1 Class analysis

The empirical research in this book covers a wide range of substantive topics: from friendship patterns and class mobility to housework and class consciousness. What unites the topics is not a preoccupation with a common object of explanation, but rather a common explanatory factor: class. This is what class analysis attempts to do – explore the relationship between class and all sorts of social phenomena. This does not mean, of course, that class will be of explanatory importance for everything. Indeed, as we will discover, in some of the analyses of this book class turns out not to be a particularly powerful factor. Class analysis does not imply a commitment to the thesis that all social phenomena can be explained primarily in terms of class, or even that class is always an important determinant. Rather, class analysis is based on the conviction that class is a pervasive social cause and thus it is worth exploring its ramifications for many social phenomena. This implies deepening our understanding of the limits of what class can explain as well as of the processes through which class helps to determine what it does explain.

Understood in this way, class analysis is what might be called an “independent variable” specialty. It is a discipline like endocrinology in medicine. If you are an endocrinologist you are allowed to study a vast array of problems – sexuality, personality, growth, disease processes, etc. – in addition to the internal functioning of the endocrine system, so long as you explore the relationship between the endocrine system and those explananda. Endocrinology is monogamous in its explanatory variable – the hormone system – but promiscuous in its dependent variables. Furthermore, in endocrinology it is not an embarrassment to discover that for some problems under investigation hormones turn out not to be very important. It is an advance in our
knowledge of endocrinology to know what hormones do not explain as well as to know what they do. Oncology, in contrast, is a dependent variable discipline. As an oncologist you can study any conceivable cause of cancer – toxins, genetics, viruses, even psychological states. Oncology is monogamous in its dependent variable but promiscuous in its independent variables. And, in oncology, it is not an embarrassment to discover that certain potential causes of cancer turn out to be not very important.

The most elaborated and systematic theoretical framework for class analysis is found in the Marxist tradition. Whatever one might think of its scientific adequacy, classical Marxism is an ambitious and elegant theoretical project in which class analysis was thought to provide the most fundamental explanations of what can be termed the epochal trajectory of human history. The aphorism “class struggle is the motor of history” captures this idea. In effect, the Marxist theory of history – or what is commonly called “historical materialism” – is like a medical theory which combined endocrinology and oncology by arguing that hormonal mechanisms provide the central explanations (“the motor”) for the dynamic development (“history”) of cancers. The argument of classical historical materialism was never that everything that happens in history is explainable by class analysis, although many critics of Marxism have accused Marxists of proposing such a moncausal theory. The claim is more restricted, yet still ambitious: that the overall trajectory of historical development can be explained by a properly constructed class analysis.¹

Many, perhaps most, contemporary Marxist scholars have pulled back from these grandiose claims of orthodox historical materialism. While the idea that history has a comprehensible structure and that the dynamics of capitalism are fraught with contradictions that point toward a socialist future may form part of the intellectual backdrop to Marxist scholarship, most actual research brackets these ideas and, instead, focusses on the ways in which class affects various aspects of social life. Class analysis thus becomes the core of a wide-ranging agenda of research on the causes and consequences of class relations.

Marxist-inspired class analysis, of course, is not the only way of studying class. There is also Weberian-inspired class analysis, stratification-inspired class analysis, eclectic common sense class analysis. Before embarking on the specific empirical agenda of this book, therefore, we need to clarify the basic contours of the class concept which will be used in the analyses. In particular, we need to clarify the concept of class structure, since this plays such a pivotal role in class analysis. This is the basic objective of this chapter.

The concept of “class structure” is only one element in class analysis. Other conceptual elements include class formation (the formation of classes into collectively organized actors), class struggle (the practices of actors for the realization of class interests) and class consciousness (the understanding of actors of their class interests). The task of class analysis is not simply to understand class structure and its effects, but to understand the interconnections among all these elements and their consequences for other aspects of social life.

In chapter 13 we will explore a general model of the interconnections among these elements. The discussion in this chapter will be restricted to the problem of class structure. This is not because I believe that class structure is always the most important explanatory principle within class analysis. It could certainly be the case, for example, that the variation in class formations across time and place in capitalist societies may be a more important determinant of variations in state policies than variations in the class structures associated with those class formations. Rather, I initially focus on class structure because it remains conceptually pivotal to clarifying the overall logic of class analysis. To speak of class formation or class struggle as opposed to simply group formation or struggle implies that we have a definition of “class” and know what it means to describe a collective actor as an instance of class formation, or a conflict as a class conflict instead of some other sort of conflict. The assumption here is that the concept of class structure imparts the essential content of the adjective “class” when it is appended to “formation,” “consciousness,” and “struggle.” Class formation is the formation of collective actors organized around class interests within class structures; class struggle is the struggle between such collectively

¹ As in all aspects of Marxism there is, needless to say, much dispute about the degree of determinism implied by class analysis within historical materialism. Some people argue that Marx was never an economic determinist at all; others argue that he defended a specific form of economic and class determinism, one which was grounded in assumptions of human agency. In any event, whether the analysis is deterministic or not, class analysis is at the core of the explanations of epochal historical trajectories in Marx. For the most sophisticated and profound account of historical materialism as a serious, explanatory theory, see G.A. Cohen (1978). For some important clarifications and amendments to the arguments in this book, see Cohen (1988). For a general assessment of the claims of historical materialism and the prospects for its reconstruction, see Wright, Levine and Sober (1992).
organized actors over class interests; class consciousness is the understanding by people within a class of their class interests. In each case one must already have a definition of class structure before the other concepts can be fully specified. Elaborating a coherent concept of class structure, therefore, is an important conceptual precondition for developing a satisfactory theory of the relationship between class structure, class formation and class struggle.

1.1 The parable of the shmoo

A story from the Li'l Abner comic strips from the late 1940s will help to set the stage for the discussion of the concept of class structure. Here is the situation of the episode: Li'l Abner, a resident of the hill-billy community of Dogpatch, discovers a strange and wonderful creature, the "shmoo," and brings a herd of them back to Dogpatch. The shmoo's sole desire in life is to please humans by transforming itself into the material things human beings need. They do not provide humans with luxuries, but only with the basic necessities of life. If you are hungry, they can become ham and eggs, but not caviar. What's more, they multiply rapidly so you never run out of them. They are thus of little value to the wealthy, but of great value to the poor. In effect, the shmoo restores humanity to the Garden of Eden. When God banished Adam and Eve from Paradise for their sins, one of their harshest punishments was that from then on they and their descendants were forced to "earn their bread by the sweat of their brows." The shmoo relieves people of this necessity and thus taps a deep fantasy in Western culture.

In the episode from Li'l Abner reproduced below, a manager working for a rich capitalist, P.U., does a study to identify the poorest place in America in order to hire the cheapest labor for a new factory. The place turns out to be Dogpatch. P.U. and the manager come to Dogpatch to recruit employees for the new factory. The story unfolds in a sequence of comic strips from 1948 (Al Capp 1992: 134-136):

---

2 The use of these episodes from Li'l Abner as an illustration for the moral critique of capitalism was introduced to me by the British philosopher G. A. Cohen in a lecture he gave on British television in August 1986.
The presence of shmoos is thus a serious threat to both class relations and gender relations. Workers are more difficult to recruit for toilsome labor and no longer have to accept "guff" and indignities from their bosses. Women are no longer economically dependent on men and thus do not have to put up with sexist treatment.\footnote{Given the prevailing ideologies of the time, it is quite remarkable that Al Capp indicated the implications of the shmoon for gender domination. The implications for workers, after all, fell neatly within the theoretical arguments of Marxism which, in the 1940s, were quite familiar to many intellectuals. The feminist critique of male domination was much less familiar.}

In the episodes that follow, P.U. and his henchman organize a campaign to destroy the shmoon. They are largely successful, and its sinister influence is stopped. American capitalism can continue, unthreatened by the specter of the Garden of Eden.

