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Now out! Toward
a Bioregional State: the Book! Currently available everywhere books sold online (amazon.com, bn.com, etc. digital or paperback versions); plus, bookshops: available for booksellers wishing to stock it for bulk purchases! Look! Biostate book already over Mao Zedong's Little Red Book! |
written from Madison, Upper Rock, Wisconsin
(find your bioregion/watershed, and health/toxics information) |
| The home page has a short description of the website, Towards a Bioregional State. | |
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Why the Electoral
Congress is Important to Keep, Read
the first 25 pages for free under 'browse before you buy' here: |
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Making Bioregionally Sensitive Congressional Districts, that would be more competitive for all parties, instead of the 'pocketed' clientelistic districts that the majoritarian parties have created for themselves alone
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| Bioregional states: the false dichotomy that attempts a separation between 'civil society' and formal structure: formal structures facilitate 'civil society' | |
| Bioregional strategies: removing the clientelistic gerrymandered majoritarian districts of the Republicans and the Democrats, because they fail to be Congressional districts | |
| Five points about proportional representation in the Electoral Congress, and how it helps third parties | |
| How do get it done in a two party context? Balancing pragmatics and ideals, the two party 'bait': proportional representation in the electoral college, with a majoritarian allotment potential: all votes can go to a party, if that party takes 50% of the votes; plurality elections go proportional representation | |
| Maximizing voting,
Maximizing party competition: Response from Representative Miller, discussing the differences between his majoritarianism that minimizes voting, and a majoritarianism that actually maximizes voting-- proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment |
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| Four criteria and requirements
for a democracy in practice-- (1) geographically inclusive, competitive districts, (2) proportional representation with majoritarian allotment clause that sets up a context for 100% maximization of voting, (3) lack of 'special' legislation marginalizing third parties, and (4) 'clean elections.' |
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Instant Run-off Voting
as Another Bait for the Majoritarian Parties, however, a change that leaves
third parties out of the picture, and minimizes low voter turnout.
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| More on why IRV would
lead to unoptimal democratic processes, though it may be a two party 'bait'
for structural change. It maintains their marginalized position as third
parties, instead of directly challenging the two party spoiler context.
IRV fails to make a more competitive party context. Why would IRV be unoptimal for a competitive democracy? In IRV, low plurality elections are institutionalized, without strengthening third parties advantage or even institutionalized existence more directly. In the United States case, IRV would lead to a further consolidation of the Democratic and the Republican parties, without them actually being required to work for votes--IRV gives them votes by default for being more and more unrepresentative. It's a poor incentive structure for expanding political inclusivity, and instead, IRV institutionalizes lower pluralities. IRV sets up lower and lower plurality winners and party strategies. IRV is a cheap version of fusion laws. If Greens actually want more competitive elections, promote fusion laws instead of IRV. Promote proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment for the electoral college, instead of IRV. I go into detail about the dynamics (with examples) of IRV institutionalizing lower pluralities for party appeals. IRV will make the Democratic and the Republican parties more secure, as well as more unrepresentative of third party politics simultaneously. |
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| More on Trojan Horses for third parties: (1) IRV, (2) Democratic/Republican gerrymandered district allotment of Presidential electors, and (3) fusion laws as opening the door for third parties. However, proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment is the only route to maintain a durable third party context in the United States. | |
| Majority rule--i.e,
where more than 50% of the voters are appealed to in an election by parties--can
only be established by proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment
potential that forces parties to compete for more than 50% of the voters.
What is called 'majority rule' win voting typically should be called 'largest
minority' win voting, because it is based on a framework of voting that
leads to 'minimum majoritarianism,' described in earlier bioregional letters,
where parties can successfully appeal to 50% or less and still win an election.
