

1. Classical model of SMs. Strain, mass society, status inconsistency, normative ambiguity. all with arrows, clear. Critique, no political context, strain is everywhere, critique of individual discontent models (cites many others), critique of SM as a psych phenomenon rather than political.

2. RM: a deficient alternative. links to elite theory. review of RM theories. nice discussion of how elites are not necessarily willing participants; forced by excluded groups. also that elite participation may kill movements. [worth coming back to these arguments in more detail!] political capacities of the mass base, indigenous social networks. dependence on prior organization. importance of collective definition of grievances.

3. Political process model. Integrates political opportunities, broad processes, indigenous strength, cognitive liberation.


5. Historical Context. 1876-1954. [A great chapter for lectures, showings shifting political context]

   Compromise of 1876. end Reconstruction to break deadlock, elect Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, get southern votes. Let whites control south. economic rapprochement between northern industrialists and southern planters. common interests. king cotton.

   1880s. Populist movement. threatened s'n planter elite. class interests: ideology of small farmers transcending race. [some truly biracial groups, others racist.] intense conflict between Populists and planters. black vote went either way. eventually both sides of whites agreed on disenfranchising blacks. Democratic planter elite appeals to white supremacy and racial purity, were effective so that Populists were effectively painted as nigger party. After 1890, efforts to get rid of black vote are very explicit. One delegate to Virginia constitutional convention of 1900 openly says that goal is to eliminate every Negro voter who can be gotten rid of legally without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate. Working around federal constitution. e.g. Louisiana 1896, 130,344 blacks registered; after 1898 revision of La const, only 5,000 blacks registered, with ultimate low of 1,772 in 1916. In 1896, blacks a majority of voters in 26 parishes, by 1900 in zero. ! Planter divide and conquer strategy destroyed the Populist movement and preserved cotton tenancy. Consequences: destroyed ability to bargain politically, or to lay whites against each other; allowed violence against blacks, because no electoral threat; because only 10% of blacks lived outside south in 1900, disenfranchisement in south was also national disenfranchisement.

   Although white southerners refused to vote Republican, Rep party after 1876 disavowed its radical wing, including its blacks, and tried to appeal to southern whites. Parties about balanced nationally, Reps needed some southerners to govern nationally. After 1892, gave up trying to get white southerners, especially as their efforts were threatening to alienate blacks, their one loyal, natural constituency. Became a northern party. Around 1900, all but six states were effectively one-party states, governed by one or other. 1896-1928, blacks had no political significance: disenfranchised in south, where there were many, concentrated mostly in one-party areas.

   1880, 91% of Sn blacks lived in rural areas. 1930 still 68%. vast majority in cotton farming. elaborate social controls. debt bondage: either tenant farmers or sharecroppers.
extreme economic dependence, debt tied you to the land. Lynching, other violence to enforce control.

1896-1928. federal actions discriminated against blacks. Supreme Court decisions erode constitutional provisions safeguarding civil rights. 14th amendment gutted. Of 604 decisions about 14th amendment 1868-1911, only 28 dealt with black rights, only 6 upheld black rights. (vast majority were extending 14th amendment to corporations.) Of all court cases about race reaching Sup Ct 1876-1930, only 23/53 (43%) decided in favor of blacks. Legislative and executive action vacillates between strict noninvolvement and aggressive opposition to black aims. Between 1876 and 1891, debate among Republicans about whether to support civil rights, with those supporting often losing. After 1891, Republicans just stopped: there is nothing. By 1900, aggressive nonaction.

But it got worse, 1900-1920, you get aggressive antiblack legislation. Despite Woodrow Wilson's image as liberal, during his administration, 'no less than twenty bills were proposed that would segregate Negroes on public carriers in the DC, exclude them from commissions in the army and navy, ad set up segregated accommodations for white and Negro federal employees (Lomax, 1962: 223).’ also ban on black immigration, ban on intermarriage in DC. most didn't pass. But WW ordered segregation in a number of federal agencies, prohibiting race mixing in work areas, toilets, food service. also decline in federal appointees. federal govt became major force supporting segregation. Powerful people benefit from segregation, and no other whites are willing to oppose them. blacks lack enough political or economic power to fight on their own.

