Integration between Difference and Solidarity

In 1974, after twenty years of struggle to make more real the promises of American citizenship, during which efforts that began with black Americans had expanded to include other racial or ethnic minorities and was beginning to open new possibilities for women, a scholar named Peter Adler concluded a widely used anthology called *Interracial Communication* by offering a definition of “multicultural.” Emphasizing the “psycho-culturally adaptive,” Adler portrayed a protean, ever-changing, integrative actor who had the desire and ability to put himself in the shoes of the other person in a relativizing, crossover, nonjudgmental way. “Multicultural man,” he wrote, “maintains no clear boundaries between himself and the varieties of personal and cultural contexts he may find himself in.” He is “capable of major shifts in his frame of reference and embodies the ability to disavow a permanent character.... He is a person who is always in the process of becoming a part of and apart from a given cultural context. He is very much a formative being, resilient, changing, and evolutionary.”

Fifteen years later, delivering her presidential address before colleagues at the Modern Language Association, the feminist literary scholar Catherine Stimpson defined multiculturalism in a decidedly different manner. It means, she said, “treating society as the sum of several equally valuable but distinct racial and ethnic groups.” At that same meeting, the editor of the explicitly multicultural *Heath Anthology of American Literature* defended his textbook's
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race and gender organization of literary materials by insisting, "I know of no standard of judgment...which transcends the particularities of time and place...of politics in short." In yet another presentation at the MLA meeting, a Shakespearean scholar justified the need for a multicultural approach to literature by highlighting the boundedness of his particular identity. Reading the work of a black woman author, he explained, "I do not enter into a transcendent human interaction but instead become more aware of my whiteness and maleness, social categories that shape my being." These juxtaposed quotations suggest more than a shift in disciplinary reference from Erikksonian ego psychology to Foucauldian power-knowledge. They indicate a sea change in social understanding. In the early 1970s, multiculturalism was not yet part of the social imagination, but it connected compromise, interdependence, a relativistic universalism, and an expanding intercultural community. In our own time, the same term, now absolutely central to the collective consciousness, appears inextricably connected not with permeability and commonality but with "difference," with the deconstruction and devaluation of claims to universality, with the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and protection of separate cultural discourses and sometimes very separated interactional communities.

Some radical advocates of multiculturalism propose that their particularistic identities determine their actions and being. Promoting a fundamental reconstruction of textbooks and pedagogy vis-à-vis the categories of "American" and "race," Molefi Kete Asante, then chair of the Department of African-American Studies at Temple University, justified Afrocentrism on the grounds that, for black Americans, "our Africentricity is our ultimate reality." "The idea of 'mainstream American,'" he writes, "is nothing more than an additional myth meant to maintain Eurocentric hegemony...Mainstream is a code word for 'white'...One merely has to substitute the word 'white-controlled' to get at the real meaning behind the code." When Cornel West, the influential black theologian and philosopher, reviews the effects that recent movements for equality have had on contemporary American academic life, he confirms this shift in mentality but demonstrates more sensitivity than Asante to its paradoxical effects. "The inclusion of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans and American women into the cultural of critical discourse," he observes, has "yielded intense intellectual polemics and inescapable ide-

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This discursive shift from an emphasis on universalism and inclusion to difference and separation seems a strange response to the continuing progress that previously excluded and subordinated groups have made vis-à-vis the core institutions of American society. A progress, that though agonizingly uneven and tragically incomplete, is nonetheless amply documented in statistics about mobility, intermarriage, occupation, and education. What is less paradoxical is that in the course of this transformation, a highly visible conservative intellectual reaction has crystallized, one that is far more suspicious about the motives of multicultural activists than is evidenced by skeptical sympathizers of the movement like Cornel West. Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy liberal and cosmopolitan thinker of an earlier day, blames multicultural activism for reviving "ancient prejudices." Rather than seeing these thinkers as responding to continuing inequality and exclusion, Schlesinger claims that they have actually introduced divisions where none existed before. By "exaggerating differences," he writes, "the cultures of ethnicity...intensifies resentments and antagonisms," thus "producing a nation of minorities [and] inflating the illusion that membership in one or another ethnic group is the basic American experience." Samuel Huntington blames the "popularity of multiculturalism and diversity," which he dub the "deconstructionist movement," for an "erosion of national identity" that is "quite possibly, without precedent in human history." More strident conservatives denounce multiculturalism as a new form of racialism, one directed against the white majority. Dinosh D'Souza denounces "the new separation" and likens it to defending the South African Apartheid regime. For Roger Kimball, multiculturalism, "far from being a means of securing ethnic and racial equality," is "an instrument for promoting ideological separatism based on...differences." Hinton Kramser attacks "the new barbarians" who have "already established as a standard practice: the imposition of politics—above all, the politics of race, gender, and multiculturalism—as the only acceptable criterion of value in every realm of culture and life."
In attacking multiculturalism as a new form of racial particularism that denies universalism, the conservative critics of multiculturalism—who are also the most conspicuous intellectual opponents of race- and gender-specific affirmative action programs—go on to make an even more fundamental claim. They argue that this movement has fundamentally undermined the solidarity that has been the basis for American democracy. As Schlesinger sees it, a once united nation has now been torn apart. "The cult of ethnicity," he decrees, "has reversed the movement of American history," and he condemns it for "breaking the bonds of cohesion—common ideals, common political institutions, common language, common culture, common fate—that hold the republic together." Kimball asserts that "what we are facing is nothing less than the destruction of the fundamental premises that underlie . . . a liberal democratic polity." 14

