The women's movement is not new, not only Western, and not always feminist. Since the early 1800s, women have been organizing as women to confront a variety of problems that reflect systematic inequalities of class, status, and power. The organizations women have built, campaigns women have led and events women have staged to challenge these relationships of domination have had an enormous impact on societies worldwide. The legacies of such organizing also continue to contribute to women's ongoing mobilization potential.

In this chapter we suggest that understanding feminism in relation to contemporary women's specific local activism demands a perspective that is comparative, historical and transnational. Women's movements are among the most enduring and successful of all social movements of the modern period. Along with liberalism and socialism, democratization and nationalism, mobilizations by and for women have shaped what we think of as modernity itself. Contemporary collective actions taken by women are rooted in structures of opportunity that are themselves the products of women's past organizing efforts as well as of present-day social relations. Women and men, together and in opposition, produce definitions of women and women's interests that serve as a discursive framework for making appeals to women to organize collectively. Both the organizational and the discursive resources available to women are used not only to challenge gender inequalities but also to mobilize women as a particular constituency to work for and against a variety of other changes in the political and economic status quo.

We present our argument in two major sections. In the first, we look at the macrohistorical basis of women's movements and their remarkable level of historical success. We focus here on defining what women's movements are, what they do, and how they relate to other social movements today and in the past two centuries. In this section our goals are to offer some general typologies, to highlight some of the dynamic elements in women's mobilizations, and to show what contemporary movements owe to their predecessors. Such a broad overview demands a wide lens, and the specificity of particular women's movement organizations and actions over so many different places and periods can only be superficially sketched.

In the second section, we narrow our focus to pick out instances of and processes in specific women's movement mobilizations that particularly challenge and extend current theories of social movements. Women's movements remain on the fringes of most theoretical efforts to understand "social movements" generically, meaning that most theories still approach male-led movements as if they represented the normative case. Instead, we argue that bringing women's movements, feminist and otherwise, equally into the formulation of basic concepts poses interesting new theoretical challenges. Social movement theories that take gender relations into account from the outset will provide a more dynamic, long-term, and less state-centered approach to power, protest, and change.

Movements of Women and Feminism

Definitions

For most Americans, the women's movement seems to be synonymous with organized feminism, where feminism is defined as efforts to challenge and change gender relations that subordinate women to men. However, in much of the world women are conspicuously organizing as women to contest or support other social relations as well. We refer to all organizing of women explicitly as women to make any sort of social change as "women's movements" regardless of the specific targets of their change efforts at any particular time. This broader definition takes explicitly into account that many mobilizations of women as women start out with a nongender directed goal, such as peace, antiracism, or social justice and gradually acquire explicitly feminist components; others, originally feminist mobilizations, expand their goals to challenge racism, colonialism, and other oppressions. To restrict our analysis to those temporary phases in which women's movements have chosen to focus exclusively on changing gender relations would be to remove this important dynamic element.

This dynamism works in both directions. We define women's movements as mobilizations based on appeals to women as a constituency and thus as an organizational strategy. Women's movements address their constituents as women, mothers, sisters, daughters. Regardless of their particular goals, they bring women into political activities, empower women to challenge limitations on their roles and lives, and create networks among women that enhance women's ability to recognize existing gender relations as oppressive and in need of change. We define feminism as the goal of challenging and changing women's subordination to men. Feminist mobilizations are informed by feminist theory, beliefs, and practices, and also often encourage women to adopt other social change goals. Autonomous forms of feminist mobilization are based on organizations and campaigns directed by and to women, and thus take the specific form of feminist women's movements.

Defining feminism has never been simple (Delmar 1986; Offen 1988; Davidson 2001). For some feminists, feminism means simultaneously combating other forms of political and social subordination, since for many women, embracing the goal of equality with the men of their class, race, or nation would mean accepting a
still-oppressed status. For some feminists, it means recognizing ways in which male-dominated institutions have promoted values fundamentally destructive for all people, such as militarism, environmental exploitation, or competitive global capitalism, and associating the alternative values and social relations with women and women-led groups. To insist on a definition of feminism that limits its application to those mobilizations that exclusively focus on challenging women's subordination to men would exclude these types of feminism. When analysts do this, they discover that the groups that are left within their purview are largely limited to mobilizations of relatively privileged women who are seeking access to existing social, political, and economic institutions and to the opportunities enjoyed by males of their social group (e.g., Chafetz and Dworkin 1986; Margolis 1993; see critiques in Gluck et al. 1998; Buechler 2000).

This, we suggest, is a definitional problem rather than an inherent limit on what feminists do in real political contexts. By acknowledging the diversity of women's movements that address feminist goals, whether or not such goals are primary or exclusive, we make central to our analysis the actual intersectionality of social movements. By intersectionality we mean that oppressions, and movements to combat them, are not apportioned singularly; of necessity, organizations as well as individuals are multicultural and engage in complex social relations of power and injustice. This is not always acknowledged theoretically. As Ferree and Roth (1998) argue, scholars of social movements have tended to construct ideal-typical movements that they envision as composed of ideal-typical constituents: thus the "worker's" movements are imagined as organizations of and for white men, "nationalist" movements as of and for indigenous men, "feminist" movements as of and for white middle-class women. At any given historical moment in a particular country, their organizations might appear feminist or not, as the immediate focus of their efforts shifted.

The Scope and Range of Women's Movements

Women's movements are ubiquitous in contemporary societies. Women mobilize as women to demand equal rights from Fiji to Finland, but women also mobilize as women to confront authoritarian rule (e.g., Mothers of the Disappeared in Argentina and El Salvador), to demand peace (e.g., Women in Black in Bosnia and in Israel), to call for handgun control (the Million Moms March in the US), and to address a variety of social problems across their communities. As examples of the latter, consider Mothers of East Los Angeles, a Chicana group fighting drug abuse and environmental contamination (Pardo 1993) and Women's Light, a group in Tver, Russia, that fights alcohol abuse and fosters women's political participation with explicitly feminist rhetoric (Ferree et al. 1999).

Addressing women as women can be a strategy to focus attention on problems that women face distinctively or to a greater degree than men do, as in India the Women's Equality Initiative (MSK) does with regard to low-caste women's illiteracy and the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) does with regard to the economic issues of the informal economy (Subramanian 2000). But mobilizing women as women may also be a response to gendered political opportunity structures for addressing problems that affect the entire community. The political opportunity for mobilizing women may be distinctively disadvantageous, as in Chile or East Germany, where women's domestic networks offered them greater protection and moral leverage in challenging the dictatorships in power than did men's (Noonan 1995; Miethe 1999). Alternatively, opportunities to mobilize women may be more limited by restrictive laws (Jacobs France and Prussia in the nineteenth century forbade all political gatherings or associations of women, and purdah in parts of the Islamic world achieves a similar result) or by a cultural politics that makes gender-specific claims problematic (a commitment to "gender-blindness" in US law, for example).

