POTENTIALS, NETWORKS, MOTIVATIONS, AND BARRIERS:
STEPS TOWARDS PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS*

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Four aspects of mobilization are distinguished: formation of mobilization potentials, formation and activation of recruitment networks, arousal of motivation to participate, and removal of barriers to participation. Four steps toward participation in social movements are then distinguished: becoming part of the mobilization potential, becoming target of mobilization attempts, becoming motivated to participate, and overcoming barriers to participation. The relevance of these distinctions is justified theoretically by the claim that different theories are needed to explain separate aspects of mobilization and participation, and practically with the argument that different efforts are required from movement organizations depending on which aspect they are handling. Empirical support from research on mobilization and participation in the Dutch peace movement is presented. Nonparticipation in a mass demonstration can be based on four grounds: lack of sympathy for the movement, not being the target of a mobilization attempt, not being motivated, and the presence of barriers. These results are interpreted in terms of the literature on mobilization and participation.

Social movements entail forming mobilization potentials, forming and motivating recruitment networks, arousing motivation to participate, and removing barriers to participation. It is important to distinguish these processes because they not only require very different activities of social movement organizations but they also require different theories of analysis. To create mobilization potentials, a social movement must win attitudinal support. The formation and activation of recruitment networks must increase the probability that people who are potentially mobilizable become targets of mobilization attempts. The arousal of motivation must favorably influence the propensity to participate of the targeted people. In removing barriers a movement organization increases the probability that motivated people eventually participate.

At the individual level, becoming a participant in a social movement can be conceived as a process with four different steps: becoming part of the mobilization potential, becoming target of mobilization attempts, becoming motivated to participate, and overcoming barriers to participate. The first two steps are necessary conditions for the arousal of motivation. Motivation and barriers interact to bring about participation: the more motivated people are the higher the barriers they can overcome.

MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL

Mobilization potential refers to the people in a society who could be mobilized by a social movement. It consists of those who take a positive stand toward a particular social movement. Attitudes toward a movement involve the means and/or goals of the movement. With respect to attitudes toward the means, the concept of mobilization potential is related to that of protest potential, that is, the willingness to become engaged in unconventional forms of political behavior (Barnes and Kaase 1979). With respect to attitudes toward the goals, the concept of mobilization potential is related to Kriesi’s (1985) concept of manifest political potential, that is, a group of people with a common identity and a set of common goals.

The mobilization potential of a social movement is not identical to the social categories who will benefit by achievement of the goals of the movement (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1976; Jenkins and Perrow 1977), although such categories can easily become included. The mobilization potential of a social movement sets the limits within which a mobilization campaign can succeed. People who are not part of the mobilization potential will not consider participating in movement activities, even if they are reached by attempts at mobilization. The mobilization potential is the reservoir the movement can draw from. It is the result of often lengthy campaigns in which a movement propagates its view that certain states of affairs are unacceptable and can be changed and that collective action will be effective in enforcing changes. Campaigns like this, called consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984) or frame

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alignment (Snow et al. 1986), are needed to convert relative deprivation or lack of trust in authorities into mobilization potential (Gurney and Tierney 1982).

RECRUITMENT NETWORKS AND MOBILIZATION ATTEMPTS

However successfully a movement mobilizes consensus, however large its mobilization potential, if it does not have access to recruitment networks, its mobilization potential cannot be realized. Networks condition whether people become targets of mobilization attempts. The more a movement’s reach-out networks are woven into other organizations, the more people are reached by mobilization attempts.

A person can be targeted by mobilization attempts through one or more of the following routes: mass media, direct mail, ties with organizations, and friendship ties. The mass media are not very effective in convincing and activating people (McQuail 1983). McCarthy (1983) and Mitchell (1984) revealed how American environmental organizations managed to make effective use of direct mail to recruit participants. But recruitment through mass media and direct mail is less likely to work in cases of high-risk or high-cost participation (McAdam 1986; Briet et al. 1987). Ties with organizations make “en bloc recruitment” possible (Oberschall 1973).

The importance of friendship networks for reaching potential participants has been repeatedly indicated in the literature. Gerlach and Hine (1970) found that people were much more inclined to join religious movements if they were approached by those whom they trusted on other grounds. Bolton (1972) showed how new members of peace groups were recruited in circles with a high proportion of people who were already members. Orum (1974) and Wilson and Orum (1976) pointed out the importance of friends or relatives who were already involved in a movement to explain participation. The introduction of network analysis in this field made more systematic analyses possible (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen 1980; Knake and Wood 1981; Granovetter 1983; Fernandez and McAdam forthcoming).

The formation of recruitment networks involves both extending the reaches of the organization, particularly at a local level, and forming coalitions with other organizations (Wilson and Orum, 1976; Ferree and Miller 1985). During a mobilization campaign a movement organization has to mobilize and activate its recruitment networks by mobilizing persons who hold positions in it. When such persons back out, recruitment channels come to a dead end.

MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE

The motivation to participate is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of participation (Oberschall 1973, 1980; Klandermans 1984; Muller and Opp 1986). The distinction between collective and selective incentives is fundamental (Olson 1965). With respect to collective incentives, a multiplicative relationship is assumed between the value of the collective good and the expectancy of success. Selective incentives are either soft (nonmaterial) or social, and hard (material) or nonsocial (Opp 1983; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1986). Soft or social incentives are important determinants of willingness to participate (Mitchell 1979; Opp 1983; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1986). Outcomes with respect to hard or nonsocial incentives are more ambiguous. Opp (1983) found that such incentives were important in activities in the antinuclear movement in West Germany. Klandermans (1984) found a moderate effect in union participation, and Mitchell (1979) found no effect in American environmental organizations. Differences in the nature of the participation seem relevant. Mitchell’s case clearly involved low-cost participation, Opp’s involved high costs, and Klanderman’s moderate costs.

On the part of the movement the arousal of motivation requires control of costs and benefits of participation. In fact, since it is perceived costs and benefits, control is not sufficient. Movements must communicate to potential participants the extent to which collective and selective incentives are controlled by the movement. Consequently, the mobilization of consensus is also an essential part of this stage of the mobilization process.

BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION

Motivation can predict willingness to participate; but willingness is a necessary but insufficient condition of participation. It can predict participation when intentions can be carried out (Mitchell 1974). Motivation and barriers interact to activate participation. The more people are motivated, the higher the barriers they can overcome. This opens up two strategies for a movement: maintaining or increasing motivation and/or removing barriers. The former strategy is, of course, closely related to the arousal of motivation; the latter requires knowledge of barriers and resources to remove them. Although every organizer knows that many people do not participate despite their promises, there is little empirical data on actual participation. McAdam (1986) showed that among applicants to Freedom Summer Rides, those who eventually participated knew more participants than those who did not. He did not provide data on
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

barriers however. Klandermans (1984) and Klaassen (1986) asserted that nonparticipants who definitely intended to go to a union meeting mentioned more concrete obstacles than nonparticipants who were less motivated to go. Scarcity of empirical evidence reflects the lack of longitudinal studies on intended and actual participation. Post hoc comparison of participants and nonparticipants is inadequate in this regard.

In this paper we present data on all four steps of the mobilization process from a mobilization campaign for the peace demonstration in The Hague in 1983, the largest demonstration the Netherlands had ever experienced.

THE 1983 PEACE DEMONSTRATION IN THE HAGUE

On October 29, 1983, 1 out of every 25 inhabitants of the Netherlands joined the largest demonstration the country had ever seen. This was the climax of a campaign against nuclear armament started five years before. Nobody would have expected this event in the early seventies when the peace movement had all but died.

The structure and constituency of the contemporary peace movement differed from those that had appeared earlier. The movement was comprised of four national organizations (The Interdenominational Peace Council (IKV), Stop the Neutron Bomb, Women for Peace, Pax Christi) and a number of smaller groups. Hundreds of active local groups formed the base of the movement. Although most of these groups were connected with one of the national organizations, they were autonomous in defining their activities. Since over half of the communities in the Netherlands had at least one active peace group, the peace movement had at its disposal a network extending to the furthest reaches of the country. Local groups played a key role in the mobilization campaigns and were capable of mobilizing an unprecedented support: 1.2 million signatures against the neutron bomb in 1978; 400,000 participants in an Amsterdam demonstration in 1981; 500,000 participants in a 1983 demonstration at The Hague; 800,000 participants in local peace week activities in 1984; and 3.75 million signatures against the deployment of cruise missiles in 1985. To evaluate these figures it is instructive to consider that the Netherlands has a population of 14 million.

NATO's decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe contributed to the rapid growth of the peace movement. The Achilles heel of the NATO decision was that each European government had to decide individually whether and where to locate the missiles. This gave the Dutch peace movement a concrete goal and a target to concentrate on: the prevention of the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands and the Dutch government, which would ultimately have to decide whether and where to deploy.

From 1981 on, mobilization campaigns were organized by a coalition of political and social organizations. Apart from the four major peace organizations, the center-left and leftist political parties and the largest union federation formed a coalition that organized the campaign for the 1983 demonstration. Despite initial, exploratory contacts, the Christian Democratic Party did not enter the coalition. At the local level, coalitions of local peace groups and organizations mobilized the population. The rest of this article is devoted to one such local campaign. We describe how it attempted to activate and expand the local recruitment network and to mobilize the population for the demonstration. This part of the article is based on a study carried out between January and November 1983.