The claim that multiculturalism undermines the cohesiveness of American society, indeed, the very existence of an American "society" as such, is potentially an extremely damaging ideological charge: after all, the construction of a fuller, more inclusive society is precisely what most of the emancipatory social movements of the last century have been about. What makes this claim so perplexing is that some of the most important intellectual advocates of multiculturalism seem to agree with these conservative critics. They allow that the movements they defend are indeed at odds with the concept of an American community. They promote, instead, an alternative ideal, a social system of insulated but equally empowered groups who, rather than experiencing some shared humanity and solidarity, would simply grant one another the right to pursue distinctive lifestyles and goals.

In this chapter, I will examine this claim on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. I will criticize it for ignoring not only the theoretical possibility of a civil sphere, but its real, if fragmented, existence in contemporary American life. We will see that the civil society theory I am developing in this book allows us to cast the debate between radical multiculturalists and fearful conservatives in a very different light.

Recognition without Solidarity?

The most important theoretical articulation of the radical multiculturalist position is Iris Young's philosophical treatise Justice and the Politics of Difference.
eliminate or transcend group difference. To the contrary, "group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes." For this reason, justice "requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression." Young argues that recent social movements should be seen just this way. She reads them simply as emphasizing difference and particularity—as identity movements in the contemporary social science sense—suggesting that the discourse of a radical, separate multiculturalism is not only rational and morally legitimate but politically effective as well.

My problem with Young's argument is not with its logical coherence but with its empirical validity, which is inextricably intertwined with its moral claims. Does Young have a realistic theory of the cultural and institutional life of contemporary societies? Of how social movements for justice actually work? I think not.

Let us examine a claim that is the fundamental meeting point between the empirical and moral dimensions of her position. Recall that Young asserts that demands for the recognition of particularity, of difference, will result not simply in the "reproduction" of difference but in greater "respect" for them. She cannot, however, defend this proposition empirically or theoretically. Instead, she simply conflates political and moral assertions of the validity of difference with the empirical achievement of social respect. Following are some examples of short-circuiting:

By asserting a positive meaning for their own identity, oppressed groups seek to seize the power of naming difference itself. . . . Difference now comes to mean not otherwise, exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity. Asserting the value and specificity of the culture and attributes of oppressed groups . . . results in a relativizing of the dominant culture. When feminists assert the value of feminine sensibility . . . when gays describe the prejudice of heterosexuals as homophobic and their own sexuality as positive . . . when Blacks affirm a distinct Afro-American tradition, then the dominant culture is forced to discover itself for the first time as specific [and] it becomes increasingly difficult for dominant groups to parade their norms as neutral . . . and to con-

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struct values and behavior of the oppressed as deviant, perverted, or inferior. These arguments seem more than a bit sociologically naive. At times, Young defends such propositions on normative grounds, as offering a dialog. "deliberative" approach to the achievement of justice: "A selfish person who refused to listen to the expression of the needs of others will not himself be listened to." But isn't "selfishness"—the self-orientation produced by xenophobic, group-limited perception—exactly what Young himself has identified as the defining characteristic of contemporary social life? When socially marginalized and culturally polluted groups make claims for recognition and respect, can the simple assertion of these claims, in and of itself, change the minds of the very dominant—that is, "selfish"—groups that have made them marginal and polluted? It seems highly unlikely that mere assertion could be so sufficient unto itself.

This is hardly surprising if we acknowledge the existence of a civil sphere and the changing context it provides for political claims. It is not the mere fact of energetic self-identification, much less the simple demand for deliberation, but the construction of the social context within which claims for recognition are made that determines whether the negative understanding of social stereotyping can be ameliorated or reversed. Statements about ourselves and others are interpreted against a background of tacit assumptions. Spokeans need to know what language game they are playing before they can properly interpret actions and statements made by the players. If we have different conceptions of the game, we will interpret the same statement differently; for all intents and purposes, we may as well be playing a different game. Insofar as the game is democratic life, the rules for this game are established by the possibility of the very civic impartiality that Young denies. But that is, by the culture and institutions of civil society.

"We should seek public fairness," Young asserts, "in a context of heterogeneity and partial discourse." Indeed we should. But the factual existence of heterogeneity and assertions of claims for its respect will never, in and of themselves, produce the kind of mutual recognition that Young seeks. It is only the implicit understandings of public culture, articulated in the complex and interrelated relations of civil life, that can valorize representations of heterogeneity in positive and negative ways. Young implicitly acknowledges this all-important fact when she contrasts more interest group
Rethinking the Public Sphere: Fragmentation and Continuity

The conservative critics of multiculturalism are right about one thing. There is already a civil sphere in the United States and in other democratic and democratizing nations as well. Yet the radical champions of multiculturalism are also right, for the civil societies that exist in the present day, and even more so those of earlier eras, remain segmented and fractured communities, solitary spheres that exclude all sorts of groups from their central cores even while proclaiming liberty and justice for all. What both sides in this argument seem to ignore, in other words, is that the existence of the civil sphere is not a zero-sum, all-or-nothing game. Failure to achieve a full or complete civil sphere should not be seen as an admission of utter failure. To the contrary, it is the contradictions generated by the tension between the ideal and the real that produce the potentially liberating dynamics of contemporary life.