In stressing that all women's movements are rooted in gendered structures of oppression and of opportunity, we stress that they all have some actual or potential relation to feminism, whether this is currently a primary goal for them or not. But we explicitly refrain from defining all women's movements as feminist. Maxine Molyneux (1985) takes a different approach to the complex and varying relations between women's movements and feminism. She extends the concept of feminism to encompass all women's organizing, using the term "pragmatic gender interests" for those women's groups whose objectives "are given inductively and arise from the concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labor" and are formulated "by the women who are themselves within these positions rather than through external interventions" (232). In contrast, "strategic gender interests" designate those that reflect an "extra-local," theoretically based "deductive" approach to challenging gender relations. Molyneux sees only this latter, strategic approach as the one "usually termed 'feminist'" but argues for politicizing the former demands as contributing to "the level of consciousness required to take this more advanced position" (233). This pragmatic/strategic distinction is not only frequently cited in the literature (see Peterson and Ryan 1995; Chass-Lupton and Udvardy 2000) but has also become widespread within women's own political organizations. For example, Seidman (1999, 2001) shows how the South African Gender Commission used this distinction to discuss and direct their own work with local women and women's groups at the beginning of the post-apartheid state.
By distinguishing women's movements (a constituency and organizational strategy) from feminism (a belief system and political goal that many movements may share), we open up the question of how women's movements relate to feminism as an empirical issue. This has several concrete implications for research.

First, because the relationship between feminism and women's movements may vary over time and place, historical/comparative approaches are especially important, paralleling studies of the relation between worker's movements and socialism (Thompson 1964; Taylor 1983; Calhoun 1991). The very diversity of women's movements globally offers a rich field for developing empirical generalizations about women's organizing and when and how such organizing makes use of feminist concepts (e.g., Bass 1995; Miles 1996; Bystrzydzenski and Sakhir 1999). Women's movements currently exist in virtually every country of the world and in multiple forms within each. Where and how specific feminist goals play a role in these mobilizations should be more systematically investigated, as well as the routes by which feminist ideas "travel" between them (Spertling et al. 2001; Gal forthcoming).

Heitlinger (1999) points, for example, to the role of emigre feminists in linking the movements of their natal countries and their current homelands. Exiled women who fled civil war in Rwanda and Cambodia have played a similar role (Kumar 2001). How feminist theories are constructed and spread is important not only as a matter of philosophy, but to understand the relationships among women's movements transnationally and over time.

Second, in this approach "women's interests" are no longer assumed to be known a priori by some privileged theory, but are examined as social constructions that are discursively produced by actual political struggles over how needs are to be defined (Melucci 1989, 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999). As Fraser (1989) argues, "need definition" is often the prior stage of politics to struggles over the satisfaction of needs thus defined, and as such it is often the focus of social movement mobilization rather than the exclusive domain of institutional policymaking (see also Stone 2003). Bringing issues of women's oppression into the realm of politics at all is a key aspect of women's self-definition of their needs (e.g., by defining rape as a "crime against humanity," and wife-battering and "honor killings" as social practices that states should work to eliminate). Need definition is a political struggle over whose version of reality will be translated into public policy and social practices.

The rhetoric that defines women as a distinctive constituency, instead of, within or against their other potentially competing allegiances and identities, is a critical element of what creates women's movements. Defining who "women" are said to be is a political process (Bacchi 1999), and the inclusions and exclusions created in these definitional struggles are important for understanding the course of specific movements over time. Women of color in the United States, for example, have pointed out the ways in which "women" is often equated in practice with "white women," whereas whiteness is treated as an "unmarked category" and normative claims are made as if this category represented the whole (e.g., Hull et al. 1982; Spelman 1988; Collins 1990). Who "women" are understood to be will always be central in defining what "women" need.

Third, this approach also brings women's movement organizations with diverse goals into the center of the analysis, where their work as "bridge-builders" figures in coalition formation (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Borden 1997; Roth 2003) and their focus on multiple, concrete needs in their communities makes them central in grassroots mobilizations for social and political change, whether in American cities (Naples 1998) or African villages (Tripp 2000). The practical work of organizing concrete women and the obstacles and opportunities encountered in this process become a basis for theory, as much as the reverse. Rather than positing any certain relation between these grass-roots women's groups and feminism as a goal, movement analysts need to explore and explain their reciprocal contributions to each other. Overviews of women's mobilizations around the world (e.g., Miles 1996) suggest that many local women's movements adopt a "strategic essentialism" that allows them to focus on politically recognizing women's differences in their current experiences and perspectives without claiming any fundamental gender differences in character or rights (cf. Steunenberg 1997). Specific women's movements may be in a more or less explicit struggle with abstract liberal individualist definitions of "rights" that make being treated as a "rights-bearer" contingent on disavowing gender-specificity (for a simultaneously gendered and raced perspective, see Roberts 1997).

In sum, therefore, a model of women's movements that treats them as contingently and variably related to feminism, and women's interests as the objects of definitional struggle rather than dichotomously "strategic" or "pragmatic," opens up such relationships for empirical examination. Changes over time both toward and away from a primary emphasis on challenging gender relations as a goal need to be explained, as well as differences among women's movements in their definitions of who "women" are, the exclusivity of the racial/national/ethnic communities to which "women" are loyal, and the relative priority they give to feminist goals in meeting their needs. Because "women's interests" are the object of social movement negotiations, making a women's movement feminist (or not) is always going to reflect struggle on the part of participants. Such active struggles over defining needs, constituencies, and politics itself become more prominent as elements of all social movement agendas, since it is in such struggles that movements grow, divide, exclude, multiply, and splinter (Mueller 1994). What has sometimes been described as "spillover" of ideas from one movement to another (Meyer and Whittier 1994) looks therefore more like a tug-of-war within and among necessarily heterogeneous movement groups.

The Historical Context for Feminism and Women's Movement Mobilization

Contemporary collective actions taken by women are rooted in structures of opportunity that are in part the products of women's past organizing efforts. Taking a comparative-historical approach to feminist women's movements suggests that it would be problematic to describe them as "new social movements." Even though autonomous feminist mobilization in the early 1970s received a major impetus from the anti-authoritarian student movements of Europe in the 1960s (Kaplan 1992), from the civil rights movement in the US in the 1950s and 1960s (Evan 1979), from movements for social justice in Latin America (Stephen 1997), and from movements of national liberation in Asia and Africa (Jayawardena 1986), these were by no means the only sources of their identities, organizations, or political analyses.
Contemporary feminist movements draw on rich lodes of organization as well as political theory in their mobilizing efforts. Some organizations were embedded within states and international bodies, such as the Inter-American Commission on Women (since the 1950s), the Women’s Bureau in the US Department of Labor (1940s). Others, such as the International Association of University Women, organized on national or transnational lines, lines that maintained an exclusionary status of women (Chuck et al. 1998). The League of Women Voters itself, a descendant of the National American Women’s Suffrage Association, excluded black women from membership in the South in the 1930s and 1960s, for example, just as the National American Women’s Suffrage Association was itself a descendant of the National American Women’s Suffrage Association. This exclusionary practice extended beyond race; in Europe, socialist politics from the late nineteenth century onward were shaped by the division between the working class and the middle class (Adams 1987; Ferree 2002). Thus, even to understand contemporary groups, a wider historical lens is necessary.

