Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology

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To the memory of Morris Rosenberg, who originally stimulated the ASA Social Psychology Section to undertake volumes like this one, took the lead role in editing the first such volume, and supported and contributed to the development of this volume until his untimely death in December 1991. We hope Manny would be pleased with the result.

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Social Movements and Collective Behavior
Social Psychological Dimensions and Considerations

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This chapter examines the social psychological aspects of social movements and crowd behaviors that occur in relation to them. Social movements have historically been treated as variants of collective behavior. Broadly conceived, collective behavior refers to extrastitutional, group problem-solving behavior that encompasses an array of collective actions, ranging from protest demonstrations to behavior in disasters, to mass or diffuse phenomena, such as fads and crazes, to social movements and even revolution. Although the umbrella concept of collective behavior is still used among scholars (Curtis and Aguirre 1993; Goode 1992; Turner and Killian 1987), most research and theoretical discussion tends to focus on either social movements or more transitory and ephemeral events, such as disasters, emergency evacuations, crowd actions, and fads and crazes. Since review of both of these traditions within the space limitations would require too superficial a treatment, we focus primarily on social movements, but we do include findings about crowds and other collective behaviors as they are relevant to the themes and arguments developed throughout the chapter.

As with most concepts in social science, there is ambiguity and debate about the conceptualization of social movements and crowds, with different theoretical traditions defining the terms somewhat differently. In the case of social movements, most conceptualizations include the following elements: change-oriented goals; some degree of organization; some degree of temporal continuity; and some extrastitutional collective action, or at least a mixture of extrastitutional (e.g., protesting in the streets) and institutional (e.g., political lobbying) activity. Some scholars associate these elements only with social movement organizations (SMOs), reserving the term social movement for sets of change-oriented opinions and beliefs (McCarth and Zald 1977) or behaviors (Marwell and Oliver 1984; Oliver 1989) that transcend any particular organization. For our purposes, we can ignore these conceptual distinctions and keep in mind that social movements are marked by collective actions that occur with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional channels with the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which they are a part (Benford 1992, 1880; Turner and Killian 1987, 223; E. Wilson 1973; B. Zurcher and Snow 1981, 447).

In the case of crowds typically associated with collective behavior, including social movements, the following dimensions have been emphasized as central defining characteristics: (1) joint action, in the sense that some number of individuals are "engaged in one or more behaviors (e.g., orientation, locomotion, gesticulation, tactile manipulation, and/or vocalization) that can be judged common or convergent on one or more dimensions (e.g., direction, velocity, tempo, and/or substantive content)? (McPhail and Wohlstein 1983, 580–581; see also McPhail 1991); (2) close physical proximity, such
that the participants can monitor each other by being visible to or within earshot of one another (Lofland 1981, 416; Snow and Paulsen 1992); (3) unconventional or extratitular occurrences, in the sense that they are neither temporally nor spatially routinized but instead involve the apriorization and use of spatial areas (e.g., street, park, mall) or physical structures (e.g., office building, lunch counter, theater) for purposes other than those for which they were designed and intended (Snow and Paulsen 1992; Snow, Zurcher, and Peters 1981, 38) (4) normative regulation, in the sense that the various behaviors are coordinated rather than random and disconnected (Turner and Killian 1987); and (5) epiphenomenality, in the sense that they are relatively fleeting or "temporary gatherings" (McPhail 1991, 153). These defining characteristics are not peculiar to the crowds associated with social movements, but they do distinguish such crowds from more diffuse or mass collective behavior, such as fads, devil's epidemics, and mass hysteria, and from more conventional crowds that are sponsored and orchestrated by the state or community, such as sporting events, holiday parades, and electoral political rallies (Aguirre 1984). Thus, when we refer to crowds in this chapter, we have in mind those gatherings that share the above defining characteristics, such as protest marches and rallies, victory celebrations, and riots, and that are often associated with social movements as well.

The study of crowds and social movements has deep roots in both political sociology and social psychology, and a major trend in current scholarship is to integrate these traditions by focusing on the linkages between macro and micro processes (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). In this chapter, we focus on the social psychological dimensions of crowds and social movements and give only passing attention to the ways these micro processes are linked to macro processes. More specifically, our aim is to identify the key social psychological dimensions of crowds and social movements and to elaborate how research and theorizing pertinent to these dimensions have informed our understanding of them. We begin with a brief overview of the historical association between social psychology and the study of crowds and social movements and then turn to a discussion of their key social psychological dimensions and the pertinent literature.

THE HISTORICAL LINKAGE

The association between social psychology and the study of crowd and social movement phenomena has a fairly long and intimate history, dating at least from the 1905 publication of Le Bon's The Crowd (1960), which strongly influenced the study of collective behavior through the 1950s (McPhail 1991; Moscovici 1985). Other early influential works by psychologists treating collective behavior and social movements as a subfield of social psychology include Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Allport's Social Psychology (1924, Dolford, et al.'s Frustration and Aggression (1939), Miller and Dollard's Social Learning and Imitation (1941); and Adorno et al.'s The Authoritarian Personality (1950). Through the 1960s, sociologists also viewed collective behavior as an important subfield of social psychology. Work rooted theoretically in symbolic interactionism was particularly important (Blumer 1939; Lang and Lang 1961; Turner and Killian 1987).2 However, as the protest-ridden 1960s faded into the 1970s, most social psychological perspectives on collective behavior were largely jettisoned in favor of the "resource mobilization paradigm" grounded in political sociology and the study of organizations (Gans 1968, 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). One early advocate of resource mobilization even went so far as to suggest that the social psychological collective behavior perspective was "nullifying" and constituted a "straightjacket" on the study of protest-oriented collective action (Gans 1990, 130).

This eclipse of social psychology in the study of social movements and crowds was never thoroughly overcome, however, as resource mobilization theory was firmly grounded in strands of rational decision-making theory. Early resource mobilization theorists also stressed the importance of social networks and preexisting organization as preconditions for mobilization and treated protest as goal-oriented action constrained by resources, costs, network ties, and organizational capacities. The macro forces of politics and organization were seen as creating the structures and resources that enabled people to act collectively, while the link between objective conditions and subjective perceptions or grievances was seen as unproblematic. Resource mobilization and its rationalist assumptions were largely hegemonic in the 1970s. The tide began to turn around 1980, however, several published articles critically assessed the contributions of resource mobilization theory and called for a reconsideration of symbolic interactionism, attribution theory and other relevant social psychological perspectives that had been tossed out indiscriminately along with such questionable notions as the "authoritarian personality" and the "collective of generations" (Ferre and Miller 1985; Killian 1980; Turner 1981; Zurcher and Snow 1981). Social psychological processes were once again topics of discussion and research. Thus, Gans and colleagues (1982) examined experimentally how small groups mobilized to resist unjust situations; Klandermans (1984) stressed the subjective nature of the terms in expected utility models and called for examination of the social construction processes that lead to these subjective perceptions; and Snow and colleagues (1986) drew on Goffman's framing concepts to examine and theorize the relevance of interpretive processes to movement mobilization.

By the second half of the 1980s, then, students of social movements were rediscovering the relevance of social psychological perspectives for understanding aspects of the dynamics of social movements, and thereby reestablishing the longstanding association between social psychology and the study of collective behavior. The social psychological perspectives being invoked were clearly not identical with those that had currency in earlier times, but social psychology was once again part of the mainstream.3

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CROWDS

The reasons for the linkage between social psychology and collective behavior phenomena are not difficult to fathom. Stated boldly, there are aspects of the empirical phenomena of crowds and social movements that are impossible to grasp or understand in the absence of social psychological and microlevel theorizing and research. This is because there are five basic social psychological dimensions or aspects of crowds and social movements: microstructural and social relational dimensions; personality dimensions and related psychological processes; socialization processes; cognitive dimensions; and affective dimensions. In the remainder of the chapter, we elaborate these dimensions and the research relevant to them.

