Repression and Crime Control: Why Social Movements Scholars Should Pay Attention to Policing of Crime as a Form of Repression
Pamela E Oliver

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Department of Sociology, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison WI 53706-1393, E-mail: oliver@ssc.wisc.edu

Abstract
Social movement research has tended to ignore the relation between the repression of dissent and the control of “ordinary” crime. However, the boundaries between crime and dissent are never clear-cut. There is a political aspect to crime, insofar as it benefits some while it hurts others. There are political disputes about which acts ought to be criminalized and what the penalties ought to be for different kinds of crime. Dissent is often criminalized, and “ordinary” crime may express discontent. Even more importantly, policing around “ordinary” crime can be an effective way of blocking the capacity for dissent. Data about the mass incarceration of African Americans in the US after 1980 suggest that crime control and especially the drug war have had the consequence of repressing dissent among the poor. The Black riots of the 1960s were crucial for the trajectory of repression of the Black movement since 1970, but social movement scholars have failed to recognize this because of the theoretical turn that built too strong a conceptual wall between crime and dissent.

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Whatever Happened to the Black Movement?

The Black Civil Rights Movement was “the” US movement of the early 1960s and the archetypical movement for resource mobilization and political process theories. Few sociologists are studying Black movements today. It seems that the movement just went away. Certainly this is the picture we get from figure 1, the plot of New York Times news stories about African American protests copied from Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone (2003). It is also the picture derived from Chicago news sources by McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, and MacIndoe (2005). Well, why did the movement decline? Why has there been so little Black resistance in the past 30 years? Is it because everything is wonderful and there are no more grievances among a younger generation of Black people? There are few sociologists who think this is the explanation. Jenkins et al. argue from their data that the pattern is due primarily to the rise in Black elected officials (giving more routine political access) and the decline in Black political influence via electoral competition and northern Democratic Party strength, as well as a decline in the level of grievance represented by a rise in the ratio of Black to White median family income.

While not disputing the relevance of these and other factors, I will argue that one reason we are seeing relatively little Black protest is that there has been massive repression of poor Black communities in the last 30 years. Further, although the repression is most extreme for Blacks, there is also a very high level of repression of Whites in this country as well, repression that probably contributes to the relatively low level of mobilization of poor and working class White people. Using this problem as a starting point, I will revisit theoretical understandings of repression and suggest that a less myopic view will greatly enhance our understanding of the role of the state in repressing dissent and maintaining social hierarchies.

Isn’t This Repression?

Figure 2 shows the long term trends in Black and White prison admissions in the US. Imprisonment rates oscillated only modestly before 1970, but beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a marked rise in imprisonment that accelerated in the 1980s. The imprisonment escalation hit both races, but hit Blacks harder. Since the mid-1990s, the US has had the world’s highest incarceration rate, five to eight times higher than that of most nations (Walmsley 2007). Even the majority White population has a very high incarceration rate by international standards: the 2005 rate of incarceration for US Non-Hispanic Whites -- 414 per 100,000 (Harrison and Beck 2006) -- is higher than the total incarceration rate for all but 15 of the 216 countries listed in the World Prison Population List (Walmsley 2007) and is two to four times the rate of Western European nations. On top of this extraordinarily high incarceration rate for the majority population, Black Americans are seven times more likely to be incarcerated than White Americans.
Many countries have comparable or even higher disparities in incarceration rates for disadvantaged minorities (Tonry 1994a). However, the Black/White racial disparity on top of the already-high rate for the majority population in the United States gives African Americans an incarceration rate that is truly without parallel anywhere in the world. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 12% of Black men in their twenties are in custody (9% in prison and 3% in jail) and that 40% of all Black men are under the supervision of the correctional system: in prison, in jail, or being supervised while on probation or parole. Petit and Western (2004) estimate that 60% of Black men 30-34 who are not high school graduates have been incarcerated.

Criminologists documented and monitored this rise in arrest and incarceration of Black people as it happened, showing that it was largely due to an increased level of punitiveness in responding to crime, not to rising crime rates. Crime rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s were high relative to the first half of the century, but were going down, not up, as incarceration and policing escalated. One study in 1999 showed that only 12% of the rise in incarceration between 1980 and 1996 was due to changes in crime rates, while changes in sentencing policies accounted for 88% (Blumstein and Beck 1999). That is, for a given crime, people were much more likely to be sentenced to prison and to be sentenced for a longer time. The rising Black/White disparity in incarceration was due primarily to the drug war and especially the intense policing of Black communities after 1986 around the “crack epidemic.” The racial disparity in incarceration for ordinary crime remained relatively constant – that is, rate of increase was similar for both races – while the racial disparity for drug offenses rose steeply (Mauer and Huling 1995), reaching 20 to 1 by the mid-1990s. Figure 3 shows this trend. At the beginning of the data series in 1983, drugs were the least disparate offense category, with a Black/White ratio of “only” five to one, compared with about seven for the other offenses.

Black people are subject to extraordinarily high rates of surveillance and arrest. A majority of these arrests are for low-level offenses (Miller 1996). Calculating from the Uniform Crime Reports data posted on the FBI web site, I estimate a national arrest rate of about13.5 per 100 for Blacks versus 5 per 100 for all other racial groups combined.1 This estimated rate is calculated for the entire adult population, including women and older people, who have substantially lower rates of arrest than young men. This total arrest rate excludes traffic stops but includes the catchall “other except traffic” along with minor thefts, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and all the index and non-index crimes. For my state of Wisconsin, using data supplied by the state’s Office of Justice Assistance, I calculated an average annual arrest rate for Blacks 1997-1999 or 41.7 per 100, while the comparable rate for Whites (including Hispanics) in Wisconsin was 6.0. Virtually all young Black men in segregated poor Black urban neighborhoods have been stopped and questioned by the police, and most have been arrested. In short, the United States is one of the most repressive countries on earth. Our Black population is living under a level of surveillance that can only be characterized as a police state.