In this civil sphere, actors are constructed, or symbolically represented, as independent and self-motivating individuals responsible for their own actions who feel themselves, at the same time, bound by collective solidarity to every other member of this sphere. The existence of such a civil sphere suggests great respect for individual capacities and, at the same time, trust in the goodwill of others. For how could we grant such a wide scope for freedom of action and expression to unknown others if we did not, in principle, trust in their rationality and goodwill? Trusting in the goodwill of autonomous others is implied in the paradoxical proposition that the “free” members of civil society are at the same time solidaristic with one another. Instead of such solidarity exists, we see ourselves in every other member of society. Imaginatively taking the place of the other, our actions become simultaneously self-oriented yet controlled in some manner by extrindividuae solidarity. In this way, we act simultaneously as members of a community and as rational, self-willed, autonomous individuals. The emergence of this kind of civil realm supersedes but—and this “but” is critically important—does not necessarily suppress more particular commitments we feel as members of primary groups. After all, if we were bound completely by kinship, neighborhood, gender, racial, linguistic, or religious boundaries, we would be something less than autonomous individuals, and we certainly would not exhibit solidarity to the myriad of others occupying the extended territories in which we live. As I have suggested throughout this book, such an idealistic vision of a civil social order has been a utopian aspiration of communities in different times and places, even while it has generated sharp tensions with other, more restrictive understandings that members of these communities have simultaneously held. As a normative ideal, this utopian vision has been promoted in one form or another by each of the great monotheistic religions, despite the cautionary restriction that members of such a universal religious community must worship one particular deity. We can think of the Athenian Republic as the first great effort to institutionalize elements of such a utopian ideal, despite the fact that access to the Greek public was, in empirical terms, severely restricted. We can see elements of this utopian civic public in myriad other places since. We can find them in the parliaments of medieval kingships in the West; in such aristocratic political demands as the Magna Carta; in what Elias called the “civilizing processes” that radically refined the manners and coarse brutality of medieval knights and courtiers; in the bureaucratic, formal, and homogenizing legal apparatuses created by early modern absolutist regimes; in the Renaissance city-states, such as Florence and Venice, which had vigorous, confrontational, civic-oriented factions and discourses, and even elections, albeit of a highly unequal sort. None of these were “real civil societies” in the modern sense. When
civil societies were first institutionalized on a national scale in such countries as England, the United States, and France, ambitious cultural revolutions created highly universalistic and egalitarian narratives and symbolic codes. Legal institutions formalized individual autonomy and responsibility, protecting free action and demanding reciprocity. In these nations, the civil sphere became so vigorous and expansive that accession to state power could not be legitimated without its blessing, which, as I suggested in chapter 6, is one way to understand the significance of mass electoral systems and the enfranchisement of significant parts of the national populations.

The glorious democratic revolutions did not achieve the full democracy that conservatives applaud, yet neither were they as illusory as radical multiculturalists claim. They marked, rather, one early step in the unfolding process of institutionalizing civil society. To understand the inherent limits on completing this institutionalization process, we need to recall the model of systematic contradictions presented in chapter 8. Even after the great democratic revolutions, civil society remained only one sphere among others within a broader social system. English, French, and U.S. societies were, and are, also composed of powerful and decidedly noncivil spheres. The family, religious groups, scientific associations, economic institutions, and geographically bounded regional communities still produced different kinds of goods and organized their social relations according to different ideals and constraints. Families, for example, were bound by love and emotional loyalty, not civil respect and critical rationality; they were organized, moreover, in highly authoritarian relations, not only between parents and children, but between husband and wife. The market relations that defined early capitalism emphasized efficiency rather than fairness, competition rather than solidarity, and, once again, hierarchical rather than egalitarian forms of respect. Religious organizations were similarly vertical in their organization, despite the significant horizontal relationships engendered in Protestant sects; they were committed to the highly elitist and exclusionary principle that only those born within a faith, or those converted to it, were to be fully respected and obeyed. Scientific communities also manifested such exclusionary elitism—around truth rather than salvation—although they were even more associations and collegial internally.

These noncivil spheres did not simply sit outside the boundaries of civil society and conduct with it a courteous and respectful exchange, as the social theory of early liberalism imagined and as contemporary conservat
of autonomy and to act according to the principles of universalism. Yet when these same men are in their private spheres—in the church, the army, or the state—they may not be allowed to exercise these civil rights and they do not have to allow others to exercise them in turn. To the contrary, they must obey noncivil authorities in a highly subservient way, and they have the right to demand obedience to their own commands. 13

Though this private-public distinction served to protect the civil sphere from obvious and delegitimizing fragmentation, it testified, at the same time, to that sphere’s profound limitations. When push came to shove, the public world was not nearly so shielded from the vagaries of the private world as Enlightenment and constitutional thinking proclaimed. To the contrary, the functional and historical particularities expressed in private life invaded and distorted the understanding of civil life. Jews may have been allowed to practice their religion in the privacy of their homes—although sometimes they were not—but “Jewishness” carried such a stigma that they were excluded from most of the central institutions of public life. The same contradiction of the public promises of civil universalism constrained such other, supposedly private categories as race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, physical location, and other religious orientations.