The saga of the shmoon helps to clarify the sense in which the interests of workers and capitalists are deeply antagonistic, one of the core ideas of Marxist class analysis. How do shmoos affect the material interests of people in these two classes?\footnote{By "material interests" here I simply mean the interests people have in their material standard of living, understood as the package of toil, consumption and leisure. Material interests are thus not interests in maximizing consumption per se, but rather interests in the trade-offs between toil, leisure and consumption. Material interests, as I will discuss them here, also excludes purely status goods — goods which get their value strictly from being enjoyed by only a few people. If the interests of capitalists are not simply to have high material standards of living, but to have higher standards of living than others in order to have higher status, then they would be opposed to shmoos even if shmoos provided people with every conceivable luxury. I am also excluding from "material interests" such things as the desire for domination for its own sake. Material interests are thus simply the interests one has in one's own standard of living. For a more extended discussion of the problem of material interests see Wright (1989a: 260–268).} This depends upon the level
of generosity of the shmoo as indicated in Figure 1.1. If the shmoo provides less than bare physical subsistence, it probably has a positive effect on the material interests of both workers and capitalists. For workers it makes their lives a little bit less precarious; for capitalists, such sub-subsistence shmoo could be considered a subsidy to the wage bill. All other things being equal, capitalists can pay lower wages if part of the subsistence of workers is provided outside of the market. At the other extreme, if shmoo provide for superabundance, gratifying every material desire of humans from basic necessities to the most expensive luxuries, then they would also positively serve the material interests of capitalists. Between these two extremes, however, the impact of the shmoo on the material interests of the two classes diverges. The welfare of workers is continuously improved as the generosity of shmoo increases, whereas for capitalists, after a point, their material interests are adversely affected. Once shmoo provide workers with a respectable standard of living, workers no longer have to work in order to live at an acceptable standard. As P.U.'s manager states in panic, "Do you realize what the shmoo means? Nobody'll have to work hard any more!" This does not mean, of course, that no workers would be willing to work for an employer. Work fills many needs for people besides simply providing earnings, and in any case, so long as the shmoo does not provide superabundance, many people will have consumption desires beyond the shmoo level of provision. Nevertheless, workers would be in a much more powerful bargaining position with modestly generous shmoo at home, and it will be more difficult, in P.U.'s words, to get them to "do the long, dreary, back-breaking labor at our canning factories."

6 There is an interesting difference in the analysis of the effect of the shmoo offered by the Dogpatch resident and by P.U.'s manager. The Dogpatch resident proclaims, "But nobody what's got shmoo has 'work any more," whereas the manager declares, "Nobody'll have to work hard anymore." The manager understands that the issue is the extraction of labor effort — exploitation — not simply getting people to show up for "work." The Dogpatchian only identifies an effect in the labor market; the manager identifies an effect in the labor process. To state the matter sociologically, the Dogpatchian provides a Weberian analysis, the manager a Marxist one.

5 Housewives might be considered a kind of quasi-shmoo providing "free" goods at less than a subsistence level (since a worker's family cannot live exclusively on the labor of the housewife).

7 These preference orderings also assume homogenous attributes among capitalists and workers. If there are big capitalists and small capitalists, or skilled workers and unskilled workers, then the preference orderings might get much more complicated. Highly skilled workers, for example, might benefit more from a supply of cheap goods produced by unskilled workers without shmoo than by an improved living standard with shmoo.
their first preference is that they alone get the shmoos, since they would obviously be slightly better off with shmoos than without them. Their second preference is that no one gets them. They would rather have the shmoos be destroyed than everyone get one. For workers, in contrast, their first preference is that everyone gets the shmoos. Workers will be slightly better off if capitalists have shmoos as well as workers, since this will mean that capitalists will have slightly more funds available for investment (because they will not have to buy basic necessities for themselves). Workers' second preference is that workers alone get the shmoos, their third preference is that only capitalists get the shmoos, and their least preferred alternative is that the shmoos be destroyed.

The preference ordering of workers corresponds to what could be considered universal human interests. This is one way of understanding the classical Marxist idea that the working class is the "universal class," the class whose specific material interests are equivalent to the interests of humanity as such. This preference ordering also corresponds to what might be called Rawlsian preferences — the preferences that maximize the welfare of the worst off people in a society. With respect to the shmoos, at least, the material self-interests of workers corresponds to the dictates of Rawlsian principles of Justice.

What the story of the shmoos illustrates is that the deprivations of the propertyless in a capitalist system are not simply an unfortunate byproduct of the capitalist pursuit of profit; they are a necessary condition for that pursuit. This is what it means to claim that capitalist profits depend upon "exploitation." Exploiting classes have an in-

---

8 This does not imply that the degree of exploitation is the only determinant of the degree of profits, or even that profits are solely "derived" from exploitation. All that is being claimed is that exploitation is one of the necessary conditions for profits in a capitalist economy.

9 This does not mean, of course, that capitalists as persons could not be enthusiastic supporters of shmoos and shmoos-like social policy. Engels, after all, was a wealthy capitalist and was an enthusiastic supporter of Marx and revolutionary socialism. But in supporting shmoos, or socialism, capitalists are acting against their class interests.

While in real capitalism capitalists do not face the problem of a threat from shmoos, there are episodes in the history of capitalism in which capitalists face obstacles not unlike the shmoos. Subsistence peasants have a kind of shmoos in their ownership of fertile land. While they have to labor for their living, they do not have to work for capitalists. In some times and places capitalists have adopted deliberate strategies to reduce the capacity of subsistence peasants to live off the land specifically in order to recruit them as a labor force. A good example is the use of monetized hut taxes in South Africa in the nineteenth century to force subsistence peasants to enter the labor market and work in the mines in order to have cash to pay their taxes. More generally, capitalist interests are opposed to social arrangements that have even a partial shmoos-like character. Capitalist class interests are thus opposed to such things as universal guaranteed basic income or durably very low rates of unemployment, even if the taxes to support such programs were paid entirely out of wages and thus did not directly come out of their own pockets. This reflects the sense in which capitalist exploitation generates fundamentally antagonistic interests between workers and capitalists.

1.2 The concept of exploitation

The story of the shmoos revolves around the linkage between class divisions, class interests and exploitation. There are two main classes in the story — capitalists who own the means of production and workers who do not. By virtue of the productive assets which they own (capital and labor power) they each face a set of constraints on how they can best pursue their material interests. The presence of shmoos fundamentally transforms these constraints and is a threat to the material
Class counts

interests of capitalists. Why? Because it undermines their capacity to exploit the labor power of workers. "Exploitation" is thus the key concept for understanding the nature of the interests generated by the class relations.

Exploitation is a loaded theoretical term, since it suggests a moral condemnation of particular relations and practices, not simply an analytical description. To describe a social relationship as exploitative is to condemn it as both harmful and unjust to the exploited. Yet, while this moral dimension of exploitation is important, the core of the concept revolves around a particular type of antagonistic interdependence of material interests of actors within economic relations, rather than the injustice of those relations as such. As I will use the term, class exploitation is defined by three principal criteria:

(a) The material welfare of one group of people causally depends on the material deprivations of another.

(b) The causal relation in (a) involves the asymmetrical exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive resources. Typically this exclusion is backed by force in the form of property rights, but in special cases it may not be.10

(c) The causal mechanism which translates exclusion (b) into differential welfare (a) involves the appropriation of the fruits of labor of the exploited by those who control the relevant productive resources.11

This is a fairly complex set of conditions. Condition (a) establishes the antagonism of material interests. Condition (b) establishes that the antagonism is rooted in the way people are situated within the social organization of production. The expression "asymmetrical" in this criterion is meant to exclude "fair competition" from the domain of possible exploitations. Condition (c) establishes the specific mechanism by which the interdependent, antagonistic material interests are generated. The welfare of the exploiter depends upon the effort of the exploited, not merely the deprivations of the exploited.12

If only the first two of these conditions are met we have what can be called "nonexploitative economic oppression," but not "exploitation." In nonexploitative economic oppression there is no transfer of the fruits of labor from the oppressed to the oppressor; the welfare of the oppressor depends simply on the exclusion of the oppressed from access to certain resources, but not on their effort. In both instances, the inequalities in question are rooted in ownership and control over productive resources.

The crucial difference between exploitation and nonexploitative oppression is that in an exploitative relation, the exploiter needs the exploited since the exploiter depends upon the effort of the exploited. In the case of nonexploitative oppression, the oppressors would be happy if the oppressed simply disappeared. Life would have been much easier for the European settlers in North America if the continent had been uninhabited by people.13 Genocide is thus always a potential strategy for nonexploitative oppressors. It is not an option in a situation of economic exploitation because exploiters require the labor of the exploited for their material well-being. It is no accident that culturally we have the abhorrent saying, "the only good Indian is a dead Indian," but not the saying "the only good worker is a dead worker" or "the only good slave is a dead slave." It makes sense to say "the only good worker is an obedient and conscientious worker," but not "the only good worker is a dead worker." The contrast between

10 There are situations in which conditions (a) and (c) are present, but not (b). For example, in what is sometimes called a "tributary mode of production," a centralized, authoritarian state apparatus appropriates surplus from peasants through taxation without directly being involved in production at all. The peasants are surely being exploited in this situation, but the state elite is not a fully-fledged "class" insofar as their social location and power is not determined by their location within the social relations of production. One could, perhaps, stretch the meaning of condition (b) somewhat by treating the direct appropriation of the peasants' product by the state elite as a form of "exclusion" of peasants from productive resources (since the surplus itself is a productive resource). But the core mechanism involved does not center on the social relations of production, but the direct control of violence by the state, and thus the state elite is not a "class" in the standard sense.

11 This is not to deny that in certain specific instances the settlers benefited from the knowledge of Native Americans, but simply to affirm the point that the displacement of the indigenous people from the land was a costly and troublesome process.

12
North America and South Africa in the treatment of indigenous peoples reflects this difference poignantly: in North America, where the indigenous people were oppressed (by virtue of being coercively displaced from the land) but not exploited, genocide was the basic policy of social control in the face of resistance; in South Africa, where the European settler population heavily depended upon African labor for its own prosperity, this was not an option.