THE CAMPAIGN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Mobilization attempts often occur at different levels. National leaders of a movement mobilize local cadres, and local cadres mobilize others inside or outside the organization. Sometimes these persons represent other local organizations, which in turn attempt to mobilize members of their own organizations. Each step involves new interactions and new actors who have to decide whether they will participate. Here we briefly describe the campaign as it penetrated our research locale, a town in the environs of Amsterdam, which we call Smalltown. Here the first level of mobilization—mobilization of the local peace group, in this case a local chapter of the Interdenominational Peace Council—went without problems. Early in January, the national IKV announced its plan to hold a national demonstration on October 29 in The Hague. Part of the local mobilization campaigns was to assemble as many relevant local organizations as possible in a peace platform and to mobilize the local population. The local IKV group showed an unquestioning willingness to do this. The second stage, activating and expanding the recruitment network by mobilizing local political and social organizations, was much more difficult. Following the general IKV strategy, the IKV group set out to organize a peace platform. Every local organization was approached by letter announcing the formation of a peace platform, stating its goals, and inviting participation. At the first meeting on April 18, 1983, 30 people representing 13 organizations attended; ultimately 8 joined, including 3 out of the 5 parties (the
Christian Democrats and the Conservatives did not participate), an organization of elderly people, a youth organization, and a women's organization. In not participating, the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives conformed to their national party organization, who were opposed to the movement's goals. The women's organization and the youth organization decided to support the peace platform because they agreed with its goals and did not expect any problem with national leadership or local membership. The organization of elderly citizens and the union decided to withhold support until the first meeting. Later, the elderly citizens' organization joined, but the union local did not. Both organizations feared problems with their membership. Unlike the elderly organization, the union decided to withdraw for this reason. Altogether, the local IKV group assembled those organizations (with the exception of the union local) that already supported the peace platform but did not mobilize the others. This in turn was critical to the local mobilization campaign.

The proximate goal of the peace platform was to send two buses (100 people) to the demonstration. To keep financial thresholds low, the platform committee worked hard to get a cheap bus fare. Most of the effort, however, was put into publicity: distributing pamphlets; selling buttons, stickers, and posters; erecting a publicity stand downtown; sending a carrier tricycle with speakers around town; and securing local news coverage. This was reinforced by a national publicity campaign. By the end of June, the local campaign was in full swing. By late September, 75 bus tickets had been sold, and eventually three buses (150 people) went to the demonstration. An unknown number also went independently. The week before the demonstration, the authors conducted a telephone survey among a random sample of the local population to determine the support for the IKV campaign. Respondents were asked if they intended to participate in the demonstration. After the demonstration, they were asked in a follow-up survey if they had been to the demonstration. The remainder of this article analyzes both surveys.

METHOD

Telephone surveys have both advantages and disadvantages. The main reasons for us to use telephone surveys rather than face-to-face interviews or mailed questionnaires were time and money. Telephone surveys are relatively cheap and easy to organize at short notice. Moreover, one has a better control over time. In our case it was important to conduct the survey in exactly 3 days before the demonstration. Mailed questionnaires lack this precision, and face-to-face interviewing is too time consuming. The major disadvantage of telephone surveying is of course bias due to the fact that there are households without a telephone. Fortunately, in the case of Smalltown this is not too serious a problem. A suburban community, Smalltown has an extremely low proportion of households without a telephone. There may be some bias in our sample, but not an alarming one.

Less important as a drawback are response rates. Although higher than those with mailed questionnaires, response rates of telephone surveys lag behind those of face-to-face interviews. Adopting one of Frey's (1983) devices, we sent an initial letter informing respondents that they would be contacted for an interview. In this way we were able to attain reasonable response rates. Since we needed the combination of telephone numbers and addresses for this strategy, we used telephone books to draw our sample. This has the disadvantage of missing unlisted telephone numbers (fortunately not yet widespread in the Netherlands) but the advantage that private numbers can be distinguished from business numbers.

We mailed letters to 175 randomly selected addresses a few days before the interviews asking the addressees to cooperate. In 9 cases there was no answer after repeated attempts to reach the addressees. No interview could be made in 52 cases for various reasons (refusals, illness, impossible to make an appointment). Ultimately 114 (69 percent) interviews were held. After the demonstration we reached three-quarters of our original respondents for a second interview. Respondents who had said they would go to the demonstration were asked if they had actually done so. Unfortunately, for some unexplained reason, those reached included only half of the respondents who had said they would go to the demonstration. Both interviews lasted about 15 minutes. We used structured questionnaires, asking about collective and selective costs and benefits of participation, attitudes on nuclear disarmament, peace movement goals, government policies and demographics. Forty-four percent of the respondents were women, 55 percent men. The average age was 44.4 (s.d. = 16.9). Respondents were normally distributed over educational levels. Compared to the local statistics in recent elections respondents sympathetic to left or center-left parties were slightly overrepresented (Table 1). Obviously, such a small sample cannot be used to draw firm conclusions about the Dutch population as a whole. Our object here is to examine processes affecting selective recruitment to collective action.
**Measurement**

1. **Mobilization potential.** The following question was used to determine whether individuals belonged to the mobilization potential of the peace movement: "The coming demonstration is directed against deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, and especially against deployment in the Netherlands. How do you feel about this goal of the demonstration?" Respondents could disagree absolutely, disagree, agree, and agree absolutely. Only two respondents had no opinion. Respondents who agreed with the goal of the demonstration were assigned to the mobilization potential of the movement.

