Sex and Authority in the Workplace: The Causes of Sexual Inequality

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SEX AND AUTHORITY IN THE WORKPLACE

This paper contributes to our understanding of the causes of the restriction of women from positions of authority in the workplace. We ascertain the extent to which the sex gap in aspects of authority can be explained by the following three factors: (1) women’s qualifications, (2) the behaviors and policies of employers, and (3) the attitudes and behaviors of women themselves.

We find that while the amount of sex difference in aspects of authority that can be explained by women’s qualifications is substantial, it is not the most important factor responsible for the restriction of women from positions of authority. Furthermore, strong evidence is presented that suggests that the behaviors and policies of employers are much more important causes of sexual differences in authority in the workplace than are the attitudes and behaviors of the women themselves.

An individual’s power and social position flows predominantly from his/her position in an economic organization, be it large or small, public or private (Dahrendorf, 1957; Galbraith, 1969). The essential feature of power in organizations is the ability to control resources: capital, people’s work, and things. Indeed, for most people, being “higher up” means precisely this: the ability to control one’s work and the work process of others.

While men have obtained power through their positions in the work setting, women’s power traditionally has derived from their roles in the family. It has been argued that women gained social position from the men in their lives, first from their fathers and then from their husbands (Parsons, 1942; 1955). This stems from the fact that until quite recently, women’s traditional role obligations centered on marriage and childbearing, and their commitment to paid employment was viewed as secondary to their other role obligations (Myrdal and Klein, 1956; Parsons, 1942; 1955; Smuts, 1971). We argue that since,
in the past, women largely derived their social positions from their families, they were restricted from positions of power in the work setting. However, the traditional view of women's roles has begun to break down as more women are in paid employment and women are more likely to work throughout their lives. This results in women's employment becoming an integral part of the family's social position (Sampson and Rossi, 1975). Furthermore, more women are likely to head their own families (Ross and Sawhill, 1975) and rely on their own work activities to obtain power and money. In short, women's situations have changed, and many now rely on their own work activities as an important mechanism for obtaining power in society.

Despite these changes, women are much less likely to be in positions of power in the workplace than are men (Wolf and Fligstein, 1979; Grimm and Stern, 1974; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973). Furthermore, sexual differences in power in the work setting recently have been found to be an important factor generating inequality in earnings between men and women (Roos, 1978; Robinson and Kelly, 1977). If one is interested in remedying sexual inequality in the workplace, it is helpful to understand how these differences in power are generated.

It is the purpose of this paper to contribute to the understanding of the allocation of men and women into positions of power in the work setting. We are concerned with legitimated power in the work setting: authority (Hall, 1972; Mechanic, 1962; Weber, 1947). We define authority as legitimated control over the work process of others.

What do we already know about sexual inequality in authority in the workplace? First, census data indicate that women are much less likely to be in the major occupation group, "managers and administrators, except farm," than are men.1 Second, although women are highly represented in certain professional occupations (nurse, social worker, school teacher, librarian), men are overrepresented in the higher level positions within these professions (Grimm and Stern, 1974). Hence, even in the sectors of the labor force where women predominate, men tend to be in supervisory roles. In general, women tend to be excluded from occupations which by definition involve supervising others and they tend not to assume supervisory positions in work settings in which they dominate, let alone in mixed work groups. Recent research has shown that women are much less likely than men to be in positions of authority, even when they have the same level of education and occupational status, and that this difference cannot be explained by the fact that men are more likely to be self-employed (Wolf and Fligstein, 1979). In sum, there is evidence of marked sexual inequality in authority in the workplace.

No existing research suggests how these sex differences in authority in economic organizations are generated. We assess the relative importance of three sets of factors that partially account for the unequal distribution of men and women in positions of authority: (1) women's qualifications, (2) the behaviors and policies of employers, and (3) the attitudes and behaviors of the women themselves.

First, it is likely that women are restricted from positions of authority because they are less qualified on the following grounds: (1) their training, (2) their intermittent patterns of employment, (3) their lack of sufficient tenure and commitment to the firm, and (4) restrictions on their geographic mobility as well as travel for work purposes because of their family situations (Blau and Jusenius, 1976; Oppenheimer, 1970).

Second, the restriction of females from positions of authority may be due to the behaviors and policies of employers. Individual employers or persons with the power to hire and promote may restrict females from positions of authority because of their attitudes about women's ability to perform in supervisory positions. In this society, persistent sex-role
socialization has led to a well-defined division of labor within the family. This has had implications for the kinds of positions employers have thought were appropriate for women (Boulding, 1976; Bernard, 1976; Hartmann, 1976). Employers' views on women's ability to perform in positions of authority are shaped by employers' attitudes on what women's roles should be as well as the actual behavior of women. Many employers feel women are too emotional and are therefore unfit to be in supervisory positions (Kantor, 1977; Bowman et al., 1965). There is also a strong belief among employers and workers that women should not supervise male or mixed-work groups (Caplow, 1954; Kantor, 1977; Whyte, 1949; Oppenheimer, 1970; Bowman et al., 1965; National Manpower Council, 1957). In short, we argue:

(1) that employers have strong feelings about the appropriateness and ability of women to assume supervisory positions, especially those positions involving supervision of mixed-sex or all-male work groups; and (2) that these attitudes affect the allocation of females into these positions. This is, in essence, a statistical discrimination argument (Phelps, 1972; Thurow, 1975) in that an individual female may be restricted from such a position regardless of her employment history because an individual employer believes that members of her sex, for whatever reason, are unsuited for assuming such roles.

