Outline

• WTO Goals on Agricultural Export Subsidies
• Export Subsidies in a Small Home Country
• Export Subsidies in a Large Home Country
• Production Subsidies
• Other Developing Country Issues
This table shows the agreements made at the 2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, which had as its major focus the subsidies provided to agricultural products. This meeting was part of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, which have not yet been concluded.

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<th>Issue</th>
<th>Decision Made in Hong Kong</th>
<th>Unresolved in Hong Kong</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic farm supports</td>
<td>Agreement to classify WTO members in three bands based on their level of domestic farm support (top—European Union, middle—United States and Japan, bottom—everyone else).</td>
<td>Must agree [on] size of subsidy reduction and rules to stop countries from shifting trade-distorting subsidies into categories sheltered from deep cuts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural tariffs</td>
<td>Agreement on four tiers (different for rich and poor countries) and on a mechanism allowing poor nations to raise duties to counter import surges.</td>
<td>Must decide size of tariff cuts and number and treatment of “sensitive” and “special” products.</td>
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1 WTO Goals on Agricultural Export Subsidies

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<td>Cotton Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement to eliminate export subsidies in 2006 and grant unrestricted access for cotton exports from West African producers and other least developed countries (LDCs).</td>
<td>United States will have the “objective” of cutting its $4 billion subsidies to cotton growers further and faster than the still-to-be-agreed-upon overall reduction for domestic farm supports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial goods</td>
<td>Agreement on formula and on a “comparably high level of ambition” for tariff cuts in agriculture and industrial goods so rich nations do not demand more cuts than they give.</td>
<td>Must agree [on] key elements of formula, how much to cut, flexibilities for developing countries, and role of sectoral negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Some negotiating guidelines for trade in services agreed upon . . .</td>
<td>The European Union is pressing for liberalization timing targets opposed by developing countries; poor nations want rich ones to accept more temporary service workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Duty-free, quota-free access extended to 97% of product[s] . . . from least developed countries by 2008, allowing significant exclusions (e.g., U.S. textiles imports). More pledges of aid for trade.</td>
<td>Must agree [on] other measures to strengthen special treatment provisions for poor countries.</td>
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</table>
Figure 1.

Average Tariff Rates for Agriculture and Processed Foods, 2005

(Percent)


Notes: Tariff-rate averages are weighted by imports.
EFTA = European Free Trade Association.

Source: CBO (2006)
Figure 2.

Average Annual Rates of Reported Domestic Support, 1998 to 2005

(Percentage of the value of agricultural output)


Notes: "Support limited by reduction commitments" refers to the category of trade-distorting support that was limited and that countries made commitments to reduce in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. It is often referred to as amber-box support.

Some countries' most recent reports of their subsidies are for some year earlier than 2005. Of particular interest, the most recent reports by the European Union and the United States are for 2001. That year is before the European Union expanded from 15 member countries to 25.

Some small developed countries have substantially higher rates of domestic support for their agricultural sectors than any of the countries shown in the figure.
Agricultural Export Subsidies

• An export subsidy is payment to firms for every unit exported (either a fixed amount or a fraction of the sales price). Governments give subsidies to encourage domestic firms to produce more in particular industries.

• Europe maintains a system of agricultural subsidies known as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

• Other countries maintain similarly generous subsidies. For example, the U.S. pays cotton farmers to grow more cotton and subsidizes agribusiness and manufacturers to buy the American cotton.
WTO Goals on Agricultural Export Subsidies

Agricultural Export Subsidies

Indirect Subsidies
Included in the Hong Kong export subsidy agreement is the parallel elimination of indirect subsidies to agriculture.

Domestic Farm Supports
Another item mentioned in the Hong Kong agreement is domestic farm supports, which refers to any assistance given to farmers, even if it is not directly tied to exports.

Cotton Subsidies
Finally, export subsidies in cotton received special attention because that crop is exported by many low-income African countries and is highly subsidized in the United States.
1  WTO Goals on Agricultural Export Subsidies

Other Matters from the Hong Kong WTO Meeting

Tariffs in Agriculture

• Export subsidies applied by large countries depress world prices, so that exporting countries can expect tariffs to be imposed on the subsidized products when they are imported by other countries.

• The agriculture-exporting developing countries pushed for a dramatic reduction in these and other agriculture related tariffs.

Issues Involving Trade in Industrial Goods and Services

• There was discussion about trade in service sectors, which would benefit the industrial countries and their large service industries.