1931-54. Social forces change. (1) WWI shuts off Eur immigration, leads to luring blacks north to work in war industries. from 200,000 migrants 1900-1909 to 500,000 1910-1919. Southern states tried to pass laws against recruiting laborers to move. First divergence between northern and southern elites. Red scale and ending of immigration in 1919 just continued trend, pulled more blacks north. (2) after 1920, southern whites stopped fighting the exit, collapse of king cotton. declining prices, boll weevil; reduced labor needs. Further collapse of cotton prices in 1930s finished off this trend. acreage declines, and need for labor declines. also mechanization.

Effects: (1) undermine elite north-south alliance. (2) as need for cheap labor declined, so did need for rules designed to enforce it. (3) rural to urban migration within south, later org basis. (4) migration to north and west, where could vote.

Migration. from 90% southern in 1900 to [table from p. 78] in 1960. Disproportionate migration from precisely those states where blacks not allowed to vote. Between 1910 and 1960, black population increased 92% but total number of blacks voting in the presidential election increased 800%. 87% of migrants in 1910-1960 period settled in 7 key industrial states: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Illinois, and Michigan. "no candidate for Pres in modern times has won without taking a substantial share of the votes of the big seven." Electoral college, population based winner-take all, gives them heavy weight. Thus massive increase in black political importance.

1930, NAACP successfully joined with other groups to block Hoover's SC nominee, John J. Parker. 1932, coordinated electoral campaign to contribute to defeat of several senators who supported Parker. 1936, Time magazine: "In no national election since 860 have politicians been so Negro minded as in 1936. In Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York live some 2,500,000 Negroes, of whom over 1,000,000 are prospective voters this year. Moreover, in these same nine states, the Roosevelt-Landon battle will be waged especially hard, with the result in each perhaps turning in favor other party which can bag the largest black vote." 1st year blacks deserted the Rep party in large numbers, became key component of New Deal coalition.
1940-60, black movement into electorate accelerates, and black support for Dems is margin of victory in 1944, 1948 elections. Only after blacks moved into Dem party could they influence northern Democrats and exert pressure for change. Added conflict to the Dem party.

[inherently unstable, as Dems also had to placate white south. Many parts of New Deal accepted segregation. Soc Sec excluded domestic servants and unskilled agricultural laborers, i.e. southern blacks. not overnight miracle, but the beginning, a source of power.]

WWII ended US isolationism. world struggle, US race relations looked bad. [more on this from other books.]

nationalization of "Negro question" improved federal action. Sup Ct started reversing past decisions. pre 1931, 23/53 (43%) pro black civil rights. 1931-55, 91% (68/75). Between 1930 and 1940, FDR tried to continue federal "hands off" policy. 1941 March on Washington movement, all-black mass protest against discrimination. never actually staged, threat itself led FDR to issue exec order terminating discrimination, creating Fair Employment Practices Commission. 1946, Truman appts Committee on Civil Rights, then desegregates armed forces, proposes civil rights bill, creates fair employment board for Civil Service, then exec order prohibiting discrim in federal contracts. Eisenhower continues, desegs military, presses for integration of public facilities in DC. More bills into Congress, but Senate domination by South keeps them from passing. "Federal policy in this period was overwhelmingly reactive." not proactive for racial justice, but trying to solve immediate crises, deal with immediate political problems. still a big change voer the past.

