Socialism as an Attitude

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In an effort to avoid utopianism in his investigation of future possibilities for socialism, John Roemer seeks to develop models of egalitarian economies driven by familiar, largely egoistic or personal forms of motivation. While I agree that socialists and egalitarians should try to avoid utopianism, I question the effectiveness of this strategy. In my view, what is required is something Roemer attempts to do without: a fairly deep exploration of the range of motivational possibilities and their relation to social structure.

For Roemer, proposed social arrangements are utopian if they would require too much altruistic or impartial motivation on the part of the people living under them. He tries to avoid this pitfall in the same way the classical utilitarians did. To the objection that utilitarianism demands too much in expecting people always to be motivated by a desire to enhance the general welfare, Mill replied that this was to confuse the criterion of right with the motive of action. 'No system of ethics,' he said, 'requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them . . . the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action....' While the utilitarian tradition has occasionally countenanced impartial moral sentiment as a limited and slowly cultivatable source of motivation for compliance with the institutions of justice and property, the major focus has been on institutional mechanisms that would produce morally optimal outcomes from non-morally motivated actions. Bentham's position provides an extreme example. Since he endorsed both utilitarianism in ethics and egoistic hedonism in motivational psychology, he viewed the problem of institutional design as the problem of creating a system of incentives that would motivate those who seek only their own pleasure to do what collectively maximizes social welfare. As

Thomas Nagel points out, he placed great importance on his 'Duty and Interest junction principle', which would sanction such measures as tying income to effectiveness on the job.

I will speak somewhat tendentiously of Roemer's response to the challenge of utopianism as Benthamite, because even though his conception of the good is not utilitarian but rather places value on various kinds of equality of opportunity, he envisages people being directly motivated largely by personal aims. It is the function of well-designed institutions to channel the pursuit of these aims so as to bring about morally good results. He defends his market socialist proposals by establishing the existence of economic equilibria for them that have certain egalitarian features and by arguing that equilibrium behavior can be motivated by material incentives and legal enforcement mechanisms similar to those in place in contemporary capitalist economies. These incentives and mechanisms are designed to bring about a 'junction' of duty and interest, so that, for the most part anyway, specifically moral motivation need not be relied upon. My characterization is tendentious insofar as Roemer might envisage non-egoistic, non-hedonistic forms of personal motivation and even some moral motivation in the voting booth (though he does not probe this possibility), thereby departing from a strictly Benthamite approach.

In order to assess this response, it is necessary to conceive of utopianism somewhat more broadly than we have so far. A reform proposal should be thought of as utopian not only for requiring too much impartiality of people, but for failing adequately to address any serious threat to the proposed arrangement's attainability or stability with respect to the values it is supposed to realize. One problem with Roemer's strategy is that utopianism in this sense threatens even Benthamite proposals. We can illustrate the point with a simple example. One can easily model an economic environment and a laissez-faire, private-ownership market economy in which the initial distribution of wealth (including property rights in firms) is fairly equal and whose corresponding Walrasian equilibrium has some nice equality properties. But it would be unwarranted to expect such egalitarian features to be sustained over time were the initial parameters of the model satisfied in reality. Because of changes in supply and demand as a result of innovations, changes in preferences, business startups and failures, etc., one should expect the distribution of wealth and income to become increasingly unequal over time, at least up to a point. Thus even if no one's motivations are strained in an impartial direction by the rules of the system, it would none the less be utopian
to propose the system as a way of implementing egalitarian principles, even leaving aside the question of attainability.

Similarly, with Roemer’s models (his model of market socialism with a stock market, for example), even if we assume that obeying the rules does not require anyone to be motivated by a sense of justice or the common good, we should expect that some firms will be more successful than others, some portfolio purchases will turn out to be more lucrative than others, and that consequently the distribution of property income will depart from equality. Also, the possibility of borrowing money on one’s stock as collateral, for instance to start up small private businesses (something the model is designed to encourage) provides a way around some of the protections of equality the prohibition on selling stocks for money is supposed to provide. Though all of this behavior is system-conforming and driven by material incentives, it can reasonably be expected to lead to inequalities of the opportunities the system is supposed to equalize. The basis would then be laid for successful and quite legal efforts on the part of the more advantaged to modify the system so as to strengthen their position. Moreover, if there are any incentive incompatibilities in the system itself, then in the absence of moral motivation one could expect role-violating behavior that could well work in an egalitarian direction.