Majority rule voting means only the shallowness of 'largest minority rule'
in practice--without the competition for 100% of the electorate that proportional
representation with a majoritarian allotment sets up as the incentive structure
for all parties. Here's why it works. This is commentary from an email exchange between Dr. Anderson and myself. Dr. Anderson was the third party ticket in 1980 for president. He is promoting a nationwide popular vote for the presidency. I argue that this idea is only to hamper third party choices for the voter at large. This would lead to a further reduction of the representativeness pressure of the Democrats and the Republicans because the only effective pressure to make any party representative is to have available challengers in the wing capable of ousting them from power if they fail to be representative. Ironically, Dr. Anderson's idea for a national vote for the president in the interests of 'majority rule' would further erode any competitiveness of third party positions and lead to more consolidated minority rule of the Democratic and the Republican parties and their continued appeals to less than 50% of the electorate in their 'majority wins.' Plus, see the above letters for further critiques of how 'largest minority rule' is always the outcome of straight 'majority voting laws,' because of how parties have incentives to appeal (or to ignore) voters in straight majority rule frameworks. |
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| This is a letter describing the importance of and the strategy behind applied bioregional perspectives in land use planning toward a bioregional state. In turn, I describe, in terms of geographic, environmental and surveying rationales, why the United States has such a difficulty with 'urban sprawl.' I explain how the way that borders were drawn mostly in the United States, following the contours of environmental changes (which are the areas where urbanization typically goes, as well as transportation networks) has led to urbanization expanding in areas that are split politically across states, or across counties, etc. I offer some advice to a planner from Texas working with applying bioregionalism to her transportation planning in this context. I describe districting boundaries as well as an important point to consider in how development proceeds, making the case for bioregional political districts as a planning issue as well. | |
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Alleviating the
faults of IRV as a 'stand-alone' change: comments on Reilly and Richie's
articles from Tom Paine magazine. They are arguing for plain vanilla
IRV and are dismissive of other frameworks. I intersperse my comments in
their articles, arguing for a merged sense of four changes: arguing for
proportional representation with majoritarian allotment and with IRV and
by district, as solving the four issues, respectively, of: low voter
turnout, first round marginalization and second round least favorite outcomes,
why IRV should only be used when 100% of the voting populace is enfranchised
or the outcome is debilitatative instead of affirmative, and why district
allotment elections by bioregional are important and why district allotment
is a step in that direction. I discuss the limitations with IRV as a long term scheme because of its 'sponge effect' on reducing the scale of popular support to winning parties in the first round, as parties coup wins in the second rounds and thus are less and less the voter's first choices. Plain vanilla IRV thus is in some ways much worse than plain vanilla majoritarian frameworks (because it lowers the voter appeal strategies of parties to gain a majority in the first round), though it has benefits of making other voter choices more durable, even though they are always going to be marginal. However, I do promote IRV as understood as a Trojan Horse IRV, that sets up more voter choices that has effects later on widening choice, and widening pressure for making the first round more important, something IRV demotes. Most of my comments to Reilly detail the low voting turnout is left unsolved in IRV. Most of my comments to Richie are critiques against seeing structural changes as separate pieces, instead of something capable of being unified. Richie discusses various changes as endemically separate structural changes, while I find that only a merging of various frameworks of proportional representation, majoritarian first rounds, IRV, and district elections as one entity and one goal will lead to the sustainable state. I discuss the rationales for this interaction between these four factors, as well as describe a plan on promoting the POIs into 'taking the bait' for structural change. Richie critiques partisan structural change, though I am all for it particularly because partisan structural change yields a more competitive unpartisan outcome in this situation, whether for district allotment of electoral votes or for IRV. I remind Richie that it is existing POIs that are going to attempt to shore themselves up with IRV, instead of a 'public pressure' for IRV that will structurally be important. I suggest the strategy as one of less informing the public exclusively, and more baiting particular state POIs to take the route of district and IRV frameworks by themselves, because their state level changes will have federal level effects on widening voter choice. This is a particularly clear response, that outlines many critiques of the previous bioregional letters, with particular reference to bioregional letter #6. In comments to Richie, the issue is how partisan intentions of the parties of incumbency (the POIs) can lead to unpartisan outcomes. Both Reilly and Richie fail to see this and typically frame partisan changes as entirely ungermane to structural change. However, I argue that these partisan intentions actually lead to unpartisan outcomes. Both Reilly and Richie have a very static sense of structure typical of most political science analysis. I critique this as missing the point: partisan party changes are the only way to get structural change, and partisan changes of the POI can have unpartisan and affirmative effects for widening voter inclusions to 100% unintentionally if the POIs get competitive (as parties should be), or making particular districts and states more competitive amongst the POIs if electoral congress seats are allotted to districts thus making third/fourth parties votes more meaningful on the local level and thus making the POIs more representative to hold on to districts or making it easier for an 'upset' in a POI gerrymandered district. |
