I. The problem of laundry-list oppressions

There is a tendency in some currents of radical theory to want to treat all forms of oppression symmetrically. One therefore frequently encounters lists of various sorts: sexism, racism, classism, ageism. In one sense this is a legitimate move: in terms of the lived experience and identity of people there is no a priori reason to regard any form of oppression as intrinsically “worse” than others, as more harmful than another. The oppression of people with handicaps can create harms as deep as class or gender. (When middle class kids asked in a survey whether they would prefer to be poor or be grossly obese without the possibility of losing weight, they say poor). Nevertheless, if the implication of the laundry list is that the specificities of the mechanisms of oppression are of secondary importance, or that all oppressions have the same explanatory importance for all problems, then I think this is a mistake.

The task of a critical theory of class and race, then, is to understand the specificity of the causal interactions of these social relations.

II. Understanding the Theoretical Specificity of Racial Oppression, racial domination, racial inequality

1. Methodological point: what do we mean by “theoretical specificity”?  

In the 2003 UN conference on Racism there was a resolution proposed by a number of delegations that “Zionism is a form of racism”. Many people regard this as an absurd statement; others regard it as capturing some underlying, deep theoretical unity between Zionism and other, more generally accepted forms of racism. The methodological problem of “specificity” involves providing a theoretical understanding of a particular form of social interaction so that we know when specific empirical cases should be treated as similar or different, as falling under the same broad category or not. This can be an arbitrary exercise in wordplay for political purposes, but can also be a more rigorous matter of figuring out how concepts fit together within theories.

[This is basically the task laid out in the Old Sesame Street ditty: “one of these things are not like the others, one of these things just isn’t the same....”. There was a funny version of this I heard on BBC Radio 4 in a spoof about Bush. Bush was given four things: a mouse, a turtle, rabbit and a waffle iron and was asked which of these was not like the other. He called up the Sesame Street hotline to discuss the matter:

Bush: “Well I think it is the turtle. It’s not like the others.”  
Kermit: “Mr. President, I think it is the waffle iron”  
Bush: “No, I don’t think it is the waffle iron. A waffle iron’s got a tail just like the bunny and the mouse. But the turtle doesn’t have a tail.”  
Kermit: “I think it is the waffle iron because it isn’t alive. The other three are alive.”  
Bush: “A waffle iron is alive. It smokes. You have to breathe to smoke.”]
Kermit: “Mr. President. It doesn’t really have a tail. That is called an electric cord with a plug on the end. You put it in the wall socket.”
Bush: “Well, you can put a little mouse’s tail in a wall socket too. I bet it would smoke then also.”
Kermit: “Anyway, a turtle also has a tail, you just can’t see it under the shell”
Bush: “You’re joking, a little turtle really has a tail?”
Kermit: “Yes, under the shell”
Bush: “Well then, that doesn’t count because you can’t put it in a socket.”

Defining the theoretical specificity of racial oppression involves three sorts of tasks:

1. Specifying what is the abstract category within which “racism” would count as one specific type. This requires developing a real theory of this more abstract category.

2. Within this abstract category, specifying what distinguishes racism as a specific sub-type.

3. Figuring out which historically concrete forms of oppression are instances of racial oppression, which are not, which have some aspects of racial oppression, etc.

2. The problem of “Essentialism”

There is one more important methodological complication in this sort of classification exercise: the theoretical specificity of a particular concept or category depends upon how it figures in some theoretical problem or question. To argue that a particular category has a particular definition irrespective of its theoretical purpose is, for some people, the sin of “essentialism”, but more often it is just sloppy thinking.

Two things should be classified together if it is the case that they identify the same kind of causal process within some social phenomenon under investigation. It may turn out when you push this that some commonsense, everyday distinctions dissolve, and other things which look very similar “on the surface” may in fact be very different. This also means that for different theoretical purposes different kinds of conceptual lines of demarcation and aggregation need to be drawn. Ultimately the issue, of course, is not so much which of these get the tag “racial oppression” – there may be historical and linguistic (if not theoretical) reasons to use this label quite narrowly – but rather how we understand the conceptual space within which racial domination/oppression is located. This is tough work and fraught with political passion in the case of racism and racial oppression.