Employers also restrict women from positions of authority because of rules and policies within the organization, but not necessarily specific to it. Segmented labor market theory suggests that women are placed in sectors where jobs have limited promotion possibilities (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Gordon, 1972; Wolf and Rosenfeld, 1978). Because of these limited career progressions, women would be less likely to be in positions of authority than men. While labor market structures exist outside any given organization, they are reflected in the policies and practices of any organization. It is also possible that union/management contracts may inhibit women's movements into positions of authority. For example, contracts which specify "last hired/first fired" conditions seem to have more impact on the career lines of women than men. In sum, we posit that employers' behaviors and policies have a marked impact on the sexual distribution of authority in the workplace.

Another reason for not expecting women to occupy positions of authority concerns some women's views of their own competence for such positions as well as their lack of desire to be in supervisory roles. Some women, not having been socialized into leadership roles, may see themselves as less capable of assuming such positions. Because women are more likely to anticipate interruptions in paid employment, they may be unwilling to make the long-term commitment to an employer that a position of authority often entails.

By empirically assessing the importance of these three factors for the explanation of the restriction of females from positions of authority, we will understand whether the major differences between men and women in authority are due to factors under the control of the individual or factors resulting from the behavior of others in the labor market. This is valuable as it suggests the direction that policy makers or people interested in achieving sexual equality in the workplace should direct their attention.

**Analytic Strategy**

In our empirical analyses, we will assess the importance of our various explanations of sex differences in authority in the workplace. This requires an approach that allows us to divide some measured difference into components that can be attributed to the various explanations we have suggested. To do this, we begin by estimating the following reduced-form equation separately for each sex:

\[ A = f(Ed, Exp, Ten, Cm, Chdn), \]  

(1)

where A is authority, Ed is education, Exp is work experience, Ten is tenure with current employer, Cm is currently married, and Chdn is whether the respondent had any children. Education, work experience, and tenure are tapping differ-
ent aspects of human capital. Marital status and the presence of children tap the restrictions on geographical mobility and travel for work purposes imposed on females by their family situations. The parameters in these equations indicate the differential effects by sex of an individual's qualifications on the acquisition of authority. Moreover, in estimating these parameters, we are able to determine the extent to which the gross sex difference in authority is due to women's inferior qualifications. We will decompose the gross sex difference in authority into three components: that due to composition on qualifications; that due to differential effects of these factors; and that due to the interaction between the two (Winsborough and Dickinson, 1971; Althauser and Wrigler, 1972; see Fligstein, 1976, or Halaby, forthcoming, for an example). The component due to differential composition of the sexes on these five factors represents the amount of the sex difference that is due to the fact that women have inferior qualifications (less labor force experience, education, or tenure with current employer or family situations which inhibit their assuming positions of authority). We use the reduced-form equations to derive such an estimate in order to obtain an upper bound estimate of the amount due to inferior qualifications. It is essential to identify the extent to which this explanation is operating as women presumably could increase their authority in the workplace by improving their qualifications. Here we are making the assumption that women are unable to improve, through their own actions, their returns on these characteristics. That portion of the sex difference in authority that is not attributable to composition on these characteristics is due to either of our other two explanations or other unspecified arguments.

In order to assess the importance of the behaviors and policies of employers and the attitudes and behaviors of women, we estimate the following equation separately for each sex.

\[ A = f(Ed, Exp, Ten, Cm, Chdn, Male, Unlabeled, Status), \tag{2} \]

where Male is whether or not an individual is in a job that is predominantly male, Unlabeled is whether or not an individual is in a job that is not sex-typed, and Status is the occupational status of the job. These variables represent different characteristics of jobs.\(^2\) There is an implicit ordering here. The human capital and family factors are attributes that an individual brings to the workplace, while the measures of job characteristics reflect aspects of the position an individual occupies in the work setting. Both sets of factors are expected to affect the probability of having authority in the work setting.

The parameters in these equations give us a mapping of how people get into positions of authority in the workplace and indicate how the effects of exogenous variables tapping qualifications are mediated by characteristics of jobs. Our ability to ascertain the extent to which women's and employers' behaviors affect the restriction of women from supervisory positions derives from the decomposition of the effects of job characteristics in these equations. That component due to composition on job characteristics could be due to either of two factors: women's or employers' behaviors. Some women may not desire positions with a lot of responsibility over the work of others. If this were the case, one might expect these women

\(^2\) Some critics of this paper were uneasy with our measures of characteristics of jobs. For example, one argued that we ought to include major occupation groups or at least a dummy variable for whether the individual was in the census major group manager or not. Although we had considered this, the results of such models would, we thought, be tautological. Another critic felt that it was inappropriate to include prestige as one could argue that authority causes prestige. This argument is sensible if one uses occupational prestige to mean a measure of social honor. Here, we use occupational status as an attribute of the job which pertains to the "goodness" of that position. We are not concerned with social honor per se, but rather the extent to which the goodness of a job affects the likelihood of exercising authority. Clearly, these are different interpretations of the status and prestige metrics. Given the selection of status rather than prestige, and given that we interpret status as a characteristic of a job and not a measure of the general social standing of the individual, we feel that we are justified in including it in our models as prior to authority in the workplace.
to select positions which have a low probability of having any authority. For example, some women may choose female sex-labeled jobs with the expectation that they will entail few responsibilities which involve controlling the work of others. On the other hand, employers, because of their beliefs about women’s ability to perform in supervisory positions, may direct or track females into positions which have little likelihood of involving supervision. Thus, the component of the sex difference in authority due to composition on job characteristics could be due either to women’s or employers’ behaviors. However, the job characteristics rates component is almost entirely due to the behavior of employers. If men get different amounts of authority than women for being in a high-status occupation, net of qualifications and sex-label of job held, then these differences must be due to the fact that employers are treating men and women disparately. Although we are not able to uniquely attribute portions of the sex gap in authority to the behaviors of employers and women, we can, through this decomposition, ascertain the relative importance of these two factors for the restriction of females from positions of authority.