Microstructural and Social Relational Dimensions

The collective decisions and actions constitutive of social movement activity, including crowd events, have long been seen as the product of dynamic interaction. However, there are two strikingly different social psychological perspectives for conceptualizing the nature of that interaction.

The older approach—variously discussed as "contagion theory" (Turner 1964; Turner and Killian 1972), "breakdown theory" (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), and the "transformation hypothesis" (McPhail 1991)—argues that participants are highly susceptible to the influence of others because of the anonymity provided by collective behavior gatherings or because they are socially isolated, disaffiliated individuals. In either case, conventional social constraints are not operative and participants are vulnerable to the sway of the crowd. Although this view is most commonly associated with such early writers as Tarde (1890), Le Bon (1895), and Freud (1921), it has also been
featured in the writings of "deindividuation" theorists in psychological social psychology (Diner 1980; Zimbardo 1969) and of mass society theorists (Adorno et al. 1950; Kornhauser 1959). The concepts of "circular reaction" (Blumer 1939; Park and Burgess 1921) and "unilateral transfer of control" (Coleman 1990) are also consistent with this contagion-like theorizing, inasmuch as both imply the dissolution of individual decision making and interpersonal constraints in collective behavior contexts. Standing in contrast is the perspective that emphasizes the group-based nature of behavior in crowds and social movements. The basic thesis is that all instances of crowds and social movements either are embedded in preexisting groups or networks of affiliation or grow out of emergent structures of social relation. We examine each of these patterns in turn.

Preexisting Groupings and Affiliations. By preexisting groupings and affiliations, we refer to structures of social relation that exist apart from and prior to the crowd and social movement activities in question. These existent structures can function both as conduits for communication and as facilitative contexts for the generation and diffusion of new ideas and actions.

Social Networks as Information Conduits and Bridges. Probably the most firmly established finding in the study of collective behavior is that preexisting social ties or network linkages function to channel the diffusion of all varieties of collective action. The evidence is overwhelming, coming from the study of religious cults and movements (Rochford 1982; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Stark and Bainbridge 1980), the civil rights movement (McAdam 1986; Morris 1984), the women's movement (Freeman 1973; Rosenthal et al. 1985), the Dutch peace movement (Klandermans and Oegema 1987), crowd assembling processes (McPhail and Miller 1973, Shell, Anderson, and Stansly 1965), victory celebrations (Aveni 1977; Snow, Zurcher, and Peters 1981), looting and rioting (Berk and Aldrich 1972; Quarantelli and Dynes 1968; Singer 1970), and even hysterical contagious behaviors (Karpoff 1965). All of this research underscores Knoepf's (1975) conclusion regarding the relation among rumors and race riots: that "these rumors were essentially social phenomena" and participants "neither related nor responded as isolated or independent units" (pp. 65-66).

Most such research has examined only the simple presence or absence of number of preexisting ties. More recently, however, attention has shifted from simply counting network ties to assessing their structure and multiplexity. Thus, Fernandez and McAdam (1989) found that an individual's network prominence or centrality in the University of Wisconsin's multorganizational field predicted recruitment to Freedom Summer. Gould's (1991) examination of the role of network multiplexity in the mobilization of insurgency in the Paris Commune of 1871 revealed that "successful mobilization depended not on the sheer number of ties, but on the interplay between social ties created by insurgent organizations and preexisting social networks rooted in Parisian neighborhoods" (pp. 716; see also, Gould 1993). And Marwell et al. (1988) computer simulation of collective actions mobilized by a single organizer showed that besides the expected simple effect of the sheer number of ties and low organizing costs, the centralization of network structures also facilitated mobilization because the person at the center could contact the critical mass of large contributors at a relatively low cost.

Such findings clearly underscore the importance of network ties, strength, density, centralization, and multiplicity in relation to mobilization processes across nearly all forms of collective behavior. It is thus tempting to conclude that little else matters in determining recruitment to crowds and social movement activities. Such a conclusion is unwarranted, however. So-called structural isolates sometimes figure significantly in the development of variegated forms of collective behavior (Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Kerckhoff, Back, and Miller 1965), and the relative influence of preexisting ties tends to vary with differences in the risks and costs associated with different crowds and movements (Karpoff 1965; McAdam 1986; Willingham and McAdam 1991). In addition, personality, socialization, cognitive, and affective processes figure in the recruitment process and can interact with network ties in different ways in different sociocultural and historical contexts.

Facilitative Social Contexts. That some social contexts are especially facilitative of collective action has been suggested by the coinage of such concepts as "the youth ghetto" (LoLoandas 1968), "internal organization" and "movement halfway houses" (Moors 1981, 1984), "free spaces" (Evans and Boyle 1986) and "micromobilization contexts" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zalk 1988). Undergirding these concepts is the historical fact that movement activity clusters temporally and is contextually pocketed or generally stronger in some locales than others (Tarrow 1989a, 1989b). Focusing on the growth of the strike movement in urban Russia before the revolution, for example, Haimson (1964) found it was most heavily concentrated in the Petersburg area because of the presence and interaction of both older experienced metalworkers steeped in the revolutionary Bolshevik tradition and younger unskilled coworkers, who were subject to the political indoctrination of the old guard. The result was a more militant political context than found in other industries at the time. Petras and Zeitlin (1967) found a similar pattern in the diffusion of radical political consciousness among the peasantry in Chile in the early 1960s, where the main determinant of peasant radicalism was proximity to the highly organized and politically radical mining centers.

Differences in residential communities have also been found to affect mobilization. For example, Broadbridge (1980) found that the character of environmental mobilization in Japanese communities varied with whether the "local social fabric" was communal or associational, with the former contexts mobilizing more quickly and pervasively because of greater solidarity. Ports (1971) found that lower-class urban Chiloeans' radicalism was predicted by how long they had lived in radical neighborhoods. And Kriesi's (1980b) research on the Dutch peace movement revealed that support for the movement and its campaigns has varied with proximity to and integration into more leftist, locality-based neighborhoods he terms "counter-cultural networks." In such cases, he notes, it is difficult to escape contact with the movement because it tends to be "integrated into everyday activities" (1980b, 69). Individuals not in these networks, by contrast, are less likely to develop attitudes and sympathies supporting new social movements (1980b, 73). Fernandez and McAdam (1988) found that Berkeley was such an "activist context" for Freedom Summer recruitment that network variables could not predict individuals' participation. In such contexts, the networks are so pervasive, dense, interconnected, and overlapping that the paths of diffusion cannot be easily traced: almost everyone is connected and subject to influence from multiple sources.

Such facultative contexts thus provide fertile soil for movement mobilization, not only because of residential proximity and network density, but also because people share significant social traits, hold similar beliefs and grievances, and encounter each other during the course of their daily routines. These facilitative contexts are not a necessary condition for social movement activity, but they can certainly foster it and, as we discuss below, can ensure the transmission of movement culture from one generation to the next.

Emergent Structures of Relation. While all types of crowd and social movement activities entail some level of joint action, not all are rooted in preexisting structures of relation. Some are emergent or peculiar to the particular collective behavior episode itself. In other words, they grow out of, rather than precede, some crowd episode or social movement activity. This fact undergirds Weller and Quarantelli's (1973) contention that the social organizational basis of collective behavior is both normative and social relationship, and that collective behavior can therefore be predicated on either enduring or emergent norms and enduring or emergent social relations.
Evidence of the importance of emergent social relationships is particularly abundant in research on organizational and community responses to disasters (Dynes 1970; Ross 1978; Zurcher 1968). It has also been found in instances of rioting and looting associated with civil disturbances (Kerner 1969; Quarantelli and Dynes 1970) and in various social movements (Gould 1991; Killian 1984). For instance, Gould (1991) found two bases of social relation in the Paris Commune of 1871: preexisting neighborhood ties and emergent insurgent organizational ties. Importantly, both sets of ties functioned to build and maintain solidarity, thus prompting Gould to argue that "mobilization does not just depend on social ties; it also creates them" (1991, 719). Snow found this to be the case in his research on the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement that he and his colleagues studied in Japan (Snow 1981). This, in turn, suggests that the development of collective action is not just a function of preexisting social ties but also the result of emergent social processes. Together, these two sets of overlapping and interlocking relationships functioned to generate a "more cohesive and highly integrated movement, and a more highly committed and mobilizable constituency" (Snow 1987, 159).