2. **Mobilization target.** Whether persons were targets of mobilization attempts was deduced from their answers to several questions. We assumed that people who had never heard of the local IKV group, nor of the peace platform in their community, and who did not know any individual who was planning to take part in the demonstration, were not targets of mobilization attempts. Although they might have been contacted in national appeals, our concern was the effectiveness of the local campaign.

3. **Motivations.** The motivation to participate was ascertained by asking the following question: "Do you plan to go to the demonstration?" (Yes, I intend to go; no, I will not go).

4. **Participation.** Actual participation was measured from the second interview.

5. **Attitudes.** Attitudes toward peace and war were measured by questions regarding NATO, governmental policy, the negotiations in Geneva, and the influence of the Dutch government on the arms race.

6. **Incentives.** Collective benefits were measured by questions about the effectiveness of the demonstration both in terms of changing the policy of the government and in terms of the number of participants. Together with the attitude toward the goal of the demonstration, they indicate the collective benefits of the demonstration. Social incentives were measured by asking about the expected reactions of significant others and by asking if many friends and acquaintances would go to the demonstration. The nonsocial selective incentives were captured by the perceived value of sacrifice of leisure and the risk of violence.

7. **Participation barriers.** Respondents who intended to go to the demonstration, but eventually did not go, were asked why they did not go. This was an open-ended question.

8. **Leftism of party vote.** Party votes in recent elections were ascertained. Table 1 presents the parties that were present in Smalltown, ordered on a right-left continuum, together with the distribution of votes in the last election of the population in Smalltown and our respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>28 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>22 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>5 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>30 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Left</td>
<td>10 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5 votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** VVD: Volksparty voor Vrijheid en Democratie (conservatives); CDA: Christelijk Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democrats); D66: Democraten 66 (Progressive Democrats); PvdA: Party van de Arbeid (Social Democrats).

The figures indicate that people voting for parties to the left are overrepresented at the expense of voters for parties to the right. Our voting behavior variable indicates a person's leftism vs. rightism of party vote, ranging from -1 (VVD/CDA), 0 (D66/PvdA) to -1 (Small Left).

9. **Demographics.** Sex, age, and education of respondents were recorded.

**RESULTS**

The major research findings are summarized in Figure 1. Twenty-six percent of those interviewed did not belong to the mobilization potential of the peace movement; 74 percent did. About one-fifth of those were not targets of a mobilization attempt, whereas four-fifths were. One-sixth of those who supported the campaign and who were targets of mobilization attempts actually intended to go to the demonstration. Two-fifths of those who intended to go to the demonstration eventually did go, whereas three-fifths did not.

These results suggest some preliminary conclusions. With each step of the mobilization process, considerable numbers drop out. This underscores the importance of the four conditions that we distinguished. Those who had not been targets of a mobilization attempt were without exception unwilling to participate, regardless of their opinion of the goals of the demonstration. The fact that three-fifths of those who, only a few days before the demonstration, had said that they intended to go, eventually did not go, underscores the importance of overcoming participation barriers. The biggest drop-off occurs, however, in the motivation stage. Here almost half of the sample got lost. Clearly, the local movement organization has been unable to arouse motivation to participate on a large scale. In the following paragraphs we examine each of the four steps and their determinants.
The Mobilization Potential

Almost three-quarters of the respondents were involved in the mobilization potential of the movement against cruise missiles, and one quarter was not. Respondents who did not belong to the mobilization potential were somewhat older, and vote almost without exception for parties to the right. No differences in education and gender were found (Table 2).

The attitudinal comparisons validate the distinction between the two groups. Individuals from the mobilization potential were more concerned about deployment, more inclined to fight against deployment even if a decision were made to deploy, and, contrary to individuals outside the potential, announced almost without exception that they would sign a petition to pass a freeze motion in their town. The two groups did not differ with regard to their views on the possibility to control the arms race either through efforts by the Dutch government or through negotiations in Geneva. These figures demonstrate that it is concern for nuclear armament rather than strong beliefs in possibilities to control the arms race that makes the difference between individuals who do and who do not belong to the mobilization potential of the movement against cruise missiles. These concerns are conflated with political party preferences (Table 3). Because our dependent variable was dichotomous, we used logistic regression analyses. Equation (1) clearly shows the significance of voting behavior as a distinguishing feature of the two groups, as compared to age and education. In equation (2) the effect of voting behavior is no longer present. The attitudinal factors take its place.

