Pamela E. Oliver
Professor of Sociology

Soc 924 – Collective Action Theory and Mobilization Processes

These readings are in the rational action tradition in the study of collective action and mobilization processes

Collective Action Theory: Basic Arguments (see below for more advanced readings)

  1. * Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (1965) Introduction and Chapter 1. Still very widely cited as true, despite extensive critical literature since its publication. You need to know what he said, as well as know why his argument is misleading (which we will discuss in class).  The PDF copy
  2. *Pamela Oliver (1993). “Formal Models of Collective Action.” Annual Review of Sociology 19: 271-300. The first part (pp. 271-277) of this article gives my summary of Olson’s problem and subsequent critics and is the only “required” part, but you should also read the short “substantive conclusions” section on pp. 292-3. The rest reviews formal models of mobilization for collective action and of models of the interplay between movements and their opponents and is less central to this class, especially as it is now out of date, although it does provide my view of the literature through 1990. Stable URL
  3. Pamela Oliver, algebraic proof that Olson’s equations are independent of group size, contrary to his text and usual claims that he “proved” that collective action is harder for larger groups. Originally published in my 1980 AJS article with lines scrambled by the typesetter to render it unintelligible and republished in Marwell and Oliver’s 1993 book.
  4. Pamela Oliver, Gerald Marwell, and Ruy Teixeira. “A Theory of the Critical Mass, I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Goods.” American Journal of Sociology, Volume 91, Number 3, pages 522-556. (1985) The first in the series, which makes the major points about differences in forms of collective action. The technical arguments can be hard to follow (and you do not need to follow them in detail unless you are interested), but the main idea is that there are different kinds of collective action and that group heterogeneity is critical. Stable URL
  5. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell. “The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action. A Theory of the Critical Mass. II.” American Sociological Review, Volume 53, Number 1, pages 1-8. (1988) Most widely cited because it is the easiest to read. A direct critique of Olson’s “size” argument. Stable URL
  6. Pamela Oliver. “Rational Action.” This is a preprint of my chapter in Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements. It argues that the impact of rational action theory was to emphasize the role of organization and networks in collective action, contra critics who associate rational action theory with isolated individualism.  Oliver_Rational Action_OxfordHandbook_1sp_preprint

Empirical Work On Collective Action Models

There are quite a few empirical articles that assess the empirical predictors of collective action using a cost/benefit framework. Interests (private and collective), selective incentives, individual and collective efficacy/influence (probability of making a difference), and perceived costs are assessed.

  • * Bert Klandermans. “Mobilization and Participation.” ASR 49 (Oct 1984):583-600. Re-casts collective action theory in subjective terms and links it to psychological theories of subjective expected utility; emphasizes importance of people’s beliefs about interests and the efficacy of action. He finds that what people believe about likely benefits, costs, and probabilities of success are related to what they do. Data on Dutch unions. Stable URL
  • Pamela Oliver. “If You Don’t Do It, Nobody Else Will: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action.” American Sociological Review, Volume 49, Number 5, pages 601-610. (1984) In some contexts, activists participate because of their pessimism about others’ participation; linked to production function theory. MS 207-215. Stable URL
  • Karl-Dieter Opp. Grievances and Participation in Social Movements. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 6. (Dec., 1988), pp. 853-864. Grievances related to participation, using a rational action framework. Stable URL Sample is opponents of nuclear power in and near Hamburg, Germany, in 1982 and 1987. Public grievances operationalized.
  • Edward N. Muller; Karl-Dieter Opp. Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action. The American Political Science Review Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 471-488 Stable URL A collective action model tested against survey data. Collective benefits and collective influence are the strong predictors. The paper begins with a formal model.
  • George Klosko; Edward N. Muller; Karl Dieter Opp. Rebellious Collective Action Revisited. The American Political Science Review Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 557-564. Stable URL
  • *Steven E. Finkel; Edward N. Muller; Karl-Dieter Opp Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action The American Political Science Review Vol. 83, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 885-903 Stable URL Stresses, measures and finds the importance of the “probability of making a difference” factor in collective action.
  • Francisco, Ronald A. (2004). “After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression.” Mobilization: An International Journal 9(2): 107-126. Tests basic collective action theory predictions in responses to 31 brutal repressions. Dissidents are outraged at the state but fear further repression. There usually is sufficient communication to enable backlash mobilization and continuity in leadership to coordinate backlash protest. A Bayesian updating test for mobilization shows that repression reduces backlash protests & that no repression increases backlash. Conclusion is that collective-action theory works to explain patterns of response. Link to Mobilization Site. Link will work if you are logged in with a UW netid or other valid authorization.
  • * Edward Walsh and Rex Warland. “Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area.” ASR 48 (Dec 1983): 764-780. also MS 216ff. Stable URL They asked people why they did or did not participate, and compared their answers with what theorists and activists said would be the reasons: Conscious free riding was rare. Main reasons for not participating were not knowing about the group, not having been asked to participate, not approving of the group’s strategies, not having time.