Criminologist William Chambliss gives a vivid account street-level view of this repression based on his observations on police ride-alongs in the early 1990s (Chambliss 1995b):

"Police departments across the nation police the urban underclass ghetto with a vigilance that would create political revolution were the same tactics and policies implemented in white middle-class communities. In Washington, D.C., for example, the police have established a rapid deployment unit (RDU: originally designed for riot..."
Members of the RDU drive in patrol cars through the ghetto on nightly vigils looking for suspects. ‘Suspects’ include all young black males between the ages of twelve and thirty who are visible: driving in cars, standing on street corners, or in a group observed through a window in an apartment.” (250-1)

He goes on to describe routine police patrol procedures, finding pretexts to stop Black men and search them, and summarizes the picture of repression:

"As a result of the treatment of young black males by the criminal justice system from arrest to incarceration, the poor black community is a community of ex-convicts. Men hardened by the experience of jail and prison; women with husbands, lovers, their children's father, brothers, uncles, and nephews with criminal records; men stigmatized and unable to break the stigma; men used to being brutalized by police, prosecutors, jailers, and other inmates. Men return with experiences of being raped, threatened, and assaulted by police and inmates. Some return to the community with AIDS and other diseases contracted while in jail or prison." (253)

Contrasting the treatment of Blacks with college students, he writes:

"Only a few miles from where the RDU and the narcs are active, lies ‘Foggy Bottom,’ home of George Washington University. On any night of the week one finds students at George Washington University enjoying leisurely evenings in their dormitory, fraternity, sorority, or sorority, underage students drink, use false ID's to go to bars and nightclubs, and in the presence of a "cool" professor they roll their marijuana cigarettes or stuff white powder up their noses. Not infrequently at fraternity parties or while out on a date these students commit rape and various other sexual assaults. Not all of them; but if the RDU paid half as much attention to the crimes of students at the universities as they do to young black males, the arrest and incarceration rate for young white males would certainly approach that of young black males. And if procedures that are followed routinely in the ghetto were followed here, the students would be violently shoved against a wall, called names, threatened with death, hand cuffed, banged around, shoved into a police car, and taken off to jail for booking. This does not happen at George Washington University or at any of the other Washington, D.C., campuses; not even at the predominantly black universities: Howard and the University of the District of Columbia.” (253) (Chambliss 1995b)

Repression and the Social Control of Protest

Social movement scholars and political sociologists more broadly have ignored these trends, because it has not fit their preconceptions of repression. Movement scholarship on repression has focused primarily on the policing of protests and on the other ways that movement actions are shaped and constrained. That is, it has focused on the overt responses to or constraints on specific acts of dissent, not on the repression of dissenters. For example, Christian Davenport defines repression as acts that “violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport 2007) and explicitly excludes deterrence of crime from his scope of inquiry. Some of Davenport’s own research has been explicitly concerned with the massive repression of the Black Power movement (Davenport 2005; Davenport and Eads 2001), but he does not connect this with the wider repression of the Black community. Similarly, studies of the policing of protest focus on
police at protests and the overt response to specific acts of dissent. (See, for example, Della Porta 1996.; Earl 2005; Earl, McCarthy and Soule 2003; Earl and Schussman 2004; Earl and Soule 2006; McCarthy, McPhail and Crist 1999; McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998; Titarenko et al. 2001; Wisler and Giugni 1999)

Recent scholarship has recognized the importance of a broader understanding of repression; it just has not gone far enough. In a series of articles that review and critique prior research and theory on repression, Earl argues that the scope of inquiry should be the “social control of protest” and develops a typology of repression that identifies both forms and agents of repression (Earl 2003), stresses the coercive capacities of non-governmental organizations such as private police forces, business anti-labor organizations, and vigilante groups (Earl 2004) and that challenge the view of arrest as a mild form of repression, stressing the costs associated with being arrested (Earl 2005). All of these works, however, focus on the direct regulation of acts of dissent, and none of them even mentions the control of “ordinary” crime as a possible way of repressing movement actors. In an introduction to a special issue of Mobilization on repression (Earl 2006), Earl argues expands on these arguments, making it clear that repression can prevent protest by preventing acts of dissent from ever occurring, but still misses the connection between crime-control and movement-control.

As Earl notes in her reviews cited above, there has been extensive debate around the question of whether repression reduces or inflames protest. Part of the confusion around this issue arises from a failure to make the important distinction between the number of acts of repression and level of repressiveness in a society. The problem is that repressiveness, when it works, prevents protest from happening at all. Any study that measures repressiveness by counting arrests of protesters or other acts of repression against specific acts of dissent will form a false picture of the level of repressiveness in a society. There is an inherent positive correlation between protest and the arrest of protesters: you cannot be arrested for protesting if you do not protest. An example of this can be seen in figure 4, which is my re-analysis from data generously provided by Ruud Koopmans (see Koopmans 1995) based on newspaper accounts of protests. Koopman’s data contains an estimated number of participants and number of arrests for protesting for each month in the series. Panel a shows the relation between the number of protesters and the number arrested for protest: the relationship is positive and the correlation is +.47. Does this mean that repression fosters protest? Well, no, it does not. Panel b plots repression as the ratio of the number arrests of protesters to participant in protest. Now the correlation is negative, -.27.

The relationship is not strong – $r^2$ is only .07 – but there is some suggestion that repressiveness (the likelihood of being arrested at a protest) might inhibit protest.

But even the ratio of arrests of protesters to protesters cannot truly measure the level of repressiveness. Repressiveness prevents protest from ever happening. Distinguishing political repression from crime control and studying the former while ignoring the latter has led most political sociologists to ignore one of the most important forms of repressiveness in any society – the prevention of dissent through the preventative incapacitation of potential dissenters and the disruption of social networks among potential dissenters through intensive surveillance. Relatedly, the attempt sharply to distinguish political dissent from apolitical crime has led to a failure to appreciate the ways in which regimes criminalize dissent and the ways in which dissent is expressed in crime. It is time to back up and take a wider perspective on the problem. In
particular, it is time to reconnect the policing of crime with the policing of dissent. There is, of course, a huge difference between an anti-war rally or gay pride march on the one hand and mugging old people or robbing convenience stores on the other hand, and it is important to develop analytic and theoretical strategies for understanding the differences among different types of crimes and different types of dissent. But we will only confuse ourselves if we try to maintain a sharp boundary between political dissent and ordinary crime, especially if we study only the former and ignore the latter. Scholars of protest in the 1960s and early 1970s understood the importance of these relations, and many criminologists still do. We need to revisit 1960s politics and 1970s scholarship on social movements to understand the social forces that put us where we are today.

