1. Adam

Cohen and Rogers seem to present a scaled down utopian model that is more feasible than, say, Parecon or Roemer's market socialism. For the most part, I think the proposal is a nice gradual approach to real utopias: although some system shock would be required to arrive at associative democracy (henceforth AD), the authors have laid out a process that would evolve and hopefully grow over time.

I wonder, however, whether AD will be useful for the truly sticky problems of governance. The examples of labor problems make sense, because a potential win-win situation exists for employers and employees. Putting aside for a moment structural concerns about capital extracting surplus from labor, these gains seem beneficial to the parties and the 'common good': we, the workers and the polity, would all prefer more and better jobs to less and fewer. But how will AD deal with highly contested issues where the common good is unspecified? Two examples that come to mind are abortion and guns. Although the authors suggest that in AD 'the participants would tend to be more other-regarding in their political practice than they would otherwise be inclined to be' (260) I'm not sure that this would supersede the deep moral and cultural predispositions about these issues. I don't think this criticism discards AD, but contextualizes it. AD can be very useful for situations where information and coordination problems lead to sub-optimal or unequal outcomes, as in the examples of labor relations and environmental hazards; but can it resolve deeper cultural schisms that fracture the political arena? Where would organizations like the NRA fit? [One issue here might be the relationship between associative democracy and representative democracy. Instead of seeing associative democracy replacing in toto ordinary, territorial representation, it could be used for specific decisionmaking problems and not others. So, things that are morally contested like abortion rights might not be dealt with through associational governance methods.]

We might look at AD as a vehicle to achieve other utopias. Suppose AD works, and we have a more accountable, flexible, democratic mode of governance. Could we then push for further redistribution, even to the point of say market socialism? Or will capital always have sufficient power to prevent that from occurring? Alternatively, could associative democracy lead away from a more egalitarian society - could it potentially morph into the neoliberal limited state, or one of the other less satisfactory arrangements the authors outlined in the opening section? [It is easier to imagine how AS could be a bridge to a more radical social transformation. Why do you think it might have some internal dynamic that would undermine the affirmative state, that would move towards neoliberal minimalist state? Would this be because AD could delegitimize the state and thus set the stage for such an attack? I’m not sure what youe intuition is here.]

This raises a question about the scope of AD: why not go further? Rather than devolving power to groups, why not devolve it to citizens? I assume that this is part of the idea behind Erik's
proposal/analysis in Deepening Democracy, and for that matter Michael Albert's ideas in Parecon. What are the values to this intermediate approach? The authors suggest that there are organizational benefits to the associational model and argue that 'any working egalitarian-democratic order requires an organized social base.' (248) But why is the extra layer of mediation needed? As the authors acknowledge, 'those who oppose bureaucracy itself will find little solace in the organizational environment suggested.' (67) [This is a very good issue to explore. Perhaps it will be best engaged after we talk about EPG. Ultimately I think we may want to think of “democracy” as involving (at least) three forms -- representative, associational, and empowered participatory – and then the issue is how they should be articulated. Perhaps there is some sort of functional division among these?]

Finally, are there enough win-win situations so that AD will be useful? Is this really a coordination or organizational problem? [Is associational democracy only effective in win-win situations where the problem is coordination failures? Or could it also be used in pure bargaining situations?] Capital is still allowed to extract surplus from labor, the question about AD becomes empirical: will it provide sufficient voice and strength for workers so that they are able to appropriate some of the surplus they create? How much?