Implications for Contemporary Debates

The idea of a contradictory and fragmented civil sphere has clear implications for the present discussion. It suggests, contrary to radical multiculturalists such as Young, that an impartial civil domain does have some traction in Western societies, indeed, that it has enjoyed a real existence for hundreds of years. It also demonstrates, however, and this goes directly against conservative polemics, that the civil sphere’s promises of autonomy, solidarity, equality, and justice have never been fully realized. Civil society is not and has never been integrated, cohesive, and fully solidary. Conservatives are deeply mistaken in their suggestion that today’s demands for multiculturalism threaten to sidetrack a great success story and that such demands introvert divisive particularities, polarizing a society that has exhibited high levels of solidarity and integration heretofore. The theory of the contradictory civil sphere suggests that multicultural demands for recognition of particularity are justifiable both normatively and empirically, even if, in their radical form, such demands can fundamentally misunderstand what the basis of such recognition might be. For the multicultural critique brings to public attention the debilitating departures from universalism that have corroded civil society from the very beginning of its modern form.

If this proposition is true, much of our thinking about contemporary racial and ethnic conflict in the United States and elsewhere must be recent. Multiculturalism may actually be a new form of social integration that, rather than denying universalism, has the potential to realize it in historically unprecedented ways. Critics on the Left and Right have taken the recent emergence of multicultural discourse, institutions, and practices as marking the end of broad projections of social solidarity. It may actually be the case, however, that it marks the beginning of a radically different, more adequate model, a mode of civil integration whose tenets, still barely visible, will provide the framework for conflicts about the possibilities of justice for decades, if not centuries, to come.
CHAPTER 16

Encounters with the Other

IN THE THREE hundred years since the first democratic institutionalizations of civil society emerged, the crippling of its utopian promises has generated continuous struggle. These have not only been political struggles for power, but legal, cultural, and emotional arguments about definitions of competence and identity, about symbolic representations of the primordial qualities of dominant and excluded groups. The public has never been a dry and arid place composed of abstract arguments about reason. It has always been filled up by expressive images, by narratives, traditions, and symbolic codes. Organizations and social movements have sustained and resisted these cultural structures, engaging in discursive struggles over the legitimating resources they need to expand or restrict civil life.

The Plasticity of Common Identity

Definitions of civic competence are expressed in terms of universal criteria, but these criteria are represented in terms of the concrete historical qualities of particular orientations and groups. "Common identity" is, in historical terms, extremely plastic. Members of subordinate religious sects, social classes, genders, races, sexualities, generations, regions, and ethnicities may look different and act differently from the nation's founders and depart from the
criteria promoted by noncivil elites. Nevertheless, as a result of social movements and less organized and more incremental processes, members of core groups can be—and often have been—convinced that beneath these differences, and even because of them, there exists a common humanity worthy of civil respect.

Whether or not members of the core groups become communicatively convinced that subordinate group members actually share with them a common humanity, and thus are worthy of respect, is critical to the process that can be called incorporation. Later I will parse this term into more historically specific and morally evocative subcategories. Here I will use "incorporation" in a general and abstract, if still obviously evaluative, manner, one that implies neither evolutionary assumptions about its empirical likelihood nor preconceptions about the empirical mode through which it may be achieved, whether conflict, coercion, patronage, or processes of a more democratic kind. When considered in this manner, it is clear that incorporation is an issue that no "modern" social system can avoid. It is thrust upon every society that includes a civil dimension, no matter how crippled or fragmented. Incorporation points to the possibility of closing the gap between stigmatized categories of persons—people whose particular identities have been relegated to the invisibility of private life—and the citizenship promises that in principle regulate civil life, which imply equality, solidarity, and respect among members of society. Whether social movements try to close this gap or exacerbate it, they make their insistent demands vis-à-vis the imminent possibilities of this incorporative process.

But incorporation does not only occur in the public arena of social movements. It is a process that proceeds along extraordinarily complex paths, extending from micro interactions such as intermarriage to such macro arenas as labor markets. Insofar as social systems contain a civil dimension, members of their core groups always face this question: In regard to a particular category of excluded persons—whether defined by class, region, gender, race, religion, or national origin—should the gap between utopian promise and stigmatized actuality be closed? Should the incorporation of this particular group into civil society proceed?