Repressing the Riots

Today’s young people are generally taught a celebratory history of the civil rights movement and the politics of non-violent resistance centered on the secular saints Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks. Our young are rarely taught about the riots, and even many academic sources on the Black movement ignore or downplay the riots. It almost seems as if those who are old enough to remember the riots are trying to forget them. But forgetting them is a big mistake, because the riots are essential for understanding the massive repression we have seen in the US since then.

We are nearly forty years out from the summer of 1968. It was a traumatic year on many fronts, in many places. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were assassinated. The US anti-war movement was dominating college campus life in the US. Independence movements were strong in Africa. There was revolutionary turmoil in France and protest movements in many countries. All of this social unrest feeds into the story, but for understanding what has happened with repression in the United States, it is important to remember the Black urban riots. Race riots are a longstanding feature of US history, but riots prior to the 1960s were usually initiated by Whites and often involved one-sided White attacks on Black communities. The 1960s riots, by contrast, primarily involved Black people looting and burning property. Riots increased in frequency from 1963. The huge 1965 Los Angeles (“Watts”) riot lasted several days, was covered full-time on television, and included rooftop snipers shooting at firemen and crowds chanting “burn baby, burn”; it has been called the entry of that Black working class into the struggle. There were more riots in 1966 and then a huge wave of hundreds of riots in 1967 and then again in 1968 after the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. The general time trend can be seen in figure 5, copied from Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney (1996), which shows event counts from New York Times stories. Research by Myers (1997; 2000) shows that riots diffused in waves connected by mass media coverage, especially television broadcast networks.

By the end of the 1960s, virtually every city with a large Black population had had at least one riot; some had had dozens. Whole sections of major cities had been burned out. Rhetoric had escalated and both Blacks and Whites were using apocalyptic language (see, for example, Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969; Yette 1971). Some kind of violent race war seemed possible to many observers, in fact, seemed to be already underway. A poll in 1968 found that 81% of the population said that “law and order has broken down” and 53% reported “fear of racial violence” (Louis Harris and Associates Inc. 1968; Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969). The first edition of Killian’s The Impossible Revolution? (Killian 1968) was written in the midst of the
riots and captures the desperate mood of the time. Similarly, both Black and White interviews from the late 1960s in Blauner’s *Black Lives, White Lives* (Blauner 1989) take for granted the possibility of race war. The race war did not happen and the riots died down after 1969. Contrary to popular belief, however, they did not go away entirely, as figure 5 indicates. There were scattered riots periodically, including a big riot in Miami in 1980 (Ladner et al. 1981) and a riot wave after the 1992 not guilty verdict for the police who beat Rodney King and the big Los Angeles riot that followed (Associated Press 1992).

In the late 1960s, Black Power organizations were expressing political anger and advocating defiance of White law. Before he was killed in 1965, Malcolm X had received wide publicity for criticizing nonviolence as a strategy in the face of White violence. In 1966 SNCC publicly launched the slogan “Black Power” during the march through Mississippi where King and Carmichael debated strategy in front of reporters. Malcolm, Carmichael and most other Black Power advocates understood the slogan to involve economic and political power and a refusal to accept violent domination by Whites, not as a call for armed aggression against White power, but the slogan was frightening enough to most Whites. There is telling footage in the first episode of part 2 of the Eyes on the Prize PBS video (newly re-released): one of the White civil rights workers who was marching alongside Blacks in the 1966 Mississippi march tells the camera that he felt very frightened when standing in the middle of an angry Black crowd shouting “Black Power.” (Movement scholars who stress the importance of emotion would do well to revisit the frustration and anger of the Black movement in the late 1960s.)

Everyone at the time knew that the riots were important political events and an important part of the Black movement, although there was substantial disagreement about their causes and meaning. Black people generally saw the riots as extreme expressions of Black political grievances. A large majority of Black people told survey researchers that the underlying cause of the riots was dissatisfaction with racial discrimination and inequality. (Feagin and Sheatsley 1968; Louis Harris and Associates Inc. 1968; Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969)  One survey in Los Angeles in the late 1960s conducted by a less sympathetic researcher found that Blacks who subscribed to “Black Muslim” ideology were more likely to support riots, also finding that their support was more oriented toward concerns about Black disadvantage than to Muslim theology (Tomlinson 1970). At the same time, Black people disagreed strongly about whether the riots would help, hurt, or make no difference to the Black cause, with roughly equal numbers choosing each option (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969).

Moderate Black leaders and many social scientists argued that insurrection was the weapon of those whose grievances were not met through peaceful channels (e.g. Lieberson and Silverman 1965; Lieske 1978). The Kerner Commission (United States. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 1968), writing after the 1967 riots and before the 1968 riots, argued that the cause of the riots was White racism, discrimination, blocked hopes, and a climate of lawlessness that had been created by widespread White resistance to laws mandating equal treatment; President Johnson rejected this report. Among most Black people, many social scientists, and many policy makers, the riots were viewed as extreme expressions of Black political grievances. Bryan (1979) explicitly argues from the survey data that the riots needed to be understood as part of the Black movement. Social scientists stressed that discriminatory and oppressive police practices both fueled underlying grievances and had exacerbated racial tensions both historically
and in the recent era (e.g. Marx 1970a; Perez, Berg and Myers 2003). In more recent studies of a longer series of race riots, Olzak and her colleagues find that ethnic competition in labor markets predicts riots, not simple deprivation (Olzak and Shanahan 1996; Olzak, Shanahan and McEneaney 1996). Olzak also shows that race riots between 1880 and 1920 were tied to labor unrest and economic competition (Olzak 1989).