Table 2. Demographic and Attitudinal Comparison of People within and outside the Mobilization Potential of the Peace Movement (Means and Standard Deviations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43.1 (18.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male = 2)</td>
<td>1.5 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.3 (2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote in last election (rightist/center right = -1; center left = 0; leftist = 1)</td>
<td>-.25 (.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudinal

Is deployment a matter of deep concern to you? (no = 1, yes = 3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50 (.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If deployment is pushed through, will you continue to fight against it (3), accept it regretfully (2), or approve it (1)?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.66 (.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the Dutch government have any opportunity to influence the arms race? (no = 1, many = 3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.74 (.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you believe that the negotiations in Geneva will lead eventually to arms reduction? (definitely not = 1, definitely = 4)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.81 (.90)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you sign a petition to pass a freeze motion in your city council? (no = 0, yes = 1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belongs to Mobilization Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (Mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.86 (.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 109.
* p < .10.
** p < .001.
Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Who Belongs to the Mobilization Potential of the Peace Movement (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Equation (1)</th>
<th>Equation (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.03* (.02)</td>
<td>-.04 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.45 (.53)</td>
<td>-.43 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.23* (.11)</td>
<td>-.24* (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote in last election</td>
<td>3.08** (.74)</td>
<td>1.38 (.93)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudinal</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is deployment a matter of concern to you?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If deployment is pushed through will you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continue to fight against it, accept it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regretfully, or approve it?</td>
<td></td>
<td>.43 (.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.42 (1.37)</td>
<td>10.72 (2.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-.4586</td>
<td>-.3341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 109.
* p<.05.
** p<.001.

Individuals who stayed outside the mobilization potential of the movement against cruise missiles were primarily from the right wing of Dutch society, although voters for parties to the right were not guaranteed opponents. A fair number of the supporters of right-wing parties (11 percent of the Conservatives and 30 percent of the Christian Democrats) could be counted among the sympathizers with the movement against cruise missiles. Virtually the entire left wing of Dutch society was part of the mobilization potential (100 percent of the Progressive Democrats, 86 percent of the Social Democrats, and 100 percent of Small Left).

Apart from political party alignment there are small independent effects of age and education. The effect of age is not different from what we found with the zero order relationships; the effect of education is. If we control for age, gender, and voting behavior, education is related to sympathy with the peace movement. The sign is negative, however, indicating that people who do not belong to the mobilization potential are more highly educated than people who do.

In summary, the mobilization potential of the movement against cruise missiles covered a broad spectrum of social categories. It clearly did not restrict itself to categories thought to be typical of the mobilization potential of new social movements, like the new middle class, highly educated professionals, youth (Brand 1982; Klandermans 1986; Kitschelt 1985; Mellauci 1980). In the case of education we even found the opposite relationship. We will come back to this in the next section.

Target of Mobilization Attempts

In order to establish whether persons have been targets of mobilization attempts, we asked our respondents what formal and informal links they had with the local peace movement. Given the intensity of the mobilization campaign, we assumed that everybody who was linked in one way or another to the movement had been a target of mobilization attempts. However, the two sets (individuals being linked and individuals being targeted) need not necessarily be identical, and there might be situations where they are rather different indeed.

Almost 60 percent of the mobilization potential was reached by mobilization attempts through formal networks: they visited the peace stand downtown (31 percent), read appeals in local newspapers (23 percent), were reached through organizations linked with the movement (16 percent), or saw posters, billboards, banners (4 percent). A brochure that was delivered at every address was mentioned by only 13 percent of the respondents. We assumed that individuals with several or even many acquaintances or friends who planned to go to the demonstration were tied with informal recruitment networks of the movement. Some 40 percent of our respondents had no such ties, and about 30 percent had several.

If we merge the two tracks, 20 percent of the mobilization potential had virtually no links at all with peace movement networks; 19 percent were reached through formal links only; 21 percent had only informal links; and 40 percent reported both formal and informal links to the movement. People who belonged to the mobilization potential had been as frequently targets of mobilization attempts as people outside the mobilization potential. There is, however, an interesting difference between the two groups: people outside the potential have, compared to those within, more formal links (chi-square = 4.811, p < .05). Obviously, outside the mobilization potential individuals are less likely to have friends or acquaintances who intend to go to the demonstration. This does not prevent local movement organizations from approaching these people, and apparently with some success.
However, these are “wasted” mobilization attempts, since nobody from this category will participate. Women had less links with the local peace movement networks (Table 4). People reached were more highly educated and voted for parties to the left. We found no relation to age. The results in Table 5 show that three independent variables account for 27 percent of the variance in linkages to local peace movement networks. The beta coefficient for gender reveals that there is no independent gender effect. Controlling for education and voting behavior, we find no significant relation between gender and links to local movement networks.