2. Stuart Meland

Cohen and Rogers’ Associative Democracy is appealing both for its use of existing political and social institutions as mechanisms for reform as well as its recognition that properly designed secondary associations could “make a substantial contribution to democratic order” (46). That said, I am not at all certain that their reconstruction of the “right” kind of secondary associations is possible without undermining the very power Cohen and Rogers hope to harness. As Offe says, “the ‘purposive’ adoption of institutions for the sake of promoting some economic objective (rather than ‘for their own sake’) may well spoil their desired effect, as only the institutions as a formal set of rules and procedures, but not the cultural values, norms, shared meanings and moral underpinnings that generate compliance with those rules are being transplanted” (117). [This is a really interesting sociological issue. It is one that Wolfgang Streeck also makes in a famous article called “Beneficial Constraints” in which he says that in order for constraints on capitalist production and markets to have beneficial consequences – for cooperation, productivity, quality production, etc. – those constraints cannot be designed to produce those benefits. They must be side-effects of other primary purposes. Elster makes a similar point. I am not entirely convinced about this. While it may be true that reforms (or organizations) that are exclusively designed for these purposes might lack the loyalties and processes needed for them to fulfill these purposes, I don’t see why functioning within associative democracy cannot be part of the purpose for the associations and their structure.] Can we accurately predict the behavior of these domesticated secondary associations? Existing secondary associations are by nature efficient and effective as a result of their unity and purpose, that of advancing the interests in common of their members. Are these same associations, purposefully constructed for the public good and representing a much more diverse array of interests, not susceptible to the same factious tendencies as current political actors?
I wonder if the problem with politics isn’t faction so much as the political apathy that allows secondary associations and political actors to seek their own ends at the public’s expense. Thus far I subscribe to the “Undesirability” logic that Associative Democracy could “invite a truly ruinous faction” (47). Wouldn’t a better solution be simply to increase the transparency and accountability of politics and mandate greater public participation? What if civic participation were mandated by the state, wouldn’t more egalitarian reforms naturally follow? By allowing self-selection of political participation don’t we naturally attract those who are passionately “against” change rather than those who are passionately “for” it? Is a reliance on the “right” kind of secondary associations really the most viable solution? [But, can civic participation provide the kind of on-going continuity in decisionmaking and bargaining needed for the kind of problem solving being discussed here?]

3. Zeynap

Secondary associations, which are the core of the associative democracy, are corporatist institutions, democratically run, on which at least some traditional state functions devolve. The aim of the associative democracy, for Cohen and Rogers, is “to carry social democracy’s egalitarian ideals forward through a more radical democratization of traditional egalitarian practice.” (239) And at the mean time to look after economic performance with related to priorities of capitalist system.

Cohen and Rogers’s proposal for alternative institutions is greatly needed in the limits of the capitalism. What I’m trying to say is this, if we keep on living within the capitalism, if there is no way out, this proposal is a chance to ameliorate the current and potential inequalities which capitalism creates. But it can’t terminate inequalities totally, not in the capitalism. Because, total equality, equal shares, fair distribution or real democratic decision are contrary to the logic of capitalism. Levine says about it with the reference of a slogan that “Cohen and Rogers have selected the wrong soil for democracy to develop.” (166) I believe that too. In the limits of capitalism, we can’t reach the real democracy, if there is one! [You are certainly right that “total equality, etc.” is not possible under capitalism, but it is less clear that “real democracy” isn’t possible under capitalism, unless this is just a matter of definition (i.e. if, by definition, to be “real” democracy must also involve democratic control over capital). But if we mean by “real democracy” that the decisions made by the state are made through a deeply participatory and democratic process which does not privilege the interests of capitalists, then perhaps capitalism could be sustained alongside “real” democracy.]

Since I think that Cohen and Rogers’s aim is improving capitalism in a democratic way, I won’t talk about why they didn’t question capitalist property relations and even class relations in their proposal.

However I have some questions, or some points that aren’t clear for me.

I just want to enumerate my questions without much interrogation:
1) What are the secondary associations? All the civic groups, with all their levels and their qualitative/quantitative differences, as I. M. Young mentioned; or just big centralized and “homogeneous” institutions like unions, neighborhood councils etc.

2) How are they built? From below with voluntary action; or if it is necessary, from above with the help of the state? [I think both of these would occur: state-centered rules would encourage, subsidize, facilitate formation of associations, but they would also be generated by energy from below.]