Feminist Women’s Movements are not New Social Movements

Feminism emerged forcefully in the eighteenth century in the writings of political theorists such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges, who in Karen O’Mara’s words “claimed the Enlightenment” for women (2000: 29). By the nine-teenth century this was no mere intellectual argument, but also a framework for social mobilization. Women’s education as well as increasing the right to vote, to retain their rights and property in marriage, and to participate more fairly and equally in the emerging wage economy animated the mobilization of women in Europe and the United States (Flexner 1959; Offen 2000). These campaigns were contemporaneous with and often connected to the emergence of socialism, liberalism, nationalism, and democracy. Feminist movements held to the belief that women were the “other” within the liberal and modern state. Feminists provided a rationale for women to mobilize as women in relation to the emergent social relations between these groups. They connected the mobilization of women to the mobilization of men in the workplace, to the mobilization of political parties, to the mobilization of political parties across the world (Gerhard 2000).

Yet as women seized the opportunity to be political actors in their own right, they also asserted a variety of social and political objectives that extended beyond the traditional goals of women’s rights. Women in the nineteenth century mobilized to end slavery and the slave trade, to obtain new and human rights, to obtain paid employment for themselves and others, to spread Christian doctrine and European social values in the expanding empires of the Great Powers. They also contributed to the development of national states, and to the protection of weak and marginalized groups as the physically and mentally ill, prisoners, children, and paupers. The close association between feminism and all sorts of women’s mobilization in the nineteenth century, a period in which all political activity by women was illegal or perfectly legal, makes it tempting to bring all women’s movements together under the rubric of “social justice feminism,” whatever their specific goals (Offen 1988; Sklar et al. 1998).

This approach obscures the debates of the period about the relative priority to be given in practice to women’s rights demands and advocacy of other social changes. American feminists after the Civil War were divided, for example, over whether this was “the Negro’s hour” in which the rights of both White and Black women were to be deferred in favor of gaining constitutional protection for Black men (Flexner 1959). In the 1880s and 1890s, German feminists divided between those who supported the right to vote for women on the same class-based system as men and those who advocated universal suffrage for men and women (Evans 1976; Gerhard 2000). The rise of nationalism, imperial claims and nationalism throughout Europe from the French Revolution to World War I gave rise to debates over women, as the Czech suffragist Josefa Zeman argued, women were “first patriots and then women” (Offen 2000: 213) or whether, in the words of Virginia Woolf, “as a woman, I have no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world.” (Woolf 1938).

Such debates of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, in which both women and men engaged, make clear that the division between “old” and “new” social movements that sometimes emerges in the literature is deeply misleading (see critique in Calhoun 1993). The “old” distributive, class-based politics that became institutionally established in Europe in the form of socialist and social democratic parties at the turn of the century was energetically involved in the very origins in active “needs definition” work. There is simply no modern period in which public debate over economic relations, class interests, and redistributive policies failed to include claims about the gender identities and gendered interests of “workers” and “citizens” (Komlos 1979; Offen 2000; Glenn 2002). “Old” social movements had to work to construct a sense of shared fate among workers in a diversity of occupations; appeals to their common manhood (and in the US to whiteness) created exclusionary forms of solidarity that still have consequences in specific organizing campaigns among women workers (Johnson 1994; Beckwith 1996; Ferree and Roth 1998).

A politics of gender, asserting men’s interests as well as women’s interests as women, is therefore just as “old” as class politics. It is institutionalized in male-led groups and “women’s auxiliaries” within class, race, and other movements, no less than in those autonomous feminist organizations that put their primary emphasis on what women want economically and socially as women. The emergence of the workplace as a site distinct from the home, the mobilization of men in workplace-based politics, and the organization of political parties centered on unions and class relations are also forms of institutionalizing gender-based repertoires of contentious politics for men that marginalize women. The struggle between class-based and gender-based priorities remains visible today in the different gender mobilizations and issues emphasized in places where socialist party politics have shaped the political field and those where the political field follows other lines of conflict (cf. Ray’s comparison of Calcutta and Bombay, 1999; Hobson’s comparison of Sweden and Ireland, forthcoming; Ferree’s comparison of Germany and the US, 2002).

International feminism has also been long enmeshed in struggles over nationalism, race, and colonialism, and popular self-determination, sometimes in conjunction with international socialism and sometimes not (Molyneux 1985; Seidman 1993; Tettey 1994; Yuval Davis 1997). Women’s gains in insurrectionary periods were
often pushed back by the newly institutionalized states, albeit not without resis-
tance. Because women are charged with the reproduction of peoples (both biologic-
ally and in the sense of cultural reproduction via maintaining language and customs
and early socialization of children), defining “proper” gender relations is often an
explicit part of the national project (Kandiyoti 1991; Yovel Davis 1997). National
women’s movements in many countries have long histories both of collaborating
with the subordination of other racial/ethnic groups at home and abroad, but also of
organizing antiracist and anti-imperialist efforts (Burton 1994; Twine and Biee
2001). The effort to define feminism as “foreign” or “Western” (as with the label
“bourgeois”) is an act of political resistance to women’s claims, one that attempts to
deny local women’s movements national legitimacy. Marta Sierra’s 1917 appeal to
“study, study our history, Spanish ladies and gentlemen, before accusing a feminist of
being foreign” (cited in Ofen 2000: 6) is much like the contemporary plea made by
Russian and other Eastern European feminists who are attempting to recover their
own nineteenth and early twentieth century feminist forebears (see sperling 1999;

Overall, across classes and countries, the history of feminist claims and women’s
movement mobilizations stretches back into the earliest formation of nation-states,
political parties, and democratic institutions. Attacks on the naturalness of patri-
archy, as well as defenses of men’s “traditional” right to govern, are a hallmark
of theorists of the state (Pateman 1988). Gender politics continue to be centrally
involved in all efforts to think about nature, the person and the citizen, not only in
debates over veiling in the Middle East (Kandiyoti 1991) or genital surgery in Africa
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), but in Western Europe and the United States, as ongoing
debates over issues such as abortion, prostitution, and women’s military service
show (see, e.g., Katzenstein 1998; Outshoorn 2001; Ferree et al. 2002).

Feminist Women’s Movements Have Long Been Transnational
Just as feminist women’s movements are not new, they are also not newly trans-
national. The current tendency to define globalization as a new process and trans-
national organizations as creating unprecedented linkages among previously
separate movements is misleading in two respects. First, the historical trajectory
for many contemporary developments might better be understood as a pendulum
swing rather than a monotonic line of development. Second, the already existing
international women’s movement was part of the institutional structure that contrib-
uted to the creation and revitalization of local and national movements. Separately
existing women’s movements did not simply come together in both the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries transnational groups and conferences created regional inter-
ests in mobilization and pushed the development of national and local movements in
certain directions, particularly in embracing a transnational discourse of citizenship,
equality, and rights.