Black Organization
Massive decline in cotton faring from 915,000 black farm operators in 1920 to 267,000 in 1959. some moved out, but others part of massive rural to urban migration within south. By 1960, proportion of southern blacks who were urban was 58%. (vs. 34% in 1930 and 9% in 1890) General upgrading of southern economy 1930-50. Lagging way behind whites, still beginning advancement of blacks into better jobs. White lynchings declined after 1930s as need for social control declined. less violence in cities. increases in black personal incomes. not just income, but escape from debt bondage, and creation of segregated ghettos within which blacks could be relatively independent and physically safe from whites. [*** call attention to this***] Education also higher in urban areas. expanding opportunities. breeding ground for leaders.

Black churches were weak before 1930. Population mostly rural, rural churches were small and underfunded. Ministers had to have several jobs, circuit preacher. thus irregular services, limited activities. Ideological conservatism, support for being obedient and looking to other-worldly reward. white domnaation. Urban churches were much stronger, had more members, higher minister salaries, more college-educated ministers, more money. after aboaut 1940, increased involvement of southern urban black church in social action. churches urge people to register and vote, offer informations about elections, organize political community, support NAACP. majority of church ministers become open advocates of civil rights.

Black colleges urban, but in 1900 only 2,624 students total erolled in 99 colleges. 1915-6 figure is 2,641. no money, poor faculty training. more private funding in 1920s, but still by 1928 only 12, 922 students, average of 130 per school. all but one black college failed accreditation examination in 1930. By 1935, 5 more accredited. total income doubled between 1915 and 1930, degrees rose 200%. But greatest rise is after 1940, a rather direct prodct of dramatic rise in financial support for black colleges. churches, United Negro College fund. also southern states: 1930 Sup Ct case, Gaines, Missouri had to admit Lloyd Gaines to the U Missouri Law School or establish a separate law school within the state to accommodate him. [product of careful plan of litigation by NAACP] to maintain segregation, states funded black schools.
NAACP founded 1909. litigation strategy. growth as a mass organization after 1930. [feeds into Morris's story. NB it grows as a mass organization during exactly the period in which it is at the vanguard with its litigation strategy which is clearly winning victories one by one. builds a rep as the org which will go to bat for blacks] during this period, growth was greatest in the south. largely urban. probably due to sense of the time. [per Morris, followed by intense repression after 1954]

Cognitive Liberation: 1876-1930. prospects awful, everyone against you. segregation seemed permanent, immutable. fatalism, hopelessness. southern system one of total control. northern, federal gave no signs of support. Pres Taft opposed voting rights for blacks: "political children, not having the mental status of manhood." Dem candidate William Jennings Bryan: blacks should be disenfranchised, "on the grounds that civilization has a right to preserve itself." 1921 Pres Harding: "fundamental, eternal, and inescapable differences" between blacks and whites, so "stand uncompromisingly against every suggestion of social equality. . . Racial amalgamation there cannot be." Booker T. Washington, "never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter as they are at the present time." Garveyism of 1920s, cities correlation between separatist sentiment and white opposition to black interests, periods of disillusionment and resignation.

Even though federal efforts were objectively trivial in 1930s & 1940s, the fact that they were there at all gave hope. WEB DuBois: "It took war, riot and upheaval to make Wilson say one small word about lynching. Nothing ever induced Herbert Hoover to say anything on the subject worth saying. Even Harding was virtually dumb. [But Roosevelt] has declared frankly that lynching is murder. We all knew it, but it is unusual to have a President of the United States admit it. These things give us hope." 1934. Paul Robeson, 1939: "change was in the air." not objective change, but hopefulness. Surveys in 1940s showed blacks thought things would be much better in the future than they had been, e.g. 75% of blacks (vs 62% of whites) thought won's chances to succeed would be better than own, in 1947. NAACP led to court decisions, but court decisions increased NAACP membership. Another study found increases in money to "Negro organizations" after court decisions.

