Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology

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During the decade of the 1990s the evolving framing perspective on social movements has found its way into an increasing amount of conceptual and empirical scholarship. There has been an almost meteoric acceleration in the number of articles, chapters, and papers invoking the frame concept or referring to framing processes in some fashion or another (Benford and Snow 2000). Presumably one reason for this escalating use of the framing perspective is that it helps fill a conceptual void and provides analytic purchase on understanding the interpretive work engaged in by movement actors and others within the movement field of action. Yet, as with any perspective, and particularly evolving ones, there are various glosses, untidy linkages, and misunderstandings that reveal themselves in both the application of the perspective and in its critical assessment. So it is not surprising that various issues with and questions about the movement framing perspective have been raised (e.g., Benford 1997; Fisher 1997; Hart 1996; Jasper 1997), issues and questions that one critic cleverly suggested constitute "cracks in the frame" (Steinberg 1998: 847). Oliver and Johnston's essay contributes to this line of critique by zeroing in one of the "cracks": the glossing of ideology and its relationship to frames. Their basic concern, as they state in no uncertain terms, is the "failure" of frame theory "to address the relation between frames and the much older, more political concept of ideology, and the concomitant tendency of many researchers to use 'frame' uncritically as a synonym for ideology."

We agree with the core contention that the relationship between frames and ideology has been glossed over, and so we would like to take this opportunity to sketch our understanding of that relationship. Before doing so, we want to clarify a number of misunderstandings and misrepresentations that appear throughout Oliver and Johnston's essay.

**MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS**

The first misunderstanding, which can also be construed as a misrepresentation, flows from Oliver and Johnson's orienting contention regarding "the tendency of many researchers to use 'frame' uncritically as a synonym for ideology." Referring to us, they charge that we "neither provide justification for abandoning the term ideology and substituting frame...." This was news to us, since we never recommended in any of our writings that the term ideology should be jettisoned or replaced by the term frame. In fact, we began our 1986 article by incorporating ideology into our conceptualization of frame alignment: "By frame alignment, we refer to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986: 464). In
subsequent works (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992), we not only refer to ideology, but we
draw on the discourses on ideology of Geertz (1973), Gramsci (1971), and Rude (1980).

Although we do not elaborate the implied relationship between ideology and framing
processes and frames in any of these works, and thus stand guilty of glossing over that
relationship, that is not the same as calling for the abandonment of the concept of ideology.
If there are other scholars who have made such a call, we are not familiar with their work
and Oliver and Johnston do not reference them. It appears that they are guilty of creating a
red herring by making an unsubstantiated inference. Had they asked, we would have been
happy to inform them that we agree that frames and ideology are not the same thing and that
neither concept should be discarded or subsumed under the other.

The second misunderstanding flows from the authors' decision, whether unwitting
or intentional, to frame the critique in terms of the noun "frame" rather than in terms of the
verb "framing," and thereby accent the constructed product over framing as a set of dynamic,
negotiated, and often contested processes. Although they acknowledge the latter, their critique
is clearly anchored in the former, thus misrepresenting what we regard the cornerstone of the
framing perspective. As we emphasized in the introduction to the 1988 article, our primary
interest was in moving beyond the "description of movement ideology" (p. 197) and the
corollary tendency to "treat meanings or ideas as given, as if there is an isomorphic
relationship between the nature of any particular set of conditions or events and the meanings
attached to them" (p. 198), to the analytical tasks of examining the "production of meaning"-in other words the "signifying work" we referred to as "framing" (p. 198). Our
focus in that article, was not, as Oliver and Johnston suggest, to "rename" the ideology
literature in frame analytic terms; rather we sought to specify the relationship between belief
systems and framing activities-for example, how various characteristics of belief systems
constrain the production of meaning and thus can affect the mobilizing potency of framings.
Our focus on the core framing tasks was not simply a case of pouring Wilson's (1973) older
wine into new wineskins. Instead, we sought to bring some dynamism to a rather static
conceptualization of ideology. Granted we refer to Wilson's three components of ideology as
"core framing tasks." But we then show how these three component elements are socially
constructed via various articulative, punctuating, and attributional processes (which we
elaborated in 1992). In short, our objective was to attempt to specify the interactive processes by
which frames are socially constructed, sustained, contested, and altered, the
phenomenological and infrastructural constraints on those processes, and the consequences of
these processes for aspects of mobilization. But most of this, which we regard as the heart
of the framing perspective, is given short shrift by Oliver and Johnston.