In the late nineteenth century, the predominant form of women’s autonomous
feminist mobilization was the suffrage organization. Individual national organiza-
tions pressing for the right to vote were already widespread when they came together
in the International Women Suffrage Alliance in 1902 (Rupp 1997). From the 1890s
to the 1930s, women’s mobilizations were deeply concerned with issues of citizen-
ship and nationhood, partly expressed in their focus on the vote, but also evident in
women’s involvement in nation-building and democratization struggles around the
world (Jayawardena 1986; Sinha et al. 1999). Ruling elites in countries such as Iran,
Turkey, and China also saw the demands of “modernity” as including increasing
individual rights for women. Suffrage organizations pressed their case for women’s
citizenship so effectively within the world community that although virtually no
state extended women the right to vote in 1900, virtually all did by 1950 (Ramirez
et al. 1997). The equation of citizenship with men ended; no newly independent
state after 1950 failed to include women in the franchise. However, the value of
modernity, its equation with classical liberal values of individualism, independence,
and democracy, and the extension of such values to include women, continues to be
debated. Often a “fundamentalist” form of religion stands in active opposition to
women’s rights (whether among the Christian Right in the US or the Islamic Right
globally; see Kandiyoti 1993; Sered 1998).

The International Council of Women, the Inter-American Commission of Women,
the International Women Suffrage Alliance, and the Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom formed an organizational infrastructure for national mobil-
izations of women in the early part of the century, but perhaps more importantly,
these and other transnational women’s organizations provided a bridge to the
remobilization of women in the 1970s (Rupp and Taylor 1999). In contrast to the
19th century, women in the early decades of the twentieth century formed international
organizations that had hundreds of thousands of members; international socialist
congresses also brought women activists together despite the enormous costs that
distance imposed; colonial relationships fostered travel and trade relations in which
women also became internationally knowledgeable and experienced actors. It was the
disruptions of two world wars and the subsequent division of the world into two
hostile blocs that brought internationalism to an apocalyptic low point by the 1950s,
and which also, and not coincidentally, marked the low ebb of women’s activism in
Europe and the United States (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Rupp 1997; Lenz 2001).

Our short historical memory offers the 1950s as the epitome of traditional values
and practices in family and gender relations in the United States. Actually, the 1950s
are the bottom of a curvilinear path taken by many diverse social indicators in the
twentieth century: Women’s age at marriage, likelihood of not marrying at all,
participation in higher education, formation of women’s social organizations, and
explicitly feminist activism are all higher in the 1920s and 1980s than in the 1950s.
Rates of international trade, formation of international organizations, and immigra-
ton also hit bottom in the 1950s and are just now equalizing or in some cases
surpassing the rates that were typical of the early twentieth century. Thus we
might better understand the current globalization of women’s movements as the
resumption of a temporarily suppressed process than as a wholly new development.

From this perspective, the linkages and legacies of the transnational women’s
movement of the early twentieth century demand particular attention. One such
direct connection runs through the United Nations, which on the urging of long-
established international women’s groups, established its own internal offices to deal
with women’s affairs (Meyer and Prigil 1999; Moghadam 2000). The International
Women’s Year, celebrated by a worldwide conference in Mexico City in 1975, gave
rise to the declaration of the UN’s 1976-85 “Decade for Women” (Fraser 1987).

As participants soon discovered, women’s movement representatives at the
NGO Tribunes and Forums that paralleled the UN assemblies had quite varied
Interpretations of women's interests (Ferree 1987). Sharp debates about the gender dimensions of issues such as development, poverty, colonialism, and wars of independence characterized the meetings. Delegations from more affluent countries listened and responded to the critiques raised by women from the global South, and began a process of reevaluation of their exclusive focus on narrowly defined gender interests (Booth 1998; Catayag et al. 1986). Women from the global South also found the conference an impetus to challenge their own governments on issues of gender equality and to mobilize in their own national and regional organizations (Ashworth 1982). Women in Latin America, in particular, developed an extensive and diverse network of organizations across the countries in this region, and many of these networks became important in resistance to the dictatorships that spread in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Alvarez 1990; Jaquette 1994; Stephen 1997).

Subsequent UN conferences in Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing drew ever widening circles of women's NGO participation, and continued to foster debate among the participants as well as spur mobilization at home both in preparation for the conference and in response to ties established there (Ashworth 1982; Catayag et al. 1986). A strong effect of women's mobilization on the agenda of other transnational organizations became evident. For example, population groups took up a discourse of gender that sees education as the key to birth control, thus giving recognition to women as agents and individuals with rights in a way that earlier, more coercive population control discourses had not (Ferree and Ganssen 1999; Greenhalgh 2001). Other feminist issues, such as objections to clitoridectomy, revulsion at the use of rape in war, and questions of coercion in prostitution and the international trafficking in women for sex, also came increasingly onto the agenda of other UN conferences, under the rubric of "women's rights are human rights." (Correa and Reichmann 1994; Booth 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Women in the global South found this use of a human rights frame for feminist demands to be empowering and useful for local and regional mobilization as well (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ray and Korteweg 1999).

Overall, a strong current of support for rights talk in the transnational arena reflected an increasing willingness to include women in the definitions of citizenship grounded in classical liberal political theory. This reflects both a long-term trend toward the expansion of liberal discourse transnationally (Meyer et al. 1997) and a victory of women's movements in having their concerns incorporated in how liberalism defines its constituency of "individuals" with rights. For example, Berkovich (1999) shows how the mobilizations of women in and around international labor organizations throughout the twentieth century pushed a redefinition of women and their needs; the "mothers" who were seen in the early twentieth century to need special protections and benefits from the state in the workplace were redefined in the late twentieth century as "citizens" who had rights to representation in labor organizations and to participate in the definition of their own needs. Increasingly, women were represented as a resource for economic development that should not be wasted, and whose progress toward equality was an indicator of modernity. Nation-states therefore had a growing obligation to "ensure the status" in education and in the economy, for which they were held internationally accountable. The women's movement, Berkovich demonstrates, both helped to produce the demand from international organizations for such statistics and continues to use such statistical data to push for changes in women's opportunities in specific nation-states, a classic example of what Keck and Sikkink call a "boomerang" effect (1998).

In sum, the connection between feminist women's mobilizations of the early twentieth century and those of the latter part of the century is direct and organizationally based. Women's movements institutionalized in civil society in a variety of formal organizations that survived and spanned "the doldrums" of the middle of the century (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Stienstra 1994; Meyer and Prügl 1999). Women's movements also created direct access into government through winning the suffrage and the right to hold public office. Although the structures of opportunity in workplaces and other nonstate political organizations continued to favor men, women continued to be active internationally in civic organizations and movements. Local and transnational women's movements have each spurred on the other's mobilization, and feminist discourses circulate through them. Women's movement demands challenged gender relations in expanding the concepts of citizenship and human rights, but also brought gendered analyses into national and international forums on development, poverty, race, urbanization, aging, and other issues.