Exploitation, therefore, does not merely define a set of statuses of social actors, but a pattern of on-going interactions structured by a set of social relations, relations which mutually bind the exploiter and the exploited together. This dependency of the exploiter on the exploited gives the exploited a certain form of power, since human beings always retain at least some minimal control over their own expenditure of effort. Social control of labor which relies exclusively on repression is costly and, except under special circumstances, often fails to generate optimal levels of diligence and effort on the part of the exploited. As a result, there is generally systematic pressure on exploiters to moderate their domination and in one way or another to try to elicit some degree of consent from the exploited, at least in the sense of gaining some level of minimal cooperation from them. Paradoxically perhaps, exploitation is thus a constraining force on the practices of the exploiter. This constraint constitutes a basis of power for the exploited.

People who are oppressed but not exploited also may have some power, but it is generally more precarious. At a minimum oppressed people have the power that comes from the human capacity for physical resistance. However, since their oppressors are not economically constrained to seek some kind of cooperation from them, this resistance is likely very quickly to escalate into quite bloody and violent confrontations. It is for this reason that the resistance of Native Americans to displacement from the land led to massacres of Native Americans by white settlers. The pressure on nonexploitative oppressors to seek accommodation is very weak; the outcomes of conflict therefore tend to become simply a matter of the balance of brute force between enemies. When the oppressed are also exploited, even if the exploiter feels no moral compunction, there will be economic constraints on the exploiter’s treatment of the exploited.

Describing the material interests of actors generated by exploitation as antagonistic does not prejudge the moral question of the justice or injustice of the inequalities generated by these antagonisms. One can believe, for example, that it is morally justified to prevent poor people in third world countries from freely coming into the United States and still recognize that there is an objective antagonism of material interests between US citizens and the excluded would-be third world migrants. Similarly, to recognize the capital–labor conflict as involving antagonistic material interests rooted in the appropriation of labor effort does not necessarily imply that capitalist profits are unjust; it simply means that they are generated in a context of inherent conflict.

Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous to claim that the use of the term “exploitation” to designate this form of antagonistic interdependence of material interests is a strictly scientific, technical choice. Describing the appropriation of labor effort as “exploitation” rather than simply a “transfer” adds a sharp moral judgment to the analytical claim. Without at least a thin notion of the moral status of the appropriation, it would be impossible, for example, to distinguish such things as legitimate taxation from exploitation. Taxation involves coercive appropriation, and in many cases there is arguably a conflict of material interests between the taxing authorities and the taxpayer as a private individual. Even under deeply democratic and egalitarian conditions, many people would not voluntarily pay taxes since they would prefer to enhance their personal material interests by free-riding on other people’s tax payments. Right-wing libertarians in fact do regard taxation as a form of exploitation because it is a violation of the sanctity of private property rights and thus an unjust, coercive appropriation. The motto “taxation is theft” is equivalent to “taxation is exploitation.” The claim that the capitalist appropriation of labor effort from workers is “exploitation,” therefore, implies something more than simply an antagonism of material interests between workers and capitalists; it implies that this appropriation is unjust.

While I feel that a good moral case can be made for the kind of radical egalitarianism that provides a grounding for treating capitalist appropriation as unjust, it would take us too far afield here to explore the philosophical justifications for this claim.14 In any case, for purposes of sociological class analysis, the crucial issue is the recognition of the antagonism of material interests that are linked to class relations by virtue of the appropriation of labor effort, and on this basis I will refer to this as “exploitation.”

14 For an insightful discussion of radical egalitarian values that provides a basis for regarding capitalist appropriations as exploitative, see Cohen (1988: ch. 11).
1.3 A note on exploitation as the appropriation of surplus

So far in this discussion, no mention has been made of the idea of exploitation as the appropriation of “surplus,” the traditional way that Marxists elaborate the concept of “exploitation.” Sometimes this idea is specified in terms of surplus labor, sometimes surplus value, and sometimes simply the surplus product. Regardless of which of these formulations is adopted, the idea seems fairly simple. The total social product can be divided into two broad categories: one part is needed to reproduce all of the inputs used up in production – labor power (i.e., the ability to work), raw materials, machines, etc. The other part is a “surplus” – the amount of the social product beyond the costs of production. If this surplus is appropriated by a group of people other than those who produced it, and this appropriation was not at the behest of the producers, then the producers are generally regarded as “exploited.”

The rhetoric of the production and appropriation of surplus is an attractive one for talking about exploitation. The existence of a social surplus is closely linked to the accumulation of capital, and describing exploitation in terms of surplus thus ties exploitation to a central aspect of the dynamics of capitalism. The idea of a surplus also has an appealing physical quality to it, which makes the appropriation of surplus seem more concrete than the appropriation of labor effort.

On closer inspection, however, the concept of “surplus” is not so simple. The basic problem is providing a clear meaning to the expression “the costs of producing and reproducing labor power,” for unless this idea is clear, the concept of “surplus” is ambiguous. How should this latter concept be defined? One solution simply equates the cost of labor power to whatever is the empirical consumption of people (i.e., the earnings they receive in a labor market minus whatever savings they make). The “surplus” would then simply be the value of the product left over after personal consumption and replacement of means of production. This solution, however, defines away the possibility that some wage-earners might appropriate surplus in the form of high earnings and spend it all for an extravagant lifestyle. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to describe a Chief Executive Officer with a $1 million/year salary as being an exploiter, as appropriating surplus within those wages, regardless of whether or not part of this income was saved from personal consumption.

An alternative is to treat the costs of producing/reproducing labor power as just the costs of “basic subsistence,” set at some culturally appropriate standard, rather than the costs of all empirical consumption. This might vary somewhat across different categories of people sicne certain kinds of labor power might require higher consumption in order to be effectively produced and reproduced, but the concept would still be distinct from empirical earnings. This second strategy has the advantage of not eliminating by definition the possibility that high wages can be a source of exploitation, but it has the disadvantage of no longer providing a clear operational solution to distinguishing “surplus” from the “costs” of labor power. If subsistence were defined at the level of mere biological survival, then perhaps it would have an unambiguous meaning, but once subsistence is understood as “basic subsistence set at some culturally appropriate standard,” then the concept seems to become open-ended and arbitrary.

One way of resolving this problem is to define “basic subsistence” counterfactually. Imagine a world in which all people who sell their labor power have exactly the same genetic and socio-economic endowments. That is, they all had an equal capacity to learn and to acquire skills, they all had the same economic resources, and they all faced the same social conditions. No workers were culturally or socially deprived relative to other workers, they all had equal access to credit in order to borrow funds to get advanced training, and there were no institutional restrictions on access to training. Medical schools, for example, would accept every qualified applicant (and these qualifications, in turn, were accessible to everyone on the assumption of equal endowments). Under these conditions, people would choose how much training to get on the basis of the amount of effort they wanted to perform labor of various sorts – and thus the reproduction of their labor power should count as a “cost of production.”

The reason for positing equal genetic endowments is to remove all impediments to the acquisition of skills by workers, so that differences in the wages linked to skills across people would simply be a function of differences in the real costs of acquiring and maintaining skills. If certain skills require certain special genetic endowments, and those endowments are rare, then this would not be the case.
to spend, given the costs of borrowing and the earnings they could expect to get from the training. As a result, the variation in labor market earnings across occupations would simply reflect the different costs (including effort) of acquiring the skills and performing the activities of the occupation. There would be nothing morally objectionable in the differences in earnings across occupations under such circumstances. If it should happen that the wage levels of an occupation were above these costs because of an undersupply of some type of labor power, then more people would seek the relevant training and the wages would accordingly fall. In this world of perfect competition in labor markets and unfettered capacity of workers to acquire skills, we can then define “basic subsistence” as the competitive equilibrium wage rate.\textsuperscript{18}

Of course, we do not live in such a world, and because of this the pressures which would reduce wages of all occupations to this counterfactual level are blocked in various ways. In some cases, as in the medical profession in the US, there are deliberate institutional mechanisms to restrict the supply of doctors. More broadly, unequal endowments (social, economic and genetic) and restrictions on access to credit mean that for many jobs earnings will not equilibrate to the costs of producing and reproducing labor power. In such cases, part of the social surplus is distributed to people in the form of higher earnings.\textsuperscript{19}

Because of the complexity of understanding the idea of “surplus” in terms of a counterfactual notion of competitively determined costs of production, I will generally discuss exploitation in terms of the extraction and appropriation of effort. This way of framing the concept also highlights the linkage between production and exchange which is at the heart of the theory of exploitation. There will be places, however, such as in the discussion of “skill exploitation,” where the more conventional language of appropriation of the surplus will be convenient. When I talk about exploitation in these terms, therefore, the surplus should be understood in this counterfactual manner.