We can bring out another limitation of the Benthamite approach by considering the question of legitimacy and its relation to socialist principles. Let us say that society embraces an ideal of legitimacy when it is true and common knowledge that everyone is concerned to deliberate and act in a way that everyone can freely accept on due reflection, on the basis of what all can recognize to be sufficient, publicly acceptable reasons. Let us say further that society realizes this ideal to the extent that it follows procedures and practices that answer to this concern. Roemer claims that socialists want equality of opportunity for welfare and self-realization, political influence and social status. Assuming for the moment that this is correct, we still need to ask about the importance of legitimacy in this scheme. That is, is it important to the ideal of socialism itself that these values be realized with legitimacy, or is the proper role of legitimacy a more instrumental and contingent one?

There should be no doubt on this score about the Marxian conception of socialism, which envisaged the consensual, joint deliberative regulation of economic and political affairs by the members of society. The role of legitimacy in this vision is not simply that of a means for achieving egalitarian ends. Rather, it is viewed as

a requirement of rational agency itself in certain social contexts, since independent deliberation in those contexts, especially by agents engaged in the capitalist production of commodities, tends to result in reification or alienation, a form of agency in which agents unwittingly confer on their own actions an alien dynamic that escapes their deliberative control. Legitimacy becomes necessary for people to assume rational control over their own lives.

But if socialism must be based on legitimacy, then the Benthamite solution is not capable even in principle of achieving the necessary kind of stability, since it does not draw on the relevant kind of concern. The stability of socialist principles, procedures and practices must be based on a reasoned allegiance to these principles, procedures and practices, and the Benthamite solution does not draw on such allegiance.

It may seem that a legitimacy requirement would only make the utopian pitfall loom larger for socialism. But in fact the opposite might be true. Depending on the availability of principles and procedures that meet it and help to reproduce it, a concern for mutual justifiability of action could be a potent source of egalitarian motivation, and thus a key element of a stable egalitarianism. Consequently, proposals that do not seek to develop and to tap this source of motivation might be more vulnerable to utopianism than others that do. In fact, insufficient concern for the legitimacy of procedures and decisions may have played a more important role in the failure of socialist ventures stemming from the Bolshevik Revolution than the absence of innovation driven by market competition—the cause cited by Roemer. If a certain apathy, cynicism and indifference infected economic performance, perhaps this had as much to do with the absence of legitimacy as it did with the absence of markets.

There are passages in which Roemer seems implicitly to acknowledge concern for legitimacy as a source of motivation. For example, when he speculates that the belief that people ‘have earned, in the moral sense, what they receive through selling their talents on the market’ may limit social-democratic redistribution because ‘an economic mechanism, at least in a democracy, cannot be stable if it rewards people in disproportionate to what they believe they deserve’, he seems to acknowledge implicitly that people can be motivated by concerns other than a direct concern for their material interests. However, beyond expressing a suspicion that the cited belief may be an inevitable psychological byproduct of the institution of a labor market, he does not probe the potential of reasoning about desert or entitlements as itself a source of motivation. This is a bit puzzling, since he cites as
definitive certain arguments by Rawls and others that an egalitarianism in direct opposition to the cited belief was "not simply a "value judgment" that people might or might not have according to their taste, but rather a view of what social arrangements were right, that any rational, honest person had to accept" and he expects that "through these academics, many more millions will eventually be influenced ..." For Rawls, of course, a conception of justice has to be capable of achieving legitimacy – mutual, uncoerced acceptance as a basis for action – or it has to surrender any claim to validity.