3. The Abstract Category within which “race” is an instance

Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel have an interesting proposal for how we should think of the conceptual category within which racial division is a specific example. The more abstract category is “communal identity”. The basic idea is this: at the very core of social life is the idea of “community” – the circle of people with which one regularly cooperates and feels bonds of trust and solidarity, the circle of people that provide the basic building blocks of social interaction and reciprocity. “Communal identity” refers to the criteria one uses to decide what sorts of people fall into this category of “community” and what sorts do not. One can have multiple communal identities in this sense, and the various kinds of community in
which one’s life is embedded can have a shifting, fluid and potentially contradictory character.

Defined in this way, community and communal identity need not imply anything about oppression; just trust, cooperation and sociability. Communal identity becomes the basis for oppression when it gets combined with mechanisms of domination and exclusion. One might want to call this an “alienated form of community”. Just as class can be thought of as an alienated form of the division of labor – i.e. an economic relation which gets linked to mechanisms of domination, exclusion and exploitation – and male domination is a form of alienated gender relations (i.e, the gender division of labor gets linked to mechanisms of domination), so to can communal identity become a form of alienated solidarity. Ethnicity, religion, language, nationality, tribe, and other forms of communal identity all can, in certain situations, be alienated in this way and become sources of communal division, antagonism and oppression. Racial division is one specific form of such communal division.

4. The specificity of Racial Oppression

Consider the following list of social divisions each of which in various times and places is a source of both conflict and – arguably – oppression:
- black and white in the US
- jew and muslim in Israel/Palestine
- anti-semitism in Europe
- catholic/protestant in Northern Ireland
- Hutu and Tutsi in Rawanda
- untouchable castes in India

Which of these constitute instances of racial oppression? You see that in the absence of a theoretical agenda and some explanatory purpose, the question is very hard to resolve.

Now, I will give a provisional definition of racial oppression, but it is one whose boundary conditions – the criteria for what is included or not – may shift depending upon explanatory contexts. But here is a provisional definition:

i. Racial division is a socially recognized distinction between people based on biological lineage: you are born into a racial category by virtue of the racial category of your parents. It is an ascriptive category, although in some special cases there are socially validated ways of “escaping” a racial classification.

ii. Typically the biological lineage is linked to some socially recognized and symbolically salient visible physical attribute (technically: phenotypic differences), but this need not be the case. Anti-Semitism in Europe was not linked to any consistent, visible phenotypic characteristics. You could be blonde and blue eyed and be a Jew.

iii. Racial division becomes racial oppression when it corresponds to some form of socially-significant exclusion, typically with an economic dimension, but also political and cultural.

iv. When racial division takes the form of racial oppression, the oppressed group is also
invariably stigmatized, given an inferior social status, in the extreme case regarded as an inferior type of human beings in the biological not just social sense (and sometimes even subhuman). It is possible that the stigmatization and status denigration can continue even if the exclusions have largely disappeared. The most striking example was anti-Semitism in Germany.

Now, this provisional definition of the distinctively *racialized form of oppression* did not, directly, make any reference to class. But a class-relevant idea enters in criterion iii: exclusion. Remember that in the definition of exploitation one of the three principles was the exclusion principle, and the idea of social relations of production centers on rights and powers over resources, which are fundamental powers of exclusion.

**III. A Class Analysis of Racial Oppression**

1. **Two Questions**

In thinking about racial oppressions and their link to class structure, the important question to ask is less: “What are the origins of racial inequality?” but rather, “What explains the durability of racial divisions and the difficulty in eliminating racial inequality?” This second question, in turn, has two dimensions of answers:

1) what are the processes which *actively reproduce* racial cleavage?

