RUPTURAL TRANSFORMATION

It may seem odd at the beginning of the twenty-first century to have an extended discussion of ruptural transformations of capitalism. While revolutionary rhetoric has not completely disappeared, few critics of capitalism today imagine that a revolutionary overthrow of the state in the developed capitalist countries is a plausible strategy of emancipatory social transformation. Quite apart from any moral considerations about the immediate consequences of adopting such a strategy, or the desirability of the ultimate outcomes that would be generated by such an overthrow, the idea that the strategy itself could possibly succeed seems very far-fetched.

In spite of this, I believe that there are four reasons why it is worthwhile discussing ruptural strategies. First, political activists, especially when they are young, are often attracted to the idea of a radical rupture with existing institutions. The existing structures of power, privilege, and inequality seem so malevolent and so damaging to aspirations for human flourishing that the idea of simply smashing them and creating something new and better can be appealing. This may be because of wishful thinking or romantic illusions, but nevertheless the idea of revolutionary rupture continues to excite the imagination of at least some activists. Second, a clear understanding of the logic and limits of a ruptural strategy of social transformation can help clarify alternative strategies. Theoretical and political debates on the left have been waged since the nineteenth century in terms of the "reform" versus "revolution" opposition, and in important ways the specificity of the former comes from this contrast. Third, while I am quite skeptical of the possibility of system-wide ruptural strategies, more limited forms of rupture in particular institutional settings may be possible, and there are aspects of the ruptural strategy—such as its emphasis on sharp confrontation with dominant classes and the state—which can certainly be important under specific circumstances. The logic of ruptural transformation need not be restricted to totalizing ruptures in entire social systems. Finally, even if systemic ruptural strategies for social empowerment in developed capitalist countries are not plausible at the beginning of the twenty-first century, no one has a crystal ball which tells what the future holds. In the world as it currently stands, the robustness of the institutions of the state in developed capitalist democracies make ruptural strategies implausible, but it is possible that in some unanticipated future the contradictions of these societies could dramatically undermine those institutions. Equilibria unravel. Systemic crises destroy the foundations of hegemony. Ruptures may happen rather than be made, and in such conditions a ruptural strategy may become what Marxists used to call an historical "necessity." The idea of ruptural strategy still needs to be part of our strategic thinking about social transformation since such strategies may become more relevant in some places at some point in the future.

THE KEY QUESTION AND UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

The question I want to address in this chapter is this: under what conditions is it plausible to imagine that there could be broad popular support for a ruptural strategy against capitalism in advanced capitalist countries? The analysis is based on three assumptions:

First, I assume that in developed capitalist countries with functioning liberal democratic institutions, a ruptural strategy for socialism would have to work in significant ways through the ordinary democratic processes of the capitalist state. This does not

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1 Theda Skocpol argued in her influential book *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) that revolutions are not made; they happen. By this she meant that the crisis conditions which make possible the revolutionary seizure of state power are not themselves the result of the strategies of revolutionaries, but of the intersection of large dynamic processes operating behind the backs of actors and contingent historical conjunctures of events which create a "revolutionary situation." Revolutionary parties "seize the time," and for this they undoubtedly have to be in some sense prepared, but actual ruptural strategies only really become operative in the context of such moments. (These issues were raised in a discussion of ruptural logics of transformation by two graduate students at Johns Hopkins University, Setika Kumral and Erdem Yoruk).
mean that the ruptural strategy would not include fundamental transformations of the form of the state itself—democratic deepening of the state is certainly a central part of the agenda of social empowerment. And it does not mean that a ruptural strategy would not also include political actions outside of the state in civil society and in the economy. My assumption is simply that if a ruptural strategy of transformation is at all feasible, it will not take the form of a violent insurrectionary assault and overthrow of the state by extra-parliamentary means in the model of classical revolutions. The reason for making this assumption is not a rejection of revolution on the basis of some absolute moral objection to insurrectionary violence, but rather a belief that under foreseeable historical conditions such means would be incapable of actually creating a deeply egalitarian democratic form of social empowerment in developed capitalist societies.\(^2\) However difficult it might be, therefore, if a ruptural strategy is to be pursued for the goal of democratic egalitarian socialism, then the strategy will have to work through the existing, imperfect state machinery.\(^3\)

Second, I assume that given the necessity of working through the institutions of representative democracy, broad popular support is a necessary if not sufficient condition for a plausible ruptural strategy. While there have certainly been historical instances in which a rupture in political institutions occurred because a well-organized political force that did not have the support of a large majority of the population was able to “seize the time” and take advantage of a severely weakened state, this has not resulted in a subsequent trajectory of broad democratic social empowerment of the sort we have been exploring in this book. Throughout this chapter, therefore, I assume that if a ruptural strategy is to be a central part of the construction of a robust socialism of social empowerment, then it would have to be supported by a substantial majority of the population.