Although preestablished associations are more fundamental to the assemblage process for crowd phenomena and to the recruitment process for social movements, it seems equally clear that emergent relations are often critical for the accomplishment of specific tasks in crowd contexts and can contribute significantly to the development and maintenance of commitment and solidarity in social movements. Both preexisting and emergent relations are thus complementary rather than contradictory, fundamental to processes of mobilization and, together, provide an appropriate point of departure for understanding much about the social psychology of crowds and social movements.

Group Interaction. Whether the structure of relations among collective actors is based on preexisting or emergent relations, the interacting units are typically groups rather than individuals. Thus, analysis of the dynamics of crowds and social movements should be focused in part on groups and the interaction among them.

To suggest such a focus must seem axiomatic from a sociological standpoint, yet the research and writing on crowds and social movements varies considerably in this regard. Group-level processes and dynamics have always figured more prominently in the analysis of social movements than of crowds, largely because much social movement activity is highly organized. But the group focus has moved even more center stage in the study of social movements over the past twenty years, with the ascendance of the resource mobilization perspective and its cornerstone concept of social movement organizations (SMOs) (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1987). Correctly noting that many movements grow out of small groups, that such groups are critical to the operation of most social movements, and that they often develop their own small group cultures or "subcultures," Fine and Stoecker (1985) argue that the study of social movements could benefit even further by examining more closely the link between movements and small group processes.

The same argument can be made with respect to the study of crowds. Some students of crowds have long been interested in underlying group processes and dynamics, of course. The theoretical and empirical inspiration for Turner and Killian's emergent norm perspective, for example, comes largely from a series of well-known small group experiments (Ash 1952; Sherif and Harvey 1952). Still, the bulk of research and theorizing on crowd phenomena has been at the individual level of analysis, as evidenced by the broad range of research that can be subsumed under either the "convoyment" and "gaming" or rational decision perspectives.

This individualistic focus notwithstanding, a number of empirical investigations of behavior in crowd contexts suggest the analytic utility of a group-level focus. Based on a comparative study of 146 protest demonstrations, MacCannell argues that their natural subdivisions are "groups, groups of demonstrators, bystanders, press, police, and others" (1973, 1-2). He acknowledges that "some demonstrations dissolve into individualistic behavior," but emphasizes that "no demonstration starts this way" (1973, 2).

McPhail's (1991; McPhail and Wolfestein 1983) systematic empirical examination of behaviors in crowd contexts for more than a decade also sheds light on the group nature and embeddedness of much of what transpires in those contexts. Although his research is heavily behavioral, aimed in large part at identifying, counting, and classifying the range of concrete behaviors occurring in crowd contexts, those behaviors are judged to be collective only insofar as they are "common or convergent on one or more dimensions" at the same time, and thus imply some coordinating mechanism or source.

For those behaviors that fall into these two categories, it seems clear that the preponderance of them would be group-based, whether the group be preestablished or emergent. That is what MacCannell's research suggests, and it is the field research of Snow and his colleagues shows (Snow and Anderson 1985; Snow and Paulsen 1992; Snow, Zurcher, and Peters 1981). Drawing on Wright's (1978) distinction between crowd activities (redundant behaviors common to most crowd episodes, such as assemblage, milling, and divergence) and task activities (context-specific joint activities, such as parading, picketing, and looting), they found that the course and character of a series of crowd episodes was largely a function of the interaction among four groups of actors—main task performers (e.g., demonstrators, marchers), subordinate task performers (e.g., counterdemonstrators, media), spectators or bystanders, and social control agents (e.g., police, military). In some instances the nature of the interaction was negotiated prior to the episode; in other cases it was emergent. But in all cases, the moving dynamic was group interaction.

There is mounting evidence, then, that insofar as one is interested in understanding the dynamics of crowd behavior, the focus of analysis should be at the group level. This makes good sense sociologically, but what about social psychologically? We think it makes good sense socially psychologically, too—not only because it is consistent with recent research that has become increasingly more systematic, but also because a social psychology that fails to anchor itself in social context, whether it be small groups or society writ large, is one that misapprehends the locus of most social psychological states and processes.

Personality Dimensions and Related Psychological Processes

As has often been noted (Marx and Wood 1975, 388; Zurcher and Snow 1981, 449), few issues have generated as much research as differential recruitment: Why do some people rather than others devote varying degrees of time and energy to participation in crowd and social movement activities? Until recently, the dominant perspective on this issue was essentially psychological—Explicitly or implicitly located in the strand of thought that Turner (1964; Turner and Killian 1987) dubbed "convergence theory" and McPhail (1991) called the "predisposition hypothesis," the underlying assumption was that participation was primarily a function of one of three psychological factors or processes: personal deficit or pathology, personal efficacy, and/or a sense of relative deprivation.

Personality Problems and Psychological Deficit.

Much of the older literature attempting to account for differential recruitment suggests a link between various psychological deficits or pathologies and participation in crowds and movements. Very generally, the basic proposition is that psychological propensities or needs render some individuals particularly susceptible to movement appeals. Some works in this tradition argue that the precipitating tension can be relieved in such as movements, improve life conditions (e.g., Toch 1965); others assume that participation cannot solve the real problems producing the strain and that participa-
tion is therefore irrational or expressive (e.g., Smither 1983). The underlying psychological propensities and mechanisms range from those that are deep-seated and personality-based, such as the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950) and the Oedipal conflict of generations (Feuer 1969), to more sociological notions, such as status inconsistency theory, which suggests that class-based tensions are often displaced onto movement issues such as temperament, pornography, and right-wing extremism (Schwendener 1967; Gusfield 1963; Rush 1967; Zurcher and Kirkpatrick 1976). The implication of such propositions is that secure personalities or clear-thinking individuals would not be lured by the questionable appeals of social movements.

Some proponents of this perspective have argued that movements are interchangeable or functional equivalents of one another insomuch as they provide prospective participants with similar outlets or opportunities for addressing their psychological needs (Hoffer 1951; Klapp 1969). Others contend that participation is contingent on correspondence between type of personal problem or need and type of movement appeal and program (Feuer 1969; Lofland and Stark 1965). In either case, little empirical support has been forthcoming.

Personal Efficacy and Other Traits. Personality and psychological deficits have been largely abandoned as explanations of differential recruitment by scholars of crowds and movements since the 1970s because of both the lack of empirical support and the tendency for such explanations to portray participants in disparaging terms. However, if we accept the importance of movement issues and assume that people participate only in movements which make sense to them or which express their interests, there is clearly room for personality characteristics to affect the level and form of participation. One personality factor found to function in this fashion is "personal efficacy"—the belief that one has the ability to make a difference, especially when coupled with low trust in the existing power structure (Forward and Williams 1970; Carson 1968; Paige 1971; Seeman 1975). More broadly, Werner (1976) found, on controlling for gender and abortion attitudes, that "activists" on both sides of the abortion issue were more dominant, self-confident, energetic, and effective in using their capabilities than subjects who engaged in less activism than their attitudes would otherwise predict.

It thus appears that there is something to gain from reconsidering "personality," or at least personality variables, as a factor in movement participation, but only if it is properly placed in context. If movement participation is viewed as problem-solving or instrumental behavior, it is plausible to speculate that, when attitudes and network ties are controlled, activists will generally be found to have higher energy levels, greater sense of personal efficacy, and greater skills for the actions they are performing than nonactivists. There is scattered evidence that bears on these hypotheses (Gansso, Fireman, and Rytda 1982, 82–93; Oliver 1984) and suggests that they merit more careful research.