In short, our regressions and subsequent decompositions will achieve two goals: (1) show the differential effects by sex of human capital, family characteristics, and job characteristics on the allocation of men and women into positions of authority; and (2) allow us to assess the relative importance of these three kinds of factors for the restriction of females from positions of authority.

Data, Variables, and Analytic Technique

Data. The data are from the Wisconsin Study of Social and Psychological Factors in Socioeconomic Achievements; this is a longitudinal study of a random sample of 10,317 persons who were seniors in Wisconsin high schools in 1957 (Sewell and Hauser, 1975). A follow-up study of the members of the sample was executed during 1975; completed interviews of 9,138 respondents (or 88.5% of the original sample) were obtained. The data for these analyses are drawn from the 1975 follow-up interviews. Using this data set means that there are no individuals with less than 12 years of education included in the sample. The results cannot be generalized to non-high school graduates. Furthermore, we are investigating the distribution of authority at midlife (around age 37) and our results do not address the issue of the distribution of authority in the work setting for the total working population or for one cohort earlier or later in their life course. One could argue that by observing individuals at midlife, there does not exist sufficient variation in the dependent variable, as individuals might be more likely to have authority in the work setting later in their life course. This is not problematic as evidenced by the marginal distributions on the authority variables which are presented in Table 1.

The present analysis concerns 3,359 men and 2,254 women: (1) who were employed in the civilian labor force during the week of the survey in 1975; (2) who were not self-employed; and (3) for whom data were available on all relevant variables. The largest sample attrition for females was due to the current employment restriction. Although information on authority was obtained for all individuals who had worked in the last five years, we could not construct the experience or ten-

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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the Analyses
ure variables for those who were not currently employed. It could be argued that, since women move in and out of paid employment, one could obtain a clearer picture of sex differences in authority by including in the sample women who had been employed during the last five years but who were not currently employed. An inspection of the distribution of the authority variables by current employment status for women indicates that women who are currently employed are much more likely to be in positions of authority in the workplace than were women who were not currently employed but had been employed during the last five years. This suggests that our exclusion of women who were not currently employed but did have recent work experience will result in an underestimation of the female disadvantage in authority in the workplace. We also have excluded self-employed people. Our three explanations related to why women as employees do not assume positions of authority within an economic organization. It should be noted that there are other ways to obtain authority in the workplace. Self-employed individuals who have others working for them have authority on the job. Men are more likely than women to be self-employed (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973; Wolf and Fligstein, forthcoming) and to have more authority if they are self-employed. Since the processes by which an individual obtains authority as an employee are probably quite different from the mechanism by which self-employed workers gain authority over others, we have decided to exclude self-employed people.

Variables. The dependent variables on authority in the workplace are derived from yes-no responses to the following set of questions:

1. I have authority to hire or fire others.
2. I can influence or set the rate of pay received by others.
3. I supervise the work of others, that is, what they produce or how much.

As earlier stated, these questions tap the amount of control over the work of others an individual has in the workplace. In our analyses, we treat these questions separately as dependent variables. Our decision to treat these as distinct aspects of authority was based on the conclusion that any scale combining these three aspects might mask or camouflage important sex differences in authority in the workplace. Having responsibility to hire and fire and/or determine pay represents a much higher level of authority than does having the responsibility of supervising others. It is probably the case that the processes by which people obtain these higher levels of authority are quite different from the manner in which people obtain these lower supervisory positions. In short, it is likely that women are discriminated against less in acquisition of positions with mere supervisory power than in their attainment of positions with more responsibility. Averaging these differences over level of supervision would not allow us to discriminate these different processes. Furthermore, different scaling options created methodological problems.

There is an extensive literature on authority in organizations (Weber, 1947; Azumi and Hage, 1972; Mechanic, 1962; Blau, 1964; 1968; Blau and Scott, 1962; Thompson, 1967; Crozier, 1964; Hall, 1972, to mention a few). This literature is mainly concerned with the levels of authority within organizations and in particular at what level various kinds of decisions are made (locus of control). Further this literature is interested in different dimensions of authority (or power). For example, distinctions between professional and bureaucratic authority, or traditional, legal, and charismatic authority are important. Our interest is not in the structure of organizations, but in the individual distribution of authority. From our point of view, it is also not critical to understand what the source of authority is (for example, is it professional or bureaucratic?), but rather our interest is in how much control an individual has.

Although these three variables form a Guttman scale, one could not assume that the scale was an interval one. Scales derived from factor analysis

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3 It is also possible that the process of acquiring authority in the workplace differs for currently employed and those who are not currently employed but had worked in the last five years. In short, we may have a censoring problem (see Heckman, 1974, and Fligstein and Wolf, 1978, for discussion of this problem). It is reasonable to argue, however, that if those not currently employed but employed within the last five years were included, the differences between the parameters for the sexes would be more divergent than they are in our current analysis.