The strong positive relationship with education confirms the findings in the literature that participants in movements like the peace movement are highly educated, young professionals (Brand 1982; Klandermans 1986; Kitchelt 1985; Melucci 1980). The findings on mobilization potential and recruitment networks suggest, however, that the explanation for this is not to be found in the stage of the formation of mobilization potentials but in the forming and activating of recruitment networks. It is not that more highly educated individuals who are sensitive to political or economic developments create new mobilization potentials but that these individuals are more connected with the social networks engaged in recruitment.

The data on voting behavior demonstrate the importance of political alignment in recruitment. The negative sign and the size of the mean of the group without any link show that people who have not been reached are located at the right side of the political spectrum. Apparently, recruitment networks did not reach this part of the mobilization potential. The means in Table 4 of the two categories having informal links indicate that the categories are densely populated with voters of the small leftist parties. This points out that the informal networks were to a large extent networks among adherents of the small parties to the left.

In our theoretical introduction we assumed that participation in movement activity would only be considered by individuals who belong to the mobilization potential and have been targets of mobilization attempts. This leads to the straightforward hypothesis that people who have not been targets of mobilization attempts will not intend to participate in the demonstration, even if they belong to the mobilization potential of the movement.

The data fit the theory perfectly; without exception every person who intended to participate had in one way or another been target of a mobilization attempt (Table 3). More interestingly, the figures in Table 4 demonstrate that the informal recruitment networks are far more important than the formal. The data suggest that informal networks are necessary conditions for the arousal of motivation to participate. In this respect our data confirm earlier findings on differential recruitment (Orum 1974; Gerlach and Hine 1970; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1982; McAdam 1986b).

In conclusion, network factors entailed important biases in the mobilization potential reached by mobilization attempts. On the one hand, they excluded to a large extent the rightist sectors of the mobilization potential, which were not reached by mobilization attempts; on the other hand, informal networks restricted themselves to a large extent to the small leftist parties. The composition of the peace platform reproduced itself in the composition of the group reached by mobilization attempts. As a consequence, the subset of the mobilization potential reached by mobilization attempts was biased to the more highly educated, radical left, a make-up much more characteristic for new social movements than the mobilization potential, demonstrating that network factors were responsible for this pattern.

### Table 4. Links between the Local Peace Movement Networks and Intention to Participate, Education, Voting Behavior, and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intention to Participate</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Voting Behavior</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No links (N = 17)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>−.73</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal links only (N = 15)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>−.45</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal links only (N = 17)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>−.14</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal links (N = 32)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: ANOVA for education: p < .01; voting behavior, gender: p < .05; N = 81.*

*In absolute numbers.*

*Means (see Table 2).*

### Table 5. Stepwise Regression of Education, Gender, and Voting Behavior Linked to Local Peace Movement Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting behavior</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R² = .27

*Note: N = 81.*
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Motivation to Participate

Although links with informal networks seem to be a necessary condition for the arousal of motivation to participate in the demonstration, it is definitely not a sufficient condition, as the outcomes in Figure 1 show. Structural factors like positions in networks increase the likelihood that a person will be a target of mobilization attempts but do not guarantee that these attempts will be successful. Mobilization attempts make individuals consider costs and benefits of participation. The outcome of this weighing process depends on the specific blend of costs and benefits perceived.

Collective incentives. None of the respondents was very optimistic about the effectiveness of the demonstration; those who intended to demonstrate were no exception. None of them believed that deployment of the cruise missiles could be stopped. Potential participants and nonparticipants did not show many differences in their expectations about the number of participants either. But it is interesting to note that the former estimated the number of participants higher than the latter. This runs counter to Olson's (1965) assumptions but confirms ours (Klandermans 1984) that people show more of a tendency to participate in collective action if they expect that others will do so as well. Oliver (1984) reports a condition in which people are less likely to participate the more they believe others will. These are in her terms forms of participation with a decelerating production function. Participation in demonstrations has an accelerating production function; that is, more participation does help in achieving the collective goal. Only one-tenth of the potential demonstrators said they expected their own contribution to have no effect. In this respect they differed from nonparticipants among the supporters, one-fourth of whom said they expected their own participation to have no effect. Since values and expectations are multiplicatively related, under such circumstances the extent to which a person agrees with the goal of the demonstration should play a large role. This turned out to be the case. Three-quarters of the potential participants belonged to the group that absolutely agreed with the goal of the demonstration, while only one-third of the nonparticipants among the supporters belonged to this group. But something must be added to this. In sharp contrast to the nonparticipants, the potential participants were of the opinion that there were ways open to the Dutch government of influencing the arms race (m = 1.72 and 2.53, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .17 \)). This is what gave substance to the demonstration and their participation in it. If the cruise missiles cannot be stopped, then at the very least it ought to be made clear to the government that it should exert its influence to oppose the arms race.