Relative Deprivation. Rooted in models of both psychological process and cognition, the general concept of relative deprivation organized a great deal of research in the 1960s and 1970s, including related approaches with different names (Abelke 1966; Davies 1969; Gurr 1970). These approaches are rooted in the seeming paradox that it is not the most emineralized populations that rebel, but those that seem to be improving their position or those that are among the more privileged sectors of an aggrieved group. All seek to subsume the causes of protest into an individual-level social psychological concept in which what ought to be is compared with what is.

Although deprivation theory is among the most theoretically sophisticated social psychological perspectives on collective action, it has not fared particularly well when subjected to empirical examination. Indeed, one might easily conclude, in light of major studies (McPhail 1971; Muller 1980; Portes 1971; Rule 1988; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Spilerman 1970) and a number of critical overviews of the concept and literature (Finkel and Rule 1986; Gurney and Tierney 1982)—that the jury is in and hypotheses linking relative deprivation to collective action are simply wrong. Such a conclusion is premature, however, for several reasons. First, few studies have directly measured a sense of relative deprivation or felt psychological tension. Instead, subjective deprivation is typically inferred from aggregate statistics of objective indicators, such as unemployment rates. The assumption of an unproblematic relation between objective conditions and subjective deprivation is not only contrary to the theory, but "the relationship between subjective evaluations of well-being and external objective conditions is itself so filtered through individual circumstances that there is little evidence of a systematic effect of macroenvironmental conditions upon overall sense of well-being" (Seeman 1981, 396).

Second, there is little reason to expect social psychological states such as deprivation to be a sufficient explanation for action. In a typical case, Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that while 76 percent of the Dutch population endorsed a campaign against nuclear armaments, only 4 percent actually attended a large demonstration in support of the campaign. However, some sort of relative deprivation may well be a necessary condition for action. Finally, some research using direct measures of subjective deprivation have found the predicted relation to participation, as in the case of the antiabusing movement in Boston and prison riots (Useem 1980, 1985; Useem and Kimball 1989).

Even here, however, it is not clear whether the rather complex concept of relative deprivation can be empirically distinguished from simpler conceptions such as "grievance" or the instrumentalists' "subjective interest."

In sum, there is little reason to reject personification factors and related social psychological processes in the study of crowds and social movements. Although it is clear that much of the earlier theorizing was excessively psychological and wrong-headed, it is also likely that there are "activist types," that a sense of personal efficacy often figures in the participation equation, and that something like relative deprivation, appropriately measured and contextualized, can affect differential recruitment and participation.

Socialization Dimensions and Processes

Broadly defined, socialization refers to two interrelated processes: the process through which individuals learn the values, norms, motives, beliefs, and roles of the group or society with which they are associated, and a parallel process through which individuals develop and change in terms of personality and self-concept or identity (Geceus 1992). Both of these processes are apparent in social movements, yet there is a long-standing tradition of treating them as qualitatively different within movements than in the larger society. The result is that socialization is seldom used by movement scholars, and students of socialization rarely mention the occurrence of these processes within social movements (e.g., Baum and Stueben 1981; Geceus 1981). We believe this tendency is misguided, since the two processes manifest themselves in at least three ways in relation to social movements: intergenerationally, in terms of childhood socialization and the transmission of activist orientations; intragenerationally, in terms of changes in worldviews and identity; and intragenerationally, in terms of changes over the life course.

Intergenerational Transmission of Activist Values

Past emphasis on the distinctive aspects of collective behavior and social movements has generally led scholars to neglect the ways movement participation and activism are often transmitted, rather than discontinuous, with the past. There are exceptions to this gloss, but most are based on research on student activists of the early 1960s, who tended to come from liberal to left activist families (Bengston 1970; DeMartini 1983; Flacks 1967; Westby and Braungart 1966; J. Woods and Ng 1980). Similarly, Johnston (1991) found that Catalan nationalist’s1’ insurgent ethnic identities were formed in family conversations and church youth groups.

Anecdotal and impressionistic evidence about other movements abounds. Some ethnic, racial, and
religious communities or groupings are facilitative contexts for the transmission of values and beliefs conducive to activism. Every continent in the world provides cases of ongoing ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts that are clearly sustained across generations. In the United States, the transmission of a culture of race-consciousness and activism has been a central feature of African-American history. Prominent African-American leaders often had activist parents, such as Martin Luther King, Sr., or Earl Little, the Garveyite father of Malcolm X. High community political participation rates for educated African Americans are well established, as are the cultural norms for “race work.” Many African-American churches have a long tradition of integrating religion, culture, politics, and resistance into a seamless whole (Morris 1984). And general population surveys indicate that African Americans receive more explicit political education about race and power than European Americans and are generally more supportive than European Americans of government action to produce social equality and of social movements and protest (Mason, Marin, and Stryker 1980). This difference seems to extend quite broadly: Kane (1992) reports that African Americans of both sexes support the women’s movement and women’s collective action much more than European Americans of either sex.

Cultural traditions of activism are also found among some Americans of European ancestry. Secular and religious Jews have very strong traditions of social activism and markedly more liberal attitudes than other European Americans. Quakers, Methodists, and other groups have taught pacifism, equality, and service for generations. Even among the largely nonactivist Catholics and mainline Protestants, “social justice” and “peace” have been significant themes for generations. On the conservative side, Wood and Hughes (1984) document the relationships between “moral reform” and moral upbringing, showing that conservative mor- alists are reared in families, religions, and communi- ties that socialize them into their moral world- view and thereby dispose them toward moral reform. In short, many American children have been and are being reared with distinct moral and political ideologies that have implications for subsequent identification with and involvement in various kinds of movement activity.

Not only do preestablished communities often constitute the moral and ideological bedroths out of which ethnic, race, religious, and political move- ments sometimes grow, but these communities and their movements often give rise to ongoing cultures of resistance or struggle that are transmitted across generations. In these contexts, children grow up with almost continuous exposure to a structure of grievances and beliefs that justify activism. Since there is little, if any, disjuncture between move- ment and community in such settings, it is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate movement so- cialization from socialization more generally.

Intragenerational Changes in Value Orientation and Identity. While students of social move- ments may have neglected the contribution of pa- rental values and childhood socialization to sub- sequent activism, no such neglect is evident with respect to changes in value orientation and identity or self-concept among movement participants. Both conversion, the process through which dra- matic changes in value orientation and identity are effected, and commitment, the process through which individuals come to pursue lines of action consistent with their beliefs and identities, have been extensively studied.

Conversion and Other Personal Changes. Al- though research on religious conversion has been described as “a minor growth industry” (MacAdams and Snow 1993, 13), conceptualization and opera- tionalization of conversion have remained some- what elusive. Conceptualized in its most extreme form, conversion involves a radical transformation of consciousness in which a new or formerly pe- ripheral universe of discourse comes to function as a person’s primary authority. In an attempt to op- erationalize this conception, Snow and Snow (1983, 1984, 173–174) have proposed four rhetori- cal indicators of conversion: biographical recon- struction, adoption of a master attribution scheme, suspicion of analogous reasoning, and adoption of the conversion and “a master status.”

Since not all changes in orientation and iden- tity that occur in social movements are as drastic as those captured by the concept of conversion, schol- ars have proposed other terms, such as “alterna- tion” and “regeneration,” for these milder changes (see Snow and MacAdams 1984, 169–170 for a sum- mary). Such distinctions are useful inasmuch as they signal that the change in orientation and iden- tity frequently associated with movement partici- pation is not unidimensional and that this conversion is but one variety of personal change that occurs in social movements.

Given that the personal changes associated with movement participation can be arrayed on a continuum, ranging from the more thoroughgoing changes associated with conversion at one extreme to little, if any, change at the other, two issues beg for clarification: What is the relationship between movement type and the kinds of personal change required for participation? And, what are the causal factors that account for the change? Regarding the first issue, there are a number of works that suggest that more dramatic personal changes associated with conversion are most likely to be required un- der the following conditions: when movement ide- ology and practices are culturally idiosyncratic or discontinuous or when a movement is stridently oppositional and defined as threatening or revolu- tionary (McAdams 1989; Turner and Killian 1987); when a movement is more “exclusive” in terms of membership eligibility and requirements (Machalek and Snow 1993; McAdams 1989; Zeld and Ash 1966); and when a movement is more “exclusive” in terms of membership demands (Coser 1967; Ger- lach and Hine 1970; Machalek and Snow 1993).