Popular White views were very different. Several surveys were cited in a special report written in 1968 one year after the Kerner Commission report (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969 pp 103-104). Nearly half (48.5%) of Whites said the disorders had been planned, versus only 18% of Blacks. Instead of “discrimination and unfair treatment” (chosen by 48.5% of Blacks), Whites said that the main causes of the disorder were “looters and other undesirables” (34%) and “Black power or other radicals” (23.5%). When asked their opinion of the Kerner Commission report, 53% of whites disagreed that riots were mainly caused by racism, and 59% disagreed that they were not organized. When asked whether disorders help or hurt “the cause of Negro rights,” 64% of Whites said hurt, mostly because they increased “anti-Negro sentiments” (versus 23% of Blacks). When Whites were asked whether Negroes with same education were better or worse off than they were, 42% said better, 46% said same, 5% said worse. Then when they were shown data that Blacks were worse off and asked why, 19% of Whites chose discrimination, 56% “something about Negroes themselves,” and 19% a mixture of both. A survey of members of Congress found that they tended toward the popular White views of the riots (Hahn and Feagin 1970).

Most Whites in the 1960s understood Black Power to refer to riots and violent resistance and a majority reported feeling afraid of riots (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969). This was not inconsistent with recognizing the reality of Black grievances. In the same surveys cited above, when Whites were asked if they would approve of programs to improve living conditions for blacks, 53% said yes even if it cost them a 10% tax increase (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969). This approval was not incompatible with fear. Some of Blauner’s White interviewees said they thought Blacks wanted to kill Whites because that is what they (the White interviewees) would feel if they had been treated like Blacks.

The riots had political consequences, as a substantial body of scholarship has documented. For example, Button’s (1978) detailed compilation of qualitative interview data and quantitative expenditure patterns show substantial impacts on policies to prevent riots through welfare payments, low income housing, jobs programs – especially summer jobs programs for youths, which were seen as “riot insurance” – and training for police in better community relations, especially before 1968. Haines (1983) showed that foundation funding for moderate Black political organizations also escalated in response to the riots.

But alongside the “carrot” of improved social provision was the “stick” of coercive social control. There were substantial expenditures on riot control, including increasing funding and training to the National Guard and the Army as military back up to police for riot control, a build up of domestic intelligence and surveillance capacity and coordination, including undercover agents from both military and the FBI as well as local police, and increased federal funding for local police departments (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969; also see Button pp. 107-179). By 1968, there had been a huge military build up to prepare for a possible civil war, as
well as a huge build up in police departments all over the country. Local police, the FBI, the US Army, and the CIA all had major domestic surveillance operations that had placed informers and agents in virtually every movement organization in the country. Other studies similarly found that police expenditures were dramatically ramped up after the riots. As early as the 1964 election, Goldwater made “safety in the streets” part of his campaign platform; he was soundly defeated by Johnson. But by the 1968 election, support for the repressive response to riots had grown. Humphrey argued that riots were caused by discrimination and deprivation, and many still agreed with him, but it was Nixon’s law and order program that won the election. Although Nixon continued funding for many of the social welfare “prevention” programs until the threat of riots was deemed low after the 1972 election, his administration and especially his attorney general, John Mitchell, escalated the federal support for the repressive approach to riot control. There was a huge increase in federal funding for police between 1968 and 1972, including a doubling of federal funding for riot control by local police (Button pp 138-9).

Welch (1975) found a similar pattern. She compared the percentage increase in per capita expenditures of various types in all the cities over size 50,000 that did and did not have Black riots. She hypothesized that cities that experienced riots would show greater increases in both their welfare expenditures and their police and fire expenditures and would receive more intergovernmental funds relative to non-riot cities, while other kinds of expenditures would show no such correlations. She found a strong positive effect of riots on increases in police expenditures; the difference for welfare expenditures was positive but not significant, while there was no difference for the other kinds of expenditures.

It was not only riots that were being repressed in that period, of course. The White populace in general and key elements of the White elite – particularly the FBI and the US military – believed that the Black riots were planned and orchestrated by Black militants with Communist connections. Communist conspiracies were also believed to underlie the other radical movements of the period, including especially the student anti-war movement and all of the various left-wing parties and tendencies that flowered in that era, but also all the radical ethnic movements, including the Chicano and American Indian movements, as well as Black separatists and militants. The massive repression of all types of “radical” social movements is well documented (e.g. Marx 1970a; Marx 1973; Marx 1974). There was massive surveillance and infiltration of the whole array of left wing and ethnic minority organizations, and also of the KKK, and there is no question that this repression played a major role in disrupting the organizations against which it was directed.

In short, the more recent focus on institutional channeling and other forms of “soft” repression should not blind us to the magnitude of “hard” repression brought to bear on leftist movements generally in the Nixon years. At the same time, the repression directed toward the White leftist movements should not blind us to the even more violent and coercive repression directed against Black Nationalist groups (Davenport 2005) as well as anyone who was deemed an instigator or likely participant in a Black riot (i.e. a poor young Black man). In particular, it is important to recognize the perceived threat represented by the Black urban riots and the massive military and paramilitary forces put together to deal with this threat.
Repressing the Rioters

The apparatus of coercive repression was ramped up in response to the Black urban riots and other social disorders, including disorderly anti-war protests on campuses. But policing and coercion in Black communities stayed high, even after the disorders died down. In fact, social control expenditures continued to rise and the US started escalating policing and incarceration. Now, however, instead of repressing the riots, the police were charged with repressing potential rioters. Police funding in the 1970s was increased more in cities with larger black populations and that had strong civil rights movements (Carroll and Jackson 1982), and crime was higher in cities that had strong civil rights movements (Jackson and Carroll 1981).

Gary Marx, who had been studying covert repression of political movements in the 1960s and early 1970s, showed how these same techniques were being used to police Black communities by the late 1970s in anti-crime efforts such as undercover fencing operations and infiltration of criminal gangs (Marx 1980; Marx 1981; Marx 1982). In the 1980s and 1990s, these same surveillance operations were put in the service of the drug war, the major source of the mass incarceration of Black people after the mid-1980s.