Encounters with the Other

Exclusionary Solidarity

In later chapters, I will describe different modes of incorporation into civil society, suggesting that there are different ideal-typical paths—each historical, empirical, and moral—along which the gap between public recognition and private exclusion can be, and has been, closed. To pose the problem in this way is to challenge the manner in which social science typically has conceptualized the problem of out-groups. What differs about the approach I am taking is the notion that out-groups are produced, first and most important, by processes internal to the social system itself. This seems paradoxical. Exclusion results from the very process of constructing, in real time and real space, empirical civil societies, from their instantiation in larger, complex, differentiated, and segmented social systems. It is the contradictions generated by institutionalization that produce exclusion. What particular groups are excluded is historically contingent. That, at any particular historical moment, some groups are relatively more distant from the core is systemic, the result of the very process of instantiating the civil sphere in time, space, and plural institutional domains.

This suggests an almost Marxian logic, one that social scientists have adopted in studies of internal class hierarchies but have rarely applied to understanding outsiders, or "strangers." From Weber and Simmel, through the ecological studies of the Chicago school, to current discussions of ethnicity, immigration, and race, American and European social scientists have tended to conceptualize exclusion differently from the way I am proposing, as resulting from encounters between a relatively well-integrated social system on the one side and an unfamiliar, physically and geographically separated group on the other. Rather than approaching exclusion in terms of endemic social system processes, processes that interwove with historical and geographic contingencies, exclusion and otherwise have typically been understood as a result of external encounters.

Forms of Out-Group Contact

By focusing mainly on encounters between imperial or national societies and "the other," such an approach avoids the fundamental question of how
the interval examination of these collectivities affects the outcome of these encounters. It is precisely such consideration, however, that leads one to recognize the signal importance of the civil sphere. The structure and visibility of the civil sphere profoundly affects the motivational, institutional, and discursive frameworks within which strangers are encountered. Such civil mediation will be my principal focus in the considerations that follow. Still, there is no reason to deny the importance of contingent encounters as such. Whether as a result of their own actions or because of developments in their environments, such large collectivities as empires and nation-states continually encounter unfamiliar groups. In the course of these encounters, existing membership in the "home" society—even for subordinate and stigmatized classes, genders, and ethnicities—can provide an insider, privileged status.

One can think systematically about the various ways in which the members of such societies physically encounter such outside groups: (1) through economic or political enslavement of other groups and societies; (2) through military conquest of stable regimes, with the aim of imperial expansion or revolution; (3) through imperial dissolution, reconquest, or upheaval in imperial peripheries; and (4) through economic, religious, or political immigration. Though the first kind of out-group contact is today relatively rare, the other social processes remain very much in evidence. In recent years, out-group contact through immigration has been a particular focus of attention. Revolutions in transportation technology, the emergence of transnational economic institutions, and the decreasing influence of national sovereignty have made it much more likely that mounting Third World poverty, which is itself connected to earlier processes of out-group contact such as imperial conquest and dissolution, will lead to immigration. These push factors are intensified by the pull factor of cultural globalization. When structural opportunities for flight are combined with the effects of an international communicative space saturated by symbolic representations of wealth and poverty—North and South, West and East—the result is unprecedented migration from the world's impoverished southern and eastern regions to northern and western ones.

When social scientists consider nonplan incorporation, they tend to conceptualize the kinds of processes I have just described—globalization, regime breakdown, military conquest, and immigration—as discrete and contingent forms of out-group contact, treating each as the cause of certain behavioral effects. As I have suggested, such an approach ignores the variable internal structure of the social system responding to such outside forces. Certainly, different kinds of out-group contact have distinctive ramifications even if they are not determinate. If we wish to analyze incorporation into American society, it would be folly to ignore the demographic reality that, in historical terms, the American population was formed from revolution (against the British), military conquest (over native Americans and Mexicans), enslavement (of African Americans), and immigration (first Europeans, later Asians and Hispanics). Similarly, if we wish to understand incorporation in France, it is important to know that although France has experienced high immigration flows, for example of Italians and Belgians in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, its patterns of out-group contact have differed dramatically from those in the United States. The long history of nation-building via imperial expansion within territorial France, the problems created by postwar imperial dissolution of "Greater France" on the African continent, and the much more unstable character of the French revolutionary founding have all been important influences on the manner in which democratic and civil France has responded to contemporary contacts with outside groups. Incorporative patterns in Great Britain and Germany have also been deeply affected by the historical patterns of their contingent encounters with outsiders. Britain has had a long and, compared with France, much less polarized process of democratization, and Germany has historically had a relatively low incidence of immigration. These facts, combined with Britain's "post-colonial melancholia" and the non- and sometimes even counterrevolutionary character of Germany's nation-building, have created populations that, until very recently, were more ethnically and racially homogeneous than those in the United States, a demographic fact that has significant comparative implications for the paths these nations have taken to civil incorporation.

Nondemocratic Incorporation

But to recognize such variations in intergroup contact—in the behavioral processes that initially place core groups and out-groups into asymmetrical relationship—is surely not enough to understand the effects that such out-group encounters have on the process of incorporation. We need to know
something more, something about the internal structures of the society in relation to which outsiders are placed. It is one thing when outsiders seek to enter rigid "state" societies, and quite another when they encounter social systems that have more independent civil realms. It is not impossible for extensive incorporation to occur in state societies, but it is much less likely, and it will involve much more coercive means.