Regarding the issue of causation, there is an extensive and continuously expanding literature. Indeed, the bulk of the literature on conversion and related processes of personal change is concerned primarily with identification of the causal precipi- tants and processes involved. Since there are a number of recent detailed reviews of this literature (see note 7), we note only a few of the more general findings. First, while little compelling empirical support has been found for explanations of conversion that em- phasize atavistic personality factors and “brain- washing” or “coercive persuasion,” there is consid- erable support for such microstructural and social relational factors as network linkages, affective and intensive interaction, and role learning in the process through which conversion and the more milder personal changes are effected.

Second, monocular explanations of these changes have fallen out of favor as researchers increasingly have come to realize that personal changes in orientation and identity, however dra- matic, result from the combined and interactive influences of multiple factors—individual, inter- personal, and contextual.

Last, the earlier presumption that conversion to off-beat groups, religious or otherwise, required the operation of unique social and psychological processes has been derailed by the growing realiza- tion that parallel processes are often at work, what- ever the context or movement. Indeed, it can be argued that the entire conversion process applies generally to most forms of intense, high-risk move- ment activity in the political arena and is perhaps also applicable to the process by which individuals become members of some voluntary organizations. The difference in such seemingly diverse cases resides not so much in the causal processes but in the content of the process and in the extent to which the new roles, beliefs, and identities are all-encompassing and pervasive in terms of their relevance to the various domains of life.

Commitment Processes. Commitment processes encompass the socialization processes through which individuals become bound to a group, result- ing in group solidarity and mutual identification of some durability. Whereas conversion entails radi- cal change in self and identity associated with the process of joining, commitment involves the devo- tion of time and energy to a cause, even in the face of adversity, and implies that one’s individual needs and interests are congruent with those of the group (Kanter 1972).

Research on commitment in the collective be- havior arena has focused on the processes and
mechanisms contributing to the development and persistence of commitment and on variation in commitment-building capacities, requirements, mechanisms, and success across groups or movements (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Hall 1988; Hechter 1987; Hirsch 1990; Kanter 1968, 1972; McAdam 1986; Turner and Killian 1987, 337–344). Most recently, there has been increasing interest in the development of collective identity (Cohen 1985; Hunt 1991; McIvor 1985, 1988, 1989; Taylor 1989), which is clearly related to commitment. Indeed, both might be regarded as flip sides of the same coin.

Research on commitment processes and mechanisms suggests four tentative conclusions. First, commitments often evolve during the course of collective action itself. Joint action both enhances existing commitments and engenders new ones (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Gould 1991; Hirsch 1990; Snow 1987). Second, different commitment-building mechanisms are relevant to different dimensions of commitment (Hall 1988; Hirsch 1990, Kanter 1968, 1972). Third, movements vary not only in the commitments they require, but in their capacity to deal successfully with the problem of commitment (Hall 1988).

Finally, the development of commitment to social movements generally occurs in a context of competing commitments and in a stepwise fashion and is thus a highly contingent process. Consider these findings from a variety of contexts: there is an extraordinarily high incidence of defection from religious cults and movements (Barker 1984; Bird and Reimer 1982); only a few members of neighborhood associations are consistently active (Oliver 1984); members of unions who are dissatisfied are more likely to “exit” than exercise “voice” (Van der Veen and Klandermans 1989); and the most active members in most kinds of voluntary associations are rarely the members with the longest tenure of association (Cress and McPherson 1992). Taken together, these observations suggest that the development of strong, enduring commitment may well be the exception rather than the rule.

Intragenerational Changes over the Life Course. A third area in which socialization processes and the study of social movements converge concerns the long-term biographical consequences of committed participation and activism. Accumulating evidence indicates that movement participation continues to have effects even long after the intense activism has ceased. This is best established for the “60s activists,” who, for the most part, continued to have relatively liberal to left political beliefs, maintained involvement in political activity, were more likely to be employed in the “helping professions,” and tended to marry less and have fewer children (Dement, Marsell, and Alken 1971; Hendrich and Lovoy 1988; Marsell, Alken, and Dement 1987; Marsell, Dement, and O’Leary 1990; McAdam 1988, 1989; Whalen and Plaick 1989). Even those who were minor participants in marches and rallies show similar, though milder, differences from nonparticipants, even when predictors of participation are controlled (Sherkat and Blocker 1992).

The persistence of activist values and identities has implications for organizations as well as individuals. Yesterday’s activists, for whom the “fire” continues to burn, often provide the organizational skills and ideological inspiration for new movements or keep the torch burning for the old, as Rupp and Taylor demonstrate in the case of the women’s movement (1987; Taylor 1989). Thus, the normalization consequences of earlier collective action experiences can have long-term effects at both the personal and the organizational levels.

Cognitive Dimensions and Perspectives

Much of the discussion among scholars of crowds and social movements since the mid-1970s has focused on issues that are essentially cognitive: How do individuals decide to participate in a particular crowd or movement activity? What is the nature of that decision-making process? What determines the kinds of meanings that are attributed to particular activities and events? How do these meanings get constructed? We organize our discussion of such questions and issues around the “debate” between rational choice and social constructionist perspectives. These two labels point to theory groups that are themselves internally diverse, with many scholars in each group taking account of the insights from the other group. Nevertheless, we can clarify many issues by employing this dichotomy.

We believe the crucial difference between these two theory groups can be understood as the difference between treating cognitions as independent variables versus dependent variables. The “independent variable” group takes cognitions more or less as given and attempts to predict behavior from cognitions. Variants of rational choice are currently dominant in this theory cluster, but it also includes control theory, learning theory, and relative deprivation theory. The “dependent variable” group, by contrast, seeks to explain the processes whereby the cognitions themselves are created. This group rejects the notion that cognitions can ever be treated as unproblematic given and stresses that behavior and cognitions are interconnected in a dynamic and reflexive fashion.

Independent Variable (Rational Choice) Perspectives. The perspectives falling into this theory group are concerned primarily with identifying either the role of different cognitions in determining behavior or the mechanisms linking cognitions and behavior. Cognitions are viewed as mediating the relationship between objective conditions and action and are assumed to bear a reasonably good fit with objective reality. Thus, these perspectives speak more often of knowledge than of belief and often explicitly treat variations or changes in cognitions as crucial determinants of behavior (Oliver and Marsell 1992).

Included in this broad grouping are tension reductionist perspectives, such as relative deprivation theory, discussed earlier; behaviorist or social learning models (Macy 1990) and rational choice or decision theory. Since the preponderance of recent work treating cognitions as independent variables is by explicitly or implicitly employing aspects of the latter perspective, we will concentrate on it in the remainder of this section.

Rational Decision Theories. The central assumptions of all instrumentalist, rational choice, or subject-expected utility models are that people seek to obtain benefits and minimize costs, and that they cognitively process information about the likely benefits and costs of various courses of action and then make a conscious choice about their behavior (see Friedman and Hechter 1988). Thus, the central metaheuristic assumptions of these theories are that cognitions precede behaviors and choices are conscious, intentional, and rational.

Although usually assuming an unproblematic relation between objective conditions and subjective cognitions, this tradition treats subjective preferences (benefits and costs) as the operational terms. Altruism and solidarity can be subjective preferences, and models can include imperfect information. These theories often make additional assumptions to permit construction of formal models and determinate calculations, such as the assumptions that everything can be reduced to a common metric or that decisions are evaluated on an expected value criterion. These are viewed as simplifying assumptions, not as statements about how most people actually think.