Selective cost and benefits—social. People who intended to go to the demonstration knew more people who were also going than nonparticipants among the supporters (\( p < .001, \eta^2 = .13 \)). The implication of this is obvious: those who knew many others who were also going to the demonstration stood a much higher chance of being asked if they participated and of getting negative reactions if it turned out that they did not participate than those who knew only a few others or none at all.

Nonsocial. The costs of participation were low. The demonstrator had to give up a free Saturday, and like any other demonstration, there was some risk of disturbances. The potential participants had no objections to the first, and they did not expect any disturbances. One-fifth of the supporters who did not intend to demonstrate did object to these costs and/or they expected disturbances.

Table 6 presents the outcomes of logistic regression analyses with willingness to participate as the dependent variable. Because of the small N, we restricted the number of variables in the equation by alternately including different subsets of independent variables.

The expectancy variables are not included in the equations because of low zero-order correlations (ranging from .02 to .06). It is clear from equations (5), (6), and (7) that collective incentives were more important than selective incentives in determining the motivation to participate (the log likelihood for social and nonsocial incentives = −24.3—not presented in Table 6—as compared to −18.8 for collective incentives). Among the selective incentives the social incentives were more important than the nonsocial. The same conclusions can be drawn from equations (2), (3), and (4) after controlling for the demographic variables. Both social and nonsocial incentives add significantly to the variance explained by the collective incentives; (log likelihood: −16.2 for collective and social incentives, −15.6 for collective and nonsocial incentives; improvement of goodness of fit \( p < .05 \) in both cases). Finally, motivational factors are much more important than demographics in explaining willingness to participate in the demonstration.

In summary, the motivation to participate was produced primarily by collective and social incentives. Participants wanted to protest against the deployment of cruise missiles and to put pressure on the government to use its influence to reduce nuclear armaments. Together with the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Equation (1)</th>
<th>Equation (2)</th>
<th>Equation (3)</th>
<th>Equation (4)</th>
<th>Equation (5)</th>
<th>Equation (6)</th>
<th>Equation (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
<td>.05 (.06)</td>
<td>.03 (.03)</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.32 (.88)</td>
<td>.92 (1.40)</td>
<td>-.17 (.88)</td>
<td>-.54 (.92)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.37 (.21)*</td>
<td>.84 (.48)*</td>
<td>.33 (.22)*</td>
<td>.39 (.21)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting behavior</td>
<td>2.33 (.90)**</td>
<td>3.07 (1.67)*</td>
<td>2.06 (.91)**</td>
<td>2.22 (.90)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward goal of demonstration</td>
<td>1.23 (1.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58 (.83)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Dutch government have the potential to influence the arms race?</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.47 (3.97)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.46 (1.67)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many acquaintances/friends will go to the demonstration?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.89 (.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsocial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrificing free time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.37 (.64)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of disturbances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.79 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.78 (.72)</td>
<td>-.77 (1.61)</td>
<td>10.41 (4.49)</td>
<td>10.04 (2.96)</td>
<td>.62 (.97)</td>
<td>-.42 (1.16)</td>
<td>-.43 (2.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 64.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

awareness that nonparticipation had to be
to friends and acquaintances, these
matters that pushed individuals toward participa-
tion. Since nobody firmly believed in the effects
of the demonstration, the collective incentives
were basically ideological: acting according to
one’s principles. The awareness that nonpartici-
aption had to be justified to one’s friends urged
even more to participate.

Barriers to Participation

The intention to participate is by no means a
sufficient condition, as demonstrated by the pro-
portion of motivated individuals that eventually
did not participate (60 percent). At this stage
numbers are too small to allow us to draw any
firm conclusion. Although it is worthwhile to
remark that those who did not go mentioned con-
crete barriers to participation (they had to work,
they were sick, or their wife was sick), obviously
the reliability of those answers is questionable.