The third misunderstanding is the authors' location of the essence of frames in
cognition. As they note repeatedly, "frames are individual cognitive structures," they are
"mental structures or schemata " they point to "a cognitive process wherein people bring
to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to locate it in a
larger system of meaning. " Certainly collective action frames are, in part, cognitive entities
that aid interpretation and social action, but their essence, sociologically, resides in situated
social interaction, that is, in the interpretive discussions and debates that social movement
actors engage in among each other and in the framing contests that occur between movement
actors and other parties within the movement field of action, such as countermovements,
adversaries, and even the media. Collective action frames are, to borrow on the language of
Bakhtin and his circle, "dialogical" phenomenon; their essence resides "not within us, but
between us" (Medvedev and Bakhtin 1978: 8; Todorov 1984). And it is this understanding
of frames as the products of the interindividual, interactional, and contested process of
framing that is glossed over by Oliver and Johnston.
The fourth misunderstanding is the authors' failure to grasp that frames and framing are embedded within social constructionist processes that involve thinking and reasoning by the parties involved. This misunderstanding, which follows understandably on the heels of the essay's focus on frames rather than on framing processes and the mislocation of the essence of frames in cognition rather than in dialogical interaction, surfaces in various questionable comments throughout their article. One such comment contends that work on ideology is evocative of a social constructionist view that "has been missing from recent scholarship." If the reference is to the framing scholarship, which we presume is the case given the focus of the essay, we wonder how such a statement could be made unless the authors have misapprehended both the framing perspective on social movements and the broader constructionist perspective in which it is located. Such a statement also raises questions about the authors' understanding of how the concept of ideology has been used in the earlier social movement literature. That scholars such as Heberle (1951), Turner and Killian (1957), and Wilson (1973) invoke and define the concept is clear, but how it is used analytically is more ambiguous. Our reading of this earlier literature is that it treated ideology in a highly descriptive and relatively static and non-dynamic fashion. Moreover, how it comes into existence and is appropriated by movement actors has been taken as given. Additionally, ideology has rarely been used as an important variable or determinant of the kinds of processes and outcomes that movement analysts have sought to explain. Rather, it has more commonly been invoked and described as an aspect of a movement, and then left to linger in the background as analysis of some other movement process or conundrum proceeds. If this assessment of the use of ideology in much of the earlier movement literature is correct, where, we wonder, is the social constructionist influence? It may be asserted or implied, but it is neither analyzed nor demonstrated.

Equally curious is the authors' contention that ideology not only is predicated on thinking and reasoning, but that it "points to an element of ideation often neglected in the study of social movements: thinking." This strikes us as most puzzling in two ways. First, does it imply that thinking and reasoning are not salient aspects of framing processes? If that is the implication, then it is empirically unfounded as any firsthand, up-close examination of movement encounters and meetings suggest. And second, it injects into ideology a degree of cognitive dynamism and interactional give-and-take that seems strikingly discordant with some conceptions of ideology, such as those that emphasize distortion, mystification, and illusion, as embodied in such corollary concepts as "false consciousness" (Marx and Engels 1989) and "hegemony" (Gramsci 1971).

A sixth misunderstanding of frames and the framing perspective is reflected in the authors' designation of the perspective as a social psychological one, and ideology as basically a political sociological designation. We would argue that such categorization is not so neat, since both frames and ideology have social psychological and political dimensions to them. In fact, we have emphasized elsewhere that framing involves the "politics of signification" and that movements function as, among other things, framing agents that "are deeply embroiled, along with the media and the state in what (has been) referred to as the `politics of signification'" (Snow and Benford 1988: 198). If so, then what is the rationale for associating framing solely with social psychology and thereby neglecting its links to politics and particularly the often contested character of framing processes?

Perhaps it is because of the foregoing misunderstandings and misrepresentations that Oliver and Johnston suggest "that frame alignment processes may be especially suited for understanding the particulars of the U.S. 1990s political culture, but is less well suited for understanding movements in other times and places." On what grounds and in terms of what evidence are such assertions made? Were social problems and grievances so transparent in
earlier periods of history and in other cultures that no interpretive work was required? Did political and economic disruptions or breakdowns not have interpretative debates and conflicts of the kind conceptualized by the framing perspective? If so, then apparently we have different historical and sociological understandings of the range of movements and revolutions that preceded the 1990s, including those that occurred in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

This takes us to a final issue that obfuscates Oliver and Johnston’s conception of and claims for ideology. We refer to the ambiguous character of the concept of ideology and Oliver and Johnston’s failure to come to grips with it. They correctly note that discussion of ideology has been characterized by a “tangle of pejorative connotations and contradictory definitions” since it was first employed the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy at the end of the eighteenth century, ranging from a general and more neutral conception, as reflected in the writing of Geertz (1973), Seliger (1976), and Gouldner (1976), to a more critical conception wherein ideology is seen as functioning to sustain existing class structures and relations of domination, as reflected in the writings of Marx and Engels (1989), Mannheim (1985) and Thompson (1984). But they invite us to accept the analytic utility of their definition—“any system of meaning that couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or resisting social change”—without reconciling it with various contradictory and problematic aspects of the above tangle of definitions, such as the above-mentioned claims of distortion and mystification that attend the more critical conceptualizations. As well, they dance around some of the problematic features of their own conceptualization. For example, their conceptualization seems to assume, just as most treatments of ideology, a degree of coherence and integration among the elements of ideology (e.g., values and beliefs) that is not in accord with research on values and beliefs (Rokeach 1973; Williams 1970). The fact is that not only do individuals acknowledge a host of values and beliefs that are often contradictory, but they rarely cohere in an integrated, systematic fashion. As Williams found in his examination of values in American society, there is neither “a neatly unified ‘ethos’ or an irresistible ‘strain toward consistency’” (1970: 451).