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Education is measured by the number of years of formal schooling completed after high school. Experience is measured by 1—Time Out, where Time Out is the proportion of months between high school graduation and the time of the interview when the respondent was known to be out of the civilian labor force. For males, we used detailed information on the timing of all levels of schooling, military service, and work in 1974 as a way to assign an individual’s months as out of the civilian labor force. For females, additional information was used to code months as out of the civilian labor force: (1) did they work in every relevant interval between important life cycle events;⁶ (2) how long (in weeks) after the beginning of the interval did they return to work; (3) how long (in weeks) before the end of the interval did they quit working; and (4) how many hours a week did they work during the interval? The use of this additional information in constructing the experience measure for females results in a very good measure for them. Since this additional information was not available for men, we could not provide an exact equivalent for males. The measure for males slightly overestimates labor market experience since we must assume that men were employed when they were not in school or in the military. This is not an unreasonable assumption since a sample of predominantly white males with a high school education usually are employed quite regularly throughout their life course. It should be noted that utilizing this additional data for females when it is not available for men is much preferable to the

other two alternatives available to us. If we had utilized the well-known formula for experience, AGE — SCHOOLING — 6, we would have found that women had slightly more experience than men since age is fairly constant in the sample and women obtain less schooling than men do. If we had used only the information that we had for both sexes to assign months to not employed in the civilian labor market, we would have found that women had quite a bit more experience than men because of the schooling differential and the enormous sex differential in time spent in the military. Both of these options distort the data. Furthermore, since one of our goals is to attribute some of the sex difference in authority to women’s employment histories, it is mandatory that we have the best available measure of experience. Our measure is clearly superior to the other alternatives available in this data set and to most of the other commonly used measures of experience for men and women.

Tenure is measured by the number of months from the time the individual first started working at the place of current employment to the time of interview minus the number of months during this period that the individual was known not to be working.⁷ The latter correction for time not working was made because females are more likely to have intermittent employment; it is possible that even though they started work with their cur-

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⁶ The intervals were (depending on the number of live births): marriage to first birth, first births to second birth, second birth to third birth, third birth to fourth birth, next to last to last birth (if more than four children). We also have information on the interval end of last period to time of interview where end of last period was marriage for those with no children and the last live birth for those with children.

⁷ The tenure question harbors some ambiguities. The question is: In what month or year did you start working there? It appeared directly following a question concerning the name and place where he/she worked. The problem is that the word “there” lacks a referent. That is, it is unclear whether it refers to a geographical location or a parent firm. This ambiguity is not too problematic for females as their geographic mobility is restricted to some extent by their families and rarely will the women’s occupational mobility result in the geographic movement of the whole family. For men, upward occupational mobility is often accompanied by geographic mobility from one establishment to another within a parent firm. If some men conceive of “there” as referring to local establishment, it is possible that time “there” would be negatively related to positions of high authority, and tenure at firm may be underestimated. It is hard to judge the extent of this problem. However, it is reassuring to note that men’s tenure levels are much higher than women’s. Further, this ambiguity may arise only for a small number of men.
rent employer several years ago, they may have interrupted their employment. Thus, tenure measures the number of months worked at current place of employment.

Currently married is measured by a dummy variable which assumes a value of one if the person is currently married and a zero otherwise. This variable taps the extent to which the presence of a spouse (and the incumbent realities of his/her work) restricts access to authority in the work setting due to restricted geographical mobility and travel for work.

Children is measured by a dummy variable which assumes a value of one if the individual has had any live births and zero otherwise. We dichotomized this variable because it is not the number of children but the presence of a child which might restrict mobility of females.

Sex composition of the individual’s occupation is tapped by two dummy variables. Male occupation is a dummy variable for whether the individual was in an occupation which is 0% to 14% female; unlabeled occupation is a dummy variable for whether the individual was in an occupation which is 15% to 74% female; the omitted category is female occupation (75% to 100% female). We used the 1970 Census of the Population Subject Report on Occupational Characteristics to determine the percentage female in each three-digit occupation. There are a variety of ways to operationalize sex-label of occupation. For example, Oppenheimer (1970) considers an occupation disproportionately female when the occupation contains a higher proportion of female workers than the labor market as a whole. For these analyses, we chose to designate highly sex-segregated occupations as male and female occupations and to include an unlabeled category which is quite heterogeneous with respect to sex composition.

Status is the occupational status (Duncan, 1961; Featherman et al., 1974) of the current job.

Analytical technique. In our analyses, we use multiple regression with a dummy dependent variable as well as decomposition techniques. Since the dependent variable is a dichotomy, the estimate of the dependent variable produced by the model can be interpreted as the probability that an individual had that aspect of authority. There are problems using ordinary least squares when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Goldberger, 1964); these can be particularly problematic when the mean probability does not range between .25 and .75. We chose to use ordinary least squares for two reasons: (1) four of the six dependent variables have mean probabilities within the .25 to .75 range; and (2) various kinds of log-linear models presented other serious problems. One consequence of this decision is low $R^2$ values.

Results

Table 1 presents means and standard deviations on all variables in the analysis. From the first three rows, we can see the extent of the gross sex differences in authority. These sex differences are quite large: 28% of male employees have the responsibility to hire and fire others while only 8.8% of the women do. In terms of control over the pay of others the comparable figures are 37.4% (male) and 14.1% (female). Sixty and seven-tenths percent of the men supervise others while 37.8% of the women do. The absolute difference between the male and female means is about the same (.21) on all three dimensions. In short, women have much less authority as employees in firms than men do, regardless of what aspect of authority is considered. We shall not discuss the rest of the table except to say that the means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables are as expected.