In response to the dangerous national conflicts that have accompanied the dissolution of the former Soviet and Yugoslav empires, some contemporary analysts have looked back longingly at imperial forms of organization, whether in the Christian or the Islamic worlds, that were conspicuously multinational and relatively stable. The best that the core groups of empires can offer outsiders, however, is some version of protected guest status. That status can qualify outsider groups for toleration in a restricted legal sense, but it does not engender incorporation in the sense of fuller participation in the communicative processes, interactions, and institutional structures of civil life. Even in this best-case scenario for state societies, in which rights to coexistence are extended to outsiders, the right to integration in a more substantive sense is denied, and hierarchy remains. In the worst-case scenario, empirically far more likely, bureaucratic authoritarian societies such as the former Soviet Union and the contemporary People's Republic of China regulate excluded categories of persons in significantly harsher ways. Political, economic, and cultural subjugation is not untypical; physical dispersion, forced relocation bordering on genocide are not unprecedented.

Yet although such patterns of national "cleansing" are indeed widespread in antidemocratic societies, the rejection of out-group integration is not necessarily tantamount to physical repression or outright annihilation. Even in China and the former Soviet Union, bargains were made between core groups and out-groups which allowed physical coexistence and behavioral cooperation to be maintained. Such accommodation may be made for reasons of efficiency. It may develop, as well, because core groups of imperial societies are frequently constrained by the cultural and institutional remnants, or fragments, of a civil sphere, even if badly deformed. Thus, bureaucratic-authoritarian societies often develop what Bryan Turner and Robert Holton call "state administered status bloc politics." Even while denying authentic forms of recognition, authoritarian regimes can co-opt demands of outside groups by agreeing to employ their primordial categories as criteria for distributing patronage, prestige, and material goods.

Internal Colonialism and the Civil Sphere

Of course, the existence of a more autonomous civil realm does not, in itself, guarantee that incorporation will proceed in a fundamentally democratic way. The systemic and historical contradictions engendered by the institutionalization of civil societies means that civil status for some groups is combined with antidemocratic rule over others. Indeed, even the most democratic civil societies have become implicated in internal colonialism. In the United States, internal colonialism was generated by the constitutional
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legitimation of slavery between 1790 and 1865 and, later, by Jim Crow in the American South. Other examples abound: England’s often brutal and exploitative incorporation of the subjugated “British” territory of Ireland; the Apartheid system in post-1948 South Africa; the decades-long occupation of Palestinian territory by the democratic Israeli state; the Western subjugation of native, aboriginal groups in the course of early modern European expansion. Yet although internal colonialism has been historically significant, and its repressions continue to be widely felt today, it cannot easily be identified with the out-group domination that occurs in noncivil state regimes. If the dominating regime contains an independent civil sphere, conditions for emancipation are sometimes fostered within the structure of domination itself. In chapter 11, I suggested that subaltern civil societies are marked by duality. In postslavery African American communities, such civil institutions as newspapers and entertainment media flourished, and professional associations created powerful office obligations to the community. In the black townships and proletarian communities of South Africa, thick civil connections also developed, not only culturally but in institutional, often quasi-legal ways. In dominated Palestinian territory, where critical communication is restricted and often distorted, counterinstitutions of office obligation and social regulation have still developed, and distinctive democratic discourses have sometimes emerged. Such nascent civil structures allow subordinated groups to make compelling protests against hegemony. Despite the enormous ideological and material constraints imposed by their exclusion, it is by no means impossible for dominated groups to successfully evoke the liberating discourses and even the communicative and regulateive institutions of the hegemonic order. Indeed, in the examples I have cited—racially segregated America, Apartheid South Africa, and the occupied Palestinian territories—fiercely contested, radical, and sometimes successful challenges to internal colonialism have frequently occurred. Of course, these challenges may not themselves be democratic, but rather mirror the repressive civil discourse that justified their own domination.

Though internal colonialism in civil societies is an extreme case, its complexities illustrate the ambiguities that out-group subordination generates in every society that supports a relatively autonomous civil sphere. Because civil societies are sustained by assumptions about enlightened human capacities and rights for participation, protection, and communication, they promise even the most dominated out-group historically unprecedented levels of accessibility and respect. Precisely because such societies possess a relatively independent civil sphere, they are in some manner committed to expanding solidarity, to opposing repressive bases for hierarchy, and to projecting common humanity as the criterion for distributing status and rights. Attention must shift from the mode of intergroup contact to variations in the relationship that develops between out-group and fragmented host society. What is the fit, or lack of it, between the out-group qualities and the primordial distortions of civil society? How will the universalistic dimensions of culture and institutions be applied to the particularities of subordination? These are the questions we now address.

Varieties of Incorporation and Resistance in Civil Societies

A newly encountered out-group defines its collective identity in such terms as language, race, gender, sexuality, religion, ethnic origin, and economic status. Members of the host society primordialize these historically arbitrary characteristics into “essences” that are held to be uniquely capable or incapable of sustaining participation in their civil sphere. Yet, even when this primordialization constructs newly encountered out-groups in terms of the discourse of repression, the resulting representation of domination remains tenuous; it can never be legitimated fully. This is true even in extremis, when civil society becomes implicated in internal colonialism. As long as there exists some autonomy for the civil sphere, primordial subordination produces a contradictory situation. Out-group contact may allow civil competence to be deeply primordialized; at the same time, however, the continuing existence of a civil realm maintains the possibility, in principle, that this polluted primordialization can be contested, neutralized, and eventually overturned.