Third, I assume, following the influential work of Adam Przeworski,\(^4\) that a necessary condition for broad, sustainable popular support is that socialism (however this is defined) will be in the all-things-considered material interests of most people.\(^5\) This is not to imply that in struggles against capitalism moral commitments that are not directly connected to material interests are not important. They matter tremendously and help forge the solidarities and willingness to make sacrifices that are essential for collective action to be robust. Nevertheless, I will assume that while ideology and moral commitment may strengthen support for a radical rupture with capitalism, they build on a base of material interests; in the absence of such interests, ideological commitments would not by themselves be able to generate durable popular support.\(^6\) Socialism of whatever form will not be sustainable in the long run if the material conditions of life for most people are worse than under capitalism.

The analysis which follows is based on these three assumptions. At the end of the chapter we will examine the implications of relaxing the assumptions.

RUPTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND TRANSITION TROUGHS

The key problem to sort out, then, is this: Under what conditions is a ruptural strategy for socialism sufficiently in the material interests of the majority of people to render it a plausible strategy of transformation? The material interests of people with respect to any large project of social change involving a sharp rupture with existing institutions depend upon three key parameters:

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2 It is often said that “ends cannot justify the means,” but unless the means are completely innocuous, only the ends can justify them. It may be that certain means cannot be justified by any ends, but in most real-world situations the means of struggle do have undesirable side effects on bystanders and unintended negative consequences of various sorts, and in deciding whether or not those means are nevertheless justified, the justification of the ends must play some role. In any case, if the means in fact cannot plausibly lead to the ends for which they are intended, then they are unjustified.

3 This does not imply, of course, that coercion would not be part of a ruptural strategy, since once state power is being used for a ruptural transformation, the defense of the state against counter-revolution may require coercion, particularly if the counter-revolution is itself violent. My assumption here is simply that the control of state power was achieved through ordinary democratic means rather than through a violent insurrection and overthrow of the regime in power, and the democratic structure of the state is maintained during the ruptural transformation.


5 In this context, “material interests” should be understood in an expansive way to include leisure as well as consumption, quality of work as well as earnings.

6 The issue here is not the standard collective action problem of whether or not individuals will actively join a political struggle for such a rupture, but rather under what conditions people will see such a rupture as being in their interests. The pragmatic “collective action problem” of overcoming free riding only becomes relevant if in fact people believe they would benefit from the success of the collective action.
• The trajectory of their material well-being *in the absence of the rupture*. This is what life would look like if the existing structures of power and privilege continued.

• The trajectory of their material well-being *after the period of rupture is over* and the new institutions are fully in place and functioning effectively.

• The trajectory of their interests *during the period between* the initiation of the rupture and the new institutional equilibrium. Given that under any plausible scenario, a rupture with the existing economic structure is likely to be highly disruptive, this period of transition will almost certainly involve a significant decline in average material conditions of life. Adam Przeworski thus dubs this part of the long-term trajectory of material conditions the "transition trough."

A simple representation of these trajectories in developed capitalism, derived from the work of Przeworski, looks something like the pictures in Figures 9.1 and 9.2. Figure 9.1 presents a hypothetical trajectory of the level of material well-being of the median person

**Figure 9.1 Hypothetical Trajectory of Material Interests in Developed Capitalism**

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7 It is important to note here that even in a period of prolonged stagnation of average wages, the standard of living of most individuals still tends to rise over time because of the positive age profile of earnings. While in the last quarter of the twentieth century in the United States median earnings stagnated, the median person’s earnings still increased over the course of their work life.

8 I am pegging this question here to the “median person” because the socialist transformation needs to be supported by the majority of the population if a socialist party is to receive continued electoral support under democratic rules.
agrees to respect the existing political rules of the game. We are thus examining the problems with a ruptural strategy under quite favorable conditions. What would happen to the material welfare of the average person? Figure 9.2 indicates three general possibilities.

The "socialist fantasy path" imagines that a rupture with capitalism immediately brings with it an improvement in the material conditions of life of the median person in the society. Either there is no significant economic disruption, or the immediate gains from redistribution are so large as to swamp whatever short-term economic decline occurs due to the disruptions of rapid institutional change. This path is unrealistic, at least in a complex, developed capitalist economy. Even if it is the case that the material conditions of life of ordinary people would be much better in a socialist economy, it is not plausible that a ruptural transition from capitalism would instantly improve things.