1.4 Class and exploitation
Within the Marxist tradition of class analysis, class divisions are defined primarily in terms of the linkage between property relations and exploitation. Slave masters and slaves constitute classes because a particular property relation (property rights in people) generates exploitation (the appropriation of the fruits of labor of the slave by the slave master). Homeowners and the homeless would not constitute “classes” even though they are distinguished by property rights in housing since this division does not constitute a basis for the exploitation of the homeless by homeowners.\textsuperscript{20}

In capitalist society, the central form of exploitation is based on property rights in the means of production. These property rights generate three basic classes: capitalists (exploitors), who own the means of production and hire workers; workers (exploited), who do not own the means of production and sell their labor power to capitalists; and petty bourgeois (neither exploiter nor exploited), who own and use the means of production without hiring others.\textsuperscript{21} The Marxist account of how the capital-labor relation generates exploitation is a familiar one: propertyless workers, in order to acquire their means of livelihood, must sell their labor power to people who own the means of production.\textsuperscript{22} In this exchange relation, they agree to work for a specified

\textsuperscript{18} In this way of defining “basic subsistence,” a combination of improvements in productivity and class struggles could raise the level of real wages for all workers above bare biological subsistence. The counterfactually defined “surplus,” therefore, is the surplus above the historically achieved costs of producing/reproducing labor power under the assumption of purely competitive labor markets.

\textsuperscript{19} A similar problem can occur for the costs of producing/reproducing the means of production. Under conditions of monopoly production of some physical input into production, the empirical price of that input will be above the price those inputs would have had under competitive market conditions. This “monopoly rent” in the price is a way that a seller of the input in question is able to appropriate surplus. Empirical prices within exchange relations, therefore, can constitute a mechanism for the appropriation and distribution of surplus to capitalists as well as to privileged categories of wage-earners.

\textsuperscript{20} If homeowners exchanged housing in vacant rooms for domestic service, then the property rights in housing might become the basis for a class relation. The sheer fact of homeownership and homelessness, however, does not itself constitute a form of exploitation and thus is not a class division. It is only when this property right is translated into a power relation between actors within which labor is appropriated that it becomes exploitative.

\textsuperscript{21} As Roemer (1982) argues, it is possible that some petty bourgeois might be exploited or even be exploiters through uneven exchange in the market. A petty bourgeois working with highly capital intensive means of production, for example, may be able to appropriate the fruits of labor of others through exchange.

\textsuperscript{22} To be somewhat more precise, in order to acquire the means of subsistence, at least some members of a propertyless family (defined as the unit of shared consumption) must sell labor power to employers. In some times and places, this has meant that the male “breadwinner” entered the labor market while the female “housewife” stayed home. In contemporary advanced capitalism, generally all adult members of households sell their labor power.
length of time in exchange for a wage which they use to buy their means of subsistence. Because of the power relation between capitalists and workers, capitalists are able to force workers to produce more than is needed to provide them with this subsistence. As a result, workers produce a surplus which is owned by the capitalist and takes the form of profits. Profits, the amount of the social product that is left over after the costs of producing and reproducing all of the inputs (both labor power inputs and physical inputs) have been deducted, constitute an appropriation of the fruits of labor of workers.

Describing this relation as exploitative is a claim about the basis for the inherent conflict between workers and capitalists in the employment relation. It points to the crucial fact that the conflict between capitalists and workers is not simply over the level of wages, but over the amount of work effort performed for those wages. Capitalists always want workers to expend more effort than workers willingly want to do. As Bowles and Gintis (1990) have argued, “the whistle while you work” level of effort of workers is always suboptimal for capitalists, and thus capitalists have to adopt various strategies of surveillance and control to increase labor effort. While the intensity of overt conflict generated by these relations will vary over time and place, and class compromises may occur in which high levels of cooperation between labor and management take place, nevertheless, this underlying antagonism of material interests remains so long as the relationship remains exploitative.

For some theoretical and empirical purposes, this simple image of the class structure may be sufficient. For example, if the main purpose of an analysis is to explore the basic differences between the class structures of feudalism and capitalism, then an analysis which revolved entirely around the relationship between capitalists and workers might be adequate. However, for many of the things we want to study with class analysis, we need a more nuanced set of categories. In particular, we need concepts which allow for two kinds of analyses: first, the analysis of the variation across time and place in the class structures of concrete capitalist societies, and second, the analysis of the ways individual lives are affected by their location within the class structure. The first of these is needed if we are to explore macro-variations in a fine-grained way; the second is needed if we are to use class effectively in micro-analysis.

Both of these tasks involve elaborating a concept of class structure in capitalist societies that moves beyond the core polarization between capitalists and workers. More specifically, this involves solving two general problems in class structural analysis: first, the problem of locating the “middle class” within the class structure, and second, locating people not in the paid labor force in the class structure.26

1.5 The problem of the “middle class” among employees

If we limit the analysis of class structure in capitalism to the ownership of, and exclusion from, the means of production, we end up with a class structure in which there are only three locations – the capitalist class, the working class and the petty bourgeoisie (those who own means of production but do not hire workers) – and in which around 85-90% of the population in most developed capitalist countries falls into a single class. While this may in some sense reflect a profound truth about capitalism – that the large majority of the population are separated from the means of production and must sell their labor power on the labor market in order to survive – it does not provide us with an adequate conceptual framework for explaining many of the things we want class to help explain. In particular, if we want class structure to help explain class consciousness, class formation and class conflict, then we need some way of understanding the class-relevant divisions within the employee population.

In ordinary language terms, this is the problem of the “middle class” – people who do not own their own means of production, who sell their labor power on a labor market, and yet do not seem part of the “working class.” The question, then, is on what basis can we differentiate class locations among people who share a common location of nonownership within capitalist property relations? In the analyses in this book, I will divide the class of employees along two dimensions: first, their relationship to authority within production, and second, their possession of skills or expertise.25

23 For an extended discussion of the limitations of the overly abstract polarized concept of class structure, see Wright (1989a: 271–278).

24 There are additional problems in the elaboration of the concept of class structure which will be discussed later in this book. The location of state employees in the class structure will be discussed in chapter 15. The issue of the temporal dimension of class locations – the fact that some jobs are organized within careers that span class boundaries – will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

25 The conceptual discussion here differs in a number of ways from the way I approached these questions in my earlier book, Classes (Wright 1985). In that book I argued that the rationale for considering authority and skills to be dimensions of the
Authority

There are two rationales for treating authority as a dimension of class relations among employees. The first concerns the role of domination within capitalist property relations. In order to insure the performance of adequate effort on the part of workers, capitalist production always involves an apparatus of domination involving surveillance, positive and negative sanctions and varying forms of hierarchy. Capitalists do not simply own the means of production and hire workers; they also dominate workers within production.

In these terms, managers and supervisors can be viewed as exercising delegated capitalist class powers in so far as they engage in the practices of domination within production. In this sense they can be considered simultaneously in the capitalist class and the working class; they are like capitalists in that they dominate workers; they are like workers in that they are controlled by capitalists and exploited within production. They thus occupy what I have called contradictory locations within class relations. The term “contradictory” is used in this expression rather than simply “dual” since the class interests embedded in managerial jobs combine the inherently antagonistic interests of capital and labor. The higher one moves in the authority hierarchy, the greater will be the weight of capitalist interests within this class location. Thus upper managers, and especially Chief Executive Officers in large corporations will be very closely tied to the capitalist class, while the class character of lower level supervisor jobs will be much closer to that of the working class.

The second rationale for treating the authority dimension as a criterion for differentiating class locations among employees centers on the relationship between their earnings and the appropriation of surplus. The strategic position of managers within the organization of production enables them to make significant claims on a portion of the social surplus (defined in the counterfactual manner discussed above) in the form of relatively high earnings.\(^\text{26}\) In effect this means that the class structure was that the control of organizational assets (i.e. authority) and skill assets were the basis for distinctive forms of exploitation. For reasons which I elaborated in a subsequent essay (Wright 1989a: ch. 8) this no longer seems a satisfactory way of specifying the class character of the “middle class.” While the formulation presented here lacks the symmetry of the earlier strategy of analysis, I believe it is conceptually sounder.

\(^\text{26}\) In earlier work I argued that by virtue of this appropriation of surplus by managers they should be seen as exploiters. The problem with this formulation is that wages and salaries of managerial labor power are above the costs of producing and reproducing their labor power (including whatever skills they might have).

The specific mechanism through which this appropriation takes place can be referred to as a “loyalty rent.” It is important for the profitability of capitalist firms that managers wield their power in an effective and responsible way. The difficulty is that a high level of surveillance and threats is generally not an effective strategy for eliciting this kind of behavior, both because managerial performance is generally rather hard to monitor and because repressive controls tend to undermine initiative rather than stimulate creative behavior. What is needed, then, is a way of generating some level of real commitment on the part of managers to the goals of the organization. This is accomplished by relatively high earnings linked to careers and promotion ladders within authority hierarchies. These higher earnings involve a redistribution of part of the social surplus to managers in order to build their loyalty to the organization. Of course, negative sanctions are still present in the background: managers are sometimes fired, they are disciplined for poor work by failing to get promotions or raises, etc. But these coercive forms of control gain their efficacy from their link to the strong inducements of earnings that, especially for higher level managers, are significantly above the costs of producing the skills of managers.\(^\text{27}\) Managers thus not only occupy contradictory locations within class relations by virtue of domination, they occupy what might managers also contribute to the surplus through their own laboring activity, and thus their surplus income may simply reflect a capacity to appropriate part of the surplus which they contribute to production. Instead of being “exploited,” therefore, many managers may simply be less exploited than other employees. Because of this ambiguity, therefore, it is better simply to see managers as occupying a privileged position with respect to the process of exploitation which enables them to appropriate part of the social surplus in the form of higher incomes.