By 1990, the US was effectively a police state for its Black citizens, and to a lesser extent, for poor Whites, as well. The crucial thing to understand is that a repressive strategy initially triggered by massive urban unrest and other social movements was maintained and expanded long after the riots abated. But it was not preventing unrest by repressing riots: it was preventing unrest by repressing potential rioters, that is, by repressing poor people, particularly poor Black people. People were not arrested and incarcerated for dissent or even for rioting; they were arrested and incarcerated for crimes. A early 1970s critic of the “law and order” move to mandatory sentences argued that this would do nothing to help the racial disparities in the system (Motley 1973). Dello Buono (1992) argues that there has been a longstanding pattern of coercive repression of Black nationalist political activity and labeling it “ordinary crime.” Chambliss (1995b) specifically argues that supporters of “tough on crime” policies distorted poll data on public fears of crime to sell a political agenda, as the poll questions of the time clearly linked ordinary crime with riots when asking people about their concerns about personal safety in the late 1960s, as in the phrase "crime, lawlessness, looting and rioting." He argues that crime did not emerge again until it was linked with drugs in the late 1980s, after the escalation of the “drug war.” Beginning in the late 1970s and escalating in the mid 1980s, what critical observers see as a politically-motivated and racially-targeted drug war provided a new rationale for surveillance and repression of Black people.

But this repression was invisible to scholars trying to understand social movements or the decline of militant protest – especially Black protest – after the 1960s. Even when concerned about coercive repression, they focused their attention on the repression of specific acts of political dissent, not on the repression of an entire dissenting community. (I should note that this critique applies to me, too, until I started paying attention to this issue in 1999.)

While scholars whose interest is political dissent have ignored the mass repression of Black Americans, it has not gone unnoticed by scholars whose focus is crime, social control, or race relations. Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject. Many
criminologists wrote about these trends as they were happening, often trying to sound alarms and arouse concern. (Bush 1998; Chambliss 1995a; Chambliss 1995b; Duster 1997; Goode 2002; Gordon 1994; Human Rights Watch 2000; Mauer 1999; Miller 1996; Tonry 1994b; Tonry 1995) Black political commentators and many criminologists of all races have been sounding alarms about this mass escalation in social control for many years, even as it continued to rise. What is somewhat chilling is that the rhetoric cannot capture the trends. The rhetoric of the late 1960s was already calling the situation a police state, a state of massive repression. Black radicals in 1971 were talking about the specter of concentration camps for Blacks. And yet things got much, much worse in the next 30 years.

Dissent as Crime and Crime as Dissent

To make theoretical sense of the repression of Black American communities, we need to revisit the relation between crime and dissent. The boundaries and distinctions between political dissent and “ordinary” crime have long been contested. Considering a continuum from fully peaceful calls for reform through militant collective disruption or violence to individual acts of theft or assault or black market economic activity, different actors have drawn different distinctions depending upon their political or theoretical agendas. In some times and places even a peaceful petition for redress of grievance was viewed by elites as the same kind of crime subject to the same kind of penalties as a collective riot or an individual assault or robbery. Depending on their theoretical or political orientation, social scientists might group protest and collective violence together and contrast them with crime, or might contrast peaceful protest with all forms of violent action or crime. But scholars who study social control almost inevitably end up concluding that all clear distinctions break down in practice. For example, Gurr (1977a) argues that the boundary between crime and civil strife has always been blurred. On the one hand, protest is often criminalized, especially when it takes the form of collective violent attacks or urban riots, as it often has in the past three hundred years. On the other, there is always conflict over what the criminal code ought to be, and over whose appropriation of whose property ought to be considered a crime rather than a legitimate tax or normal business practice.

Elites always criminalize some forms of dissent, and any failure to cooperate the laws and customs that maintain oppression is generally a crime. It is often a crime to criticize the government. It was a crime to violate the segregation laws of the Old South. It was a crime in England in the 18th century to refuse an offer of employment. Laws are often passed to criminalize successful protest forms. It is a violation of US labor law to organize a “secondary boycott.” During the Montgomery bus boycott, a law was passed making it a crime to organize a carpool. After Chicano high school students walked out in Los Angeles in the late 1960s, felony conspiracy charges were brought against adults accused of organizing the walkout. After a series of disruptive protests at abortion clinics, many communities passed laws prohibiting collective assembly within several hundred yards of a medical clinic, often making violation a felony subject to a large fine or a jail term.

It is always a political act to decide what is criminal and what is not (Reasons 1973). Some coercive or deceptive transfers of property are criminalized as theft, while others are treated as legal business practices. Political actors seek to legitimate and legalize the actions that benefit them while delegitimizing and criminalizing the actions that hurt them. There is never a pure
distinction between individual and collective motives, nor between individual and collective
consequences. Even apart from social banditry – the Robin Hood ethic of stealing from the rich
and giving to the poor – crime often benefits one group at the expense of another. Many thieves
and drug dealers share their gains with their family and friends. But even if they are selfish, the
proceeds of their thieving have economic consequences for their communities in the goods and
services they purchase.

It is not possible to dichotomize apolitical and political motives for crime. People always have
mixed motives. The very act of attributing motives to an actor is, itself, a political act. To give
an intelligible account of a person’s motives is inevitably to seem to justify the behavior.
Opponents of an action tend to deny its motives, to call it purposeless or mindless or lawless or
criminal. One of the “problems” of regime legitimacy is to persuade the disadvantaged members
of a society that their society’s inequality and hierarchy are just. Other things being equal,
property crime is higher where there is more inequality. Criminals often justify their actions
with reference to larger systems of inequality, and often claim to have principles about whom it is
appropriate to victimize. Political ideologies often justify certain kinds of crimes. LaFree
(1998) argues that the Civil Rights Movement’s attacks on the legitimacy of the system (along
with other political movements) fed into higher crime rates. LaFree and Drass (1997) show
that Black arrests for robbery and burglary rose with Black collective action in the 1950s and
1960s, then continued to rise after the Black riots subsided in the 1970s. In the early 1970s,
some White radical friends of my own acquaintance would describe the theft of a bottle of
orange juice as “liberating” it from the grocery store. Studies of rioters in the 1960s found a
mixture of motives, ranging from political anger to wild celebration (similar to the drunken riots
of college students after football games) to the simple material desire to obtain free merchandise
through looting. There were differences among individuals in their motives, and the same person
might have multiple motives.