A standard liberal argument that egalitarianism can achieve legitimacy invokes the idea of a 'moral division of labor' between institutions and individuals. Unlike a Benthamite scheme, a moral division of labor has individuals doing some of the moral work instead of its being left entirely to institutions. The idea is that a sense of justice can play an important motivational role in generating support for and compliance with egalitarian institutions, provided the latter are designed to provide sufficient scope for the pursuit of personal aims through system-conforming behavior.

Nagel investigates this idea at length and reaches pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of a non-utopian egalitarianism extending much beyond what is approximated and immune to public challenge in today's capitalist democracies: roughly, equal basic rights of citizenship, formal equality of opportunity, and insurance against the worst consequences of natural and social misfortune (through guarantees of disaster relief, unemployment compensation, access to health care, and the like). Like Roemer's, Nagel's egalitarian ideal goes beyond this to regard as morally tainted any socially produced inequalities tied to variations in any factor for which individuals are not responsible, such as their socioeconomic class of origin or their innate abilities or talents. So if Nagel is right, the notion of legitimacy will not take us beyond what Roemer thinks is realizable by Benthamite methods, if indeed it can take us that far.

To secure legitimacy as Nagel sees it, we must find mutually acceptable ways for us to respond both to the egalitarian values we all must impartially acknowledge and to our respective personal concerns. That is, we must find an answer to the question, given that each of us not only acknowledges egalitarian values but also has his own life to lead, what can we all agree we should do? Finding an adequate answer requires imaginative social and economic modeling as well as ethics, since the livability of a morality of individual conduct as well as its ability to accommodate both personal and egalitarian concerns will depend on the institutional setting in which it

is imbedded. For example, a limited morality of non-interference, respect for life, liberty and property, and duties of basic mutual aid can be an adequate individual morality only within a social system that itself does much more to satisfy egalitarian values. On the other hand, a social system cannot be justified simply by appeal to such values. It must be realizable and sustainable through deliberation and conduct it is reasonable to expect of individuals who have personal as well as egalitarian concerns. To ignore this requirement is to risk the utopianism of advocating a social ideal without a feasible underlying reasonable motivational psychology.

Nagel sees the charge of utopianism as hardest to deflect in the case of talents. Advantages due to talent, he says, come as a result of demand for scarce resources in a competitive labor market. The preservation of some form of labor market with economic incentives seems to be necessary for an adequate level of economic efficiency, productivity and growth. Social structure must therefore leave room for, and perhaps even encourage, the play of personal acquisitive motives in response to economic incentives, with its inevitable resulting inequalities. Complete elimination of inequalities due to talent thus seems to Nagel to be utopian in the extreme. The most that can be done is to impose structural limits on such inequalities that ensure that they work to everyone's benefit, especially to the benefit of those whose talents leave them with the lowest prospects. And even this idea, Nagel suggests, is utopian, because sustaining it requires a morally incoherent motivational psychology, one that would combine in one outlook both the attitude that inequalities due to talent should be minimized and the attitude that one is entitled to exploit one's talents in an effort to get as much out of the system as one can.

. An economically competitive egalitarian with the appropriate partition of motives is supposed to reflect, as he signs the astronomical check for his three-star meal, that although it's a shame that business talent such as his should command such rewards while others are scraping by, there is no help for it, since he and his peers have to be allowed to earn this kind of money if the economy is to function properly. A most unfortunate situation, really, but how lucky for him!

A moral division of labor is unworkable here. The idea of that strategy, roughly, is to effect a division of the self into public and private roles in such a way that the impartiality demanded of people in their private roles is minimized, and in those roles there is ample play for agent-centered prerogatives; the dominance of impartiality
as a motive is restricted to public roles. For example, you can to a certain extent feel entitled to purchase extra education for your children while not feeling entitled to favor them through nepotism in some public capacity. You restrict your partiality to the private sphere. In your public status you are impartial, and this finds expression not only in your refraining from nepotism but also in your supporting measures that enhance equality of educational opportunities. Nagel claims that, while this can work to a certain extent with inequalities due to class, it is impossible to effect in the case of talent-based inequalities. You cannot, within an integrated moral outlook, feel entitled in your personal affairs to rely on whatever superior advantages you can out of the system through aggressive use of your talents, while feeling disapproval as a citizen for any system that allows such activity to any degree more than necessary to benefit the least advantaged. How we decide to use our abilities has both public and personal significance, so both of these motives will come into play and oppose each other in such decisions.