Having established a conceptual scaffolding for examining women's movements in relation to feminism, other social movements, institutional forms of politics, and state policy and practices transnationally, we turn now to examine what social movement theory can learn from studies of women's movements. Most "general" movement theory has developed to date with primary reference to movements led by and directed toward men. In this section we ask not only whether these models apply well to women's movements but also how the analysis we have derived above from the study of women's movements can add significant questions and insights to these frameworks.

Women's Movements and Social Movement Theory

We begin with the theoretical framing that McAdam et al. (2001: 14-15) characterize as the "classic social movement agenda" since the early 1970s (see also McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998). In this basic model, social changes initiate (1) new political opportunities and threats, (2) shifts in mobilizing structures of communication, coordination, and commitment among potential actors, and (3) reframing of claims, identities, and culturally resonant meanings. Activities encompassed by these three clusters of concepts (political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and meaning work) influence each other as well as create integrated repertoires of contention, the forms of claims-making that are transmitted between organizations and generations and adapted for specific interactions in concrete historical moments of opportunity (Clemens 1993; Tilly 1995). Although we organize our look at concrete women's movements in terms of these three clusters of concepts, in conclusion, we integrate all three into the overall idea of gendered repertoires of contention in movements to produce intersections that address gendered opportunities through gendered structures of mobilization with gendered rhetorics of meaning. We stress that social/political structures, opportunities, organizations, and frames are gendered. Thus in this section we argue that analysis need to study not only women's movements as defined...
above with attention to gender, but to make all social movement theory attentive to the gender dynamics that shape mobilization. Not all feminist mobilization is autonomous, in the form of women's movements, but all social movements in a gendered society perpetually use gendered repertoires of contention. We indicate how women's movements theoretically raise issues for all movements. We particularly argue that a long-term view of history and social change is essential for understanding the origins, outcomes, and dynamics of women's movements (cf. Bunch 1980; Offen 2000), and that most social movement theories have taken an approach that is too short term — one in which gender-specific relations and repertoires appear to be stable, "natural" facts rather than variable aspects of contentious politics for both women and men.

Political Opportunity Structures

Political opportunity structures were initially conceptualized as the given alignments of potential allies and opponents faced by a potential social movement within a single nation; opportunities that were thus more or less available to social movements were understood as chances (at best) to seize and use or as constraints or rights costs, with legal and institutional arrangements as well as cultural patterns and expectations, in addition to dynamic elements of shifting alignments and "policy windows" interpreted through issue cultures, public discourse, and media frames (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Ferree et al. 2003). This more expansive view of political opportunities is helpful in considering how elements support and which undercut the emergence and extent of women's movements. Yet it still fails to consider when and how political opportunity structures are specifically gendered (McCannon et al. 2001).

Looking specifically at women's movements suggests that political opportunity is not gender neutral, either for individuals or for groups. Rita Noonan (1995), for instance, shows how women under the Pincheñit dictatorship in Chile had opportunities not open to men to take to the streets and demand protection and support for their families because their needs and their protests were defined as less "political," and therefore less threatening, than similar acts by men would have been.

Such mobilization appears to be timeless, as women have long drawn on a political tradition of gendered opportunity that connects women's responsibility to feed and protect their families with their rights to make claims on state and society for the means to do so (Molyneux 1985; Miles 1996). The women's march to Versailles in 1789 demanding bread "captured the imagination of contemporaries as well as subsequent commentators" and was one of the opening salvos of the French Revolution (Offen 2000: 13). Other mobilization of women have also drawn on similar imagery of maternal care to legitimize challenging political actions that also became more widespread: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo spurred a more general human rights campaign in Argentina (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and US mothers' activism around Love Canal and other sites spurred more general environmental mobilizations (Kaplan 1997). Studies of Black women in the American civil rights movement emphasize their role as early innovators of resistance strategies, such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and point to the significance of their own gender-specific organizations as forerunners for later mobilization, as well as grass-roots leadership (Payne 1990; Barnett 1993; Robnett 1997).

Some analysts (e.g., Miles 1996) understand this sort of gendered mobilization as inherent in the position of women, across societies and periods, as the universal caregivers. Instead, we would ask, why women are apparently overrepresented in both early and informal forms of resistance and rebellion. Why are women's movement organizations among the "early risers" in many cycles of protest? We suggest that women's movements respond to a long-term organization of political opportunity by gender that is part of the organization of state and nonstate forms of authority. The factors that privilege access to modern state and party systems (workplace-based connections, control over wealth, "paying one's dues" in the bureaucratic organizations and networks in which favors are traded) among men and male-led organizations are strongly gendered in their social organization (Chapman 1993; Sturgeon 1997). As an outgrowth of the way nation-states constructed their policies on gendered lines, women are institutionally disadvantaged in attempts to act on "men's" terrain. Women thus are more likely to organize outside the formal polity, in those community and grass-roots contexts that are gendered female.

Such demand-based politics is less likely to be recognized as "political," which may provide protective coloration in a wide variety of dictatorships and other conditions of marginal opportunity for male mobilization, as Noonan (1995), Miëste (1999), and others have found. These examples suggest that women will mobilize as women, and frequently in the absence of men, when the risks are exceedingly high and when women's maternal role and existing networks render their political roles invisible. Ingrid Miëste's studies of women peace activists before and after the collapse of the East German state points to a conscious use of the separation of public and private in state socialism to pursue dissent "politics around the kitchen table," a locale in which women were already present and legitimate actors (1999). In recently unified Germany, where "politics" now means reliance on political parties in which women are organizationally disadvantaged, women have lost their former leadership roles.

Even women activists themselves, however, may be slow to define grass-roots community organizing and "bridge leadership" as being really "politics," which they may define as the male-dominated formal institutions — electoral office, bureaucratic positions, and even official leadership roles in movement organizations. Local women activists in Russia (Gottlieb 1999; Sperling et al. 2001), grass-roots organizers in Africa and India (Tripp 2000; Subramaniam 2000) and community organizers in poor communities in Canada and the US (Christiansen-Ruffman 1995; Naples 1998; Robnett, 1997) all seem to distance themselves and their "work for their community" from what they call "politics," which they frequently define as corrupt, self-serving, and male-dominated. Their disavowal of politics in favor of some other rhetoric is striking. Quite unlike Molyneux's assumption that such activism springs spontaneously or naturally from women's position in the gender division of labor (pragmatic gender interests), we argue that it is constructed as nonfamilial but also as nonpolitical community work — quintessentially bridging these domains (Stall and Stoelcker 1998). A rhetoric of male-dominated politics as
untrustworthy, corrupt, self-serving, unresponsive may be an important factor creating the space for women to do such "anti-politics." This gender division of labor flows from the definition of formal politics as male no less than from the idea that women are the ones who are domestic/private/responsible for the home. Such gendered dichotomies, like the distinction between paid work and housework, obscure the essential political labor being done by women in their local communities, the "housework of politics" (Ferree 1997). Grass-roots organizing faces a structure of opportunity that differs from epiphenomenal forms of street-level protest as well as from the creation of more formal social movement organizations, particularly, but not only, on gender lines (Stall and Streeck 1998). Payne (1990) has noted that Ella Baker, the first "Acting" Director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, distinguished between "mobilizing" (for short-term events) and "organizing" (for the long-term), and that women more readily serve as activists in the latter type of work. Moreover, as opportunities arise for community groups to gain public recognition and become more "conventionally political," women and women's groups tend to lose or withdraw from public leadership roles (see Bookman and Morgen 1988).