Trying to separate crime from dissent by making a distinction in form between individual and
collective action also breaks down in practice. There is individual dissent and collective crime,
and both are common. The more repressive a system, the more dissent take the form of
individual, often anonymous, acts of resistance. Weak actors in oppressive systems may look for
ways to reduce the risk of dissent through what appear to be “random” criminal acts, such as
posting graffiti, circulating anonymous documents critical of the regime, vandalism, or theft.
Johnston (2006) gives examples of how graffiti and other “small” transgressions can be forms of
resistance in repressive states, as they feed into the contentious political talk that is essential for
constituting resistant groups. On the other hand, collective crime is common. This is most
obvious for “organized crime” or “gang-related crime,” but groups also commit much “ordinary
crime.” In some cases, intentionally political groups run criminal enterprises to fund their
efforts, or target certain individuals for assault or death as part of their political strategy.

*Riots and crime*

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, social scientists joined the public debates about the meaning of
riots. Although a majority of Whites defined the riots as meaningless violence or a Communist
conspiracy to overthrow the US, many social scientists argued that riots were not merely crime,
not uncontrolled or senseless, and should be viewed as extreme expressions of political
grievance. Social scientists cited evidence that rioters rarely killed people (most deaths in riots were rioters shot by police or merchants), that businesses tended to be attacked or spared depending on whether their owners were Black or White and whether they hired local residents and treated local customers with respect, that measures of the level of grievance tended to predict which cities would have riots, and that rioters often gave political accounts of their actions. While agreeing that the Black riots were a form of protest, Marx stressed that not all riots necessarily were protests, that there were also “issueless riots” such as brawls after sporting events (Marx 1970b).

The resource mobilization turn in the 1970s tended to ignore or discount any relation between crime and dissent. This avoidance was grounded in a rejection of the dominant thrust of prior theory, which had tended to view protest as an emotional response to strain or tension, not a purposive attempt to attain well-defined political goals. (Prior theory, of course, was never as one-sided as these critics said, but addressing this issue is outside the scope of this paper.) A widely-cited study by Lodhi and Tilly (1973) presented data showing that the time trends and geographic distributions of crime and collective violence in 19th Century France were different and argued that this showed that the two must not have common causes. Oberschall (1978) criticizes breakdown theorists for seeing equating collective violence with crime and seeing a sharp break between collective violence and peaceful protest, arguing that collective violence is just as purposive; the sentence structure presupposes that crime is purposeless but does not assert it. McCarthy and Zald never mentioned crime in their most widely-cited articles (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977), nor did Snyder and Tilly (1972).2

In the wake of the disruptions of the 1960s, a great deal of scholarship in the 1970s addressed questions of the relation between disruptive civil strife (especially urban riots) and other crime, often with the agenda of demonstrating that urban riots were not “merely crime” or unorganized mindless emotional eruptions. While agreeing that the Black riots were a form of protest, Marx stressed that not all riots necessarily were protests, that there were also “issueless riots” such as brawls after sporting events (Marx 1970b). Historical research on urban violence – much of it conducted in the wake of the US riots – found that violent crowds were common in European cities in the 18th and 19th centuries. Scholars took different positions about the relation between common crime and collective protest or violence.

Rudé conducted one very influential line of work. Examining patterns of crime and rioting in London and Paris in the 18th century, he argues that riots tended to occur in areas dominated by working class people with occupations and stable abodes, not in the high-crime highly-transient areas of the urban underclass (1988), specifically critiqued Chevalier for confusing “individual anti-social behaviour with the collective action of social groups” (p. 237) and says: “The two may occur together, as they often did in nineteenth-century Paris (we have but to consult the police files to establish the point) but they arise from different causes, have their own distinctive histories, and there is no necessary connection between the two” (p. 237). He concludes the chapter by saying: “The whole question needs further study but, paradoxically, was it not rather the stability of old social relationships that provided the characteristic seed-bed of rebellion and collective protest, and not the instability of mass migration, uprooting and the dissolution of old social ties?” (p. 238)
Gurr and his colleagues also studied patterns of collective protest, urban violence, and crime in several cities in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries (Gurr 1976; Gurr, Grabosky and Hula 1977). Like many others who analyze social control, Gurr stresses that authorities create crime by deciding what to criminalize. Summarizing findings across studies, Gurr (1977b) draws several generalizations. First, all the cities studied had high levels of urban rioting and crime in the late 1700s and a general decline in both crime and urban rioting thereafter. A high proportion but not all periods of rising crime were associated with periods of collective strife. Second, rioting and violent contention has always been criminalized, while the trend of history is the gradual decriminalization of non-violent civil strife. Similarly 19th century laws criminalized vagrancy and unemployment, requiring lower classes to accept any employment offered to them. The general arc of history, at least through the early 1970s, was toward legalization of more forms of collective contention and greater power and resources for lower class workers. Police forces were originally private armies raised by the elites to protect their own interests, especially from violent collective action. Police reform and the incorporation of police into the state arose from a confluence of elite desires to protect themselves from collective violence and middle class desires to protect themselves from theft.

There was a specific sub-debate about the empirical relationships between rates of common crime and the level of urban disruption. Some (e.g. Gurr) found that there was a high (although not perfect) correlation between eras of collective dissent and eras of rising crime. Others (e.g. Eisinger 1973) argued that collective protest substituted for crime, that people who could air their grievances politically had less need or motivation to commit crime. One oft-cited study from the era published in a psychiatry journal found that it was particularly black-on-black violent crime that declined in southern towns during civil rights protests; these authors stressed that oppression would turn anger inward toward one’s own group and that collective protest reduced this self-destructive impulse (Solomon, Walker and Fishman 1965). Still others (e.g. Lodhi and Tilly 1973) found little correlation (positive or negative) between the two across time or locale and concluded that they had different causes. None of the theoretical turns in the study of social movements since has revisited the question of the relation between crime and dissent.