Table 2 presents parameters for Equation (1) (the reduced-form equation for each sex). The columns labeled sex difference are the results for regressions pooled for the sexes. The parameters in those columns represent the effects of the interaction terms between sex and the variables in the pooled model and thus

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* The sex differences in education are larger than are obtained from national cross-sectional samples (Treiman and Terrell, 1975; McClendon, 1976; Featherman and Hauser, 1976). This results from the fact that our sample includes only high school graduates. Women are more likely to finish high school but are less likely to complete each subsequent year (Folger and Nam, 1967).
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<td>(.096)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>-.00028*</td>
<td>.0004*</td>
<td>-.00068*</td>
<td>-.00018</td>
<td>.00039*</td>
<td>-.00057*</td>
<td>.00012</td>
<td>.0008*</td>
<td>-.00068*</td>
<td>.00014</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.00027)</td>
<td>(.0004)</td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00013)</td>
<td>(.00014)</td>
<td>(.00022)</td>
<td>(.00014)</td>
<td>(.00017)</td>
<td>(.00024)</td>
<td>(.00014)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.00027)</td>
<td>(.00014)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.00027)</td>
<td>(.0004)</td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently Married</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.0009</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.114*</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.133*</td>
<td>.079*</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.105*</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.105*</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.216</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.587</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.587</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significantly different from zero at the .05 level.
indicate whether the sex differences are statistically significant. These parameters indicate the total effects of human capital factors as well as the effects of family characteristics on the acquisition of authority in the workplace. As expected, the parameters indicate marked sex differences. Post-high school education is an important mechanism by which both men and women obtain authority, as witnessed by the size and statistical significance of its effects. Men and women obtain quite different authority returns on these investments, at least at higher levels of authority. In terms of gaining access to positions with the responsibility to hire and fire and/or determine pay, men receive about three times the return to each year of post-high school education than women do. For example, in the hire and fire equation, for each additional year of post-high school education, a man's probability of being responsible for hiring and firing others increases about 4% for each additional year whereas the comparable figure for women is 1.5. Similar patterns appear in the pay equation. Other than the fact that women get fewer payoffs for their schooling, these differences may reflect the divergent types of major fields of study chosen by men and women in post-high school education. For example, one would expect a man who majored in business to have greater access to a position of authority than a woman with a degree in nursing. Sex differences in returns to education do not appear in access to positions with mere supervisory power. Therefore, it appears that the lower the level of authority considered, the more egalitarian is the process of acquiring that level of authority, at least with respect to education.

The effects of experience are essentially similar across all aspects of authority. For men, experience has no effect on authority. There are two possible explanations for this lack of effect. First, the kind of interruptions in employment that could affect men's acquisition of authority are not necessarily being tapped by our experience measure. Second, there is little variance in experience for men in our sample and in the population of white male high school graduates at large. In other words, males tend to work almost continuously and the only interruptions we measure (for education and military) do not affect their acquisition of authority in the workplace. Experience has substantively important, statistically significant, positive effects on all aspects of authority for women. If a woman had been in the civilian labor market all months from high school graduation until the time of interview instead of none, her probability of hiring and firing others would increase by .11, of having responsibility for pay would increase by .22, and of supervising others would increase by .30. The pattern suggests that experience has its largest effects on acquisition of lower levels of supervision. Although these effects are quite large, they are not as large as they seem, since a one-unit change in experience is the full range of the variable. The experience effect for women is probably due to the fact that: (1) increased work experience results in an increase in on-the-job training, which makes an individual more capable of assuming positions of responsibility; and (2) employers consider past employment history as a good indicator of women's current and future commitment to work in the paid labor force.

Tenure with current employer has quite different effects on authority for men and women. For women, tenure has a positive, statistically significant effect on each aspect of authority; however, these effects are not very large. A five-year increase in time with current employer increases the probability of hiring and firing or determining pay by .024; the comparable increase in the probability of supervising others is .048. For men, tenure with current employer only has a negative, statistically significant effect on the probability of hiring and firing others; however, the effect is very small such that a five-year increase in tenure reduces the probability of hiring and firing by .017. This small negative effect could be caused

---

9 By higher levels of authority, we mean ability to hire, fire, and determine pay. We discuss these together as these two equations appear remarkably similar for each sex. Clearly, our measures do not tap the highest levels of authority: the ability to make decisions concerning the creation and discontinuation of actual positions.
by two factors: (1) for men, highest level management positions often are filled from outside the firm rather than from within; and (2) the ambiguity of the question used to construct tenure for men who simultaneously experienced upward occupational mobility and geographical mobility (see fn. 7). In general, access to positions of authority in economic organizations is minimally affected (if at all) by tenure with current employer for men. However, for females, tenure with current employer has small effects on access to higher level supervisory positions and somewhat more of an effect on access to lower level positions of authority. The effects of tenure for women have two possible explanations: (1) women receive higher returns to on-the-job firm-specific training since higher level female managers often are produced from within rather than brought from outside (because of a presumed lack of qualified female managers); and (2) employers use length of service as an indicator of a woman's commitment to the employer and the paid labor force.

The two other variables in the reduced-form equations of Table 2 are whether the individual is currently married and whether the individual had any children. It is possible that women are restricted from positions of authority due to their limited geographical mobility and restrictions on travel for work purposes due to the presence of a spouse and/or children. There is no evidence for this, since each of these variables relating to a woman’s family situation lacks substantively important effects on any aspects of authority. That these variables lack effects for females is neither surprising nor in conflict with earlier arguments. There are three ways in which the presence of children and marital status could affect women’s access to authority: (1) women could be staying at home with children or being housewives, thereby reducing their work experience and job tenure; (2) women could be restricted in their ability to travel for work purposes or their geographic mobility could be limited by their spouses; and (3) other unspecified possibilities could be operating. Since tenure and experience are controlled in this equation, the variables indicating whether or not children are present and whether or not the woman is married would only have significant effects if the latter two factors were important. Although women’s family factors may be related to their experience and tenure, they do not have any direct effects on authority.