G.A. Cohen would argue that this incoherence amounts to hypocrisy: if we are capable of deciding to make a given contribution without getting superior advantages in return, then we cannot reasonably expect others to accept our demand for those advantages as justified on the grounds that they are necessary to maximize benefit to the least advantaged. Nagel would not call it hypocrisy, but rather an attempt to acknowledge certain realities about human nature, and the way it constrains motivational possibilities. But he would call it an unsuccessful attempt; the pervasiveness of personal motivation will destabilize any social commitment to make talent-based inequalities work to the benefit of the least advantaged. The personal acquisitiveness the system feeds on will tend to erode political support for the commitment among the better off. It’s not like the case of people playing a strictly competitive sport under strict rules — when support for the rules is guaranteed by the fact that without them winning is meaningless. People’s personal concerns make social and economic advantages meaningful, apart from any commitment to equality or legitimacy.

Have we reached an impasse? Benthamite proposals would face serious instabilities with respect to equality and moreover would not meet the socialist requirement of legitimacy. Thus if Nagel’s investigations reveal the egalitarian limits of legitimacy, then socialism is indeed a utopian idea. However, if legitimacy might take a different form from the one envisaged by Nagel, a form more intimately bound up with rationality and equality, then such a conclusion is premature.

For Nagel, legitimacy is a matter of a convergence of different people’s answers to the question of what they could reasonably agree to, given that they all have personal as well as egalitarian concerns that must find viable expression. This is a very specific understanding of the kinds of values that have to be accommodated and the kinds of motives that can be drawn upon. Individuals who relate to each other with legitimacy share a common framework of justification, and to that extent they relate to each other on the basis of shared reasons. Yet what is shared is a converged-upon sense of the reasonableness of specific assignments of relative weight or priority to the two kinds of concerns in various spheres of action. With or without legitimacy, the kinds of concerns remain the same. For Nagel, this is because their existence is rooted in a duality of standpoints fixed in each person’s nature: the personal and the impersonal. Your personal standpoint takes into account who in particular you are. It thus enables you to identify reasons you have in virtue of your own features and circumstances — your subjective or agent-relative interests or values. On the other hand, you can also view the world in abstraction from your particular place in it; in abstraction, that is, from who in particular you are. To do this is to take up the impersonal standpoint. From this standpoint you can still consider your concerns, but not as your own particular concerns; rather, you consider them, as well as the concerns of others, simply as someone’s concerns, without taking into account that you in particular are that person. When you do this, it becomes clear that some of these concerns still matter, and not just to the particular person whose concerns they are, but matter, period, since from the impersonal standpoint they matter to you no matter who you are. The impersonal standpoint thus discloses values that have a certain objectivity or intersubjective validity. Moreover, they are egalitarian values; from an impersonal standpoint everyone’s life matters, and no one is more important than anyone else. On the other hand, from the personal standpoint each of us attaches special importance to his own particular concerns. The duality of standpoints within the self thus provides a source of two fixed kinds of concern, and the function of legitimacy, if it can be achieved, is simply to integrate them in the governance of action in a psychologically feasible and universally acceptable way.

On this view human nature determines certain forms of concern that serve as inputs to practical reasoning aimed at legitimacy. The most that such reasoning can do is to assign weights or priorities to these kinds of concern. The specifics of social structure — in particular, structures of deliberation — do not enter the determination of these
kinds themselves. These are fixed by human nature. Also fixed are certain limits on the feasibility of relations of weight or priority that they can assume. In particular, the impersonal, egalitarian concerns cannot approximate complete dominance over personal concerns. Human nature requires that personal concerns play a strong and significant role in life. This is why economic gains by the better off remain meaningful apart from any commitment to equality and legitimacy. And this is why socialism is utopian. What Roemer calls the ‘socialist person’ would require a motivational system outside the bounds set by human nature on feasible integrations of the two kinds of concern, even allowing for legitimacy to make some difference.