Closing Down the Civil Sphere

As long as a differentiated civil realm remains, so too does the tension I have just described. This contradictory condition creates the possibility for the incorporation of out-groups into civil society. Progressive incorporative
movements aim to resolve the contradictions of civil society by more fully including out-groups and expanding the autonomy of the civil realm, but this is only one possibility; for the contradictory situation need not be resolved in an inclusive, progressive way. Antidemocratic movements take a very different path to resolving such contradictions. They promise to eliminate the independence of the civil sphere itself. Because out-group subordination belies the promises of civil life, it threatens members of society’s already established, core groups. Core groups worry that dominant groups can make use of the cultural promises and institutional mechanisms of civil life. When excluded groups do make such efforts, backlash movements form in response. In the midst of progressive movements toward incorporation, in other words, demands arise for new or renewed forms of exclusion, sometimes even harsher and more permanent ones. It was in the face of significant Jewish assimilation into late-nineteenth-century German, French, and American societies that massive anti-Semitism emerged. It was in response to intensifying European unification, in the late nineteenth century, that there developed vociferous and exclusionary anti-immigrant movements.19

In the context of civil societies, these, social movements emerge that can successfully block further inclusion and sometimes reverse it. Indeed, backlash movements can threaten the existence of the civil sphere, demanding suppression of the very autonomy that allowed their own movements to emerge. The goal of such backlash movements is understandable sociologically even if noxious morally. If the civil aspect of society can be restricted or even destroyed, the immanent universalism that creates continuous dissatisfaction with inequality and exclusion can be eliminated; with this elimination, the threats to core-group status will disappear. When the forces of universalism are too weak to mediate exclusion and moderate the subordination of out-groups, civil ties can deteriorate into civil war, for efforts to enforce primordial identities lead to attempts to mobilize noncivil institutions, particularly the state. Stability is possible in so-called plural societies—democratic societies composed of “columnized” primordial groupings.20 It is empirically more likely, however, that processes of pluralization will engender new forms of domination and, eventually, secession and even civil war. In this manner, the social system can be transformed from a partially realized civil society into a primordial community, from a partially demos-
1. Is the civil sphere of a particular nation-state really autonomous? How "free-floating" can it be vis-à-vis the historical primordial identities instantiated in various forms of national stratification? Is the nation's civil realm so closely attached to primordial understandings that it should be regarded not as providing a counterweight to stratification but as simply legitimating it?12

2. How could the identities of outsiders be understood in relation to the binary discourse of civil society? Are they rational or irrational, honest or deceitful, open or secretive, autonomous or dependent?

The democratic response to these difficult questions is straightforward. The demeasuring contradictions of universalism can be ameliorated, and justice enhanced, only (1) if civil society can be culturally represented and organizationally empowered in a manner that is relatively independent of primordial identities and (2) if core-group members construct outsiders in terms that maintain or restore their full humanity. In 1859, Carl Schurz, a German immigrant to the United States who eventually was elected a U.S. senator, addressed incorporation in these optimistic terms when he argued, in the face of backlash movements against immigration, that the United States was "a great colony of free humanity which has not old England but the world for its another country."13 By not identifying the mother country of American immigrants and founders with England, a particular nation, but rather with the world, Schurz was denationalizing American ethnicity, erasing its primordial form. The contradictions between the civil aspirations of America and its historical and geographical specificity were in this way vitiated, and the notion Schurz was defending could be seen as composed of "free humanity" in more than a partial and rhetorical sense.

In real civil societies, however, such ideal, politically correct answers have not been so easily forthcoming. They must, at any rate, always involve as much feeling and speculation as rational common sense, be symbolic and not simply pragmatic, as expressive as scientific. John Higham explained why this must be so in his account of the antecivil American nativism that challenged the waves of American immigrants in the late nineteenth century. "What was worse than the size and the strategic position of the alien population," Higham writes, "was its apathy."14 It was this moral distance that marked the chosen. "The new immigrants lived in a social universe so remote from that of the Americans on the other side of the tracks," Higham writes, "that they knew practically nothing of one another." If core-group members rarely encounter out-group directly, neither evidence from actual encounters nor personal experience can guide their judgments of civil competence. It is more in response to untested beliefs, to fantasies, hopes, and fears that they place members of outsider groups at different points along the continuum of citizens and enemy.

What are the sociological pathways by which civil reactions to out-groups have been constructed? To the degree that there is incorporation, it has occurred in three ideal-typical ways: assimilation, ethnic hypenation, and multiculturalism.