The presence of children has a persistent nontrivial positive effect on each aspect of authority for men. This result is a bit surprising (but see Cramer, 1977, and Duncan et al., 1972). There are three possible explanations for this result. First, men with children may work harder because of the need to support additional individuals (Duncan et al., 1972:243). Second, men without children may be freer to consider other aspects of jobs besides earnings and power than are men with children. Third, the small group of men who have not had children by age 35 may be handicapped, ill, or may have spent a portion of their adult lives in institutions. All of these explanations are compatible with Cramer’s (1977) finding that having a child positively affects a man’s earnings, net of any increase in hours worked.

Table 3 presents a decomposition of the gross sex difference in different aspects of authority into three components: that due to compositional differences on human capital/family factors between the sexes; that due to differential rates of returns on

Table 3. Decomposition of the Authority Gap Using Only Human Capital/Family Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Gross</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Responsibility to Hire and Fire Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Responsibility for Pay of Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>-27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Responsibility to Supervise Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>-48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
human capital/family factors; and that due to an interaction between composition and rates. The males are used as a standard in this analysis. It should be noted that these decompositions are not unique as different standard populations could produce different results. Here, the choice of males as the standard was based on the fact that females have less authority than men and our interest is in seeing how the positions of females would be improved under different situations.

The purpose of this particular decomposition is to indicate the extent to which the restriction of females from positions of authority is due to their inferior qualifications. The extent of the sex difference due to this factor is measured by the component due to composition. This component indicates how much of the sex difference in authority would be alleviated if women had the same amount of education, experience, tenure, and the same family situations as men did but still had their own returns on these characteristics. Two-sevenths (28.6%) of the sex difference in the probability of hiring and firing others would disappear if women were as well-qualified as men on these factors; the comparable figure for the sex difference in control over pay is 36.9% and for supervising others it is 64.2%. The percentages of the sex difference in authority due to composition is nontrivial, suggesting that part of the reason women are excluded from positions of authority is their inferior qualifications. However, with respect to all three aspects of authority in the workplace, that proportion of the sex difference due to women's inferior qualifications is smaller than that due to differential returns on individual characteristics. Thus, even though the component due to women's inferior qualifications is significant, this is not the most important reason for women's restrictions from positions of authority. Last, the percentage of the sex difference that is due to women's inferior qualifications depends on level of authority; the higher the level of authority the smaller the percentage of the sex difference explained by women's qualifications. If women and men were equally well-qualified on human capital and family factors, women would still have very restricted access to the higher level supervisory positions.10

The second half of our analyses allows us to assess the extent to which sex differences in authority are caused by women's and employers' behaviors. Table 4 presents parameters from equations predicting authority in the workplace where the independent variables are not only human capital/family factors but also certain characteristics of jobs. In our discussion of this table, we shall consider the two aspects of authority which represent upper level supervisory responsibilities together since patterns of effects are similar across these two aspects. Our discussion of these equations centers on two main issues: (1) the extent to which the exogenous variables are mediated by the characteristics of jobs; and (2) the differential effects of job characteristics.

In the equations predicting an individual's probability of hiring and firing or having control over pay, we find marked sex differences with the addition of job characteristics. Education has a statistically significant effect for men but not for women; about 70% of the effect of post-

10 It is necessary to assess the extent to which the component of the sex gap in authority that is due to women's inferior qualifications is over- or underestimated. There are two arguments suggesting that this component is overestimated and one suggesting that it is underestimated. First, because the decompositions are calculated from the reduced-form equations, they produce an upper bound estimate of the importance of composition on qualifications. This is because we are tapping the total effects of these variables; clearly, some of the effects are mediated by job characteristics. Second, since work experience may be slightly overestimated for men, the component due to composition on human capital/family factors is overestimated somewhat because if there were no measurement error, the mean on experience for men would be lower. The component due to composition could be underestimated as our measure of education does not tap the differences in the major areas in which men and women receive training. That is, part of the large differences in the effects of education on authority for men and women may be due to the fact that men (more than women) may choose college majors which increase their access to positions of authority. If measures of majors were included, the rate differences between men and women for years of schooling could decrease, and the composition differences in college majors could explain more of the authority gap between men and women. Thus, the differences due to composition could be underestimated.
Table 4. Regressions of Three Aspects of Authority on Human Capital/Family Factors and Job Position Variables by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hire-Fire</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Supervise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Sex Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metric (SE)</td>
<td>Metric (SE)</td>
<td>Metric (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.012* (.005)</td>
<td>.0038 (.0038)</td>
<td>.0007 (.0007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>.115 (.072)</td>
<td>.085* (.031)</td>
<td>.029 (.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>-.0002 (.0013)</td>
<td>.0003* (.00013)</td>
<td>-.0005* (.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently Married</td>
<td>.024 (.027)</td>
<td>.021 (.016)</td>
<td>.003 (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.095* (.025)</td>
<td>-.021 (.020)</td>
<td>.116* (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>.006* (.0004)</td>
<td>.002* (.0003)</td>
<td>.004* (.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.189* (.051)</td>
<td>.156* (.024)</td>
<td>.032 (.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlabeled</td>
<td>.137* (.051)</td>
<td>.057* (.012)</td>
<td>.080 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.399 (.122)</td>
<td>-.110 (.072)</td>
<td>-.074 (.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.122 (.136)</td>
<td>.072 (.072)</td>
<td>.160 (.160)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significantly different from zero at .05 level.
high school education is mediated by job characteristics for men while all of the effect of education is mediated by these characteristics for women. This means that education is important in women’s access to positions which involve high level supervision only because it helps to place them in jobs which have higher probabilities of having these responsibilities. For men, however, post-high school education is not only important because it helps locate them in certain jobs that have high probabilities of having authority, but also because, net of job characteristics, men’s educational credentials give them access to additional authority in the workplace. The effects of experience and tenure for females are only partially mediated (15% to 25%) by job characteristics; that is, net of the occupational status and sex-label of the job held, experience and tenure have, in three out of four cases, positive, small but statistically significant effects on the probability of having high amounts of authority. The fact that these effects persist suggests that regardless of position, additional experience and the implication of higher career commitment increase a female’s probability of assuming positions with a higher level of authority.