\(^\text{27}\) This rent component of the earnings of managers has been recognized in “efficiency wage” theory which acknowledges that the market-clearing wage may be suboptimal from the point of view of the goals of the employer. Because of the difficulty in enforcing labor contracts, employers have to pay employees more than the wages predicted by theories of competitive equilibria in order to gain compliance. While this mechanism may generate some small “employment rents” for all employees, it is especially salient for those employees who occupy strategic jobs requiring responsible, diligent performance of duties. For the mainstream economics discussion of efficiency wages, see Akerlof and Yellen (1986). For arguments that extend efficiency wage theory to Marxist arguments about the “extraction” of labor effort from workers, see Bowles and Gintis (1990).
be termed a *privileged appropriation location within exploitation relations*. Both of these differentiate them from the working class.

**Skills and expertise**

The second axis of class differentiation among employees centers on the possession of skills or expertise. Like managers, employees who possess high levels of skills/expertise are potentially in a privileged appropriation location within exploitation relations. There are two primary mechanisms through which this can happen. First, skills and expertise are frequently scarce in labor markets, not simply because they are in short supply, but also because there are systematic obstacles in the way of increasing the supply of those skills to meet the requirements of employing organizations. One important form of these obstacles is credentials, but rare talents could also constitute the basis for sustained restrictions on the supply of a particular form of labor power. The result of such restrictions on supply is that owners of the scarce skills are able to receive a wage above the costs of producing and reproducing their labor power. This “skill rent” is a way by which employees can appropriate part of the social surplus.

Second, the control over knowledge and skills frequently renders also the labor effort of skilled workers difficult to monitor and control. The effective control over knowledge by such employees means that employers must rely to some extent on loyalty enhancing mechanisms in order to achieve desired levels of cooperation and effort from employees with high levels of skills and expertise, just as they have to do in the case of managers. Employees with high levels of expertise, therefore, are able to appropriate surplus both because of their strategic location within the organization of production (as controllers of knowledge), and because of their strategic location in the organization of labor markets (as controllers of a scarce form of labor power).

Understood in this way, the possession of skills and expertise defines a distinctive location within class relations because of a specific kind of power they confer on employees. It may also be the case that expertise, skills and knowledge are associated with various kinds of “symbolic capital” and distinctive life-styles, as Bourdieu (1984) and others have noted. While these cultural correlates of class may be of considerable explanatory importance for a variety of sociological questions, they do not constitute the essential rationale for treating skills and expertise as a dimension of class location within a materialist class analysis (except in so far as symbolic capital plays a role in acquiring skills and credentials). That rationale rests on the claim that experts, like managers, occupy a privileged appropriation location within exploitation relations that differentiates them from ordinary workers.

Throughout this book I will frequently use “skills and expertise” as a couplet. The term “skill” by itself sometimes is taken to refer simply to manual skills, rather than the more general idea of enhanced or complex labor power, contrasted to “raw” or undeveloped labor power. This enhancement can take many forms, both physical and cognitive. It may provide great flexibility to engage in a variety of work settings, or it may be highly specialized and vulnerable to obsolescence. Enhanced labor power is often legally certified in the form of official credentials, but in some circumstances skills and expertise may function effectively without such certification. The important theoretical idea is that skills and expertise designate an asset embodied in the labor power of people which enhances their power in labor markets and labor processes.

**A map of middle-class class locations**

Adding position within authority hierarchies and possession of scarce skills and expertise to the fundamental dimension of capitalist property relations generates the map of class locations presented in Figure 1.2. With appropriate modifications depending upon our specific empirical objectives, this is the basic schema that underlies the investigations of this book. It is important to stress that this is a map of class *locations*. The cells in the typology are not “classes” as such; they are locations within class relations. Some of these are contradictory locations within class relations, others are privileged appropriation locations within exploitation relations and still others are polarized locations within capitalist property relations. By convention the polarized locations – “capitalists” and “workers” in capitalism – are often called “classes,” but the more precise terminology would be to describe these as the fundamental locations within the capitalist class structure. The
typology is thus not a proposal for a six-class model of the class structure of capitalism, but rather a model of a class structure which differentiates six locations within class relations.

In some of the empirical analyses we will discuss, we will combine some of the locations in this typology, typically to generate a four category typology consisting of capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, “middle-class” locations (contradictory locations and privileged appropriation locations among employees) and workers. In other analyses we will modify the typology by adding intermediary categories along each of the dimensions. On the relation to means of production dimension this involves distinguishing between proper capitalists, small employers who only have a few employees, and the petty bourgeoisie (self-employed people with no employees). On the authority dimension this means differentiating between proper managers – people who are involved in organizational decision making – and mere supervisors, who have power over subordinates but are not involved in policy-making decisions. And, on the skill dimension this involves distinguishing between occupations which typically require advanced academic degrees, and other skilled occupations which require lower levels of specialized training. The result will be the twelve-location class-structure matrix presented in Figure 1.3.

This way of specifying the distinctiveness of the class location of managers and experts is similar in certain respects to Goldthorpe’s (1982) treatment of the concept of the “service class.” Goldthorpe draws a distinction between two kinds of employment relations: one based on a labor contract, characteristic of the working classes; and one based on what he terms a “service relationship,” characteristic of managers and experts. In the latter, employees enter a career structure, not simply a job, and their rewards are in significant ways prospective, rather than simply payments for labor performed. Such a service relation, Goldthorpe argues, is “likely to be found where it is required of employees that they exercise delegated authority or specialized knowledge and expertise in the interests of their employing organization. In the nature of the case… their performance will depend upon the degree of moral commitment that they feel toward the organization rather than on the efficacy of external sanctions” (Goldthorpe and Erikson 1993: 42). This characterization is closely related to the idea that, because of their strategic power within organizations, the cooperation of middle-class employees is achieved in part through the payment of loyalty rents embodied in their earnings. The main difference between Goldthorpe’s conceptual analysis and the one adopted here is, first, that Goldthorpe does not link his analysis of service-class jobs to the problem of exploitation and antagonistic interests, and second, that he treats the authority dimension of managerial positions simply in terms of heightened responsibilities, not domination. Nevertheless, Gold-
thorpe's conceptualization of class structure taps many of the same relational properties of managerial and expert positions as the conceptualization adopted in this book.

1.6 People not in the paid labor force

Many people in capitalist societies – probably the majority – do not fill jobs in the paid labor force. The most obvious case is children. How should babies be located in the class structure? But there are many other categories as well: retirees, permanently disabled people, students, people on welfare, the unemployed and full-time homemakers. Each of these categories of people poses special problems for class structure analysis.

As a first approximation we can divide this heterogeneous set of situations into two broad categories: people who are tied to the class structure through family relations, and people who are not. To be in a "location" within class structure is to have one's material interests shaped by one's relationship to the process of exploitation. One way such linkages to exploitation are generated by class structures is through jobs. This is the kind of class location we have been exploring so far. I will refer to these as direct class locations. But there are other mechanisms by which people's lives are linked to the process of exploitation. Of particular importance are the ways in which family structures and kinship relations link an individual's material interests to the process of exploitation. Being born into a wealthy capitalist family links the child to the material interests of the capitalist class via family relations. It makes sense, then, to say that this child is "in" the capitalist class. If that child, as a young adult, works in a factory but stands to inherit millions of dollars of capitalist wealth and can rely on family resources for various needs, then that person would simultaneously be in two class locations: the capitalist class by virtue of family ties and the working class by virtue of the job.

I will refer to these situations as mediated class locations. Family ties are probably the most important basis for mediated class locations, but membership in certain kinds of communities or the relationship to the state may also provide such linkages. In each case the question one asks is "how do the social relations in which a person's life is embedded link that person to the various mechanisms of class exploitation and thus shape that person's material interests?" Many people, of course, have both direct and mediated class locations. This is of particular importance in developed capitalist economies for households in which both spouses are in the labor force, for this creates the possibility that husbands and wives will have different direct class locations, and thus each of them will have different direct and mediated locations. Understanding such "cross-class families" is the core problem of chapter 10.

There are, however, people for whom family ties provide at most extremely tenuous linkages to the class structure. Most notably, this is the situation of many people in the so-called "underclass." This expression is used in a variety of ways in contemporary policy discussions. Sometimes it is meant to be a pejorative term rather like the old Marxist concept of "lumpenproletariat"; at other times it is used more descriptively to designate a segment of the poor whose conditions of life are especially desperate and whose prospects for improvement are particularly dismal. In terms of the analysis of this chapter, one way of giving this concept a more precise theoretical status is to link it to the concepts of exploitation and oppression: an "underclass" can be defined as a category of social agents who are economically oppressed but not consistently exploited within a given class system.

