Preliminary Agenda, Session #10. Discussion of Vivek Chibber's *Locked in Place*
November 13, 2002

1. **Disciplinary planning** (Pablo, Matt N., Cesar, Landy, Keedon)
   -- Did Korean Capital really endorse the disciplinary part of disciplinary planning, or just the subsidy part? Was the level of disciplinary capacity in Korea greater than that needed by capital or desired by capital? (Pablo)
   -- Doesn't Park's strong capacity to unilaterally impose restructuring on capital in the late 1970s indicate that the Korean state really did dominate capital and not simply have disciplinary power? (Keedon)
   -- Why don't capitalists in general support disciplinary solutions to those aspects of underdevelopment linked to collective action problems?
   -- If the interests of the capitalist class are not unified and some are hurt by rent-seeking ISI, wouldn't this create potential capitalist basis for disciplinary planning? (Landy)
   -- The French and Japanese cases do not seem like real instances of imposing disciplinary ISI over capitalist objections (Matt N)
   -- Is it really plausible that disciplinary ISI could ever be imposed over the objections of a recalcitrant capitalist class? How much disciplining does disciplinary planning really impose? How would mobilizing capacity by labor really help solve this problem, given that costs would come with such mobilization? (Cesar)

2. **The working class: the role of labor/workers/struggle in the development projects.** (Sarah, James, Matt D
   -- Is it really plausible that the Indian labor movement could have sustainably constrained capital in ways that would have allowed for disciplinary planning?
   -- How does the counterfactual in the Indian case relate to Swenson's analysis of Sweden in which organized labor helped discipline capitalists?
   -- Exactly how was the state able to demobilize the working class given that it was so strong? Was the result a cooptation structure with side-payments as discussed by Waldner, and did this generate the kind of preocious Keynesianism Walder discusses?
   -- What about labor struggles in the Korean case?

3. **Regime form** (Amy, Cesar,).
   -- How relevant it is that Park had concentrated military power available for coercion? Is the authoritarian structure of the state significant for erecting disciplinary planning?

4. **State capacity/autonomy** (Matt V, Sarah, Robyn, Matt N., Theresa)
   -- How should we understand the problem of implementation of policy with respect to the concepts of autonomy and capacity? Is implementation mainly a question of the internal cohesion of the state, or of external factors?
   -- In the argument about the "shared project" of development it is easier to see how the state is constrained by capitalist elites than how these elites are really constrained by the state (since the state policies serve their needs). (Sarah)
   -- What really explains the failure of the Indian state to achieve internal cohesion – is this because of the factional fights among state managers or is this also due to opposition by the business class to state cohesion? Did post-colonial legacies contribute to this incoherence? (Robyn)
   -- To what extent is the possibility of disciplinary planning conditioned by existing organizational and institutional properties of the state rather than simply capitalist class interests? In the Philippines the organization of the state seems like a big obstacle to any coherent disciplinary possibility. (Theresa)
   -- Is it necessary to posit the capitalist class *supporting* disciplinary planning to understand its adoption? Couldn't the process be something like this: *capitalists were confused about their interests and so resisted the developmental reforms, states overcame this resistance, and then capitalists came to understand what was good for them?* (Matt N)

5. **ISI/ELI contrast** (Shamus)
   -- Is the issue of ISI simp ly capitalists wanting to be sheltered from competition? Are there ways that the state could enhance competition internally under an ISI regime?

6. **Geopolitics** (Sun)
   -- Isn't the specific geopolitics of Korea's location in the Cold War crucial also, and the US market policies that accompanied this?