The "pessimistic path" is predicted by anti-socialists. The disruption of capitalist mechanisms causes an economic collapse, but the system never recovers and the new equilibrium is permanently below what it would have been had capitalism continued. If one believes in this path, then socialism is simply undesirable. The

issue is not the costs of a transition from capitalism to socialism, but the relative steady-state economic performance of the two systems.

The "optimistic path" recognizes that any rupture with capitalism would necessarily entail significant economic disruption and thus sacrifice. Even if we assume that the rupture occurs under democratic conditions and that there is no violent resistance, any serious move towards socialism would trigger significant destruction of the incentive and information structures that animated economic coordination under capitalism. Supply chains, systems of distribution, credit markets, pricing systems, and many other pivotal elements of economic integration would be deeply disrupted. This would certainly precipitate a significant decline in production and standards of living for some period of time. This would be intensified by capital flight and disinvestments in the run-up to a socialist rupture, since many capitalists would preemptively respond to the "writing on the wall." The path is nevertheless optimistic for it predicts that eventually new processes of coordination are effectively installed, appropriate incentives are restored, and production and distribution under the new rules of the game are institutionalized. As this happens conditions improve, eventually crossing the predicted trajectory of capitalism itself and moving towards a higher general level. The shaded area in Figure 9.2, then, constitutes the "transition trough" between the ruptural break with capitalism and the point where material conditions of life under socialism exceed those under the previous social order for the median person.

Let us assume that the most likely trajectory is some variant of the optimistic path. The key issue then becomes the size of the transition trough. Depending upon how deep and prolonged the transition trough is, it may not be in the material interests of most people to support a ruptural path to socialism even if they firmly believe that life would be better once the transition was weathered. Interests must always be understood within specific time-horizons, and if the transition trough continues for a sufficiently extended period it is unlikely to be seen by most people as in their material interests.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that from the perspective of the actors encountering a transition, the shape of these curves is not an empirical observation, but a hypothesis about the future. The future is uncertain, and in any case such predictions are always based on highly contestable theoretical arguments. Even if
these arguments are well-founded, most people are unlikely to have unshakable confidence in them. In the period of the downward slope of the transition trough, as indicated in Figure 9.3, the empirical trajectories of the optimistic and pessimistic paths look very similar. As the economy declines political forces opposed to socialism will argue strenuously that the trajectory will continue downwards to catastrophe and that the transition should be reversed. Of course socialists will counter with arguments that eventually the economy will improve and people should stay the course, but this may look like wishful thinking to many people if the transition is prolonged. In the midst of the transition trough, the observable trajectory of material conditions in the recent past looks rather like the predicted path of the anti-socialist pessimists. The political coalition of supporters for a democratic ruptural transition to socialism, therefore, is likely to become increasingly strained and fragile over time if the transition trough is relatively deep and prolonged.

The situation is actually likely to be even more precarious than this, for so far we have looked only at the trajectory of material interests of the median person. Let us suppose that there are two classes of people whose material interests would ultimately be broadly served by a successful transition to socialism. Let us call them the “working class” and the “middle class.” In capitalism the middle class has in general a higher material standard of living than the working class and let us suppose that this inequality has been growing over time. Figure 9.4 indicates the nature of the transition troughs for these two classes of people in a ruptural transition to socialism. A ruptural transition to socialism under democratic conditions requires a broad coalition between the middle class and the working class, but the experience of transition is likely to be different for individuals in different parts of the coalition. Specifically, if the socialist government takes the egalitarian principles seriously, then the transition trough is likely to be deeper.

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9 I am using the term “middle class” here in a deliberately loose way. The issue is to distinguish, within the coalition of people whose lives would be improved by socialism (and thus would potentially support its goals on the basis of their material interests), those people who are relatively advantaged within capitalism from those who are not. The precise definition of the middle class and working class does not matter for this specific purpose. If one prefers an expansive concept of the working class, then the issue would be one of a coalition between the relatively advantaged and disadvantaged segments of the working class.
and longer for the middle class, even if they remain materially better off than workers throughout the process. This means that in addition to the general problem of a decline in political support in a prolonged transition trough, there is likely to be a particularly acute problem of middle-class defections from the socialist coalition.

If these arguments are roughly correct, and if the transition trough resembles the general pattern suggested in Figures 9.2 and 9.4, then it is unlikely that a ruptural transition to socialism would be sustainable under democratic conditions. Political support simply would not remain sufficiently strong or intact for a long enough period of time. This means that a democratically elected socialist government attempting to build socialist institutions through a ruptural strategy would either face political defeat in a subsequent election or, in order to stay in power and traverse the transition, would have to resort to undemocratic means. A turn to authoritarian party rule, however, would undermine the radical democratic egalitarianism of the institution-building project itself. The result is therefore more likely to be a transition to some form of authoritarian statism than a radically democratic form of social empowerment.