A second crucial issue for rational choice theories of collective action is the link between individual and group interests. Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965) is the crucial watershed in thinking about this issue. Prior to this work it was widely assumed that there was a natural tendency for people with shared interests to act together to pursue those interests, that is, that there was an unproblematic congruence between individual interests and group interests. Olson argued otherwise. Drawing on standard cost-benefit microeconomics and public goods theory, he argued that rational individuals would not contribute to the provision of public or collective goods (i.e., goods that are shared by everyone whether or not they help to pay for them). There has been extensive work in the rational choice paradigm showing that Olson’s claim that collective action is “irrational” is overgeneralized and misleading (Hardin 1982; Marsell and Oliver 1993; Oliver and Marsell...
In particular, Olson confuses the "free rider" problem, in which individuals are motivated to let others provide the good, with what Oliver and Marwell (1988) call the "efficacy problem," in which each individual cannot make a large enough difference in the collective good to justify participation. What remains is broad agreement that both the relationship between individual and group interests and mobilization around shared interests are vexing issues.

A third feature of rational choice theories also follows from Olson (1962). He argued that actors must be provided with selective incentives—private goods that reward contributors or coercive measures that punish nonparticipation. Although the claim that such private incentives are necessary has been rejected by subsequent theorists, Olson's work has led to a focus on individual incentives that reward participation or punish nonparticipation (see Oliver 1980) for a discussion of the difference between rewards and punishments as incentives). Olson stressed private material gain, but subsequent scholars in the rational choice tradition have extended the notion of incentives. Following James Q. Wilson (1973), most scholars recognize three broad types of incentives: material, solidarity, and purposive. Material incentives are those Olson discussed and include salaries, insurance programs, and threats of physical or economic retaliation. Solidary incentives arise from social relations with other participants, such as praise, respect, and friendship shared among coparticipants or shame, contempt, and ostracism in the case of nonparticipants. Purposive incentives arise from internalized norms and values in which a person's self-esteem depends on doing the right thing. The concepts of solidarity and purposive incentives have permitted rational choice theories to incorporate the influences of social networks, culture, and socialization. Thus, although the theory makes individualistic assumptions about decisions as it is employed in the study of social movements, it has come to recognize the influence of social networks, socialization, and culture on individuals.

These core features of rational choice theory—conscious intentional decisions, the importance of benefits and costs, the problematic nature of mobilization, and the importance of individual incentives for action—mesh directly with the central concerns of resource mobilization and political opportunity theories (Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998b; Tilly 1978; Zald and McCarthy 1987). They focus attention on resources and capacities and on a series of variables likely to promote or hinder the prospects for mobilization. Objective structural conditions are assumed to be a major determinant of subjective interests and perceived costs and capacities. Rational choice theory puts the stated "goals" of a movement or action center stage as the central explanation for participation and tends to describe participants as people concerned about a problem trying to use their available resources to address that problem.

Besides its influence on political and organizational studies in the resource mobilization paradigm, this general perspective has been employed directly in a wide variety of studies, including religious political behavior and violence (Muller 1980; Muller and Opp 1986; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991); antiracist protest and crowds and riot participation (Berk 1974; Bryan 1979); mobilization in the wake of nuclear accidents (Opp 1988; Walch and Warland 1983); organizational dynamics in the John Birch society (Oliver and Furman 1989); and labor movement mobilization (Klandermans 1984). Specific theoretical issues addressed using this paradigm include identity incentives and collective action (Friedman and McAdam 1994); ethnic mobilization (Hechter, Friedman, and Applebaum 1982); individual thresholds for participation in collective behavior events (Granovetter 1978); the difference between rewards and punishments as incentives (Oliver 1980); the difference between collective goods that can be provided by a few large contributors and those that must be provided by many small contributors (Oliver, Marwell, and Teneira 1985); the difference between time and money as movement resources (Oliver and Furman 1989; Oliver and Marwell 1992); and the dynamics of paid versus volunteer activism (Oliver 1983) and professional versus volunteer mobilizing technologies (Oliver and Marwell 1992).

An important trend in rational choice theory is a move away from models of individual decisions toward models of group mobilization processes. Oliver and Marwell's "critical mass theory" (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Oliver, Marwell, and Teneira 1985) provides a variety of models of organizer-centered mobilization, in which resource-constrained organizers try to maximize the total amount of resources mobilized from a heterogeneous pool of potential participants. Heckathorn (1990) discusses chains of influence, in which group members may sanction each other to enforce compliance with external demands. Macy (1990) has modified these models to replace the rational decision maker with an adaptive learner, showing that different assumptions about individuals lead to different predictions about group outcomes. In all these cases, illuminating conclusions about the differences between groups in their possibilities for collective action are obtained by making simplifying assumptions about the individuals in those groups.

Ignoring for a moment the metatheoretical presuppositions of the theory, we may consider its capacity as a predictive tool, which is often substantial. Attitude measures that can be construed as measures of a person's subjective interest in an action's goals have reasonably strong correlations with participation in many forms of collective action (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Oliver 1984; Opp 1988; Walch and Warland 1983). Direct measures of solidarity and purposive incentives also have the expected positive relations (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Opp 1988). Cardon (1978) argues that activists motivated by purposive incentives require control over their actions and decentralized organizations, but generally material incentives have not been found to motivate activists. However, financial contributions from less interested members do allow for paid activism (Oliver 1983) and enable more committed members to pursue their goals (Knoke 1988).
raises questions about the construction of such meanings and understandings, issues that rational decision models cannot really address.

The second problem is that self-reported individual efficacy levels often seem implausible. Opp's (1989) movement participants claimed levels of individual efficacy that are so objectively impossible that it is difficult to accept their answers at face value, just as voters vastly overstate the impact their one vote has on election outcomes. Participants seem to attribute to themselves as individuals the efficacy they believe the whole movement has. Only if they are asked to distinguish very carefully their own individual contribution from that of others will they acknowledge that their contribution alone is not likely to make much difference. Instead, they appear to answer efficacy questions as if their own answer refers to the joint effect of all people like themselves. That is, they simply gloss over the individual efficacy problem in favor of a collectivist perception. Although less clearly documented for most other cases, this kind of answer or statement is often made by movement participants. At one level, this finding is consistent with rational decision models, since this transformation of the efficacy term makes action sensible and possible. But at another level, this transformation itself begs for explanation. Although Opp offers an individual cost-benefit account of why people choose to modify their perceptions of efficacy, this tendency seems to cry out for a constructionist account.

Dependent Variable (Social Constructionist) Perspectives. In response to the tendency for resource mobilization and rational choice theorists to treat preferences or values, costs and benefits, and meanings and grievances as unproblematic givens or as data points that can be plugged into an equation as independent variables, a number of scholars began to call in the first half of the 1980s for renewed attention to such cognitive and ideational factors and the processes of interpretation and symbolism (Cohen 1985; Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Turner 1982; Zurcher and Snow 1993). This was not so much a new initiative as it was an attempt to rescue and resuscitate previously glossed concepts, such as ideology and grievances, and blend them with more recent strands of cognitive social psychology, such as attribution theory, symbolic interactionism broadly conceived, and the rediscovery of culture in American sociology. By the early 1990s, this initiative and the issues it raised were attracting increasing interest and being discussed under the rubric of "social constructionism." We thus use it here as an integrative cover term that is suggestive of an emerging perspective with respect to the study of crowds and social movements.

This perspective acknowledges the rationalist and resource mobilization insight that social movements constitute purposive, self-conscious attempts to produce or halt social change. But social constructionists also recognize that perceptions of grievances, costs and benefits, and possibilities for action are all socially constructed: "what is at issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations" (Snow et al. 1986, 466). Thus, social constructionists are especially concerned with the processes whereby existing structures of meaning are challenged or modified and new ones are created, deployed, and diffused through processes of collective discourse and action.