But suppose that the significance of motivational concerns depends less on human nature and more on socially specific features of deliberation than this view allows. Then legitimacy might have a wider role in the determination of the forms of concern that have significance. Strangely, though Marx stressed something like this possibility, it has gone largely unexplored. When confronted with the charge of proposing the hopelessly utopian idea of a society of altruists, he replied that egoism and altruism are complementary, socially specific motivating attitudes rather than transsocially necessary expressions of human nature. He was adamant in his insistence that the communists do not put egoism against self-sacrifice or self-sacrifice against egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; on the contrary, they demonstrate the material basis engendering it, with which it disappears of itself. The communists do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want . . . to do away with the ‘private individual’ for the sake of the ‘general’, self-sacrificing man.\(^{11}\)

These remarks are in direct opposition to the foregoing idea of the socialist person, and they gesture at a different conception, one in which changes in social structure can release hitherto untapped forms of motivational potential. An investigation into the possibility of socialism that did not explore the viability of such a conception would be seriously incomplete.

If we think of practical rationality as a kind of deliberative control over action, then we can distinguish two ways in which agents might seek to meet its standards in multi-agent situations: independent agency and collective or joint agency. In independent agency, individuals engage in separate deliberations that exclusively concern their own respective actions. They treat the actions of others as events to be anticipated, matters of uncertainty their deliberation has to address, but not as matters they have any part in deciding. Nor do they conceive of others as playing an authoritative role in their own deliberations.

In collective agency, by contrast, it is common knowledge that everyone takes as a source of reasons for his individual action actual or possible public deliberation about the entire profile of actions. Agents treat the question of which profile will be realized as a matter under their joint deliberative authority. In collective agency there is thus a public commitment to possible reasoned consensus as a constraint on deliberation. It is common knowledge that everyone accepts the ideal of making their willingness to perform their respective individual actions depend on the acceptability to everyone of the profile as a whole.

Collective and independent agency can be distinguished in three significant ways. First, they solve different problems. When a decision problem is formulated, it divides features of the world into environmental variables, whose values have to be predicted or estimated as a basis of decision, decision variables, whose values are to be decided, and consequence variables, thought of as functions of environmental and decision variables. For an agent participating in collective agency, the actions of the other agents are thought of as decision variables rather than environmental variables, as is the case in independent agency. In this respect more of the world is brought within the scope of decision. Secondly, they take place under different intentions. In collective agency each agent acts under a collective intention – an intention to act jointly with the others by performing his individual action. Moreover, in fully realized collective agency it is not only true but common knowledge that all agents act on the basis of such intentions, and that these intentions have as a common object the realization of the entire profile of individual actions.\(^{12}\) Thirdly, they are regulated by different self-conceptions. Rational collective deliberation is aimed at the construction of a common or joint practical orientation, one reflectively acceptable to all as a basis of joint action. When one deliberates as an independent agent, one is guided by a conception of oneself as having exclusive control over the alternatives one faces, as the sole deliberative authority. When one engages in collective deliberation, one conceives of oneself as accountable not only to oneself, but also to the other cooperating
agents, understood as themselves similarly accountable to everyone in the group.\(^\text{13}\)

Legitimacy understood as this type of collective rationality suggests a different potential for the ideal of legitimacy as a source of motivation. Its aim would not be to arrive at a generally acceptable allocation of given, independently significant attitudes of personal and impersonal concern. It would no doubt end up certifying certain matters as properly belonging to a personal sphere of decision, but the aims pursued within this sphere would be understood as depending on their legitimacy for their meaning and value, because in this sphere one would conceive of oneself as acting socially, even when exercising one’s prerogatives. Under this ideal, personal economic-gains would derive their value even to the gainer in part from their legitimacy. Nagel’s rejected analogy with a fiercely competitive sport is more apt in this case.