3) How do they devolve some functions of state? Who will decide to this distribution?

4) What about the actions of the associations internally and also interactively? Cohen and Rogers encourage the centralization of authority and encompassingness in the actual realm. They want this kind of an improvement to make association powerful opposed to the state. But how can this tendency affect,
   a) democratic participation in the association itself?
   b) competition among the associations which devolve the state’s functions? Wouldn’t encompassing cause monopolization when there is only one big association; or cause inefficiency when there are more then one and almost equal associations? [Does it follow if associations are encompassing that they would have to be internally undemocratic? Can’t there be functionally-defined organizations which are large and encompassing and still internally democratic and open?]

5) Secondary associations, like parecon system, basically depend on the human behavior. If people don’t act in the interaction with the others, if they can’t build solidarity, mutual respect and consensus, these systems can’t reach the successful conclusions that they hope. If we assume that the majority of people are self-interested, unaware and/or unconcerned about social problems, how can we trust that they claim their “rights” which system gives? Will institutions and their rules be enough to teach people to act solidaristicly or to care each other? [I don’t know how fragile these institutional proposals are to these kinds of motivations of actors. I am not sure that the associational participants have to be super high-minded so long as the internal functioning of the association is open and democratic, and thus leadership would be held accountable to the constituency.]

4. Matías

The absence of the gigantic transnational firm (transnational concentrated capital)

In the third section of their article “Associations and Democracy”, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers propose “associative solutions” to the decreasing ability of national states to “deliver the goods” due to their limited capacity to control their tax bases and monetary policies. This limited
capacity in both fiscal and monetary policy is explained by the “internationalization of capital and product markets coupled with increased possibilities for firms to migrate from national economies [emphasis added]” (52). I partially agree with the authors’ diagnosis, but I also think that one omission in his model is highly problematic: the omission of the gigantic transnational firm (they only mention “powerful economic actors” in p. 51). Assuming the existence of gigantic transnational firms—an assumption that we find quite ‘realistic’—the limits of modern states has not only to do with the tax base and the monetary policy, but are also proportional to the power such transnational firms exerts both in the state and the civil society, that is, the power of transnational concentrated capital. Such transnational power takes the national form of monopoly tendencies, self-regulation, campaign financing, government capturing and so on. It could be argued that such power is inversely related to the size of the country, but we think that contemporary capitalism does not provide a definite answer to such claim.

I think that the assumption of gigantic transnational firms poses serious problems to the institutional proposal of Cohen and Rogers. As far as their model of associative democracy depends ultimately on state enforcement, the following question arises: does the effectiveness, if any, of the new institutions and organizations depends exclusively on (a) how independent is the state from transnational concentrated capital and (b) assuming a “benevolent” state independent from concentrated transnational capital, how powerful is the state vis-à-vis the concentrated transnational capital? [I think, from the specific formulation you made about the power of transnational capital, that you are mainly referring here to what could be termed instrumental power – i.e. the power of such corporations to actively deploy their resources politically to shape, capture, influence, state policies. Isn’t the issue with respect to Associative Democracy whether ordinary representative democracy or associative democracy is better positioned to counter this power? It may be true that TNC power is such that it can disproportionately impact state policies in any capitalist state, but is this problem more intense or less intense in a democracy within which AD is a significant element?]

5. Linda M. Zech

Can the secondary associations which already play a major role in our society form the basis for a new group based Associational Democracy in the United States?

Iris Marion Young raises one of questions which occurred to me as I read Cohen & Roger’s paper: from where will the new associational institutions they envision come? Not out of “thin air” certainly. Unlike Young it appears to me that the authors look to build upon at least some of those institutions existing in “the real world”, like labor unions, albeit granted new legislative background, new systems of authorization, new oversight mechanisms and new powers. They are clearly influenced by the role of federal trade unions in European Countries in suggesting how associations would function.

