Sociology 924: Social Movements Seminar Calendar Pamela Oliver

 

Collective Action Theory & Mobilization Processes

"Stable URL" is a link to the article in JSTOR. You will need a legal connection to JSTOR to use these URLs, which you will have if you enter the system through a UW connection. If you are on the Internet another way, you need to get to JSTOR through the library homepage, which will ask you for login information for a proxy server, and then you should be able to get to the article by searching for it within JSTOR. Most JSTOR articles are also available on line through other sources (but not with stable URLs). Also note that it is much faster to download the JSTOR files to your PC for easier reading & printing off-line, instead of having to wait while each page processes on line.

NOTE: The *'s indicate the readings you should prioritize. In the "advanced" list, # marks the articles that are especially helpful for distinctive elaborations of the collective action model.

Web page programming note: I tried to enable "open new browser window" while maintaining this page, so you can get back to it easily as an index, but this did not work. You get the new window, but the original window also changes to the linked site. I am working on this. Sorry for the annoyance. A work-around: in the original window, the "back" button will work, so immediately hit "back" to bring you to this page, and read the on-line file in the new window.

A. Collective Action Theory: Basic Arguments (– see D below for more advanced readings)

  1. * Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (1965) Introduction and Chapter 1. Still very widely cited as true, despite extensive critical literature since its publication. You need to know what he said, as well as know why his argument is misleading (which we will discuss in class). The PDF copy
  2. *Pamela Oliver (1993). "Formal Models of Collective Action." Annual Review of Sociology 19: 271-300. The first part (pp. 271-277) of this article gives my summary of Olson's problem and subsequent critics and is the only "required" part.. The rest reviews formal models of mobilization for collective action and of models of the interplay between movements and their opponents and is less central to this class. Stable URL:
  3. Pamela Oliver, algebraic proof that Olson's equations are independent of group size, contrary to his text and usual claims that he "proved" that collective action is harder for larger groups. Originally published in my 1980 AJS article with lines scrambled by the typesetter to render it unintelligible and republished in Marwell and Oliver's 1993 book.
  4. Pamela Oliver, Gerald Marwell, and Ruy Teixeira. "A Theory of the Critical Mass, I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Goods. " American Journal of Sociology, Volume 91, Number 3, pages 522-556. (1985) The first in the series, which makes the major points about differences in forms of collective action. The technical arguments can be hard to follow (and you do not need to follow them in detail unless you are interested), but the main idea is that there are different kinds of collective action and that group heterogeneity is critical. Stable URL:
  5. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell. "The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action. A Theory of the Critical Mass. III." American Sociological Review, Volume 53, Number 1, pages 1-8. (1988) Most widely cited because it is the easiest to read. A direct critique of Olson's "size" argument. Stable URL:

B. Empirical Work On Collective Action Models

    There are quite a few empirical articles that assess the empirical predictors of collective action using a cost/benefit framework. Here are a few.

  1. Bert Klandermans. "Mobilization and Participation." ASR 49 (Oct 1984):583-600. Re-casts collective action theory in subjective terms; emphasizes importance of subjectivity. Data on Dutch unions. Stable URL:
  2. Pamela Oliver. "If You Don't Do It, Nobody Else Will: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action." American Sociological Review, Volume 49, Number 5, pages 601-610. (1984) In some contexts, activists participate because of their pessimism about others' participation; linked to production function theory. MS 207-215. Stable URL:
  3. Karl-Dieter Opp. Grievances and Participation in Social Movements. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 6. (Dec., 1988), pp. 853-864. Grievances related to participation, using a rational action framework. Stable URL:
  4. Edward N. Muller; Karl-Dieter Opp. Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action. The American Political Science Review Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 471-488 Stable URL:
  5. George Klosko; Edward N. Muller; Karl Dieter Opp. Rebellious Collective Action Revisited. The American Political Science Review Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 557-564. Stable URL:
  6. Steven E. Finkel; Edward N. Muller; Karl-Dieter Opp Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action The American Political Science Review Vol. 83, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 885-903 Stable URL:

 