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Bioregional Hellenism: Districting the States of the World for Environmental Sustainability and Democratic Accountability In this letter, I describe four rationales why bioregional based districting is integrally involved with setting up sustainable states--and for setting up more democratically representative states--which amounts to the same topic. Bioregional based districting can solve more issues in a single swoop than any other framework. Plus, bioregional districting represents a universalistic principle for institutionalizing sustainable states, a principle that takes into account (and in actuality, requires) the institutionalization of voice for local variation, instead of institutionalizing a process that is unfortunately and typically based on distanciated political expression and demotion of localities in a political process. I imagine that the typical critique of any universalistic frameworks is that they demote locality. However, this is a framework that integrates several issues that are rarely if ever discussed--border area problematics, for one, and their connection with urbanization--while assuring local voice is institutionalized in the state framework as a material expression, instead of a gerrymandered expression. Bioregional districts can be another framework principle for other changes that are required to move to the sustainable state. This is discussed as a change toward formal state frameworks only, however, bioregional districting can be influentially important in the applied issues of science and agriculture extension programs, important in financial infrastructures (banks, loans, etc.) for rural as well as urban area peoples, as well as consumption frameworks. (More on these issues in later essays.) Bioregions can be a guide to institutionalized focuses for many frameworks. The sustainable state is above all a developmental state, though it is a political developmental state, one based on institutionalizing equity in development instead of institutionalizing inequity, one that institutionalizes variation instead of demotes it. In the sustainable state, policy prioritizations can be decided upon democratically with the particular geographies of areas in mind. |
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#18
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This bioregional letter
moves into the intersection between consumption and formal state structures:
by discussing the nascent movements towards state level food policy councils.
It is an analysis of how how sustainability (and unsustainability) is
related to food. It touches on how human and environmental health difficulties
are the same phenomenon of distanciated (despatialized) consumption. Why are the states of Connecticut and Iowa the first state level Food Policy Councils in the United States? This paper describes how rural Iowa and urban Connecticut are materially the most extreme cases of distanciated consumption, and how it effects health and environment in these states the worst over other states. There are many color graphs describing data of the 50 states as well. [1.75 MB Word 2000 file, many color charts of cancer prevalence, pollution streams, food insecurity/hunger, farmers markets, CSAs, etc. watersheds, aquifers, etc.]
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| Green Party Bioregionalism Platform. Are parties useful for green bioregionalism? This came out of a discussion on a listserve for bioregionalism, on how to get green parties away from the model of 'national parties as demographics', and instead, 'national parties as geographics' in other words, getting national parties to promote policies that geographically facilitate democracy in practice. The point is to consider keeping the social and legal frameworks centralized while decentralizing economic issues, and in considering formal changes in voting and districting that facilitate sustainability and demote unsustainability. | |
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#20
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Constitution of Sustainabilityexternal link: sign the petition at ipetitions.com ---> http://www.ipetitions.com/campaigns/constitution_of_sustainability/ The appended text
to the left is a transcription of the Constitution of the United States
of America. It has the required additions and changes for checking and
balancing against the process of unsustainability, that, unless addressed
explicitly in the formal frameworks of government, will plague all societies
and all governments. Thus, this is a Constitutional blueprint for sustainability, regardless of geography or epoch, as it represents general requirements of governments in administrating and creating the conditions of sutainability, and maintaining the process of sustainability. To read it with a critical eye as to the origin of the ideas and phrasing: Items in black text are the same as the United States Constitution. Items in green text are additions. Items in faded light blue have since been amended or superseded in the Constitution of the United States, or appear in blue to avoid duplication as already folded in black text in this 'update' for sustainability. For example, many later amendments (in blue) have become black-text Articles in this update, or appear folded in as Sections in particular Article. Thus, all that is in black text is already part of the United States Constitution. What is in green text represents additions. The Signature Area at the ipetitions.com website can be signed, by you, on the webpage. From that page, it is suggested that you could, if you wish, send this copy to any of your present government's representatives or officials. Send it to academics to get them thinking about the formal political requirements of sustainability. After any email is sent, then you can see the total number of people who have signed this Constitution for Sustainability, organized by their origin in existing unsustainable governmental frameworks--which of course are obsolescent in the Constitution for Sustainability, because they abet unsustainability. Within the Constitution of Sustainabilty is a process of how existing unsustainable formal frameworks can be adapted to sustainability, for unsustainable States around the world. These sections describe how entry in the Constitution of Sustainability is possible for such States wishing to join the Union or claim their rights under the Union as politically and consumptively externalized trade colonies. These trade colonies experience "extraction without representation." At present, they are socio-financially manipulated from afar by other States, and denied political feedback into these unsustainable relationships. It is demoting that difference, a difference that facilitates the unsustainabilty of trade relationships, that this addresses. The aim of the petition is both recognition of the Constitution of Sustainability, as well as promoting State level activism toward setting in motion existing U.S. Constitutional machinery for establishing a Constitutional Convention that would institutionalize sustainabilty instead of unsustainability in the present frameworks of the United States government. (Of course, I reserve the ability to edit and adapt the text, though I will explain the changes and show the changes by keeping a record on the drafts on the left.) |
Civic Democratic InstitutionsFeatured in Article I. of the Constitution of Sustainability (Bioregional Letter #20), is a framework that provides checks and balances between: informal, local, geographically specific coalition and leadership building-- and external, clientelistic, ideological, party politics. The CDI thus provides a check and balance between informal and formal politics, making sure that formal politics, through informal parties, is unable to gatekeep and frustrate the political agendas of citizens of local, state, and/or federal governments, due to lack of organization on the local level by citizens. You can read the short
description of the CDI in Bioregional Letter #20 above, or you can go
to the website below, which has longer descriptions. One of the links
on that website is a 30 page essay describing the interactions more thoroughly.