Because gender segregation leaves an alternative geography of opportunity open to women more than men, women's political openings and allies are more to be found in the institutional domains defined as "apolitical": communities, grass-roots civic organizations, social work, and social services. From this perspective, maternist mobilizations are not merely outpourings of "natural" grievances, but organized efforts to mobilize the power of civil society against "politics as usual," which is still defined as male. Particularly when states are inaccessible or irresponsible in general, and fear of challengers makes them hostile to male mobilization, women have a structural and cultural opportunity to play a significant role.

Nonetheless, any issues that can be defined as "women's" can offer an entry for women's groups and networks to make inroads in formal politics, as German women legislators found for the abortion debate in the early 1990s (Ferre et al. 2002) and women's pacifist groups demonstrated in international relations debates about resolving conflict via non-violent strategies in the early 1990s (Hogendoorn 1998). Defining building democratic community groups as something at which women excel has given women's groups a means to appeal for support from international donors throughout former Yugoslavia (Babic 2002). At the World Bank, women have achieved their greatest success in bringing gendered concerns to bear on bank policies where they support conventional understandings of women's reproductive responsibilities for health, population, and education, and less success with arguments based on gender equality (O'Brien et al. 2000).

In sum, studies of women's movements point to the analytic usefulness of (1) acknowledging a relationship between gender and political opportunity that may vary systematically between states and in state institutions relative to civil societies, giving either women or men different advantages in mobilizing at any given point; (2) linking gendered leadership, gender-specific organization, location in party-based or community-networked political systems to opportunities for long-term organizing, and (3) finding out how change in gendered opportunity arises out of and affects the actions of women and men throughout the entire cycle of protest, including both incentives to engage in "anti-politics" and new chances to enter the formal political system.
they do not advocate either “empowering” the ordinary soldier in the ranks or challenging the centrality of combat in military careers. Katzenstein argues that both groups have chosen strategies adapted to the institutional terrain in which they are struggling.

Similarly, Ferree et al. (2002) argue that feminist adaptation to institutionalized opportunities in the political culture of Germany and the US has led to differences in their mobilization strategies and types of success in abortion politics in each country. For American feminism, the combination of universalistic individual rights discourses affirmed by the Supreme Court and a weak welfare state offer an opportunity to mobilize male allies to support “privacy” for women’s abortion decision, yet leave poor women’s childbearing needs out. US abortion rights mobilization is thus dominated by mixed-gender groups who campaign for the “right to choose” abortion without stigma or sanction. German feminists face a constitutional court decision affirming the fetus’s right to life and a strong welfare state, which give them the opportunity for a specifically gendered mobilization to empower women, using women legislators to represent “women’s demands” that the state protect the fetus “with the woman and not against her” by offering the social supports that would allow her to raise a child and permitting the woman herself to decide whether she is able to do so or not. But quietly accepting the continuing stigmatization of abortion by criminal law is the price feminism in Germany pays for its strategic choice, no less than American feminists see the loss of state abortion funding for the poor as a painful part of the cost that liberal individualism extracts for the abstract “right to choose” (cf. Solinger 1998; R. Roth 2000).

The interweaving of strategic choice and perceived opportunity in these cases is not accidental, and highlights the difficulty of nearly separating mobilization processes from opportunity structure. As these two examples show, opportunity structures already anchored in institutions provide powerful incentives to movements to choose certain types of strategies and these differ dramatically between institutional contexts. Since opportunities, as perceived, affect choices of strategy and over the longer term strategies affect the types of gains that movements can make, there can be no question that mobilization practices institutionalize opportunity. Given the variability in institutional contexts, it should not be at all surprising that women’s movements adopt quite different strategies from time to time and place to place; what is more surprising are the commonalities. The contrast that Katzenstein draws between a discursive politics about values (in the Church) and a politics of rights and access (in the military) is a common strategic distinction between those who would define themselves as “radical” and others, variously defined as pragmatic or liberal within Western societies (Ryan 1992). Explicitly naming women as women as a constituency with distinctive experiences and interests, as German but not American feminists do on abortion, frequently vies with strategies that focus on downplaying differences of gender (Cott 1987; Offen 2000).

Among feminists, strategies that adapt to institutions and their constraints are often in conflict with strategies that entail staying “outside and casting blame” (Ferree and Martin 1995). This strategic debate is often pronounced initially, for example in the battered women’s movement, as a contest between more professionalized and state-supported forms of intervention in the late 1970s (Bevacqua 1999). Later, when the institutionalization of once-radical feminist goals seems commonplace (e.g., higher education for women, equal pay, or

the criminalization of rape in marriage), debates within feminist organizations may focus on how they do their practical work, such as racial inclusivity in staffing and services (Scott 1998). What remains constant is the fact that women’s choices of mobilization strategies and tactics are deeply embedded in institutional practices. How this applies to men’s choices of organizational strategy appears to have been less studied, perhaps because studies of men’s movements have been more sharply divided into competing theoretical schools in which specific organizational types were postulated as the normative standard case.

The resource mobilization approach initially took the language of corporate organization (entrepreneurs, franchises, etc.) as its dominant metaphor for thinking about movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Useful as these analogies have been, we suggest that they also have guided social movement thinking in the US toward theorizing the hierarchical, centralized, formalized organization as the normative “SMO.” Juxtaposed to this, often in a gendered and dichotomous way, were the nonhierarchical, decentralized, branching networks that were more typical of some women’s movements and some “new social movements” in Europe, as well as in the “participatory democracy” mode of organizing among a younger generation on the Left in the US within the civil rights, antiwar, feminist, peace, and environmental movements (Miller 1988; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Polletta 2002). When the NSM approach postulated this specific organizational form as defining the movements of interest, it made it difficult to see when and how transitions between organizational types might be occurring.