2) what are the processes that block *challenges* to eliminating racial cleavages?

The first of these concerns various mechanisms which actively reinforce or reproduce racial inequality. This would include propaganda, stereotyping in the media, direct legal discriminations, informal discriminatory practices and norms, and so on. The second concerns the mechanisms that undermine attempts to mobilize against racial inequality. This may involve the same processes involved in active reproduction, but it may also involve more indirect processes.

The central claim of class analysis is that the interactions of class and race helps to answer both of these questions. This does not mean that class and class alone is sufficient to explain the durability of racial inequality and oppression, but that it is one of the central processes involved.

2. **Who Benefits from Racism**

A useful way of approaching these questions is to begin by asking what seems like a simple question, and then seeing what make this question more complex (and more interesting). The simple-sounding question is this: *Who benefits from racial inequality?* Let us try to answer this question with an initially quite simple model of the relevant actors about whom we ask the “who benefits” question: White capitalists; White workers; Black workers

There are four traditional answers to the questions of who benefits from the overall patterns of racial disadvantage of blacks:
1. **white workers exploit black workers**: there is actually a transfer of surplus from black workers to white workers → they are really in distinct classes. This is the strong version of internal colonialism arguments, theories of super-exploitation. White workers and white capitalists form a racial alliance because they share common interests in the exploitation of blacks. **White workers would be worse off if black workers simply disappeared.**

2. **white workers oppress black workers** but do not exploit them: they benefit from exclusionary practices, but do not receive direct transfers = split labor market theories. White workers would **not** be worse off if black workers disappeared.

3. **white workers neither oppress nor exploit black workers**: capitalists differentially exploit different categories of workers, but all workers suffer from the differential exploitation = traditional Marxist class analysis. **Capitalists alone benefit from racism.**

4. **The differential exploitation of black and white workers is of decreasing relevance.** The key issue = the marginalization of segments of the black population from the system of exploitation altogether: the theory of the underclass. **The underclass = oppressed but not consistently exploited** (e.g. welfare mothers; permanently unemployed; “criminal underclass”). Racial conflict therefore centers on the State’s intervention to deal with underclass phenomena, not directly on class antagonisms/competition between black and white workers.

Different theorists have different answers:

- **William Wilson**: historical transition from preindustrial slave relations (white ruling class exploits black slaves), to industrial period (white workers oppress black workers through job competition and exclusion) to contemporary period (differential exploitation disappearing where class inequalities among blacks matter more than between blacks and whites).

- **Edna Bonacich**: white workers oppress black workers through exclusions, segmented labor markets = classic divide and conquer dynamic: by structuring the labor market in particular ways, capitalists can pit the real interests of different groups of workers against each other.

- **Michael Reich**: capitalists exploit workers of different races differentially. Racial divisions hurt both black and white workers. The econometric data on this are quite compelling: white workers are worse off under conditions where black workers are most oppressed. The wages of white workers are highest where the inequalities between black and white workers are least.

At different times and places each of these views may be correct. There is no particular reason to believe that there is a single, overarching profile of interests that link class and race.

One problem with all of these views, however, is that they fail to pay much attention to the real specificity of “racialization” as a dimension of cleavage, about why this specific form of cleavage has such staying power, such bite, through its interconnection with class. I would like to propose a way of looking at this issue that may help clarify this.

3. **Why racialized inequality is especially robust**
3.1 *The problem of rational material interests of privileged white workers*

Let us consider two dimensions of stratification within the working class:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Strata</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black workers</td>
<td>High paid skilled workers: good jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White workers</td>
<td>Low paid unskilled workers: bad jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What I want to explore is why there are real, material obstacles to solidarity between black and white workers. The traditional claim of Marxists has always been that *racism hurts white workers as well as black workers*: black and white unite and flight. Sometimes this may be true: solidarity pays. Workers untied are stronger, and as a united force they can win a better deal from capital for all workers. But I think in general the practical situation is more complex.

