1. **Party strategy**
   - The model of strategy \( \rightarrow \) voting behavior (Emanuel, Aliza, Michael)
   - theory of voting vs voters: how can this explain defections to the Right? (João)
   - the substance of the theory: is there inherently the dilemma/trade-off around diluting the class base of the party? Could an aggressive anti-capitalist policy focused on enemies overcome the trade-off? (Chris)
   - does the model need a richer (perhaps social psychological) account of identity formation, preference formation, etc.? (Alex)

2. **Class compromise**
   - Militancy vs passivity model: is it really true that withholding militancy is in the longterm interests of workers? (Alex)
   - How should we understand the motivations of workers in the class compromise/consent model? Is the Przeworski model too thin psychologically? (Katheryn)
   - Economic crisis & consent: how does economic crisis affect the Przeworski model? (Michael, Paul)
   - Does the model work in the developing world? (Chris)
   - In the era of global capital mobility: does this destroy the possibility of this kind of class compromise? (Ayca)

3. **Instrumental rationality & the Przeworski model**
   - Is the model of class compromise premised on instrumental rationality? (Matt)

4. **The State**
   - What is the state’s role in class compromise? (João)
   - Compare Prz theory of the state to Therborn/Poulantzas (Yotaro)

5. **Class structure**
   - Przeworski’s concept of “working class”: why restricted in the way it is? (Ayca)
   - What does Przeworski mean by “class struggle”? How to understand his argument about class-in-itself transformed into a class-for-itself? (Sarah)

6. **Methodology**
   - How useful are computer simulations like those on p.154-55? (Bob)
   - Game theory, methodological individualism, etc: The model treats organizations as unit of analysis – no free rider problem. (Emanuel)

7. **The “surplus labor” population**
   - How to explain the state’s reaction to this issue? (Naama)