The synthesis into a comparative political process model seems to have resolved the tension between the two schools, but at the cost of not considering historical transformations in strategy as something to be explained. The institutionalization of class politics (but not their nineteenth and early twentieth-century feminist competitors) in Europe and the emergence of lobbying forms of movement organizations in the US in the early twentieth century to express both class and gender demands (Clemens 1997) laid the groundwork for movement organizing to follow different institutional tracks in each context. For example, network-like informal groups have remained more common for longer among feminists in Europe, while American feminist groups—like those of other movements—shifted to more conventional lobby-like structures (Ferree 1987). The basic lobby form was already part of the institutional repertoire of the US, even if the fully-professionalized SMO and “checkbook activism” that McCarthy and Zald (1977) saw emerging were innovative developments within it. In contrast, the NSM groups emphasized a style of decentralized organizing that was not in the corporate model, and that focused on identification and “lifestyle” politics in daily life (Lichterman 1996). Some of these persist among American feminists (e.g., Whittier 1995) although less significantly today than in the 1970s. As the history of women’s movements makes clear, using lifestyle to challenge social exclusion and subordination is not a new strategy (cf. the nineteenth-century dress reform of “Bloomerism” in the US and cross-dressing “Georgiansim” in France). But it competes with strategies that are more adapted to gaining access and influence within formal, state-centered politics. Working-class organizations, especially in Europe where class-based politics is institutionalized in the formal party system, have moved far away from a politics of daily life, and this makes the “new” (nonclass-based) movements appear more “radical” by contrast. As feminist politics become more anchored in party caucuses and electoral systems
in Europe, one could predict a shift away from discursive and toward more access-oriented strategies there as well, in which formal organizations would have advantages over collectives and networks.

What do these trends mean for the formal-bureaucratic and collectivist-libertarian organizational types? They do not necessarily conflict within a movement, but may offer synergistic advantages (Lollard 1995). LeviTnly (2001) offers an example of how organizations themselves see the potential “division of labor” among groups between pursuing more formal organizational strategies (e.g., those focused on electrics, legislation, courts, and rights) or more localized, community-based challenges to norms in the gay rights movement. She also suggests that the least advantaged subgroups in the movement have the most to gain by not narrowing the repertoire of contention to more formally political strategies. Particularly when the analysis of oppressive relations focuses on institutions other than the state (such as feminie critiques of organized medicine, the Catholic Church or the media), discursive and informal repertoires of contention may be especially suitable (see Taylor 1996).

But it would be a mistake to view such strategic choices of organizational form as necessarily dichotomous or exclusionary. Bord (1997) surveyed a variety of women’s movement organizations in NYC and found not only a melding of more collective and bureaucratic structures but also that networks were a particularly valued and useful organizational structure in their own right. Keck and Sikkink’s important study of transnational social movements illustrates processes particularly indicates the suitability of the “principled advocacy network” as an organizational form for working across borders (1998). Students of women’s movements have also looked critically at the use of the advocacy network as a form of taking movements inside institutions (on “NGO-ization” see Alvarez 1990; Silliman 1999), contrasting this with the model of mass movements in the streets (using numbers as a resource rather than access or expertise) and the more lifestyle approaches (focused on discourse as a resource). The differences between and transitions among these three broad types of organizational forms may be clearest when one looks at women’s movements, since all three types of mobilizing strategies have been commonly found there since the nineteenth century.

One location where the significance of all three types of organizing can be seen is the conference as a specific type of movement activity. Women’s movement campaigns based on conferences as a movement tool were a significant part of the organizational basis of first-wave feminist mobilization (Rupp 1997; Meyer and Prügl 1999), and they formed a spur to mass mobilization in the second-wave as well (cf. Ross 1982; Weiss 1999). Conferences are a means of building networks regionally around the globe among contemporary women’s movements: such “encounters” have been particularly important in Latin America (Alvarez 1990; Alvarez et al. 2003; Stephen 1997). Because conferences are both organizational and interpersonal, they offer a particularly useful melding of advocacy network and lifestyle politics, as Rupp and Taylor’s argument about social construction of affection ties of sisterhood suggests (1999).

Conferences have been a major part of the international feminist women’s movement, not only as mobilizing structures but also as elements in the repertoire of contention in their own right (see chapter 14 in this volume, for more general coverage of international conferences). As events, not merely sites where something else happens, conferences punctuate and focus organizing that has become less episodic and more regularized, giving a concrete form to an otherwise dispersed network (see Sperling [1999], on Russian; Hercu [1999a, 1999b, forthcoming], on Australian; and Stephen [1997], on Latin American conferences). Although conferences are events in the same way that a strike, a demonstration or an urban insurrection is, they have been less readily recognized as important by social movement researchers, perhaps because women have relied on them as mobilizing tools disproportionately more than men.

In sum, studies of women’s movements, their differences, and changes over time suggest that organizational repertoires may be broader, more strategic, and more interconnected than dominant ways of conceptualizing social movements suggest. The long time span of feminist movements and the variety of their organizational forms has encouraged women’s studies scholars to pay more attention to the transitions between types of organization and the strategic implications of organizational form than is found in the mainstream of social movement research. Taking full account of scholarship on women’s movements would tend to direct the social movement research agenda toward acknowledging a more diverse and varying organizational repertoire, including mobilization within institutions in addition to autonomous movement groups in bureaucratic, collectivist, and hybrid organizational forms; as well as conferences as significant events; and interpersonal networks as well as advocacy networks among NGOs as strategically important links sustaining activists over the long run.

Ideologies and Frames for Women’s Movements

The so-called “cultural turn” in social movement theory has placed increasing emphasis on discourses rather than organizations as the critical carriers of movement intentions, without always making careful distinctions between terms such as ideologies, beliefs, frames, and grievances (Oliver and Johnston 2000). Still, giving attention to ideas provides a useful point of entry into considering both micro (social psychological) and macro (institutional cultural) dynamics that the meso-level organizational emphasis of the 1980s had neglected. Research on women’s movements additionally points to blind spots at each of these levels that have been produced by taking men and male experience as the standard case for thinking about people and cultures (Ferree and Merrill 2000).

At the cultural level of institutions, the organization of public and private as gendered spheres in modern societies creates specific contradictions that are often the locus of movement debates. Especially as notions of a world polity with norms that are negotiated in transnational venues (Meyer et al. 1997) begin to challenge “realist” visions of states acting on narrow self-interest, the underlying value structures of democracy and market economies are increasingly recognized as important to what movements do and claim. Normative political theory offers useful insights into the nature of these values.

While liberal democracy defined the “rights of man,” it also premised the exercise of these formal rights on a social position as a head of a household, one who was autonomously able to enter into contracts, participate in labor markets, and exercise free choice. Even when property qualifications for such a vision of autonomous citizenship were discarded, the anchoring of concepts of modernity and democracy in a marketized and gendered vision of autonomy (freedom from family dependency
and rejection of moral claims that would interfere with self-interest) made it inconceivable to some that women could or should be included as appropriate political actors. If women are free citizens on these terms, the family and morality seem to be at risk, and resistance to feminism has been framed as the "decline of the family," "women's selfishness," and the "natural" demands of eugenics/sociobiology. Gender politics is therefore misunderstood by focusing only on feminist women's movements, and not recognizing those men's movements that raise reactionary claims, from the Boy Scouts to the Promise Keepers (Kimmel 1996; Schwab 1996).