What I want to compare is two situations:

- **Situation #1**: there is a significant economic gap between high paid and low paid workers and this corresponds to a racial division between white and black workers. Racial stratification is closely linked to stratification within the working class.

- **Situation #2**: there is a significant economic gap between high paid and low paid workers but there is only one race (or there is, in any case, no racial correspondence to the class division).

**Situation #1.**

Here is the problem: so long as significant inequality between skilled and unskilled workers exists, if the racial division between blacks and whites is overcome then *some white workers will be worse off than they would otherwise have been*, even if the average white worker improves his/her position. *Solidarity among privileged workers*, therefore, would face a trade-off between gains for the average person in that group (if they were solidaristic with black workers) and potentially significant losses to some members of the privileged group (as they lose good jobs to black workers). This is a complex calculus and it may often be very unclear how sharp this trade-off will be, since it depends upon how much the average conditions of the advantaged worker improves.

Here is a simple numerical example. Suppose 80% of the working class is white and 20% black. Suppose all the white workers are in higher paying jobs and all the blacks in lower paying jobs – i.e. an extreme racial polarization – and suppose the good paying jobs pay $20/hour and the bad jobs $10. Now suppose you magically get rid of racism so blacks and whites are evenly distributed in the two jobs, and also suppose that because of broader solidarity the average earnings of both strata of workers improves: the well paid workers now make $22/hour and the poorly paid workers $15. This would mean that 20% of the white workers would have to have their wages decrease from $20 to $15 *even though the average white skilled worker would have*
their wages increase from $20 to $22.

The conclusion is simple: where there is deep racial stratification, then inter-racial solidarity will hurt some advantaged white workers even if overall wages of both whites and blacks improve as a result of solidarity.

**Situation #2.**

Suppose that the sharply divided categories of privileged and disadvantaged workers did not correspond to a racial divide. Suppose that the working class was ethnically and racially homogeneous across these strata of relative privilege. How would this change the equation – again from the point of view of strict material interests (not moral concern)? The pivotal difference, I think, is that over time there would likely develop a relatively thick pattern of social ties across the privilege boundary, especially ties of kinship, but also community: people would have children, siblings, cousins, parents on the other side of this divide, and certainly friends and community members. Even more crucially, even for people without such direct, hard social ties across the privileged strata boundary, they would exist in a socio-economic space within which they had a reasonable probability of having such ties in the future (or had them in the past). What this means is that the concept of “narrow material interests” would be stretched in ways that span the privilege divide to a much greater extent than when this divide corresponds in significant ways to race or ethnicity.

This is an important point to really understand: the notion of “selfish material interests” is ambiguous about the category of people subsumed under the “self”: the individual? One’s immediate family? One’s extended family? Friends? Market relations continually push for an atomization of the definition of the relevant unit for self-interest; kinship and community relations push for a stretching of this unit. And since interests have a temporal dimension – one has material interests in the material well-being of one’s children in the future, not just instantaneously in the present – the probability of such ties across privileged/underprivileged strata matter for the definition of interests. In Sweden, for fifty years, skilled workers strongly supported a labor movement which systematically worked to flatten out wage differentials between highly skilled and unskilled workers – the famous “solidarity wage” of Sweden. Arguably the ethnic and racial homogeneity of the working class was very important for this.

3.2 Racial Division and cross-strata class solidarity

Back to the problem of Race: The key issue here is the way race especially and ethnicity usually to a somewhat lesser extent define communities of deep interpersonal relations, especially kinship. Racialized social division, especially, is a powerful obstacle to intermarriage, and this blocks the proliferation of the kinds of ties that stretch interests. The problem of intermarriage across racial divisions has always been one of the most salient, biting features of racism and is fundamental to cementing the social mechanisms of racial oppression.