Unlike conceptions that preserve the opposition between morality and self-interest by understanding legitimacy as appealing to standards of reasonableness separate from and taking priority over the demands of rationality (as when we say, ‘What she’s doing is quite rational, but she’s not being reasonable’), this conception takes reasons of legitimacy as entering into the determination of what is rational. Deliberation aiming at rational collective agency seeks to arrive at a joint practical orientation that satisfies the standard formal requirements of rationality in a manner acceptable to each participant from the requisite point of view. This point of view differs from that of an independent agent pursuing his separately determinable values (whether these be disclosed by a personal or impersonal standpoint). It is rather that of one of a number of equally sovereign participants in a common endeavor. It is required not in virtue of a separate standard of reasonableness, but rather as the point of view appropriate for judging the rationality of joint action.\(^\text{14}\) For this reason, Cohen’s idea that ‘people would mention norms of equality when asked to explain why they and those like them are willing to work for the pay they get’ seems less utopian when interpreted within the framework of this conception of legitimacy.\(^\text{15}\)

Personal gains at the expense of equality might be more difficult to justify under this conception – and have less motivating force – for another reason as well. Insofar as Roemer follows a Benthamite approach, he does not attempt to anchor his egalitarianism through its engagement with citizens’ reason at all. For Nagel, egalitarianism has its origin in the impersonal standpoint but is certified as non-utopian and thus receives whatever final justification it has through its legitimacy, which is determined by the extent to which it can be endorsed as a way of life by the practical reason of each member of society. Legitimacy as consensual deliberative rationality could certify many forms of equality in this way as well. But for some forms there is an even tighter connection. The status of citizens as fully cosovereign cannot be achieved without equality of at least some rights, opportunities and resources. Such equality gets anchored as necessary for proper deliberation rather than merely certified as the outcome of such deliberation.\(^\text{16}\) To the extent that this kind of legitimacy is required for meeting the challenge of utopianism, there is a much more intimate connection between socialist egalitarianism and the ideal of democracy than Roemer is inclined to endorse in his book. Rather than simply a means to equality, the ideal of democracy provides egalitarianism with its proper foundation.\(^\text{17}\)

I have not shown that such an ideal can succeed in establishing as non-utopian a more democratic and egalitarian socialism than Roemer is prepared to defend. That cannot be done without an exploration of the possibility, rational accessibility and stability of principles and procedures that would both answer to and reproduce a concern for consensual deliberative control over economic affairs. I hope only to have made plausible that such an exploration is worth undertaking and indeed may provide the only hope for socialism or indeed any significant advances in equality, given the stability problems that Roemer’s proposals would face and the limited potential of legitimacy as Nagel understands it.

Notes

4. I offer an explication of this idea in ‘Reification as Dependence on Extrinsic Information’ (unpubl. MS).
5. Roemer, p. 119.
8. Nagel, p. 117.
12. The action pair \((x, y)\) would be such a common object of collective intention if agent 1 had the intention of jointly performing \((x, y)\) with agent 2 by performing \(x\) while agent 2 had the intention of jointly performing \((x, y)\) with agent 1 by performing \(y\). In acting on these intentions the agents would assume it to be common knowledge that the pair is such a common object of collective intention. In fully realized collective agency this assumption would be correct. In treating a collective intention as an intention to act jointly with others by performing an individual action, I am in agreement with John R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions,’ in Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan and Martha E. Pollack, eds, Intentions in Communication, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990, pp. 401–15.
14. One might claim that a distinct standard of reasonableness is required to motivate people to formulate their problems as collective decision problems in the first place. But if independent agency can be expected to lead to reification, then an interest in deliberative control could close this motivational gap by itself. I explore this possibility in ‘Reification as Dependence on Extrinsic Information’. The matter is complicated, since questions of attainability and stability have to be carefully distinguished.
17. As a consequence, the principles of socialist egalitarianism might differ from those specified by Roemer. For example, I think that at least some of the socialist concern for self-realization is more properly interpreted as a concern for deliberative control and consequently as being met by society’s commitment to legitimacy as collective rationality.

The Prospects for Coupon Socialism in Ex-Command Economies