---

29 The claim that the people in these categories do not participate directly in production is simple enough for the unemployed, retirees and children, but it is problematic for housewives, since housewives obviously work and produce things in the home. This has led some theorists (e.g. Delphy, 1984) to argue that the work of housewives should be treated as domestic labor performed within a domestic mode of production in which housewives occupy a distinctive class location, the domestic worker. Others have argued that household production is a subsidiary part of the capitalist mode of production. It has even been argued (Fraad, Riesnick and Wolff, 1994) that household production is a special form of feudal production in which housewives are feudally exploited by their husbands since the husbands directly "appropriate" use-values from their wives. All of these views in one way or another attempt to treat the gender and kinship relations within a family as if they were a form of class relations. This amalgamation of class and gender undercuts the explanatory specificity of both class and gender and does not, I believe, enhance our capacity to explain the processes in question. In any case, since the analysis in this book is restricted to people in the paid labor force, we will bracket these issues.

30 Although he does not explicitly elaborate the term "underclass" in terms of a theory of exploitation and economic oppression, the definition proposed here is consistent with the more structural aspects of way the term is used by William Julius Wilson (1982, 1987) in his analysis of the interconnection between race and class in American society. Wilson argues that as legal barriers to racial equality have disappeared and as class differentiation within the black population has increased, the central determining structure of the lives of many African-Americans is no longer race as such, but class. More specifically, he argues that there has been a
Different kinds of class structures will generate different forms of an "underclass." In many parts of the world today and throughout much of human history, the pivotal resource which defines the underclass is land. Landlords, agrarian capitalists, peasants and exploited agrarian producers all have access to land; people who are excluded from such access constitute the underclass of agrarian societies. In these terms, many Native Americans were transformed into an underclass in the nineteenth century when they were pushed off of the land onto the reservations.

In contemporary advanced capitalism, the key resource which defines the predicament of the underclass is labor power itself. This might seem like an odd statement since in capitalism, at least since the abolition of slavery, everyone supposedly owns one "unit" of labor power, him or herself. The point is that some people do not in fact own productively saleable labor power. The situation is similar to a capitalist owning outmoded machines. While the capitalist physically controls these pieces of machinery, they cease to be "capital" - a capitalistically productive asset - if they cannot be deployed within a capitalist production process profitably. In the case of labor power, a person can physically control his or her own laboring capacity, but that capacity can cease to have economic value in capitalism if it cannot be deployed productively. This is the essential condition of people in the "underclass." They are oppressed because they are denied access to various kinds of productive resources, above all the necessary means to acquire the skills needed to make their labor power saleable. As a result, they are not consistently exploited.31

Understood in this way, the underclass consists of human beings who are largely expendable from the point of view of the logic of capitalism.

...substantial growth of an urban underclass of people without marketable skills and with very weak attachments to the labor force, living in crumbling central cities isolated from the mainstream of American life and institutions.

It is perhaps controversial to amalgamate the exclusion of the contemporary urban underclass from human capital and other job resources with the exclusion of Native Americans from the land. In the latter case there was a zero-sum character to access to the resource in question and massive coercion was used to enforce the exclusion, whereas in the case of education, skills and even good jobs, it is not so obvious that the resources in question are a fixed quantity and that access is being denied through force. Thus the factual inequalities of access to these resources may not in fact be instances of coercively enforced exclusions which benefit certain groups of people at the expense of others. The plight of the underclass might still be a matter of serious moral concern, but it would not count as an instance of nonexploitative oppression analogous to the condition of Native Americans.

Like Native Americans who became a landless underclass in the nineteenth century, repression rather than incorporation is the central mode of social control directed toward them. Capitalism does not need the labor power of unemployed inner city youth. The material interests of the wealthy and privileged segments of American society would be better served if these people simply disappeared. However, unlike in the nineteenth century, the moral and political forces are such that direct genocide is no longer a viable strategy. The alternative, then, is to build prisons and to cordon off the zones of cities in which the underclass lives.

1.7 Marxist versus Weberian class analysis
As a set of empirical categories, the class structure matrix in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 could be deployed within either a Weberian or Marxist framework. The control over economic resources is central to both Marxist and Weberian class analysis, and both frameworks could be massaged to allow for the array of categories I am using. Indeed, a good argument could be made that the proposed class structure concept incorporates significant Weberian elements, since the explicit inclusion of skills as a criterion for class division and the importance accorded income privileges for both managers and credentialed experts are hallmarks of Weberian class analysis. In a real sense, therefore, the empirical categories in this book can be seen as a hybrid of the categories conventionally found in Marxist and Weberian class analysis.32 In what sense, therefore, does this class structure analysis remain “Marxist”?

To answer this question we need to compare the theoretical foundations of the concept of class in the Marxist and Weberian traditions.33 The contrast between Marx and Weber has been one of the grand themes in the history of Sociology as a discipline. Most graduate school programs have a sociological theory course within which Marx versus Weber figures as a central motif. However, in terms of class analysis,

31 It should not be so surprising to see Marxist and Weberian elements conjoined in class analysis. After all, Weber's class analysis was deeply indebted to the Marxist legacy which was part of the general intellectual discourse of his time. In spite of the fact that Weber constantly distanced himself from Marxism, particularly because of its tendencies toward economic determinism which were especially pronounced in his day, when Weber talks of classes he is speaking in a rather Marxian voice.

32 For discussions of the contrast between Marxist and Weberian class analysis, see for example, Parkin (1979), Burris (1987), Giddens (1973), Wright (1979: ch. 1).
posing Marx and Weber as polar opposites is a bit misleading because in many ways Weber is speaking in his most Marxian voice when he talks about class. The concept of class within these two streams of thought share a number of important features:

- Both Marxist and Weberian approaches differ from what might be called simple gradational notions of class in which classes are differentiated strictly on the basis of inequalities in the material conditions of life. This conceptualization of class underwrites the common inventory of classes found in popular discourse and the mass media: upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, lower class, underclass. Both Marxist and Weberian class analysis define classes relationally, i.e. a given class location is defined by virtue of the social relations which link it to other class locations.

- Both traditions identify the concept of class with the relationship between people and economically relevant assets or resources. Marxists call this relation to the means of production; Weberians refer to “market capacities.” But they are both really talking about very similar empirical phenomena.

- Both traditions see the causal relevance of class as operating, at least in part, via the ways in which these relations shape the material interests of actors. Ownership of the means of production and ownership of one’s own labor power are explanatory of social action because these property rights shape the strategic alternatives people face in pursuing their material well-being. What people have imposes constraints on what they can do to get what they want. To be sure, Marxists tend to put more weight on the objective character of these “material interests” by highlighting the fact that these constraints are imposed on individuals, whereas Weberians tend to focus on the subjective conditions, by emphasizing the relative contingency in what people want. Nevertheless, it is still the case that at their core, both class concepts involve the causal connection between (a) social relations to resources and (b) material interests via (c) the way resources shape strategies for acquiring income.

How then do they differ? The pivotal difference is captured by the contrast between the favorite buzz-words of each theoretical tradition: *life chances* for Weberians, and *exploitation* for Marxists. The reason why production is more central to Marxist than to Weberian class analysis is because of its salience for the problem of exploitation; the reason why Weberians give greater emphasis to the market is because it so directly shapes life chances.

The intuition behind the idea of life chances is straightforward. “In our terminology,” Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1958:181–2) writes:

“classes” are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action. We may speak of a “class” when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under conditions of the commodity or labor markets. [These points refer to “class situation,” which we may express more briefly as the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions and life experiences, in so far as this chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order. The term “class” refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation].… But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the *market* is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for the individual’s fate. “Class situation” is, in this sense, ultimately “market situation.”

In short, the kind and quantity of resources you own affects your opportunities for income in market exchanges. “Opportunity” is a description of the feasible set individuals face, the trade-offs they encounter in deciding what to do. Owning means of production gives a person different alternatives from owning credentials, and both of these are different from simply owning unskilled labor power. Furthermore, in a market economy, access to market-derived income affects the broader array of life experiences and opportunities for oneself and one’s children. The study of the life chances of children based on parents’ market capacity is thus an integral part of the Weberian agenda of class analysis.

Within a Weberian perspective, therefore, the salient issue in the

---

34 The contrast between “gradational” and “relational” concepts of class was first introduced into sociology by Ossowski (1965). For a more extended discussion of gradational concepts of class, see Wright (1979: ch. 1).
the expression "the leisure class" or the "idle rich"), whereas for both the middle class and the working class in this stylized drawing, zero work corresponds to zero income. The middle class has "greater" opportunities (life chances) in the market than workers because the slope they face (i.e. the wage rate) is steeper. Some workers in fact might actually have a higher standard of living than some people in the middle class, but the trade-offs they face are nevertheless less desirable. These common trade-offs, then, are the basis for a potential commonality of interests among members of a class, and thus constitute the basis for potential common action.