Despite the expansion of the franchise and women's political participation around the globe, discourses of familial domesticity and religious fundamentalism continue to cast women as the preservers of "tradition" and reservoirs of moral values on whose subordination the good of the nation depends (Yuval-Davis 1997; Sper 1998). Such deeply gendered ways of thinking pervade specific claims about liberalisms, modernity, nationalism, and globalization, and continue to offer ways of articulating resistance to the state-building, science, and secularization that are seen as characteristic of contemporary public life, particularly as associated with the West. Gender ideologies, no less than those of race, class and nation, are core arguments that movements develop and on which they depend for frames that will resonate with socially institutionalized values. Antifeminist and antimiradist goals can thus logically be used to mobilize reactionary women's movements, too.

Thus if current events drive social movement analysts to consider right-wing mobilizations, antimiradist ideologies, and religious fundamentalisms as important aspects of political culture, feminist theorizing about gender and the state offers significant conceptual tools for understanding these changes and conflicts transnationally. The mobilization of racial visions of the nation often combine with masculinist discourses of humiliation and the loss of honor, whether in the US militia and Christian Identity movements (Kimmel and Ferber 2000; Blee 2002), Hindu nationalism (Sehgal 2002), or Islamic fundamentalisms (Kandiyoti 1991; Moghadam 1992). Such antimiradist movements have often been the opponents of organized feminism, and have made gender relations (along with race and nation) an explicit target of movement mobilization. Understanding gender ideologies and frames as pervasive elements in political struggles around the globe is now inescapably part of the challenge facing movement theories.

At the social psychological level, the gendering of rationality as male has led to a dichotomization of reason and emotion, leaving emotionality, the "female half," both understudied and undervalued (Taylor 1996; Ferree and Morrison 2000). Without posing women as actually any more emotional than men, studies of women's movements have challenged the idea that emotions interfere with reason rather than complementing and enhancing narrowly cognitive responses. Issues of will (motivation) and of values are especially poorly understood by a model that posits unemotional calculation of expected outcomes. Producing activists who have long-term, even lifetime, commitments to social change and the communities that sustain and support such enduring identities is one dimension of movement organizing that demands an analysis of "passions" in protest (Goodwin et al. 2001; Coman, 2001). This sort of interest in biographical models (Andrews 1991; Stryker et al. 2000; Miech and Roth 2001). Social movement organizations exist beyond the lifetimes of single individuals. They transmit ideologies over time and space, and not only recruit participants but sustain}

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Their involvement and help them to transmit values to new generations, as Roth's discussion of political socialization in the Congress of Labor Union Women (2003) and Whittier's cohort analysis of radical feminist groups in Columbus Ohio (1995) point out. Understanding such "social movement communities" (Buechter 2000) offers a less state-centered view of how social change comes to be institutionalized.

Organizational behavior is another significant dimension of movement activities that can hardly be analyzed without understanding how emotions are used to frame political action. Groves' (2001) analysis of the gendered understandings of "scientific objectivity" as valued and "empathic identification" as suspect bases for making claims about animal rights shows why and how men came to be preferred (even by women) as spokespeople for the movement, despite its majority female membership (cf. Eriwhinen 1999). Similarly, women's attempts to challenge World Bank priorities have been stifled by neo-liberal economic frameworks that reduce gender change to "the market case for gender" or "the economic rationale for investing in gender" (O'Brien et al. 2000). Cohn (1987) shows how the discourse of "defense intellectuals" makes peace talk seem "emotional" and "uniformed" while disguising nuclear planners' own emotional investments in "beautiful" weapons and in "winning" a masculinity-testing game.

While "outlaw emotions" such as rage over inequality may be important for movements to generate passion among both women and men (Jagger 1989), the expression of emotions may be regulated by gender codes that specifically associate irrationality and "tender-heartedness" to women, and can discredit the force of their claims to speak for peace, social justice, or the needy if this is defined as an "emotional" rather than a "realistic" appeal. But because emotionality is ascribed to women, women may be more aware of their emotions and more able to use them strategically, while men in movements may suffer under the illusion that they are dispassionate and fail to recognize their own visceral responses.

Overall, drawing from feminist democratic theory as well as studies of women's and men's movements to recognize that emotions and emotion work (Hochschild 1983) are part of the framing process for all movements should enrich our models of political culture and its discourses. It should also expand the model of the social movement actor from a narrowly cognitive rational actor to a more historically and biographically situated person with attachments and emotions that can be intrinsically motivating (but also open to manipulation by others). Such actors are part of communities with historically developed traditions and acquire commitments and a sense of entitlement through processes of political socialization, within movement communities as well as in mainstream, possibly patriarchal cultures. Social movement organizations, no less than individual actors, are shaped by emotion norms in the culture as well as by the personal passions of participants.

**CONCLUSION**

Looking at feminism and women's movements as a lens on social movement theory has suggested that formal and informal political opportunities, organizational structures and strategies, and frames and feelings carry gender meanings that have often been disregarded by purportedly general theories that have in practice studied men. By making gender salient and visible, feminist women's movements in particular
expose dynamics that are in play in many if not all movements. Political action, whether women's or men's, occurs within systems that have deeply institutionalized gender in their structures of formal policymaking. Gender relations are also power relations. They are therefore important for organizations and individuals that are attempting to mount political challenges on a variety of issues. Gendered repertoires of contention are strategic responses to institutions that structure oppression and opportunity along lines of gender and are therefore found in all movements that attempt to navigate such political terrains.

Making gender salient, or conversely, concealing or denying the gender dynamics that are part of institutional structures, is part of what movements do. Constructing solidarity based on gender is a dynamic process that requires work, but so also is the construction of solidarities among women and men based on other identities that are defined as more significant than gender. The intersectionality of gender, race, class, nation, and other potential identities creates specific opportunities and obstacles for collective action. Understanding these boundaries, and when and how they shift historically, poses a challenge for social movement theories that take group interests for granted and focus on explaining only what predefined groups demand of the state. Social movement theories that instead take gender relations into account from the outset suggest a more dynamic, long-term, and less state-centered approach to power, protest, and change.

While women's movements are not to be confused with specifically feminist claims, it is also clear that there will be a relationship between mobilizing women as women and challenging existing gender relations that still situate women as "outside" politics and the public. The forms that women's movements take are widely variable, as are the goals they adopt, and this variety helps to illuminate the range of ways in which opportunities, organizations, and frames are all gendered. Changing these gender relations, the objective of feminism, is one of the ongoing struggles associated with the realization of the modernist project, along with democratization, and thus a core feature of what many social movements struggle for or against. Bringing the analysis of feminist women's movements into the center of social movement theory is therefore an essential corrective to the gender blinders that have limited its vision, and will contribute to constructing more historically and geographically inclusive thinking about social movements as central to social change in modern society as well. With issues around modernization, democratization, and gender privilege animating many of the social movements that are of most concern today, the centering of a gender analysis in a long-term, historically grounded understanding of social movements, states, and societal change is more pressing and potentially fruitful than ever.

Notes

1 This assertion is based on a wide scholarship in history, political science, and political sociology as well as women's studies. Studies that have focused more narrowly may arrive at different conclusions, particularly if indicators of the women's movement are restricted to public protest events.

2 Some would call these women's activism, or mobilizations, or movements of women rather than "women's movements," but we find such a subtle linguistic distinction confusing.

References and further reading

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