• Finally, there was agreement to allow 97% of imported products from the world’s 50 least developed countries (LDCs) to enter WTO member markets tariff-free and duty-free.
Applying a subsidy of $s$ dollars per unit exported will increase the price that Home exporters receive from $P^W$ to $P^W + s$.

As a result, the domestic price of the similar good will also rise by that amount. This price rise leads to an increase in Home quantity supplied from $S_1$ to $S_2$ and a decrease in Home quantity demanded from $D_1$ to $D_2$, in panel (a).
2 Export Subsidies in a Small Home Country

Impact of an Export Subsidy

Exports rise as a result of the subsidy, from $X_1$ to $X_2$ in panel (b).

The Home export supply curve shifts down by exactly the amount of the subsidy since the marginal cost of a unit of exports decreases by exactly $s$.

As in the case of a tariff, the deadweight loss as a result of the subsidy is the triangle $(b + d)$, the sum of consumer loss $b$ and producer loss $d$. 
2. Export Subsidies in a Small Home Country

Impact of an Export Subsidy

Impact of the Subsidy on Home Welfare

• The rise in Home price lowers consumer surplus by the amount \((a + b)\).

• The price increase raises producer surplus by the amount \((a + b + c)\).

• The export subsidy costs the government \(s\) per unit exported, shown by the area \((b + c + d)\).

• The triangle \((b + d)\) is the net loss or deadweight loss due to the subsidy in a small country.
Panel (a) shows the effects of the subsidy at Home. The Home price increases from $P^W$ to $P^* + s$, Home quantity demanded decreases from $D_1$ to $D_2$, and Home quantity supplied increases from $S_1$ to $S_2$.

The deadweight loss for Home is the area of triangle $(b + d)$, but Home also has a terms-of-trade loss of area $e$. 
3 Export Subsidies in a Large Home Country

Effect of the Subsidy

In the world market, the Home subsidy shifts out the export supply curve from $X$ to $X - s$, reflecting the lower marginal cost of exports. As a result, the world price falls from $P^W$ to $P^*$. The Foreign country gains the consumer surplus area $e'$, so the world deadweight loss due to the subsidy is the area $(b + d + f)$. The extra deadweight loss $f$ arises because only a portion of the Home terms-of-trade loss is a Foreign gain.
3 Export Subsidies in a Large Home Country

Effect of the Subsidy

Home Welfare

• The increase in the Home price from $P_W$ to $P^* + s$ reduces consumer surplus by the amount $(a + b)$ and increases producer surplus by the amount $(a + b + c)$.

• Due to the terms-of-trade effect, the revenue cost of the subsidy to the government is the area $(b + c + d + e)$, which equals $s \cdot X_2$. The net effect on welfare is $-(b + d + e)$.

Foreign and World Welfare

• While there is a terms-of-trade gain of $e'$ for the foreign country there is still an overall deadweight loss for the world, measured by the area $(b + d + f)$.
The Notes under this slide are the same as the notes under slide 9. Accurate?

JNB, 7/17/2014
APPLICATION

Who Gains and Who Loses?

We return to the agreements of the Hong Kong meeting of the WTO in December 2005 and ask: Which countries will gain and which will lose when export subsidies (including the “indirect” subsidies) are eliminated?

Gains

Current agricultural exporters will gain from the rise in world prices as agricultural subsidies by the industrialized countries—especially Europe and the United States—are eliminated.

Losses

The food-importing countries, typically the poorer non-food-producing countries, will lose. This theoretical result is confirmed by several empirical studies.
Who Gains and Who Loses?

Agriculture, Food, and Cereal Exports Panel (a) shows net agricultural exports graphed against countries’ income per capita. The poorer countries export more agricultural products overall and would thus benefit from a rise in the prices due to the removal of subsidies. On the other hand, panel (b) shows that it is middle-income countries that export the most food. Panel (c) shows that poor countries are net importers of essential food items (cereals) such as corn, rice, and wheat and would be harmed by an increase in their world price.
APPLICATION

Who Gains and Who Loses?

Food Aid

Even though the proposals from the Hong Kong talks were never ratified, and the Doha Round of negotiations is still ongoing, some recent progress has been made toward the goal of replacing food aid with efforts to increase production.

• In 2009, the Group of Eight (G8) countries pledged to increase funding for agricultural development by $14 billion per year.

• This pledge represents a shift in focus away from food aid and toward agricultural sustainability in developing countries.

