GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Econ 521)

      TTh 11:00am-12:15pm, SOC SCIE 5106
      Prof. Marzena Rostek
      Office hours: Tu, 3:45pm-4:55pm, 7440 SOC SCIE

 


 

      SYLLABUS
     
All other course materials (problem sets, handouts, practice exams, solutions, etc.)
      are available through Learn@UW.

      READINGS: W=Watson (3rd edition), O=Osborne

      L1 (Jan 19): What is game theory? ''Guess the Number'' game. Dominance.
            W: Ch 1, Ch 6 (pp. 49-53); O: Ch 1, Ch 2 Sections 2.1-2.2.

      L2 (Jan 21): Strictly and weakly dominated strategies. Iterated dominance. Common knowledge.
            W: Ch 6 (pp. 60-63), Ch 5, 7; O: Sections 2.9.1-2, 12.2-12.4.

      L3 (Jan 26): Best response.
            W: Ch 4, Ch 6 (pp. 54-63); O: Section 2.8.

      L4 (Jan 28): Synergistic relationship. Externalities. Best response with continuous strategies.
            W: Ch 8 (pp. 81-91); O: pp. 39-41.


      L5 (Feb 2): Outcomes versus payoffs. Nash Equilibrium.
            W: Ch 9 (pp. 95-105); O: Section 2.3, 2.5-2.6.

      L6 (Feb 4): Nash Equilibrium-examples and interpretation.
            W: Ch 7 (pp. 71-73); O: Section 2.7.

      L7 (Feb 9): Oligopolistic competition. Cournot model of quantity competition. Collusion.
            W: Ch 10 (pp. 113-115); O: Section 3.1.

      L8 (Feb 11): Bertrand model of price competition. Solving for NE without calculus.
            W: Ch 10 (pp. 115-118); O: Section 3.2.

      L9 (Feb 16): Electoral competition.
            W: Ch 8 (pp. 78-81); O: Section 3.3.

      L10 (Feb 18): Mixed strategies.
            W: pp. 431-433, Ch 11; O: Section 4.1-4.3.

      L11 (Feb 23): Mixed strategy Nash. Existence of Nash Equilibria.
            No new readings. PS 4 due.

      L12 (Feb 25): Review.
            Handout 1.

      L13 (March 1): Midterm 1.

      L14 (March 3): Introduction to dynamic games. Backward Induction.
            W: Ch 2 (pp. 9-11), C 15 (pp. 186-188); O: Section 5.1.

      L15 (March 8): Trees and strategies in dynamic games. Centipede game.
            W: Ch 14 (pp. 175-177); O: Section 5.2, 7.7 (pp. 233-236).

      L17 (March 10): Stackelberg model.
            W: Ch 16 (pp. 180-182); O: Sections 6.2.1-6.2.2.

      L18 (March 15): Nash Equilibrium versus Backward Induction. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
            W: Ch 15; O: Sections 5.3-5.5. PS 5 due.

 
      L19 (March 17): Ultimatum game. Dictatorship game. Perfect and imperfect information.
            W: Ch 19 (pp. 214-216); O: Section 6.1. PS 5 due.

      Spring Break

      L20 (March 29): Bargaining.
            W: Ch 19; O: Sections 16.1.1-16.1.2.

      L21 (April 5): Review.
            Handout 2.

      L22 (April 7): Midterm 2.

      L23 (April 12): Finitely repeated games.
            W: Ch 22 (pp. 291-296); O: Sections 14.1, 14.4.

      L24 (April 14): Infinitely repeated games.
            W: Ch 22 (pp. 297-301), Ch 23; O: Sections 14.2-14.3, 14.5-14.6, 14.9.

      L25 (April 19): Repeated games and contracts.
            W: Ch 22 (pp. 302-307); O: Sections 14.7-14.8.

      L26 (April 21): War of Attrition.
            Lecture notes.

      L27 (April 26): Job market signaling.
            Lecture notes.

      L28 (April 28): Information economics. Adverse selection.
            W: Ch 27 (pp. 360-362); O: Section 10.7.

      L29 (May 5): Auctions.
            W: Ch 27 (pp. 363-368); O: Sections 9.6.1-9.6.2.



     LINKS:
    
Practice, practice, practice!
    
History of Game Theory
    
Econ glossary
    
Movie
    
Autobiographies:
    
     Robert J. Aumann
    
     John C. Harsanyi
    
     Daniel Kahneman
         
John F. Nash
    
     Thomas C. Schelling
    
     Reinhard Selten
    
     Vernon Smith

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