Insofar as values and beliefs constitute salient components of ideology, then such observations suggest that perhaps their presumed integration with respect to any particular ideology should be problematized, such that they can range on a continuum from being tightly coupled to loosely coupled. Such a conceptualization is not only consistent with the frequent observation that movements on different sides of the political spectrum can find sustenance in the same broader cultural ideology, but it calls for an alternative concept that encompasses emergent sets of ideas and values that function either as innovative amplifications and extensions of existing ideologies or as antidotes to them. Obviously, we think the concept of collective action frames helps to fill this conceptual void. This, of course, begs the question of our understanding of the relationship between ideology and framing.

LINKING IDEOLOGY AND FRAMES

Because of limited space, we briefly sketch our view of the relationships and distinctions between the framing and ideology. First, we view ideology as a cultural resource for framing activity. Specifically, we contend that the framing process involves, among other things, the articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of existing beliefs and values, most of which are associated with existing ideologies. Hence, it is arguable and empirically demonstrable that collective action frames are typically comprised, at least in part, of strands of one or more ideologies. If so, then collective action frames are rooted, in varying degrees, in extant ideologies, but are neither determined by nor isomorphic with them. Instead, from a framing perspective, ideologies constitute cultural resources that can
be tapped and exploited for the purpose of constructing collective action frames, and thus function simultaneously to facilitate and constrain framing processes (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988). Following Swidler (1986), we are arguing that if culture is best conceived as a "bag of tools," then clearly ideologies function in this fashion in relation to collective action frames. As well, extant ideologies, or aspects of them, can function as points of contention to which collective action frames are developed and proffered as antidotes or emergent counter-ideologies.

A second aspect of our view of the relationship between ideology and framing is that framing may also function as remedial ideological work. By that we mean that framing provides a conceptual handle for thinking about and analyzing the not infrequent remedial, reconstitutive work that is required when members of any ideological or thought community encounter glaring disjunctions between their beliefs and experiences or events in the world. It was this very dilemma that was the basis for Berger's analysis of the remedial "ideological work" that rural communards in upstate California engaged in so as to "maintain some semblance of consistency, coherence, and continuity" between their beliefs and actions when circumstances rendered them contradictory (1981: 22). Such remedial discourse or ideological work is likely to be precipitated or called forth by a number of disjunctive occurrences, such as (a) when beliefs and events in the word are discordant, (b) when beliefs and behavior or outcomes contradict each other, and (c) when the existence of competing or conflicting beliefs within a group threatens its coherence and increases the prospect of schism or factionalization. What is called for in each of these situations is a reframing, or "keying" in Goffman's words (1974), of the tear or rip in the ideology, a stitching together of the disjunctions.

A third aspect of the relationship between ideology and framing that warrants mention is that framing mutes the vulnerability of ideology to reification. As we have noted, the language of framing directs attention to the processes through which interpretive orientations develop, evolve, and change, and thereby triggers warning signals about the prospects of reifying existing ideologies or the products of framing activity, such as emergent ideologies and master frames. The tendency to reify movement ideologies or mobilizing beliefs and ideas, as well as master frames, has been particularly prominent in the social movement literature. The concept of framing functions as an antidote to that tendency because framing is a social activity and accomplishment.

A final aspect is that framing, in contrast to ideology, is an empirically observable activity. It is one of the things that we have repeatedly observed social movement actors doing over and over again during the course of their conversations and debates in the context of movement meetings and activities. Framing is empirically observable, as we emphasized earlier, because neither frames nor framing processes are purely or merely mentalistic or cognitive entities. Instead, they are rooted in and constituted by group-based social interaction, which is readily available for first-hand observation, examination, and analysis. That too few movement scholars have made actual framing activity the focus of empirical inquiry is no reason to gloss over this characteristic interactive, constructionist feature of framing.

SUMMARY

Based on the foregoing observations and arguments, it should be clear that we agree with Oliver and Johnston (1) that frames and ideology are not different words for the same thing but are, in fact, different entities; (2) that both concepts should therefore be retained; (3) that frames and ideology thus merit studying in their own right; and (4) that the relationship between frames and ideology needs to be understood as well. Where we differ, it seems, is in our respective conceptualizations of ideology and of the relationship between
ideology and framing. As well, we have argued that Oliver and Johnston have misunderstood or misrepresented aspects of our work on frames and framing processes and have ignored issues within the voluminous literature on ideology that, in the absence of further elaboration and clarification, undermine the utility of their take on ideology and its relationship to social movements and related processes. These concerns and unresolved issues notwithstanding, Oliver and Johnston's essay has functioned usefully to focus attention on an important and neglected issue in the study of social movements.

REFERENCES