It does seem to me that reliance on labor organizations for such important roles as implementing uniform wages across businesses and increasing productivity, is the intermediate step in the
scheme which Young argues is not identified. Such “associations” are not as narrowly defined as the associations necessary to their vision, nor are the use of sunset provisions (unless they are imagining voting out particular unions) likely to be effective. Given the growing impotence of trade unions in our society they may be the Frankenstein the authors worry about. **[How would growing impotence of unions lead one to fear that they could become a Frankenstein?]** But maybe with a change in laws governing organization and eliminating exclusive representation new life can be injected into a once vibrant institution.

Those associations which are not addressed in the paper are the internet groups which in some cases supplement other organizations and others which are born on the net and thrive there. Here single issue groups—which may be at least territorially encompassing –form and function to mobilize and enhance civic consciousness. Movements, like those described in Szasz’s critique, are further energized and coordinated through that new tool or organization. Oversight of government and even business activities is enhanced through this medium of nearly instantaneous communication. The use of this mechanism to create, authorize, empower and inform secondary associations and their leaders could be a great boon to the associational democracy envisioned by the authors.

There are other associations of great and surprising strength which are forming in response to talk radio show pundits, like Rush Limbaugh and Rush wannabe Tom Gallagher. These groups are mobilized along interest lines by neocons (mostly) who may nor may not really share their views. They may not be responsible to their “members” as there is some evidence that sometimes they are merely entertainers playing to a known consistency. But there is evidence that the power of the groups have given people like Mr. Limbaugh de facto power to influence government policy – at least with the current administration. In the case of environmental issues the Whitehouse has even reversed course when objections from Mr. Limbaugh were raised. **[In what sense is Limbaugh the leader of a “secondary association”? He may have followers and there may be a loose sort of network among this constituency, but does this constitute them as a “secondary association?”]**

While the personal power of the pundits is clearly not what Cohen and Rogers have in mind, they would no doubt like to harness the grassroots basis of particular interests to join in supporting properly selected groups. Creating a framework in which such organizations would function legitimately to advise the state, and negotiate with other groups could provide a clearer picture of what people know, think or want. This could further the goals of political equality (given more people a voice through their chosen groups), civic consciousness and popular sovereignty. It is not clear what mark it would make on distributive equity.

Whatever the system that would arise, increasing the wages of citizenship – particularly basic pension and health care rights is essential. This issues so divide existing groups, political parties, and other organizations – and dominate the employer/employee relationship. With these items removed from the employment realm, to a difference forum (one in the hands of multi-group negotiations possible?), there could be room for real multilevel implementation of the types of quasi public institutions the authors envision.
6. Elizabeth Holzer

Eric, I didn’t get through the final chapter in which Cohen and Rogers re-do some of the plan. If my concerns are addressed in there, just tell me where—you needn’t bother writing it out yourself. Last week, I actually started pulling topics out of the interrogations, and I’m feeling a bit guilty now. I underlined my question, if that makes it easier.

We haven’t talked much about post-revolution social change with any of these proposals, but given that social change is desirable and unavoidable, a sustainable institutional design ought to be able to cope with it. I wonder if the institutional design would produce a conservatism that would undermine the sustainability of the plan for letting all significant interests—especially new ones—be heard. I think Schmitter is right when he says many systems have problems with fixity, but it concerns me here because harnessing associations—binding them to the state by developing quasi public status and direct subsidy and clearly restricting recipients to a “demarcated set of specifically national concerns” (56)—co-opts potential sources of social change. Particularly as the distinction between interest group, association, and social movement is not clear, Szasz’s concern about losing oppositional space is a legitimate one. I don’t think this is a fatal flaw. To the extent that the emergence and effectiveness of social movements depends on the opportunity structure, an institutional design can foster social activism—I just think that as the process co-opts some tradition resources for social change and the model places a high value on the empowerment of underrepresented interests, this ought to be an explicit part of The Plan. (I think part of what is at stake here is the precise mechanism by which associations are “certified” by the state to be at the table of the associational democratic deliberation. It is hard to imagine this occurring in the way parties are authorized for territorial representation — i.e. through a freely competitive electoral game. But perhaps there could be something like that — any association that wanted to represent a particular functional association could try to do so, and there would be some sort of selection process of a democratic sort to get associations chosen for the table. I don’t know how this might work, exactly.)