CONCLUSIONS

Each step in the mobilization process produced
another group of individuals dropping out, and
as a result not even 1 out of 20 sympathizers
eventually participated in collective action. This
proportion is not spectacular and in line with the
percentages presented by Walsh and Warland
(1983) and Oliver (1984). Both focused on the
free-rider problem (that is, nonparticipation by
people who sympathize with the movement
goals), the former describing noncontributors as
free riders, and the latter by explaining partici-
pation on the part of activists resulting from the
awareness of the free-rider problems. As Oliver
(1984) showed in her study, the awareness that
others will not participate is capable of motivat-
ing participation in activities with decelerating
production functions. Free riding is pertinent as
an explanation of nonparticipation in these ac-
tivities. Nonparticipation in activities with accel-
erating production functions however requires
more complex explanations. Walsh and Warland
(1983) conclude from their analysis that “both
the structural variables advocated by resource mo-
bilization theorists and more social psychologi-
cal ones such as ideology and discontent should
be considered by analysts seeking a better un-
derstanding of the factors inclining people to-
ward activism” (p. 778, emphasis in original).
Our paper is an attempt to systematically expand
and elaborate this argument.

In Walsh and Warland’s papers nonparticipation
is made identical to free riding. Our research
presents a much more differentiated picture.
Nonparticipation in collective action can result
from four different grounds: lack of sympathy for
the movement, not having been the target of
mobilization attempts, not being motivated to
participate, and the presence of barriers. Free
riding is a pertinent explanation only in the
motivational stage where costs and benefits of
participation are weighed. Elsewhere Klanderm-
ans (1987) argued that only in situations where
collective action is expected to be effective can
free riding be a valid explanation of nonpartici-
pation. Otherwise nonparticipation results from
perceived inefficacy of collective action, distrust
of the behavior of others, or costs of participation
that are not outweighed by benefits.

Students of social movement participation must
be aware of what aspect of mobilization they are
studying, otherwise results can easily be misin-
terpreted. To illustrate, we refer to our finding
that participants in the peace movement are
young, highly educated, and professionals. From
similar observations, new social movement lit-
erature concluded that movements like the peace
movement draw from new mobilization poten-
tials created by modernization and industrializa-
tion (cf. Klandermans 1986). Our results made
clear, however, the dangers of inferences about
mobilization potentials from characteristics of par-
ticipants. In our case, aspects other than the for-
mation of mobilization potentials were responsi-
ble for the typical participant.

The four facets of mobilization imply different
processes, both theoretically and practically.
Mobilization potential presupposes grievance inter-
pretation; the formation and activation of recruit-
ment networks imply coalition formation and the
linking of movement organizations to existing
formal and informal networks; the arousal of
motivation to participate rests on calculations of
cost and benefits of participation; and securing
actual participation entails the maintenance of
motivation and the elimination of barriers. With
regard to each step, important questions need to be
answered. Recent literature on social movements
in Europe and the United States has concentrated
on different aspects of mobilization (cf. Klanderm-
ans 1986). European literature focused on the
formation of new mobilization potentials, whereas
American literature paid much attention to motiva-
tion to participate and attempts of movement
organizations and authorities to control the costs
and benefits of participation. By assuming that
grievances are ubiquitous, it neglects to a large
extent the creation and interpretation of grievances
and the formation of mobilization potentials. As a
consequence several steps in the process of
mobilization remain insufficiently examined in the
literature, like grievance interpretation, or more
general consensus mobilization, targeting potential
participants, and participation vs. nonparticipation
among motivated individuals.

Unlike previous research on union participa-
tion (Klandermans 1984), the present study
reveals that attitudes toward the goal were important determinants of willingness to participate. This points to the significance of the multiplicative relation of values and expectations. In the case of the peace movement, people had almost unanimously modest expectations about the efficacy of the demonstration. Because of the multiplicative relations of values and expectations with willingness to participate, differences in attitude toward the goal become more important in this situation. In the case of the union actions it was just the other way around. On the whole, attitudes toward the goal were favorable and opinions on the effect of action were divided. Under such circumstances, expectations become of greater importance for the willingness to participate.

Ideological and social incentives appeared to be the primary motivations to participate in the peace demonstration. Our results make us speculate about the interaction of ideological incentives and informal networks: the more important ideological incentives are in a movement the more informal networks linked to the movement act as guardians of the principles by forcing people to act according to their principles. Knowing other participants turned out to be an important variable in the mobilization process, not only in the case of high-risk activities like McAdam (1986) demonstrated but in the case of low-risk activities as well. Ideological incentives presuppose the presence of ideological and attitudinal support for a movement in a society. This brings us back to the very beginning of the mobilization process: the formation of mobilization potentials. Recent work on micromobilization points to the relevance of informal social networks in this regard (McAdam 1986; Snow et al. 1986; see Klandermans, Tarrow, and Kriesi [forthcoming] for a compilation of contributions from both Europe and the United States), but many questions remain to be answered.

Our model combines structural and cognitive factors, and there is clear evidence that both interact in determining whether people participate or not in collective action. We spelled out the four different grounds nonparticipation can have. Influenced by events, circumstances, and movement strategies, the number of people prevented from participation by one or more conditions fluctuates. It would be of interest to study which factors influence those fluctuations and to what extent mobilizing organizations can control them.

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