Now, here is the kicker: when a cleavage between privileged and underprivileged categories
within the class structure corresponds to a racial division, this means that cross-strata solidarities are likely to be significantly weakened – especially because of the inter-generational and kinship structure of such solidarities – and this means that the collective basis for solidaristic struggle against the exclusions that generate the division are also likely to be weaker. It also means that the issue raised in situation #1 above are also likely to be much stronger: the fate of one’s friends, children, kin, within the privileged category would matter more than the fate of the average person in that category.

3.3 Two Hypotheses

This reasoning suggests the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the correspondence between strata within the working class and racial division, the weaker will be the potential for class solidarity across these strata. This weakened class solidarity will, in turn, reinforce the distinctively racial form of inequality.

What this means is that even if it is the case that capitalists exploit both privileged white workers and underprivileged black workers, under conditions of a strong correspondence between race and class-based privileges, cross-race solidarity will be very difficult to sustain and thus collective challenges to racial oppression will be weakened.

But this also suggests another hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** As the correspondence between class/strata and race declines or is eroded, the basis for collective challenges to racial inequality increases.

3.4 The Specificity of Racial Oppression within class analysis

To return to our starting point, racial division can be seen as a particularly strong form of a more general theoretical category: forms of social division that block the creation of communal ties through kinship. The specific biological lineage mechanism in racialized social interaction, then, is particularly salient because of its close connection to family-formation and thus kinship formation. When this division becomes a form of oppression through its links to forms of economic exclusion, and thus class relations, a self-reinforcing cycle is generated.

Racialized oppression, then, is part of a family of divisions and oppression that, in different times and places, can be closely linked to tribal membership, ethnicity, or religion, if these all determine lines of communal ties and barriers to the formation of the kinds of social ties – especially kin but also friendships – which help stretch the definition of material interests.
IV. The Transformation of the Southern Racial State

David James’ research on sharecropping and racial oppression is a specific illustration of this complex problem of the interaction of class and race.

1. Core thesis: The Southern racial state was instituted and stabilized because it was a solution to a serious problem in the post-civil war era. The problem was this: how to secure the extraction of surplus labor from peasants in a liberal democracy? This was an acute problem especially in cotton agriculture. Solution to the labor extraction problem = sharecropping. Problem = the need for coercive mechanisms to reproduce these relations, prevent coalitions with poor whites, prevent excessive labor migration (keep the peasants on the land). Racialized sharecropping with political disenfranchisement was the successful solution.

Alternative hypothesis: there was a pervasive, intractable culture of racism generated by slavery. As soon as the North withdrew, this southern racism was unleashed to restore racial domination, the driving force being white racist identities, prejudice, hatred, etc.

2. Empirical claim (David James): if the class analysis thesis is correct, then prediction =
   (a) that the resiliency or fragility of the racial state would depend significantly upon its correspondence to the underlying material conditions linked to the class structure.
   (b) that challenges to the racial state would be both easier and more likely to be successful when the class structure no longer functionally depended upon it.

3. Historical Trajectory of creation, stability, dissolution of the Southern Racial State:

   1. material conditions at creation: Dissolution of Slavery: manifest problems of surplus extraction, stabilization of labor force.
   2. political conditions at creation: populist threat: threat of black/white poor alliance → escalation of KKK
   3. solution: the creation of widespread sharecropping
   4. Superstructural consolidation: Jim Crow laws to disempower sharecroppers; vagrancy laws to enforce surplus extraction; etc.
   5. New Deal Agriculture: agricultural relief programs → unintended consequence of massive incentives from above which to eliminate sharecropping → acceleration of the dissolution of this form of class relations. By 1950s coercive extraction of surplus had almost disappeared.
   6. Cold War & post-WWII US world position → National geopolitical reasons to end racial state in the South
   7. Resistance to destruction of racial state in late 1950s and 1960s: greatest in those countries with the strongest legacies of sharecropping.