Social Control: Legitimacy, Choices, and Inter-group Conflict

In this section, I want to begin the task of developing an understanding of social control that links crime control and political repression. It is time to back up and reconsider the debates from the early 1970s about the relation between crime and civil strife from a different vantage. As my short summary indicates, even a cursory reading of the empirical literature makes it clear that the empirical correlation between common crime and either violent or nonviolent dissenting collective action is varied. This should not be surprising, as neither crime nor dissent have simple empirical correlates. On the crime side, the rates of property and violent crimes often do not correlate with each other, and crime rates are affected by a wide variety of different kinds of social conditions. On the collective action side, different forms of action are not necessarily correlated with each other and are similarly impacted by different kinds of social conditions. In short, both crime and collective action are abstractions from an extremely diverse and complex set of empirical instances.
That said, as abstractions, crime and dissent share the properties that they involve challenging the dominant social order and that they are subject to social control. Authorities decide which things to define as crimes, authorities decide how much effort to put into the control of the different kinds of crimes, and authorities decide what kinds of tactics and strategies to adopt in crime control. Authorities decide which kinds of dissent to criminalize and they also decide which categories of dissenters are most dangerous. Social control is never focused solely on specific classes of acts, it is always focused on classes of acts as they are committed by particular classes of people. What to criminalize and whom to target are the crucial elements of a social control system. The minute we recognize that it is possible to target people who are dissenters for control, whether or not they commit specific illegal acts of dissent, we are ready to see that “crime control” and “dissent control” can never be disentangled.

The social control of dissent can only be understood in the broader context of social control overall. To understand repression, we have to begin with non-repression. To understand dissent, we have to begin with non-dissent. It will be helpful to provide an over-simplified review of the problem of social order. Why do people restrain their selfish impulses? Why do people comply? Why do they not commit crimes? Why do they not protest? The most important source of social control is system legitimacy and normative compliance (e.g. Black 1984; Garland 1985; Garland 2001a; Garland 2001b). People who are satisfied with what they have and with the political situation generally do not dissent or steal because they see no reason to do so. Concrete material conditions, relative deprivation, and social construction processes feed into levels of satisfaction with the social order and political regime. This composite of material and constructed satisfaction with or acceptance of things as they are is the essential source of social order. If there is widespread satisfaction, there is little protest and little crime; if there is widespread dissatisfaction, there are more people who are motivated to commit crimes or dissent. The second fundamental source of social order is the normative structure of social relations: people feel pressure to do the things approved of by those close to them. The content of the normative structure obviously varies: retail theft, failing to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk, and complaining about government officials are behaviors that are approved by some members of our but considered unacceptable in others. Further, there is obviously a close relation between the normative order and extent to which most people’s needs are met in a society. Groups in which most people are basically satisfied tend to be groups in which the normative structure supports the regime.

Regimes that are legitimate to the governed don’t get much dissent and don’t need to do much repressing. Regimes need repression when they are not legitimate and not satisfying their populace. Thus, from the dominant actors’ point of view, the social control problem involves weighing the benefits and costs of making subordinates satisfied so they will not rebel versus the benefits and costs of preventing their rebellion through repression. The US could have responded to the challenges of the Black movement by opening the doors of economic opportunity and political power to Black people. Instead, it chose repression. Why it chose repression is another story. But that it needed repression because it failed to satisfy people’s basic needs and desires is central to the story. Given that their needs and desires are not being met, poor Black people can choose acquiescence or some form of resistance. That resistance may take many forms, including both illegal ways of making money and political mobilization.
The more political mobilization and collective action are blocked or seem fruitless, the more attractive property crime or illegal markets are likely to seem as alternatives.

*How Repression Works: Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Surveillance*

If the dominant group chooses coercive repression as a strategy, it has a wide array of repressive tactics to choose from. Analytically, there are three ways coercive repression “works” to affect the behavior of dissidents: deterrence, incapacitation, and surveillance. Deterrence works when the threat of punishment for a particular class of acts persuades people to avoid that kind of action. The theory of deterrence is action specific. That is, to prevent protests in abortion clinics, you increase the penalties for protesting in abortion clinics. To prevent the use of guns in crimes, you create penalty enhancers for using a gun in the commission of a crime. Thus, the deterrence of protest requires sanctions against protest. However, incapacitation “works” by removing people from the system before they commit the undesired actions. Incapacitation works best if people are identified as potential criminals or dissenters before they actually commit a real crime or a real act of dissent. Thus, from the point of view of incapacitation theory (and ignoring any issues of justice or civil liberties), pretexts are needed for incarcerating the kind of people who will become troublemakers, and there is logically no necessary relation between what people are arrested for and the kind of behavior the system is trying to prevent. Finally, coercive surveillance “works” by gaining information to identify the people to target for control and by disrupting or blocking the social organization of collective action. Again, the pretexts for surveillance bear no necessary relation to the behavior to be prevented. That is, for two of the three ways coercive repression prevents dissent, the control of “ordinary” crime can work to accomplish the control of dissent. Further, the agenda of social control often conflates ordinary crime and political dissent, as either involves a challenge to the dominant authorities.

*Implications for Inter-group Conflict and Repression*

Social control theorists have long recognized the interplay of policing and inter-group conflict. Policing is almost always differentially targeted on subordinate social groups and is often one of the tools dominant ethnic groups use to maintain their dominance over other ethnic groups. Most countries have some disadvantaged ethnic group that has higher official crime rates and is arrested and incarcerated at higher rates than the majority (Mauer 2003), and a great deal of research has documented class or ethnic inequalities in policing of both ordinary crime and civil unrest. Dominant groups will often support policies to intensify the social control of groups threatening their domination.

There is clear evidence that the policing build-up in the late 1960s and 1970s was directly related to the desire to control a threatening Black population. It is often argued that the policing and incarceration boom tied to the “drug war” of the 1980s was similarly racialized. While it is a matter of political debate whether the intentional *purpose* of the drug war was the suppression of Black revolt, there is little doubt that a *consequence* of the drug war was the intensification of the surveillance and control of the Black population.