C. Mobilization Processes (Empirical Work)

  1. # Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema. "Potentials, Networks, Motivations and Barriers: Steps Toward Participation in Social Movements." ASR 52 (1987): 519-532. Data on mobilization for a Dutch peace march. Besides using cost-benefit logic, a nice logical approach to organizer-centered mobilization and how it works. Stable URL:
  2. Edward Walsh and Rex Warland. "Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area." ASR 48 (Dec 1983): 764-780. also MS 216ff. Stable URL:
  3. Dirk Oegema and Bert Klandermans. (1994). "Why Social Movement Sympathizers Don't Participate: Erosion and Nonconversion of Support." American Sociological Review 59(5): 703-722. MS 174-189. Trading the factors predicting both loss of support and failure of supporters to act during a peace movement petition campaign in the Netherlands. Stable URL:
  4. Sherry Cable, Edward J. Walsh, Rex H. Warland. Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes after the Three Mile Island Accident. Social Forces, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Jun., 1988), pp. 951-969. Stable URL:

D. Collective Action Theory: Deeper Reading

  1. #Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1996). "The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action." American Sociological Review 61(2): 250-277. Stable URL: This is an integrative article that shows how different "games" can all be integrated into one larger framework. You do NOT need to engage this article deeply for this seminar. I put a * by it because I consider this to be a "state of the art" overview of the problem of collective action. I think everyone should have a superficial knowledge of the basic argument that there are different types of collective action situations.
  2. Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver. The Critical Mass in Collective Action. 1993. Cambridge University Press.
  3. Chong, Dennis. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. 1991.
  4. Chong, Dennis. (1991). "All-or-Nothing Games in the Civil Rights Movement." Social Science Information / Information sur les Sciences Sociales 30(4): 677-697.
  5. Pamela Oliver. Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 6. (May, 1980), pp. 1356-1375. Stable URL: This article distinguishes the different "kinds" of collective action, and is a precursor of the 1985 AJS Oliver, Marwell, Teixeira article. Logically, rewards are efficient for motivating a few to do things that benefit many, while punishments are efficient for motivating unanimous action.
  6. Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1989). "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem." Rationality and Society 1(1): 78-100.
  7. Heckathorn, Douglas D. (1993). "Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision versus Selective Incentives." American Sociological Review 58(3): 329-350. Stable URL:
  8. Douglas D. Heckathorn. Extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm: The Altruist's Dilemma and Group Solidarity. Sociological Theory, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Spring, 1991), pp. 34-52. Stable URL:
  9. Douglas D. Heckathorn. Collective Sanctions and Compliance Norms: A Formal Theory of Group-Mediated Social Control. American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3. (Jun., 1990), pp. 366-384. Stable URL:
  10. Douglas D. Heckathorn. Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner's Dilemma Norms. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, No. 3. (Nov., 1988), pp. 535-562. Stable URL:
  11. Macy, Michael W. (1990). "Learning Theory and the Logic of Critical Mass." American Sociological Review 55(6): 809-826. Stable URL: Adds learning algorithms to collective action models.
  12. Macy, Michael W. (1991). "Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action." American Sociological Review 56(6): 730-747. Stable URL:
  13. Macy, Michael W. and A. Flache (1995). "Beyond Rationality in Models of Choice." Annual Review of Sociology 21: 73-91. Stable URL:
  14. # Kim, Hyojoung; Bearman, Peter S. "The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation" American Sociological Review; 1997, 62, 1, Feb, 70-93. Stable URL Adds influence to collective action models.
  15. # Chwe, M. S. Y. (1999). "Structure and Strategy in Collective Action." American Journal of Sociology 105(1): 128-156. Stable URL Network and influence models.
  16. Pamela Oliver & Gerald Marwell, "Whatever Happened to Critical Mass Theory? A Retrospective and Assessment." Sociological Theory 19(3), October 2001, pp. 292-311. This article reviews much of the above literature with an eye to understanding the influence of the "critical mass" articles. On-line article not currently available. PDF copy of galley proofs with edits.

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Sociology 924: Social Movements Calendar Pamela Oliver

Last updated February 8, 2008 © University of Wisconsin.