Some revolutionary socialists have believed that a turn to authoritarian one-party rule during a transition from capitalism need not destroy the possibility of the subsequent evolution of meaningful egalitarian democracy. Historical experience suggests that this is very unlikely: the concentration of power and accountability that accompanies the abrogation of multi-party representative democracy and the "rule of law" generates new rules of the game and institutional forms in which ruthlessness is rewarded, democratic values are marginalized, dissent is dealt with repressively, and the kinds of autonomous capacities for collective action in civil society needed for democracy are destroyed. The legacies of such practices during the difficult times of a transition make a democratic socialist destination implausible.

REJOINDERS

There are a number of possible responses to this generally pessimistic view of the possibility of a ruptural strategy. First, and most simply, it may be that the transition trough would not be deep and prolonged. While the "fantasy path" may be unrealistic, perhaps the optimistic path is itself too pessimistic. If the duration of the trough were reasonably short, and especially if the upturn occurred relatively quickly, then a democratic coalition for transformation might remain intact.

Second, it might be argued, the projection of material conditions of life for people under capitalism is wrong. If developed capitalism were to enter a prolonged period of endemic crisis with long-term prospects of deterioration, then the likely transition trough out of capitalism might not look so bad. This, of course, is what Marx in part believed: In the long term capitalism undermines its own conditions for profitable accumulation with
a resulting intensification of crisis tendencies. As illustrated in Figure 9.5, as crises deepen, transition troughs become shallower because the counterfactual trajectory within capitalism becomes increasingly downward sloping. It may even become plausible, if crises take the form of a sharp and enduring collapse, that the socialist trajectory would be more like the "fantasy path" in Figure 9.2: material conditions immediately improve for most people relative to what they would have been in the absence of the rupture.

Third, actors may be motivated for a transition to socialism by values other than material interests, and it is not necessarily the case that with respect to these other values a sharp transition trough would exist. For example, it is certainly possible that with respect to the values of democratic participation and community solidarity the very process of rupture and transition enhances their realization. Thus, if these values constituted a robust and powerful source of motivation for people, then it is possible that support for the socialist project over the course of even a prolonged trough in material conditions could be sustained.

None of these responses are, I believe, convincing. It is possible that the disruption accompanying a rapid transformation of capitalist relations might be less than anticipated here, but historical experience of patterns of disinvestment in the face of even mild state-initiated threats to capital suggests that the disruption would more likely be quite severe. It is also possible that capitalism will enter into a long-term process of intensifying crisis and permanent decline that lowers the standard of living of most people, but in the absence of a compelling theory of the mechanisms that generate such intensification, this is a purely speculative argument. And while motivations other than material interests are profoundly important for the struggle for human emancipation, there is little historical evidence that over an extended period these motivations could neutralize the effects of a sharp economic decline accompanying a project of radical transformation of capitalism.

Large-scale ruptural strategies for constructing a democratic egalitarian socialism, therefore, seem implausible in the world in which we currently live, at least in the developed capitalist economies. If we wish to work for such a transformation, therefore, we need to think about some broadly different approaches to the problem. The question becomes: is it possible to expand the space for new forms of social empowerment within capitalism? What are the limits on this process?

INTERSTITIAL TRANSFORMATION

If one believes that systemic ruptural strategies of emancipatory transformation are not plausible, at least under existing historical conditions, then the only real alternative is some sort of strategy that envisions transformation largely as a process of metamorphosis in which relatively small transformations cumulatively generate a qualitative shift in the dynamics and logic of a social system. This does not imply that transformation is a smooth, non-conflictual process that somehow transcends antagonistic interests. A democratic egalitarian project of social emancipation is a challenge to exploitation and domination, inequality and privilege, and thus emancipatory metamorphosis will entail power struggles and confrontations with dominant classes and elites. In practice, therefore, an emancipatory metamorphosis will require some of the strategic elements of the ruptural model: the history of the future—if it is to be a history of emancipatory social empowerment—will be a trajectory of victories and defeats, winners and losers, not simply of compromise and cooperation between differing interests and classes. The episodes of that trajectory will be marked by institutional innovations that will have to overcome opposition from those whose interests are threatened by democratic egalitarianism, and some of that opposition will be nasty, recalcitrant, and destructive. So, to invoke metamorphosis is not to abjure struggle, but to see the strategic goals and effects of struggle in a particular way: as the incremental modifications of the underlying structures of a social system and its mechanisms of social reproduction that cumulatively transform the system, rather than as a sharp discontinuity in the centers of power of the system as a whole.1

1 This understanding of metamorphosis suggests that the stark contrast between "rupture" and "metamorphosis" is in some ways misleading since