Within a Marxist framework, the feature of the relationship of people to economic resources which is at the core of class analysis is "exploitation." Both "exploitation" and "life chances" identify inequalities in material well-being that are generated by inequalities in access to resources of various sorts. Thus both of these concepts point to conflicts of interest over the distribution of the assets themselves. What exploitation adds to this is a claim that conflicts of interest between classes are generated not simply by what people have, but also by what people do with what they have. The concept of exploitation, therefore, points our attention to conflicts within production, not simply conflicts in the market.

This contrast between the Marxist and Weberian traditions of class analysis is summarized in Figure 1.5. Weberian class analysis revolves around a single causal nexus that works through market exchanges. Marxist class analysis includes the Weberian causal processes, but adds to them a causal structure within production itself as well as an account of the interactions of production and exchange. Part of our analysis of the class location of managers, for example, concerns the "loyalty rent" which managers receive by virtue of their position within the authority structure of production. This reflects the way in which location within the relations of production and not simply within market relations affects the "life chances" of managers. Our analysis of the shmo - and more broadly, the analysis of such things as the way transfer payments of the welfare state affect the market

### Figure 1.4 Leisure vs. consumption trade-offs faced by people in different economic classes

- Capitalist class
- Middle class
- Working class

| Amount of leisure | Maximum leisure [Zero work] | Amount of leisure | Zero leisure [Maximum work] |

linkage of people to different kinds of economic resources is the way this confers on them different kinds of economic opportunities and disadvantages and thereby shapes their material interests. One way of representing this idea in a simple way is by examining the income-leisure trade-offs faced by people in different classes as pictured in Figure 1.4. In this figure, everyone faces some trade-off between leisure and income: less leisure yields more income. However, for the unskilled class it is possible to have high income with no work (thus

For simplicity, the leisure-consumption trade-off is pictured here as a linear relation. For the working class and the middle class the slope of the line thus represents a linear wage rate. Of course, in the real world, because of such things as overtime on the one hand, and substandard wages for part-time work on the other, the relation would not be linear. The slope of the capitalist class curve in the figure is given as roughly the same as that of the middle class. If we consider all capitalists, not simply those with great entrepreneurial talent, there is no reason to assume a priori that their imputed hourly wage (i.e. the part of their earnings that is derived from labor time rather than from their property) would be greater than that of the middle class (skilled employees and managers). In any event, for our present purposes the main point about the capitalist curve is that it does not intersect the x-axis.

---

35 For simplicity, the leisure-consumption trade-off is pictured here as a linear relation. For the working class and the middle class the slope of the line thus represents a linear wage rate. Of course, in the real world, because of such things as overtime on the one hand, and substandard wages for part-time work on the other, the relation would not be linear. The slope of the capitalist class curve in the figure is given as roughly the same as that of the middle class. If we consider all capitalists, not simply those with great entrepreneurial talent, there is no reason to assume a priori that their imputed hourly wage (i.e. the part of their earnings that is derived from labor time rather than from their property) would be greater than that of the middle class (skilled employees and managers). In any event, for our present purposes the main point about the capitalist curve is that it does not intersect the x-axis.

36 The conceptual distinction between life chances and exploitation being argued for here runs against the arguments of John Roemer (1985), who insists that exploitation is strictly a way of talking about the injustice of the effects of what people have (assets) on what people get (income). In this sense, he collapses the problem of exploitation into the problem of life chances and thus dissolves the distinction between Marxist and Weberian class analysis. The notion of the extraction of labor effort disappears from his analysis of exploitation.
I. Simple gradational class analysis

II. Weberian class analysis

III. Marxist class analysis

Figure 1.5 Three models of class analysis

capacity of workers - illustrates how market capacity has an impact on the extraction of labor effort within production. The Marxist concept of class directs our attention both theoretically and empirically towards these interactions.

A Weberian might reply that there is nothing in the Weberian idea of market-based life chances that would prevent the analysis of the extraction of labor effort within production. A good and subtle Weberian class analyst could certainly link the analysis of market capacities within exchange relations to power relations within the labor process, and thus explore the causal structures at the center of Marxist class analysis. In systematically joining production and exchange in this way, however, the Weberian concept would in effect become Marianized. Frank Parkin (1979: 25), in a famous gibe, said, "Inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out." One could just as easily say that inside every left-wing Weberian there is a Marxist struggling to stay hidden.

There are three main reasons why one might want to ground the concept of class explicitly in exploitation rather than simply market-based life chances. First, the exploitation-centered class concept affirms the fact that production and exchange are intrinsically linked, not merely contingently related. The material interests of capitalists and workers are inherently shaped by the interaction of these two facets of the social relations that bind them together. This provides us with the way of understanding the class location of managers as determined not simply by their position within the market for managerial labor power, but also by their position within the relations of domination in production. More broadly, the exploitation-based class concept points our attention to the fact that class relations are relations of power, not merely privilege.

Second, theorizing the interests linked to classes as grounded in inherently antagonistic and interdependent practices facilitates the analysis of social conflict. Explanations of conflict always require at least two elements: an account of the opposing interests at stake in the conflict and an account of the capacity of the actors to pursue those interests. A simple opposition of interests is not enough to explain active conflict between groups. Exploitation is a powerful concept precisely because it brings together an account of opposing interests with an account of the rudimentary capacity for resistance. Explorers not only have a positive interest in limiting the life chances of the exploited, but also are dependent upon the exploited for the realization of their own interests. This dependency of the exploiter on the exploited gives the exploited an inherent capacity to resist. Exploitation, therefore, does not simply predict an opposition of interests, but a tendency for this antagonism of interests to generate manifest conflicts between classes. This understanding of the inherent power of exploited classes is marginalized when class is defined strictly in terms of market relations.

Finally, the exploitation-centered class analysis implies that classes can exist in nonmarket societies, whereas Weberian class analysis explicitly restricts the relevance of class to markets. For Marxist class analysis, the relationship between slave master and slave or lord and serf are instances of class relations because they all involve exploitation linked to property rights in the forces of production.37 The relationship

37 The classic Marxist description of feudalism is a society in which the lords appropriate surplus products directly from the serfs through the use of what is generally called "extra-economic coercion." This coercion either takes the form of
between bureaucratic exploiters and producers in command economies can also be considered a form of class relations since the capacity of the state bureaucratic elite to appropriate surplus rests on their effective control over the society's productive resources (Wright 1994: ch. 6). For Weberian class analysis these are not class relations, but rather examples of castes or estates or some other form of inequality of power, since the differences in "life chances" of the slave and slave master, the lord and serf, the bureaucratic appropriator and producer, are not the result of their meeting within a market. The Weberian restriction of the concept of class to market societies, therefore, directs our attention away from the underlying commonality of these relations across different kinds of social systems.

There is, of course, no metatheoretical rule of sociology which says that every sociologist must choose between these two ways of grounding class analysis. It certainly might be possible to construct an eclectic hybrid between Marxist and Weberian class analysis by seeing exploitation as defining the central cleavages within a class structure and differential market capacities as defining salient strata within classes. Strata within the capitalist class would be defined by differential capacity to appropriate surplus; strata within the working class would be determined by differences in incomes and working conditions generated by different market capacities. In such a hybrid class analysis, what I have been calling the "middle class" might be more appropriately described as privileged strata within the working class.

Nevertheless, throughout this book I will interpret the class-structure matrix we will be using within a neo-Marxist class analysis framework. In the end, the decision to do this rather than adopt a more eclectic stance comes at least in part from political commitments, not simply dispassionate scientific principles. This does not mean that Marxist class analysis is pure ideology or that it is rigidly dictated by radical egalitarian values. My choice of analytical framework is also based on my beliefs in the theoretical coherence of this approach - which I have argued for in this chapter - and in its capacity to illuminate empirical problems, which I hope to demonstrate in the rest of this book. But this choice remains crucially bound up with commitments to the socialist tradition and its aspirations for an emancipatory, egalitarian alternative to capitalism.

Readers who are highly skeptical of the Marxist tradition for whatever reasons might feel that there is no point in struggling through the masses of numbers, graphs and equations in the rest of this book. If the conceptual justifications for the categories are unredeemably flawed, it might be thought, the empirical results generated with those categories will be worthless. This would be, I think, a mistake. The empirical categories themselves can be interpreted in a Weberian or hybrid manner. Indeed, as a practical set of operational categories, the class structure matrix used in this book does not dramatically differ from the class typology used by Goldthorpe (1980) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993). As is usually the case in sociology, the empirical categories of analysis are underdetermined by the theoretical frameworks within which they are generated or interpreted. This means that readers who are resolutely unconvinced about the virtues of understanding classes in terms of exploitation can still engage the empirical analyses of this book as investigations of classes differentially situated with respect to life chances in the market.

