TTh 11:00am-12:15pm, Computer Science and Statistics 1221
     Professor: Marzena Rostek
     Office hours: Tuesday, 4:00-5:00pm, 7440 SS



All the official materials will be posted on Canvas.
3/15: Axiomatization (what, why, how, relation to identification), Mixture set,
     Proof of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem;
     Readings: MWG, pp. 175-8
3/20: Static Bayesian games (continuous strategy spaces), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,
     Harsanyi's trick, Standard auction formats, First-price auction, Winner's curse;
     Readings: Gibbons 3.1.C, 3.2B+Appendix 3.2B, MWG, pp. 865-6
3/22: First-price auction (Linear equilibrium and general solution for the monotone BNE),
     Second-price auction;
     Readings: Jehle and Reny 9.1, 9.2.1-9.2.4
3/24: Revenue Equivalence Theorem, Stochastic orders, Double auction, Myerson-Satterthwaite
     Readings: MWG 6.D, Gibbons 3.2.C, (Salanie 3.2.3, optional)
4/3: Adverse selection, Akerlof's Market for Lemons
     Readings: MWG 13.A-B (or Jehle and Reny 8.1.1))
4/5: Spence's Job Signaling model, Single-Crossing Property
      Readings: MWG 13.C (Gibbons 4.2.B offers a nice treatment, though it's not a substitute)
4/12: Costly signaling games, Equilibrium Dominance, Intuitive Criterion
      Readings: MWG Appendix A in Ch 13, The relevant part of Gibbons 4.4
4/17: Principal-agent problems, Screening, Price discrimination, Information rent
      Readings: Salanie 2.2, MWG 14.C
4/19: Moral hazard, Incentives versus risk sharing, Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
      Readings: MWG 14.B
4/24: Costless signaling games, Partitional equilibrium
      Readings: Salanie 4.3.2 (Gibbons 4.3.A, optional)
4/26: Adverse selection with a continuum of types, Incentive compatibility in general mechanisms
      Readings: MWG, pp. 887-9 
5/1: Mechanism design, Direct mechanism, Revelation Principle
      Readings: MWG, pp. 884-5, 889-891