Collective Action Theory: Deeper Reading

  • #Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1996). “The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action.” American Sociological Review 61(2): 250-277.Stable URL This is an integrative article that shows how different “games” can all be integrated into one larger framework. You do NOT need to engage this article deeply for this seminar. I put a * by it because I consider this to be a “state of the art” overview of the problem of collective action. I think everyone should have a superficial knowledge of the basic argument that there are different types of collective action situations.
  • Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver. The Critical Mass in Collective Action. 1993. Cambridge University Press.
  • Chong, Dennis. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. 1991.
  • Chong, Dennis. (1991). “All-or-Nothing Games in the Civil Rights Movement.” Social Science Information / Information sur les Sciences Sociales 30(4): 677-697.
  • Pamela Oliver. Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 6. (May, 1980), pp. 1356-1375. Stable URL This article distinguishes the different “kinds” of collective action, and is a precursor of the 1985 AJS Oliver, Marwell, Teixeira article. Logically, rewards are efficient for motivating a few to do things that benefit many, while punishments are efficient for motivating unanimous action.
  • Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1989). “Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem.” Rationality and Society 1(1): 78-100.
  • Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1993). “Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision versus Selective Incentives.” American Sociological Review 58(3): 329-350. Stable URL
  • Douglas D. Heckathorn. Extensions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Paradigm: The Altruist’s Dilemma and Group Solidarity. Sociological Theory, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Spring, 1991), pp. 34-52. Stable URL
  • Douglas D. Heckathorn. Collective Sanctions and Compliance Norms: A Formal Theory of Group-Mediated Social Control. American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3. (Jun., 1990), pp. 366-384. Stable URL
  • Douglas D. Heckathorn. Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner’s Dilemma Norms. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, No. 3. (Nov., 1988), pp. 535-562. Stable URL
  • Macy, Michael W. (1990). “Learning Theory and the Logic of Critical Mass.” American Sociological Review 55(6): 809-826. Stable URL Adds learning algorithms to collective action models.
  • Macy, Michael W. (1991). “Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action.” American Sociological Review 56(6): 730-747.Stable URL
  • Macy, Michael W. and A. Flache (1995). “Beyond Rationality in Models of Choice.” Annual Review of Sociology 21: 73-91. Stable URL
  • #Kim, Hyojoung; Bearman, Peter S. “The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation” American Sociological Review; 1997, 62, 1, Feb, 70-93. Stable URL Adds influence to collective action models.
  • #Chwe, M. S. Y. (1999). “Structure and Strategy in Collective Action.” American Journal of Sociology 105(1): 128-156.  Network and influence models.
  • Pamela Oliver & Gerald Marwell, “Whatever Happened to Critical Mass Theory? A Retrospective and Assessment.” Sociological Theory 19(3), October 2001, pp. 292-311. This article reviews much of the above literature with an eye to understanding the influence of the “critical mass” articles. pdf
  • Kanazawa, Satoshi (2000). “A New Solution to the Collective Action Problem: The Paradox of Voter Turnout.” American Sociological Review 65(3): 433-442. Uses Macy’s translation of collective action into stochastic learning theory to provide a potential solution to the paradox of voter turnout. A test with General Social Survey data finds that citizens make their turnout decisions according to the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” pattern predicted by the stochastic learning theory, especially if there are no strong third-party candidates.
  • Kitts, James A. (2006). “Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms.” American Sociological Review 71(2): 235-259. “Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) & informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), & group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms promote the collective good & thus peer influence complements a centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions, social scientists must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective action to selective incentives, group cohesiveness, & second-order free riding.”
  • Willer, Robb (2009). “Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem.” American Sociological Review 74: 23-43. One of sociology’s classic puzzles is how groups motivate their members to set aside self-interest and contribute to collective action. This article presents a solution to the problem based on status as a selective incentive motivating contribution. Contributors to collective action signal their motivation to help the group and consequently earn diverse benefits from group members—in particular, higher status—and these rewards encourage greater giving to the group in the future. In Study 1, high contributors to collective action earned higher status, exercised more interpersonal influence, were cooperated with more, and received gifts of greater value. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these findings while discounting alternative explanations. All three studies show that giving to the group mattered because it signaled an individual’s motivation to help the group. Study 4 finds that participants who received status for their contributions subsequently contributed more and viewed the group more positively. These results demonstrate how the allocation of respect to contributors shapes group productivity and solidarity, offering a solution to the collective action problem.

 

 

Assignment:

  • In “Basic Arguments,” read selected pages from Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective action
  • Read Oliver’s overview of collective action theory in the first six pages of “Formal Models of Collective Action”
  • I will give a mini-lecture on what I see as the key ideas. (Hint: besides benefit/cost, the other key ideas are probability of making a difference and assessments of others’ actions.)

 

NOTE: The *’s indicate the readings I suggest you  prioritize. In the “advanced” list, # marks the articles that are especially helpful for distinctive elaborations of the collective action model.

If you need a tutorial on reading regression tables, here is a PowerPoint file of my undergraduate lecture that includes detailed slides on interpreting the tables in the Klandermans and Oegema article (as well as the Wood and Hughes article listed in another section).