1.8 The empirical agenda of the book

Broadly speaking, the empirical studies in this book explore three interconnected problems in class analysis: (1) Characteristics of and variations in class structure itself; (2) The relationship between class and gender as aspects of social structure; (3) The linkage between class structure and aspects of class consciousness.

Class structure

The research in parts I and II all concern various problems in the analysis of class structure itself. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the rest of the book by presenting basic descriptive data on the overall shape of the class structure in a number of advanced capitalist societies. Here
we are not so much interested in testing specific hypotheses about cross-national variations than in carefully describing various aspects of these variations. As a result, in some ways this chapter is less interesting theoretically as the empirical chapters which follow.

Chapter 3 examines changes in the distribution of people in the American class structure between 1960 and 1990 and decomposes these changes into a part that can be attributed to shifts in class distributions within economic sectors and a part to shifts in the distribution of people across economic sectors. The basic results are quite striking. The working class expanded slightly in the 1960s, but has declined at an accelerating pace since then, especially because of a decline in the working class within sectors. Supervisors increased significantly in the 1960s and modestly in the 1970s, but declined in the 1980s. In contrast, managers, experts and expert managers have all increased throughout this period. The petty bourgeoisie and small employer class categories declined both within and across sectors in the 1960s, but since then have had a more complex trajectory, leading in the 1980s to a quite significant expansion of the petty bourgeoisie and a nearly steady state for small employers. While our data do not allow us to test alternative explanations for these changes, I offer a tentative explanation in terms of the combination of technological change and the ramifications of long-term economic stagnation in an increasingly competitive international capitalist economic system.

Chapter 4 examines in much greater detail one of the trends in Chapter 3, the initial decline and then steady expansion of self-employment. Two different strategies of data analysis are presented: first, a time series analysis of annual changes in the rate of self-employment in which we test whether or not changes in self-employment can be attributed to changes in the rate of unemployment; and second, an examination of the sectoral patterns of changes in self-employment in which we document that the upsurge in self-employment which began in the mid-1970s is a broad trend throughout the economy, not simply in the service sector.

Part II explores the degree of permeability of class boundaries in four countries: the United States, Canada, Norway and Sweden. Class structures vary not simply in the distribution of people into class locations, but in the extent to which the lives of people are narrowly confined to specific class locations or involve social contacts and experiences across class boundaries. Chapter 5 lays out the theoretical and methodological issues involved in studying the permeability of these boundaries. The following chapters examine three forms of permeability: the permeability of class boundaries to intergenerational mobility (Chapter 6), the permeability of boundaries to friendships (Chapter 7), and the permeability of boundaries to cross-class marriages (Chapter 8). To somewhat oversimplify the main punchlines of the research, for each of these forms of permeability in all four countries, the authority boundary is the most permeable and, generally, the property boundary is the least permeable.

Class and Gender

Since the late 1970s, one of the main challenges to class analysis has come from feminist scholars who have argued for the centrality of gender as an explanatory principle in social theory and research. Many feminists have been especially critical of claims to "class primacy," which are often attributed to Marxist scholarship (in spite of the fact that few Marxists today actually defend class primacy as a general principle).

In more recent years there has been something of a truce on the issue of class and gender as most people recognize that there is no point in arguing for all-encompassing abstract claims about the "primacy" of particular causal factors in social explanations. Primacy is a tractable issue only with respect to specific explananda, and even then it is often more fruitful to explore the forms of interaction of different causal processes than to focus on which is "more important." Rather than seek any kind of metatheoretical priority to class analysis over gender analysis (or vice versa), it is more important to understand the interconnections of class and gender in specific explanatory problems.

This dialogue between Marxism and certain strands of feminism constitutes the backdrop to the analyses of class and gender in Chapters 9–12. Chapter 9 defends a conceptualization of class and gender in which they are treated as analytically distinct relations which interact in various social settings. The chapter then frames the empirical agenda by discussing a menu of five different forms in which this interaction takes place.

Chapter 10 examines the conceptual and empirical problem of the class location of married women. In Chapter 8, where we explore the permeability of class boundaries to cross-class marriages, the class character of households is defined in terms of the individual job-classes

38 For a general discussion of the problem of explanatory primacy, see Wright, Levine and Sober (1992).
of both husbands and wives. Some scholars have challenged this way of understanding the class location of married women in the labor force. They have argued that families, not individuals, occupy locations in class structures, and thus all members of a family must share the same class position. Since the class interests of families are most decisively shaped by the class character of the husband’s job, the argument goes, all members of the family, including married women with paid jobs, should be seen in the husband’s class. This chapter explores the conceptual foundations of this argument and various other conceptualizations, and then proposes a strategy for empirically comparing the alternatives.

Chapter 11 examines an explanatory problem that is of considerable importance within gender analysis: the gender division of labor in the home. Many feminists have argued that the sexual division of labor within families is at the very core of the social practices which produce and reproduce gender hierarchy in the society at large. In this chapter we examine the relationship between the class composition of households and the amount of housework husbands perform in Sweden and the United States. The results are quite simple: class has almost no effect on husbands’ performance of housework in either country.

Chapter 12 explores a specific aspect of gender distributions within class structures—the differential probabilities of men and women having workplace authority. It is hardly news that men are more likely to have authority within the workplace. What we explore in this chapter is first, the extent to which there are cross-national variations in this “gender gap” in authority; second, the extent to which this gender gap can be accounted for by a range of individual attributes of men and women (such as job experience, age, education, part-time employment, sector, occupation, and a few other variables); and third, the extent to which there is evidence of a “glass ceiling” within authority hierarchies (i.e. the gender gap in authority increases as one moves up hierarchies). The basic answer to the first question is that there are quite substantial cross-national variations, with the United States and Australia having the smallest gender gaps, followed by Canada and the UK, then the two Scandinavian countries in the analysis, Norway and Sweden, and finally Japan, which has by far the largest gender gap in authority of all of these countries. The answer to the second question is that very little of the gender gap in authority or the cross-national differences in the gap can be explained by the distribution of attributes of men and women. The gaps thus appear to be largely due to direct discrimination within employment. The answer to the third question is perhaps the most surprising: there is virtually no evidence that a genuine glass ceiling exists, at least into the middle ranges of authority hierarchies.

Class structure and class consciousness

One of the main reasons for studying class structure is because of its importance in explaining other elements of class analysis, especially class formation, class consciousness and class struggle. Chapter 13 lays out a general model of the interconnection of these elements of class analysis. More specifically, the chapter tries to clarify the relationship between the micro- and macro-levels of class analysis. This involves first discussing in general metatheoretical terms the distinction between micro- and macro-analysis, and then elaborating a micro-model of the relationship between class location, individual class practices and class consciousness, and a macro-model of the relationship between class structure, class struggle and class formation.

Chapter 14 applies the framework in Chapter 13 to a study of class consciousness and class formation in the United States, Sweden and Japan. These three countries are striking contrasts in the patterns of what we will call “ideological class formation.” Sweden is quite ideologically polarized between a working-class coalition and a bourgeois coalition with a relatively large and distinct middle-class coalition in between. Ideological differentiation is sharpest along the property dimension of the class structure matrix, but is systematic and marked along the authority and skill dimensions as well. In the United States the bourgeoisie coalition penetrates much more broadly into the class locations among employees and the overall pattern of class formation is less ideologically polarized than in Sweden, but the basic shape of ideological differentiation across the class structure matrix is still quite similar in the two countries. In Japan the patterns are drastically different: the degree of polarization is much more muted than in either the US or Sweden, and among employees the ideological cleavages occur mainly along the skill-expertise dimension rather than the authority dimension.

Chapter 15 examines the problem of class location and class consciousness in the state. The state sector poses a number of interesting problems for class analysis, since class relations inside of the state are not directly built on the relation between capitalists and workers. I
argue that the state employment in capitalist societies should be divided into two subsectors: first, an embryonic form of a post-capitalist, statist mode of production, and second, the apparatuses of the political superstructure of capitalism. This chapter then explores for Sweden and the United States the relationship between class location within the private sector of employment and these two state subsectors and class consciousness.

Finally, Chapter 16 examines the relationship between class location, class biography and class consciousness in Sweden and the United States. Two aspects of class consciousness are distinguished: class identity and what I call class-interest consciousness. The former I describe as a backward-looking aspect of consciousness since identities are rooted in a person's overall biography. Interest consciousness, on the other hand, is forward looking, since one's interests depend to a large extent on one's expectations about the future. This leads to the specific prediction that class identity should be more closely linked empirically to one's overall biographical trajectory in the class structure than to one's current class location, whereas class-interest consciousness should be more closely tied to class location.

This is a highly heterogeneous set of empirical problems. What emerges cumulatively from the research is not a simple punchline about the superiority of Marxist approaches to class over its rivals, or the universal explanatory power of class relative to other social causes. Rather, the bottom line message of the research is two-fold: first, within the family of developed capitalist societies there is considerable variation in both the structural properties of the system of class relations and the effects of class, and second, in spite of these variations, the fundamental class division based on ownership of the means of production remains a consistently important division within nearly all of the analyses of the book.