**Stigmatized Persons and Their Qualities**

As a result of the most common manner in which the historical expansion and revision of the civil sphere has taken place. For comparative and empirical reasons, therefore, as well as for normative ones, it is important to define assimilation in a precise way. In assimilative incorporation, members of primordially designated groups are allowed, and often encouraged, to "pass" into public life. As this notion of passing suggests, such incorporation is not merely the result of regulative institutions guaranteeing excluded groups civil treatment in a procedural sense. The communal life of societies is much too layered and culturally textured for that. Because civil competences are always interlarded with particular identities, any mode of incorporation must focus on the public construction of identities, on how the civic competences of core groups are related to the abilities of subordinate ones. Assimilation is an incorporative process that achieves this extension, or transformation, in a distinctive way. Assimilation takes place when out-group members are allowed to enter fully into civil life on condition that they shed their pollarded primordial identities. Assimilation is possible to the degree that socialization channels exist which can provide "civilizing" or purifying processes—through interaction, education, or mass-mediated representation—that allow persons to be separated from their primordial qualities. It is not the qualities themselves that are purified or ac-
public lives. They can change from being different and foreign to being "normal" and "one of us."

The plasticity of identity, its cultural and constructed character, allows such assimilative transformation to occur vis-à-vis every conceivable primordial quality. Not only ethnicity and language, but the public identities of stigmatized members of religious, economic, racial, and sexual communities can be reconstructed in an assimilative way. The qualities of these groups remain stigmatized, but they can now be left behind at the door of private life. Those who carry them privately can venture forth into public exhibiting civic competence differently. With assimilation, the split between private and public remains in place; indeed, because the polluted qualities of stigmatized group membership are even more firmly restricted to the private sphere, this split becomes sharper and more unyielding. From a moral point of view, assimilative incorporation is paradoxical. On the one hand, it fails entirely to challenge the myths of transparent civility, leaving in place the illusion, so cherished by members of already established core groups, that primordial characteristics do not belie the substantive validity of the civil sphere. On the other hand, it is precisely this failure to challenge civil transparency that allows out-groups to be massively incorporated in an assimilative way.

Despite its paradoxes, in other words, and even to some degree because of them, assimilative incorporation seems to validate the Enlightenment vision of democratic mass societies. It is for this reason extraordinarily significant in both historical and comparative terms. Insofar as assimilative incorporation proceeds, the notion that all human beings are rational, perfectible, and capable of self-control can be taken seriously, despite the enormous prejudices and distortions that continue to bedevil national social life. Insofar as an out-group is assimilated, its members seem to be treated, in the public sphere, according to the discourse of liberty. They are encouraged to shed those ascriptive qualities that insiders deem inimical to the requirements of modern civil societies and, insofar as they do so, they are treated as representatives of "humanity" rather than as members of a group whose qualities remain stigmatized.

Because the contemporary discourse of difference promoted by postmodern sensibilities has objectified and amalgamated the various phases of modernity, it has become fashionable to attack the incorporation of out-groups into civil society as "merely" acculturation or normalization, to
regard it invidiously as simply the stripping of particularist identities and, thus, as a form of repression. Incorporation is reduced to assimilation, and assimilation is reduced to a kind of cultural cleansing. If, under the sign of Foucault, cultural knowledge is falsely equated with structural power, then exclusion of out-group primordial traits from the public arena is underpinned as simply another form of institutional domination.

Such arguments, however, fundamentally misunderstand assimilative incorporation and civil incorporation more generally. Equating assimilation with domination both eliminates the distinction between state and civil societies and smoothes over the paradoxes that mark civil societies themselves. Affirming the most enlightened principles of human sensibility and confirming democratic against authoritarian morale, assimilation extends some important degree of civil status and participation to persons regardless of primordial origin and private identity. In earlier American history, and in the histories of other democratic nation-states, assimilating out-groups experienced a confirmation of their common humanity, not only its restriction. This is in part because the private-public split allows them to continue to reproduce their primordial cultures in a relatively integral way; it is also because their personhood has been affirmed with their enlarged participation in civil and public life. The paradox, however, is that by failing to challenge negative representations of out-group qualities, by keeping them private and outside of the public sphere, assimilation reproduces demeaning stereotypes in a different way, confirming the substantive restrictions and debilitating contradictions of civil society. We will explore this paradox, and examine the alternative possibilities, in the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER 17

The Three Pathways to Incorporation

In comparative analyses of the United States and France, sociologists, historians, and national intellectuals have argued that incorporation in these nations is different from that in other nations because it proceeds under civic ideological rather than ethnic-primordial understandings of citizenship. Their revolutionary origins and self-conscious Enlightenment rationales are supposed to have initiated such radical ruptures with tradition that their postrevolutionary civil societies are legitimated not by any primordial particularities but simply by democratic ideology as such. In this chapter, I will demonstrate this is not the case. There are, indeed, highly significant differences between France and the United States, on the one hand, and central and southern European nations, on the other. Nonetheless, both revolutionary countries avoided the primordialization of its civil premises or the struggles over incorporation that issued therefrom. The three pathways to incorporation cannot be parsed into such neatly compartmentalized ways. All three forms are relevant, although certainly not equally relevant, to every national experience.

Even in such a democratic country as the United States, in other words, assimilation has assumed a fundamentally paradoxical form. Though assimilation provided enormous opportunities for participation, it failed to challenge stigmatized qualities, confirming significant restrictions on promises for a democratic life. In the face of increasing immigration and internal