Still in the vein of dealing with social change, it’s not clear to me how “by establishing terms of cooperation among affected actors, such a system can contribute to the willingness of those actors to experiment with initiatives that disrupt old patterns” (56). The cooperation—which is tied to any association’s privileged position in the polity, right?—is not indefinite (nor should it be). Associations are still in danger of losing accreditation, so why would they be more likely—or even as likely—to take chances as would groups that have as a given the precariousness of their position, like social movements?

Lastly, also on the same topic, it would be nice to clarify the institutional mechanisms for bringing in new associations, particularly in light of Hirst point that popular choice enacted through the state is not necessarily popular choice. When you promote associations of excluded interests (44), is it like affirmative action? How do you decide which ones? Through popular choice? Are people more likely to support including excluded interests in an associative democracy than they to support affirmative action in our society? If so, why? The broad discussion of changing legitimated associations is on pages 71-74 for the curious. (These are excellent points. I think there are two different sorts of issues here: 1) For a given
associational domain, how does the state decide which association(s) are to be formally admitted to the AD process, and 2) what differentiates the domains of associations. Are environmental associations restricted to environmental decisionmaking, or are they at the table of labor market deliberation as well, since these may have environmental ramifications?]

7. César Rodríguez

I found Cohen and Rogers’ proposal completely engrossing and fascinating. The following discussion points thus aim at singling out possible avenues for elaboration or clarification of their associative democracy model.

1. Given their preoccupation with the problem of faction, Cohen and Rogers make an explicit effort at highlighting the potential of associations to engage in cooperative, positive-sum relations among themselves and with the state. The cost of this argumentative strategy is that conflict and contentious politics somewhat drop out of the picture. In an associative democratic society, for sure, contentious collective action (i.e., social movements) and adversarial organizations would still be part of the social and institutional mix. Given the model’s emphasis on cooperation, it is not clear precisely what role contentious politics and adversarial associations play, and how the latter would be treated by a state whose primary concern is to foster cooperation. For instance, would overtly adversarial associations—e.g., squatters’ associations, radical unions, etc.—run the risk of being discriminated against (e.g., in terms of public funding) vis-à-vis more collaborative associations? [This would certainly be a risk, but it could still be the case the AD with discrimination against adversarial associations provides greater opportunities for influence by those associations than does purely representative democracy. But I am sure that certain kinds of militancy would provoke marginalization from the process, just as certainly kinds of disruptive radicalism marginalizes electoral parties.] Although the authors do not make any such suggestion, the role that they assign to the state—i.e., as the “first organizer of social capabilities for the solution” of problems—, seems to indirectly discourage militancy and contentious politics.

This would pose a problem for associative democracies for two reasons. First, adversarial organizations are key conduits of countervailing power that, as such, are fundamental to equalizing the uneven bargaining and associational capacities of different groups in society. Second, adversarial organizations have been key sources of institutional innovation and vibrant public life—goals to which associative democracy is certainly committed.

What exactly, then, is the place of this type of associations and politics in associative democracy? [Like some of the other interrogations, this issue also concerns the problem of state authorization: the procedures by which associations are selected. In principle there would not be a reason for contentious associations to be excluded from the deliberative process.]