A range of work clusters under the canopy of social constructionism, including Turner and Killian's (1987) continuously emerging ever-normal perspective; the framing perspective of Snow and Benford (1988, 1992, 1987; Snow et al. 1986); Klandermans's (1984, 1988) work on consensus mobilization; Gamson's (1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) theorizing and research on media discourse and packaging; Melucci's (1985, 1988, 1989) work on the construction and negotiation of collective identities; and a growing number of works focusing on the interface of cultural reality construction, consciousness, and contention (Benford and Hunt 1992; Fantasia 1988). Since space does not permit an overview of each of these lines of theory and research, we consider the work associated with framing processes and collective identity, the two social constructionist themes that have generated the most attention in recent years.

Framing Processes and Collective Action Frames. From a framing perspective, movement activists and organizations are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings, but as "signifying agents" actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders. In addition, they are seen as being embedded, along with the media, local governments, and the state, in "the politics of signification"—that is, the struggle to have certain meanings and understandings gain ascendancy over others, or at least move up some existing hierarchy of credibility. Building on Goftman's Frame Analysis (1974), Snow and Benford (1992) conceptualize this signifying work with the verb framing, to denote the process of reality construction. This process is active, ongoing, and continuously evolving; it entails agency in the sense that what evolves is the product of joint action by movement participants in encounters with antagonists and targets; and it is contentious in the sense that it generates alternative interpretive schemes that may challenge existing frames.

Snow and Benford (1992) call the products of this activity "collective action frames," which can be defined as emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns. They perform this mobilizing function by identifying a problematic condition and defining it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action (see also Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982, 14–16; Turner 1969; Turner and Killian 1987, 242–245); by attributing blame or identifying the causal agent(s) (Ferree and Miller 1985; Snow and Benford 1992); and by articulating and aligning individual orientations, interests, and life experiences with the orientation and objectives of movement organizations. Regarding the latter process, Snow and colleagues (1988) have identified four distinct alignment processes: "bridging" frame congruent or ideologically isomorph but immobolized sentiment pools; "amplifying" existing values or beliefs; "extending" the SMO's interpretive framework to encompass interests and perspectives that are not directly relevant to its primary objectives; and "transforming" old meanings and/or generating new ones, usually through affecting conversion.

Since the initial work on frame alignment processes, the framing perspective has broadened and new research questions have been raised. First, what determines the effectiveness or mobilizing potency of movement framing efforts? Why do some proffered framings affect mobilization, while others do not? What, in other words, accounts for "frame resonance" (Snow and Benford 1988; see also Gamson 1992)? Second, to what extent and under what conditions does a collective action frame sometimes come to function as a "master frame" in relation to a cycle of protest or movement activity by coloring and constraining the orientations and activities of other movements in the cycle (Snow and Benford 1992; Tarrow 1989)? Third, what is the link between collective action frames and the generation of incentives for action, or what Klandermans calls "action mobilization" (1984, 1988)? To what extent and how does the framing process generate "motivational frames" that function as props to action (Bentford 1995b; Snow and Benford 1988). Fourth, what are the internal and external dynamics that affect the framing process? Discussion, debate, and contention exist within movements just as between movements and their antagonists, countermovements, and targets. How do these tensions, debates, and disputes affect the framing process and/or mobilizing capacity of existing frames (Bentford 1993a)? And what is the role of the media in this process, especially since one of its primary functions is framing issues and agendas (Gamson 1992; Gitlin 1980)?

During the past several years, these questions about the link between collective action frames and
mobilization have generated considerable research that demonstrates the centrality of framing pro-
clems in mobilization in such diverse cases as the U.S. peace movement (Benford 1987), the IRA
(White 1989), Italian protest cycles (Tarrow 1989a), protest demonstrations in West Germany
(Gerhards and Rucht 1992), ideology and abeyance processes in U.S. farmers’ movements (Mooney
1990), and the Catalanian nationalist movement (Johnston 1991). These empirical works and other
critical assessments (Gammson 1992; Tarrow 1992) point to modifications and refinements of framing
concepts while affirming their value. Transcending framing theory itself, this research demonstrates
more generally that the cognitions relevant to col-
llective action—are they preferences, values, inter-
ests or utilities, costs or benefits, punishments or
rewards, self-concepts or identities, or conscious-
ness itself—are social constructions that are
dynamic and evolving entities which must be ex-
amined and explained.

Collective Identity and Collective Action. Al-
though identity is a central concept in sociological
social psychology and identities are often at stake
in movement activities, emphasis on identity in the
study of collective behavior has waxed and waned.
It figured prominently in a number of well-known
works in the 1970s and 1960s (Hoffer 1951; Kenis-
ton 1968; Klapp 1969) and then lay fallow through-
out the 1970s and the early 1980s. The reason for
its neglect was due largely to the tendency of ear-
ier accounts to portray participants as suffering
from spoiled identities (Hoffer 1951) or identity
deficits (Klapp 1969; Kornhauser 1959) and the
dominance of cognitive and political perspec-
tives in the 1970s. But despite academic neglect,
there is always a very real connection between
identity and movement participation. As Gammson
noted recently:

Chosen of its assumptions about a spoiled or
erased identity, there is a central insight that re-
 mains. Participation in social movements fre-
quently involves enhancement of personal identity
for participants and offers fulfillment and realiza-

When realization of this connection resurfaced in
the 1980s, attention shifted to the link between
identity deficits and quests to the construction of
“collective identities.” At the forefront of this line
of inquiry were several European scholars asso-
ciated with the “new social movements” perspec-
tive (Melucci 1985, 1988, 1989; Pizzorno 1978;
Touraine 1981), with the work and voice of Me-
lucci being most prominent. For Melucci, collective identity is inseparable from collective action and is the key to under-
standing its dynamics. He defines collective identity as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are con-
cerned with the orientations of their action as well
as the field of opportunities and constraints in
which their action takes place” (Melucci 1989, 34).
This means, according to Keane and Mier, who ed-
ited Melucci’s most explicit treatment of the con-
cept, that collective identity is “a moveable defini-
tion (that actors) have of themselves and their
social world, a more or less shared and dynamic
understanding of the goals of their action as well
as the social field of possibilities and limits within
which their action takes place” (Melucci 1989, 4).
Deconstructed even further, Melucci’s actors are in
the “process of constructing an action system,” and it is the product of this constructive process
that is constitutive of collective identity (Melucci
1989, 34).

Turan (1991a) has noted that this provocative
conceptualization is very similar to the Blumerian
of symbolic interactionism and resonates with
social constructionism more generally. How-
ever, it is conceptually and empirically slippery.
How is it captured empirically or operationalized?
How can we probe for its presence or absence?
Collective identity is more than the aggregation of
corresponding individual identities, but how is that
difference grasped without rendering the concept
tautological? Because of its empirical elusive-
ness, it appears that scholars who find the idea of col-
lective identity interesting have opted for a concep-
tion that highlights the kinds of shared commitments
and bonds of solidarity that give rise to a sense
of “one-ness” or “we-ness.”

Thus, Taylor and associates, in their research
on collective identity in the women’s movement
and lesbian feminist mobilization, define collec-
tive identity as “the shared definition of a group
that derives from its members’ common interests
and solidarity” (Taylor 1989, 77); see also Taylor
and Whittier 1992). In his study of the construc-
tion of collective identity in a peace movement
organization, Hunt refers to it as “the qualities
and characteristics attributed to a group by mem-
bers of that group” (1991, 1) and explicitly links
the concept with the identity literature in social
psychology (e.g., Stryker 1980; Weigert, Teige,
and Teige 1986). These definitions make collec-
tive identity more empirically accessible, but they
to also make it almost indistinguishable from the
concept of commitment. Perhaps that is not a
problem, however, so long as Melucci’s central
contributions are not lost: that collective identity is
not merely shared opinions but emerges out of
joint action; that collective identity is both
grounded in and helps to constitute the field of
action; and that identities and action fields are con-
stantly changing.