In terms of access to positions involving high levels of supervision, the job characteristics included in the model have stronger effects for men than women. A ten-point increase in occupational status produces an increase in the probability of hiring and firing or determining pay of .06 for men. For women, the comparable result from a ten-point increase is .02 for the probability of hiring and firing and .03 for the probability of control over pay. Thus, in general, being in a higher status position increases a person’s probability of assuming considerable control over the work of others. However, for each additional increment in status, the authority returns are two to three times larger for men than for women. This implies that, for men, being in a high status position often goes hand in hand with being in a position of authority, whereas for women, this is much less likely to be so. Of course, one could argue that this results from the fact that status measures different things for men and women. For evidence that this is not the case, see Bose (1973).

We can also discern a general pattern of the effects of sex-typing of occupations on access to high levels of supervision. For both males and females, being in a male-labeled job (relative to a female one) and to a lesser extent being in an unlabeled job (relative to a female one) greatly increases an individual’s access to positions of authority. These effects are quite large. For example, for males, being in a male occupation increases the probability of hiring and firing by .189; the comparable figure for an unlabeled occupation is .137. The effects of sex-label of job held are smaller for females; however, the sex differences are only statistically significant in the pay equation. These powerful effects of sex-label of job suggest that the concentration of females in female-labeled jobs is an important factor restricting females from positions of authority.

The differences in the processes by which the sexes gain access to positions with mere supervisory power follow the same general pattern as was found in the other two aspects of authority; we shall just highlight the main differences. First, 60% of the effect of education on the probability of supervising is unmediated by the characteristics of job position included in this model for women, whereas only 36% of the effect for men is unmediated. While the sex differences in the effect of occupational status are still large, they are not as large as they were in the case of higher levels of supervision. These two differences suggest that access to mere supervisory power is a bit more egalitarian than access to higher level supervisory positions. Sex-typing of occupation has no effect on the probability of supervising for either sex. Thus, the fact that women are highly concentrated in female jobs is not a good explanation for sex differences in supervision. Furthermore, these differences across dimensions of authority exemplify the necessity of inspecting each aspect separately.

Table 5 presents a decomposition of sex differences in different aspects of authority within economic organizations. The Appendix describes how these calcu-
Table 5. Decomposition of the Authority Gap Using Human Capital/Family Factors and Job Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hire-Fire</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Supervise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross Percentage</td>
<td>Gross Percentage</td>
<td>Gross Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (A)</td>
<td>.192 100</td>
<td>.233 100</td>
<td>.229 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital/Family Factors Total (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition (C)</td>
<td>.128 66.67</td>
<td>-.020 -8.58</td>
<td>-.092 -40.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates (D)</td>
<td>.092 47.92</td>
<td>-.040 -17.17</td>
<td>-.127 -50.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (E)</td>
<td>.013 6.77</td>
<td>-.052 -22.32</td>
<td>-.077 -33.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Characteristics Total (F)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition (G)</td>
<td>.338 176.04</td>
<td>.376 161.37</td>
<td>.228 99.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates (H)</td>
<td>.086 44.79</td>
<td>.085 36.48</td>
<td>.050 21.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (I)</td>
<td>.205 106.71</td>
<td>.217 93.13</td>
<td>.143 62.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (J)</td>
<td>-.047 24.48</td>
<td>.074 31.75</td>
<td>.035 15.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

lations were done. As earlier stated, this particular decomposition allows us to begin to assess the relative importance of the attitudes and behavior of women and the behaviors and policies of employers for the restriction of females from positions of authority. It should be noted that we view this as a first step in understanding the relative importance of these two factors. The component of the sex difference due to all aspects of human capital/family factors is not of much interest in this respect. It is only of interest to note that in models where certain characteristics of jobs as well as human capital/family factors are held constant, the amount of the sex difference due to human capital/family factors is much smaller than that due to characteristics of job positions. This merely indicates that the effects of exogenous variables are mediated through characteristics of jobs. In all instances, the component due to composition on human capital/family factors is positive since males have higher mean levels on these exogenous variables than females. For this particular model, the negative rates component of human capital/family factors arises when more of the effects of exogenous variables are mediated by job characteristics for men than for women. As discussed earlier, the decomposition of the influence of job characteristics allows us to ascertain the extent to which women’s and employers’ behaviors affect the restriction of women from positions of authority. That component due to composition on job factors could result from either women’s or employers’ behaviors. This is because women who are inhibited about taking positions of authority may choose job positions with little opportunity of obtaining authority. At the same time employers may direct women toward such job positions. The amount of the difference due to rates on job characteristics, on the other hand, is due almost entirely to the behaviors and policies of employers. If men get different amounts of authority than women for being in a high status occupation, net of human capital/family factors and sex-label of job held, then these differences must be due to the fact that employers are treating men and women unequally.