2. Beyond the three policy issues discussed by the authors—that is, vocational training, worker organization, and the enforcement of health and safety standards—, I’d be interested in discussing other specific areas in which associations would have a clear advantage vis-à-vis both the state and the market. A particular area where it would be useful to explore the relative
advantages of each of these three institutions is the enforcement of labor laws. For instance, would associations also be the ideal mechanism for enforcing other labor standards, such as minimum wage regulations, overtime and anti-discrimination laws? Alternatively, should the state be responsible for guaranteeing a floor of minimum labor rights (e.g., the so-called “core labor rights”), upon which associations could then build to enforce other labor rights? [I think what we need to think through here are the theoretical criteria for the domains suitable to AD institutions. (Since AD involves both policy-making and policy-implementation, there may be some areas in which the AD institutions would work for implementation but not for initial decisions). One issue is the potentiality for win-win solutions – moving towards the pareto frontier. I am sure there are others.]

3. In concluding their reply to the commentators, Cohen and Rogers state “how the order [associative democracy] implies...might be constitutionally regulated is something on which we do not wish to speculate on here.” (p. 263). For our class discussion, I think it would be worth to speculate on precisely this issue, which seems both fascinating and complex from a constitutional point of view. What would the constitution of an associative state look like? Would it be mostly made up of meta-rules regulating associational life? If so, what would be its core rules? [One idea might be something like the Austrian “functional chambers” in the legislature – a legislative chamber in which representation is of labor associations and employer associations. So, one might have some kind of elective representation of associations, in which participation in the elections was contingent on satisfying certain kinds of internal democratic conditions. Anyway, good issue to talk about.]

8. Chang

I agree with the idea that market and state are not enough (p.88). By definition, the core of associative democracy is that “the members of a society ought to be treated as equals in fixing the basic terms of social cooperation – including the ways that authoritative collective decisions are made, the ways that resources are produced and distributed, and the ways that social life more broadly organized (p.34).”

First, I agree with that ideal. But, I am not sure about the question, “What are the differences between the traditional Swedish welfare state and associative democracy?”

Cohen & Rogers point out the problems in the welfare state, that is, the growing mismatch between the present regulatory institutions and the tasks of democratic regulation. According to Cohen & Rogers (p.52), internationalization of capital and product markets coupled with increased possibilities for firms to migrate from national economies had limited the capacities of states to maintain control of their tax bases and monetary policies. Under that situation, they propose the new form of corporatism. And they focus on the formation of policy. I think that’s only the format. The more important thing is the content of the policy. What in their proposal are the egalitarian characteristics which are different from the traditional Keynesian welfare state? Although their recognition on the present problem is correct, there is nothing new in their proposal. [I think what is most basically different is that Keynesianism is primarily oriented
towards macro-economic plans of one sort or another, especially around aggregate demand and the like, whereas the Cohen & Rogers proposals are much more oriented to micro-economic problem solving and the supply conditions of production – not in the sense of supply-side economics, but in the sense of problem solving to increase the quality of the supply conditions. This is quite a different focus of substantive policy.]

Related to the first question, I have some questions on associative solutions (pp.55-63). What are the connections among national policy formulation, regional/sectoral groups, and local or intra-firm organization? C & R explain the three-level decision making process. But, I don’t know about the combination and their effectiveness under the rapid economic change. Is their solution state-centered eventually? [The solutions are certainly state-anchored, but not so much state-centered, insofar as secondary associations are expected to take over from central state bureaucracies a range of implementation activities. Contrast Occupational safety & health as directed from a central inspectorate vs as organized through secondary associations. The latter still requires a state with a real role, but it is less statist – and least in the sense of less command-and-control.] And what’s the role of the state if there are no central associations? I am not sure their remedy.