• Despite this announcement, however, many observers remain skeptical that the funding will be forthcoming.
4 Production Subsidies

Suppose the government provides a subsidy of $s$ dollars for every unit that a Home firm produces. This is a production subsidy because it is a subsidy to every unit produced and not just to units that are exported.

There are several ways that a government can implement such a subsidy.

- The government might guarantee a minimum price to the farmer, and make up the difference between the minimum price and any lower price for which the farmer sells.

- Alternatively, it might provide subsidies to users of the crop to purchase it, thus increasing demand and raising market prices; this would act like a subsidy to every unit produced.
In panel (a), applying a production subsidy of $s$ dollars per unit produced will increase the price that Home firms receive from $P^W$ to $P^W + s$. This price rise leads to an increase in Home quantity supplied from $S_1$ to $S_2$. The consumer price at Home is not affected because the production subsidy does not distinguish between items sold at Home or exported (firms therefore continue to charge the world price at Home), so the quantity demanded stays at $D_1$. 

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The deadweight loss of the subsidy for a small country is the area $c$. In panel (b), exports rise as a result of the production subsidy, from $X_1$ to $X_2$, though the increase in exports is less than for the export subsidy because, for the production subsidy, quantity demanded does not change at Home.
Effect of a Production Subsidy in a Small Home Country

Targeting Principle

Our finding that the deadweight loss is lower for the production subsidy makes it a better policy than the export subsidy to increase Home supply. This finding is an example of the targeting principle: to achieve some objective, it is best to use the policy instrument that achieves the objective most directly.

There are many examples of using a targeting principle in economics:

• Taxes on cigarettes and gasoline.
• To use an example from this book, it is better to provide trade adjustment assistance directly to those affected, than to impose a tariff or quota.
Effect of a Production Subsidy in a Large Home Country

- Notice that the rise in the quantity of exports due to the production subsidy, from point $B$ to $C'$ in Figure 10-4, is less than the increase in the quantity of exports for the export subsidy, from point $B$ to $C'$ shown in Figure 10-1.

- With the export subsidy, the price for Home producers and consumers rose to $P^W + s$, so exports increased because of both the rise in quantity supplied and the drop in quantity demanded.
4. Production Subsidies

Effect of a Production Subsidy in a Large Home Country

- As a result, the export subsidy shifted the Home export supply curve down by exactly the amount $s$ in Figure 10-1.

- In contrast, with a production subsidy, exports rise only because Home quantity supplied increases so that export supply shifts down by an amount less than $s$ in Figure 10-4.
4 Production Subsidies

Effect of a Production Subsidy in a Large Home Country

• If we drew a downward-sloping Foreign import demand curve in panel (b), then the increase in supply as a result of the production subsidy would lower the world price.

• But that drop in world price would be less than the drop that occurred with the export subsidy because the increase in exports under the production subsidy is less.
Summary Figure 3.
Breakdown of Domestic Support by Categories in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Average Annual Reported Values, 1998 to Present

Note: Numbers are based on subsidy data reported to the World Trade Organization by the countries in question as of June 30, 2005. The most recent reports by most countries are for 2002 or earlier. See Table 13 in the main text for source and additional notes.
Full Ag. Trade Liberalization

• From CBO (2006)
• Biggest ag sector benefits: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina.
• Biggest ag sector losses: members of the European Union and the European Free Trade Association and high-income Asian countries
• If phase-out by 2010, then by 2015: resulting efficiency gains and investment growth would be in the range of $50 billion to $185 billion, or 0.1 percent to 0.4 percent of the value of world output of all goods and services, or roughly 3 percent to 13 percent of the value added by world agriculture.
Developing Country Issues

• Access to Patented Medicines

Doha Sec 6: “WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”

• Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment

Five S&D provisions for LDCs, including the tariff-free and quota-free access for LDC goods described in the NAMA section.

Fergusson/CRS (2011)
NAMA: Non Agricultural Market Access

...tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation.” Tariff peaks are considered to be tariff rates of above 15% and often protect sensitive products from competition. Tariff escalation is the practice of increasing tariffs as value is added to a commodity. The talks are also seeking to reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers, which include import licensing, quotas and other quantitative import restrictions, conformity assessment procedures, and technical barriers to trade. The sectoral elimination of tariffs for specific groups has also be forwarded as an area of negotiation. Negotiators accepted the concept of less than full reciprocity in reductions for developing and least-developed countries.

Fergusson/CRS (2011)