Similarly, intense interest in controlling “gangs” can be understood in an inter-group conflict perspective. Gangs tend to arise in contexts of inequality and ethnic conflict. Gangs vary in
form and content from what are really no more than juvenile play groups, boys who hang around
together and commit petty crimes, to highly-organized businesses. Some gangs operate like
warlords in many parts of the world, dominating and governing a territory, defending it from
outsiders in exchange for tribute. In some cases, “gangs” developed ideologies and political
agendas and were part of the broader Black Power movement. Black gangs said to be the nexus
of the illegal drug trade were subject to infiltration and surveillance that was very similar to the
infiltration and surveillance of Black Power organizations in the late 1960s.

Another trend that was happening in the 1980s and the 1990s was the deindustrialization of inner
cities and the loss of blue collar jobs, coupled with the growth of inequality and new wealth.
Some argue that the mass incarceration of lower class people has blocked the rebellion that
might otherwise have been expected from the growing economic distress of working class people
of all races. It is argued that mass incarceration in the US leads to an under-estimate of the true
rate of unemployment in the country (Western and Pettit 2000). Many observers have linked the
mass build up of coercive social control to interlinked patterns of deindustrialization, economic
inequality, and ethnic/racial conflict. Echoing historical sociologists’ arguments about the
importance of the police for preventing working class rebellion, Jacobs stresses the importance
of high levels of inequality, especially the presence of the very wealthy, finding that inequality is
associated with greater expenditures on police forces in 1970 (Jacobs 1979) and a higher rate of
police killings of civilians (Jacobs 1978), as well as higher rates of property crime in 1970
(Jacobs 1981); states with higher inequality were likely to have larger Black populations (Jacobs
1982). Civilian killings and assaults of police are also higher where there is more Black/White
inequality, but a Black mayor weakens this effect (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Incarceration
rates are higher where Republicans are stronger and there are more Black residents (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2001). Although political conservatism, a stronger Republican party, and racial
threat explain whether a state ever used the death sentence, the states which actually execute
large numbers of people are those with greater membership in conservative churches and higher
violent crime rates (Jacobs and Carmichael 2004).

These lines of argument and research all suggest that there needs to be much more investigation
of the relationships between crime and political mobilization in disadvantaged communities, as
well as of the factors that lead dominant groups to support repressive strategies toward
minorities.

Conclusions

Part of a theoretical and political agenda among social scientists in the late 1960s was to reject
older treatments of social movements that lumped them together with other forms of “deviance.”
As part of the debates about the meaning of the Black riots, many social scientists argued that
they needed to be understood not as mere criminality nor as mindless emotional expression, but
as extreme expressions of political grievance. But along with these political concerns, a
generation of sociologists was engaged in a sub-disciplinary movement to create and legitimate a
specialty in the study of collective behavior and social movements. That is, what we call the
“resource mobilization” turn was not just about a particular theoretical perspective, it was about
creating a sub-discipline. This is important for understanding why blindness developed around
crime control as repression. Social movements had previously been classed as a sub-type of
collective behavior, and both had typically been viewed in the field as subcategories of deviant behavior. Theories to explain them had typically been individual-level social psychological accounts of inadequate socialization or frustration, similar to the social psychological accounts of criminal behavior. The sub-disciplinary project thus involved setting boundaries and distinguishing political movements from other phenomena with which they had previously been grouped. Within a very few years, there were quickly theoretical critiques of the resource mobilization perspective per se, calling for recognition of political processes, meaning construction, culture, frames, and so forth. But these were all elaborations that occurred within the sub-disciplinary project, not a rejection of it. That is, they did not question the boundaries of the field. The sharp distinction between political collective action and common crime that was important in the foundation of the sub-discipline was never revisited.

This theoretical blindness was not noticed because most movement researchers were focused on understanding the movements they could see, and developing concepts to help explain them. The movements they could see were predominantly White middle class movements. Few asked about why the movements they could not see were missing. The people who were noticing and writing about the mass policing of Black people were criminologists, or scholars of race. They were often raising alarms about the repression of poor Blacks, but not drawing links to the way this repression affected the capacity for political mobilization.

Bringing these two problems back together and revisiting just what happened in the responses to the 1960s riots forces us to take a new look at the role of coercive repression in constraining the possibilities for collective mobilization. It forces us to ask how oppressed people can gain redress under conditions of extreme repression, and to understand the forms that resistance can take when the possibility of direct resistance is blocked. It forces us to re-think the kind of data we need if we want to study the interplay of repression and mobilization. Finally, it also forces us to revisit questions of where the key axes of inequality and injustice are in our society, and questions about what will need to happen for these problems to be addressed.
Notes

1 It is impossible to calculate the correct rate from easily-available counts because not all agencies report arrests, and only total population figures are given for reporting agencies, not race-specific population counts.

2 I mention this because Gary LaFree, whose book *Losing Legitimacy* (LaFree 1998) I found very useful for thinking about these issues – although I disagree with parts of his analysis – repeatedly claims in both this book and in his *Social Forces* article (LaFree and Drass 1997) that these authors assert that collective action is unlike crime; in fact, none of them even mentions crime.
Figure 1. African-American Protest Events, coded from the New York Times. (Source: Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone 2003).

Fig. 1.—African-American protest events, 1947–97
Figure 3. Black/White disparity in prison sentences for drug offenses. Author’s calculations from data compiled from the National Corrections Reporting Program.
Figure 4: Comparing participants and arrests in German protests. Author’s calculations from data provided by Koopmans (Koopmans 1993).

Panel a

![Number of Participants & Arrests for Confrontation & Violence in German Protests](image1)

Panel b

![Ratio of Arrests to Participants in Confrontation & Violence in German Protests](image2)
Figure 1. Black Riots and Other Forms of Racial and Ethnic Collective Action Occurring in 55 SMSAs: 1960 to 1993

*Note:* This figure is based on the 1,770 events reported in *The New York Times* from 1960 to 1993: 154 of these were riots by Blacks; the remaining 1,616 were other racial or ethnic events.
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