6. Generation of Black Insurgency 1955-60. tests theories. deprivation models could be right or wrong, depending on indicator, but correlations on yearly basis with protest are low. External resources follows protests, does not lead it. outside funding is a product of protest. in early period, colleges, churches, and NAACP account for 74% of all events in this period, 50% direct and another 24% are events following events initiated by these. This also excludes actions by MLK, SCLC, or SNCC, even though we know from history that these were founded in black churches, colleges, and NAACP. review lit with individual interp. instead focus on chars as orgs. not just source of recruits, but membership redefined to include action. Estimates activism rates of 60-80% at black colleges where there was activism. variation in level of participation related to degree of integration into the group. Nearly all leaders came from these. Page 134: big difference in type of actions by each group. NAACP: court action, other institutions (e.g. voter reg, petitions). Church groups: boycotts, sit-ins & direct action, some other instit. Students: sit-ins or direct. 30/35 leaders of NAACP had occupations independent of white control. "those with income dependent on white power were not of the movement."

More detailed information on well-developed communication networks, specialization of issue.

White supremacist activity follows black actions. 1956 White Citizens Council. had 800 members before boycott. after boycott, 13,000 or 14,000 in Montgomery alone, 75,000 members in 80 chapters around the state. By Nov 1955, all white citizens councils 60,000. But in 3 months following Montgomery, grew to 250,000. States busy passing laws, doing things to support integration, step up as federal govt backs off on enforcement. ** Two sets of white
actors: state govts fighting federal actions, and white supremacist crowds responding to integrationist efforts.

7. Heyday of Black Insurgency. 1961-5. Organizational strength, external support, movt orgs take over resources of indigenous orgs, concentrated in the south, concentrated on issues, concentrated on orgs (shift to SCLC, SNCC, CORE). org coalitions. Dramatic rise in southern black voters after 1962. crucial votes in 1956 [Adam Clayton Powell urges blacks to vote for Ike to punish Stevenson for weak Civ Rts stand; many do]. 1960 close election. Continuing cold war pressures. Poll data shows blacks very optimistic in this period, more optimistic than whites. vast majority thought white attitudes were getting better. very high proportions express willingness to protest. 1963: 51% march in demonstration, 49% sit-in, 47% go to jail, 46% picket a store.

Peaks in movt activity coincide with tactical innovations, new ways of pushing. External support. needed, but divergent interests. short run asset, long run liability. competition for money, tensions. outside money is for moderate, tame activities, permits pressure to rein in militants. dependence means decline when support withdrawn. Fed govt tried to maintain tactical neutrality throughout period. Kennedys tried to get away from confrontation, toward votes. refuse to intervene unless forced.

white supremacist violence follows movement actions, by about a month. movement triggers whites, whose violence forces federal action.

8. Decline. Org proliferation. rise of black power wing. King dies 1968. by 1970, back to decentralized local groups. no centralized conscious planning. growing internal fights. political reaction and devaluation of black vote. [get other notes on issue evolution] Dems identified with blacks, Reps with racist whites. Nixon and Wallace in 1968. as blacks incorrigibly Dem, nobody cared about them. 97% of blacks voted for Humphrey vs 35% of whites!! + Wallace showing evidence of importance of white racist vote.

competing issues take white attention, esp Vietnam. declining org strength of blacks. black riots. McAdam says white leaders interpreted as criminal. [well of course] [give my rap] rise of law and order, official federal hostility to blacks. see Nixon as harmful to blacks. declining black proportions think white attitudes will improve (although still majority). rise in proportion thinking whites want to keep Negroes down. Rise in segregationist impulses by 1970, suggest rise in despair, pessimism. declines in personal and political efficacy among blacks through the 60s. Declines in black %s willing to engage in all forms of action 9although small). Black militants and riots scare whites.

external resources channeled to NAACP, acceptable groups. CORE & SNCC collapse when external money is withdrawn. SCLC dependent on King.

northern white resistance a different problem from southern. not just white south. urban riots started by blacks, got greater black repression. direct repression of black power groups. [get more notes]

9. brief conclusion.