characterized by a hierarchy of personal services and obligations that regulated the tasks of the state. This principle can be seen most clearly in the system of noble

\(^{56}\) Joseph Strayer has described these as ‘the two levels of feudalism’; see Medieval Statescraft and the Perspectives of History, Princeton 1971, ch. 6. Cf. O. Hintze, ‘Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus’, op. cit.