In Table 5, we note that the component due to the differences in composition on characteristics of jobs is nontrivial. This suggests that if women had the same mean occupational status and the same distribution on sex-label of job held as men, 22% to 40% of the sex difference would disappear. The job characteristics rates components are positive and quite large, suggesting that most of the sex differences in authority could be alleviated if women got the same authority returns to their job characteristics as men did. The component due to differential effects of job position factors is much larger (two to three times) than that due to composition on these factors. Although this is not a unique decomposition, this implies that the behaviors and policies of employers are a much more important explanation of the sex differences in authority than are the attitudes and behavior of women. One
could argue that the rates component is due in part to women’s attitudes and behaviors. This is because women might get into positions of high status and income and yet not want to exercise the authority that is often demanded in such positions. The major implication of this is that some part of the job characteristics rates component may not be the result of employers’ behaviors and policies. We argue that this is probably a minimal part of the job characteristics rates components since women who are inhibited about assuming positions of authority would not select positions which have a high likelihood of controlling the work of others.

Conclusions

There are two interrelated sets of conclusions that can be drawn from our analyses. The first relates to how men and women attain positions of authority in the workplace and the second concerns the extent to which sexual inequality in authority in the workplace is generated by our three potential explanations. Men are more likely to hire and fire, determine pay and supervise than women. The differential process of acquiring authority is quite complex, at least with respect to human capital/family factors. Men receive higher returns to certain human capital factors while women receive higher returns on others. With respect to job characteristics, it is clear that men get more authority for similar levels of occupational status and sex labeling of job held than women, at least in the access to higher levels of supervision. Further, the process of acquiring mere supervision is more egalitarian between the sexes than is the acquisition of higher levels of authority.

Our decompositions allowed us to ascertain the extent to which our three factors can explain the sex gap in authority. The amount of the sex gap that is due to women’s qualification is nontrivial, but is, in all cases, less important than the attitudes and behaviors of women and the behaviors and policies of employers. While the subsequent decompositions do not allow us to identify uniquely the proportion of the authority gap that is due to women’s and employers’ behaviors, our results suggest that the behaviors and policies of employers are much more important in the restriction of females from positions of authority. It should be realized that this is a first attempt to explore the sex differences in authority in the workplace. Clearly, a study of large firms which obtained data on employers’ and women’s attitudes and behaviors would be a relevant step in furthering our knowledge in this area.

The implications of these results suggest sorts of policies needed to produce parity between men and women in the distribution of authority in economic organizations. First, women should be encouraged to improve their qualifications. But this is not enough to alleviate the sex gap in authority in the workplace. More important, steps must be taken to alter the behaviors and policies of employers before women can reach parity with men with respect to authority in the workplace.

APPENDIX

CALCULATION OF DECOMPOSITION FOR TABLE 5

Given that:

\[ A_M = a_M + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_i X_{iHM})(X_{iHM}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_j X_{jJM})(X_{jJM}) \]  

\[ A_F = a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_i X_{iHF})(X_{iHF}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_j X_{jJF})(X_{jJF}) \]  

where \( \bar{A}_M \) and \( \bar{A}_F \) are the means on authority for males and females; \( a_M \) and \( a_F \) are the intercepts for males and females; \( b_i X_{iHM} \) and \( b_i X_{iHF} \) are the parameter estimates (metric) for the effects of human capital/family factors on authority for males and females; \( X_{iHM} \) and \( X_{iHF} \) are the means of human capital/family factors for males and females; \( b_j X_{jJM} \) and \( b_j X_{jJF} \) are the parameter estimates (metric) for the effects of characteristics of job on authority for males and females; \( X_{jJM} \) and \( X_{jJF} \) are the means of the characteristics of jobs for men and women.

The total difference to be decomposed (A) is:

\[ \bar{A}_M - \bar{A}_F \]  

The human capital/family total component (B) is:

\[ (a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_i X_{iHF})(X_{iHF})) \]
\[ + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_j X_{jJF})(X_{jJF}) - \bar{A}_F \]  

The human capital/family composition component (C) is:

\[ (a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_i X_{iHF})(X_{iHF})) \]
\[ + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_j X_{jJF})(X_{jJF}) - \bar{A}_F \]  

The implications of these results suggest sorts of policies needed to produce parity between men and women in the distribution of authority in economic organizations. First, women should be encouraged to improve their qualifications. But this is not enough to alleviate the sex gap in authority in the workplace. More important, steps must be taken to alter the behaviors and policies of employers before women can reach parity with men with respect to authority in the workplace.
The human capital/family rate component \( (D) \) is:
\[
(a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_{i,60}x_{i,60}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_{j,60}x_{j,60})) - \bar{A}_F.
\]
(6A)

The human capital/family interaction component \( (E) \) is:
\[
B - (C + D).
\]
(7A)

The job characteristics total component \( (F) \) is:
\[
(a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_{i,60}x_{i,60}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_{j,60}x_{j,60})) - \bar{A}_F.
\]
(8A)

The job characteristics composition component \( (G) \) is:
\[
(a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_{i,60}x_{i,60}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_{j,60}x_{j,60})) - \bar{A}_F.
\]
(9A)

The job characteristics rate component \( (H) \) is:
\[
(a_F + \sum_{i=1}^{5} (b_{i,60}x_{i,60}) + \sum_{j=1}^{3} (b_{j,60}x_{j,60})) - \bar{A}_F.
\]
(10A)

The job characteristics interaction component is:
\[
F - (G + H).
\]
(11A)

The overall interaction component is:
\[
A - (B + F).
\]
(12A)

It should be obvious that whether one considers the intercept as part of the rates of human capital/family factors or characteristics of jobs is totally arbitrary. Since there were dummy variables in each set of variables, the intercept is the amount of authority a currently unmarried, childless individual in a female occupation has. Since it seemed arbitrary as to which rate it is, the intercept difference is, by default, included in the Total Interaction term.

REFERENCES


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