9. Richard Thomson

1. Decentralized, De-coordinated, and Hybrid IR Systems and Collective Bargaining / Articulated Bargaining / Microcorporatism – Current industrial relations trends in the major Western economies have been moving away from centralized and coordinated (e.g. corporatist) forms and solutions, in favor of more decentralized, de-coordinated, and hybridized forms and solutions (e.g. microcorporatism, articulated bargaining, etc.). Cohen and Roger’s attempt to promote centralized and coordinated (more-corporatist) forms of associative governance comes at a time when corporatist forms and solutions are at their weakest in decades (exempting temporary “solidarity pacts” used to stabilize and moderate national economic indicators as mandated by European Union inclusion). Cohen and Rogers attempt to distinguish associative democracy from corporatism in the conclusion, yet the comparison is roughly equivalent enough to draw conclusions. Certainly then, any attempt at implementing associative democracy would run into this formidable roadblock – how would Cohen and Rogers propose to overcome this obstacles? [You raise an important issue: how different, really, is the AD model of C&R from corporatism? And if in some crucial ways they are similar, does the erosion of support for corporatism mean that associative democracy would also face the same opposition and problems? Now, one crucial way that corporatism and AD are different is that in corporatism, the corporatist institutions are primarily engaged in bargaining which generates compromises that the state enacts and implements – things like wage bargains and labor market policies. In contrast, the AD models sees associations as directly deliberating both about policy and about its implementation. This embeds them much more deeply into the process of problem-solving rather than simply demand-making, and – it is hoped – this fundamentally changes the character of the dynamics.]
2. Internal trade union problems - Trade unions are currently plagued by three major internal problems (according to Richard Hyman); willingness to act, wildcat conflict, and wildcat cooperation (a phrase coined by Streeck) –

   a. “willingness to act” - the refusal, perhaps passive and individualized, to support union calls to collective mobilization.
   b. “wildcat conflict” – anti-official militancy, articulate a rejection of the restraints and disciplines imposed by relatively strong national unions.
   c. “wildcat co-operation” – in conditions of intensified competitive pressures in product markets, when the viability of the employer can seem genuinely at risk, workplace union representatives may accept company initiatives that run counter to national union principles. Any trend toward bargaining decentralization to company level necessarily encourages the pressures toward “company egoism.”

Associative democracy’s centralized and coordinated class-based associations would likely experience magnified versions of these three internal trade union problems if implemented. Cohen and Rogers need to address how associative democracy’s class-based associations would overcome these current problems. [Since these associations will be engaged in governance rather than in workplace bargaining and the like, I am not sure that these issues pertain in the same way. The associations in AD do not call strikes or mobilize people for mass protest, except perhaps in very special situations. Disruption is not the foundation of their power. This may lead to other problems, of course — tendencies towards oligarchy and the like. But the union dilemmas don’t seem to directly apply.]

3. Economic Heterogeneity - Borrowing heavily from Piore and Sabel’s Second Industrial Divide: Increasing uncertainty in product markets and global economics \( \rightarrow \) causes increased diversity and changes in production \( \rightarrow \) resulting in diversity and changes in the skills and workers needed to staff organizations \( \rightarrow \) producing increased heterogeneity of workers and decreased interest aggregation. Cohen and Rogers discuss social and political heterogeneity, and the collapse of Keynesianism due to economic changes, but they needed more elaboration of how associative democracy can overcome the challenges of economic heterogeneity. [To the extent that AD implies devolution to local levels of problem-solving, decision-making and implementation, then at least some sources of heterogeneity may become less salient than in highly centralized arenas of decisionmaking. At least this is what I think they believe.]

4. Sabel’s moebius-strip model of hyper-organizations - Cohen and Rogers discuss Sabel’s moebius-strip model of hyper-organizations (they note that it is over-emphasized by the business community, but they confirm that the trend does exist) – if the trend is toward moebius-strip organizations (however over-emphasized), does this reduce the ability of associative democracy to ameliorate the problems of the under-represented, when the barriers to entrance/exit are reduced to such a low level that it impacts the effectiveness of voice mechanisms? [I am not sure I quite understand your point here — perhaps I need to reread the section on the moebius-strip organization]