Affective Dimensions

Emotions are not peculiar to any particular domain of
social life. Like other inner states, however, they
are subject to differential expression contingent on
differences in social circumstances, regulations,
and cues. Thus, some situations are more evocative
of emotion and its display than others. Clearly this
is the case with collective behavior situations.
Most people participate in crowd behavior and so-
cial movement activities because of emotions or
dilemmas they care about, and these events are
often characterized by displays of emotion or at
least a palpable sense of passion, anger, or solidar-
ity. Such emotion and passion were evident in the
pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing in the
Spring of 1989; in the throngs mustering to celebrate
the fall of the Berlin Wall in early November
1989; in the outpouring of shock, dismay, and
anger in the wake of the Rodney King verdict in
Los Angeles in May 1992; and in such ongoing
conflicts as those between antigovernment and pro-
choice advocates and between environmentalists
and the lumber industry. Indeed, one is hard-
pressed to think of instances of collective behavior
banners that do not evoke strong sentiments,
even if their expression is restrained, as in the case
of memorial gatherings for AIDS victims or the
homeless.

Yet this affective dimension of collective be-
avior and social movements has been the least
theorized and researched of all the social psycho-
logical dimensions. There are two major recent
exceptions: one is Turner and Killian’s (1987, 104–
105) reasoned linkage of emotion and expressive
tendencies in collective behavior; the other is
Lofland’s (1981) original taxonomy of “elemen-
tary forms of collective behavior” based on the
dominance of one of emotions of excitement, anger,
and fear. Not coincidentally, that essay was
written for the initial volume of this book. Zurcher
and Snow’s (1981, 477–479) discussion of social
movements in the same volume also called atten-
tion to the neglect of passion in relation to the ebb
and flow of social movements, and hypothesized
that movement viability is contingent in part on
the management of the ongoing dialectic between
organization and passion. But it was Lofland’s chap-
ter (1981) and other work (1985) that constituted
a clarion call for greater attention to affect and
emotion. Nevertheless, a decade later, the imbal-
ance remains. McPhail’s (1991) detailed and sys-
tematic discussion of the literature on crowds con-
tains only two mentions of emotion in its index,
one pointing to his review of Lofland’s work and
the other to Couch’s (1968) critique of older stereo-
types of collective behavior as emotional and irra-
tional.

Why the obvious neglect of emotion or affect in
recent studies of crowds and social movements?
Probably the ultimate answer is the long-standing
tradition in Western philosophy of treating reason
and emotion as opposites. But the more proximate
answer resides in two parallel occurrences: the
ascendancy of choice theory and rational decision
perspectives and the identification of most scholars
of collective action with the
60s movements. The result was a corresponding tendency to impute heightened rationality to collective actors. This tendency notwithstanding, more and more scholars today reject the dichotomy of reason and action and would agree with Turner and Killian:

"... the very distinctions themselves are difficult to make. Emotion and reason are not today regarded as irreconcilable. Emotion may accompany the execution of a well-reasoned plan, and the execution of an inadequately reasoned plan may be accompanied by no arousal of emotion. (1987, 13)"

Moreover, emotion and cognition are often, and perhaps always, intimately linked. Emotion and emotional displays can be socially constructed and managed, as Zurcher (1982), among others, has amply demonstrated, and there is no necessary or inevitable contradiction between the study of emotion and rational choice perspectives. In fact, it is possible to have noninstrumentalist cost-benefit decision models for what Turner and Killian (1987, 97–105) refer to as "expressive" crowd behavior and what Rule (1988, 191, 196, pass.) calls "consummatory" actions—actions that are ends in themselves. Rule uses the example of African American rioters' expressions of anger at white businesses and white police in the 1960s. In these cases, the emotion is the consummatory pleasure in the act itself, and the cost of the action is its consequences. There are also, obviously, mixed cases, in which an action is both pleasurable as an end in itself and a means to another end.

The point is that cognitive perspectives, whether rational choice or social constructionist, can inform understanding of the link between affect or emotion and crowd and social movement dynamics, and vice versa. There are, then, only ideological reasons for not pursuing this linkage more vigorously. Clearly the time has come to heed Lofland's call and move forward on this front, bearing in mind the caveat that what Turner and Killian (1987) have called the "illusion of homogeneity" applies just as readily to emotional displays as to the array of behaviors with which they are often associated.

SUMMARY

We have provided a working conceptualization of collective behavior, crowds, and social movements, discussed the historical linkage between the study of these social phenomena and social psychology, identified the five major social psychological dimensions of crowds and social movements, and synthesized and critically assessed the extensive literature relevant to these key social psychological dimensions. They include the microstructural and social relational dimension, the personality dimension and related social psychological processes, the socialization dimension, the cognitive dimension, and the affective or emotional dimension. These social psychological dimensions are relevant to all domains of social life, of course. But it is the way they operate, interact, and combine with structural and cultural factors in each domain of social life that distinguishes one domain from another.

We think our examination of the theorizing and research pertinent to these dimensions not only demonstrates how social psychology has informed understanding of issues and questions central to the study of crowds and social movements, but also indicates that the social psychology of this domain of social life is alive and well. Indeed, we would agree with the former critic of social psychological perspectives on collective action, who has done an about-face and recently asserted that "many of the major questions animating contemporary work on social movements are intrinsically social psychological" (Gamson 1992, 54–55). While others might take exception to this contention, there is little question but that a full-bodied, thoroughgoing understanding of the emergence, operation, and course and character of crowds and social movements requires consideration of the social psychological dimensions elaborated throughout this chapter.

NOTES

The authors are indebted to Rob Benford, Bill Gamson, Scott Hvet, Doug McAdam, Clark McPhail, and Ralph Turner for their useful suggestions and comments.

1. Some readers might object to the conceptualization of collective behavior as collective problem-solving activity, yet an examination of virtually any collective behavior reveals people engaging in joint action to deal with a particular problem. Even in so-called panics, where individuals are dealing with the perception of imminent danger, Johnson (1987a, 1987b) finds that cooperative, coordinated behavior is typical.

2. For discussion of the range of literature on crowd phenomena and behavior in disaster situations, see Goode (1992), Turner and Killian (1987), and Dyson et al. (1987).

3. There has been a misguided tendency among resource mobilization and political opportunity theorists (e.g., McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Morris 1984; Tilly 1978) to lump all pre-1965 work together as the "collective behavior tradition," ignoring important differences and distinctions among theories and thus missing important insights from pre-scholarship. Snow and Davis (1995) have attempted to correct this tendency in part by distinguishing among the "Harvard" strain tradition, the "Michigan" resource mobilization perspective, and the "Chicago" symbolic interactionist tradition.

4. In this same period, other scholars with more macro orientations were examining the variations and complexities of organizational forms and showing how movements' organizational forms cross national and across time. By the late 1980s, however, most scholars had abandoned the false dichotomy of micro versus macro, social psychology versus politics and organization, and had come to see both as important. Indeed, forging links between these aspects of social movement is now regarded as one of the important agendas for the 1990s.

5. Drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and William T. Powers, McPhail has developed a cybernetic model of coordination that entails individuals adjusting their behavior to bring their perceptual signals in line with a reference signal (McPhail 1991; McPhail, Powers, and Tucker 1992; McPhail and Tucker 1990).

6. Space does not permit a comprehensive listing of the various mechanisms and hypotheses associated with this perspective, much less a detailed review treating their subtleties and complexities on their own terms, but overviews can be found in Zurcher and Snow (1981, 439–434) and Turner and Killian (1987, 334–337).

7. Space does not permit a detailed review of the extensive literature on conversion; for comprehensive reviews see Machalek and Snow (1993), Robbins (1988), and Snow and Machalek (1984).

8. Most sociologists have misunderstood the logical implication of Olson's argument about the "irrationality" of collective action, which is that collective action never occurs—clearly a false empirical claim—but that when collective action occurs it must be either because the participants are not rational actors or because they have additional individual motivations for action.

9. For corresponding but more focused critiques of rational choice perspectives on collective behavior and social movements, see Pierre (1997), Fireman and Gamson (1979), and Turner (1991b).

10. For a number of useful and overlapping discussions of this "new social movements" perspective, see Klandermans (1986), Kriesi (1985a), Rucht (1988), and Tur- row (1989b).

REFERENCES