It was written in 1997. The idea for CDIs was originally written up in
1994, as a general local citizen-based pool of representatives and local
ideas serving as an informal checking and balancing against a potentially
unrepresentative party political framework. Only after it was integrated
into the bioregional state in early 2002, this feature deserves its own
bioregional letter designation. http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mwhitake/cdi1.htm
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Multi Member Districts have been voiced as another strategy for expanding multiple parties and voter choice. However, I argue they are only an inferior Trojan Horse to IRV for expanding multiple parties and voter choice. Like IRV frameworks, multi member districts have drawbacks in that they both fail to analyze what happens to the slate of party appeals in aggregate once these frameworks are institutionalized and how it they demote voter choice in party strategies--forcing all parties in practice to fit in a single mold of minority appeals, without allowing for registering of potential majority appeals. Multi member districts formally demotes majoritarian appeals which serve as a form of informal check and balance against the singular option of multiplying small parties in multi member district frameworks. In this letter, three drawbacks of multi member districts are mentioned (issues that proportional representation with majoritarian allotment solves). Additionally, multi-member districts and instant runoff voting (IRV) are compared and contrasted with proportional representation with majoritarian allotment. Multi member districts and IRV are seen as only Trojan Horses, useful for widening the field for pressures for other changes, with IRV actually the better Trojan Horse. I explain why. More benefits of proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment come to the fore. Multi member districts are an inferior choice to proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment. References: previous bioregional letters.
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More on political strategies towards formal sustainability, and getting it done in the present two party gerrymandered context: tackle this directly instead of indirectly. Change the partisan conflicts of interests in the drawing of the districts first. This is a recommendation: deal with the gerrymandered districts first as a political strategy. Any subsequent pressures, including IRV (Instant Runoff Voting), will come out of the larger and more accurate party contention when the districts are drawn by groups of interests instead of one party. This unclientelistic district framework can only be set up more readily as a systemic base when the districts are more representative of particular geographies--instead of dealing with it as a secondary and latter issue. I of course recommend a bioregional district framework, districts based on watersheds to give more accurate feedback and evaluation through voting from the very people influenced by state developmental policies. This is more on how the incumbency-selected and hand-tailored districts in the United States are presently based less on competitive parties and more on "one party" government on the particular geographies of how the districts are drawn. This is a letter addressed to the Center for Media and Democracy on their present strategy of IRV as their tool of choice. It has evidence that such a strategy of dealing with the gerrymandered districts first is reaching people. The evidence is from Jim Young's campaign platform (Jim Young is running Green Party, for Governor in 2002.). For documentation purposes, a Jim Young media release focusing on the issues of the present gerrymandered districts is enclosed, in a letter concerning his political platform on dealing with cleaning up corruption in Wisconsin state government. |
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How did Nation-States
Become Innately Environmentally Degradative? Part One. To Assemble These Localist Jurisdictions in a Nation-state instead of Demote Them is How to Turn Unsustainable Nation-States into Sustainable Bioregional States This is only an introductory and theoretical section from another longer and more comparatively empirical work, analyzing and evaluating the political and ecological contexts of where public participation in land use planning has struck first in the United States. The introductory section of this paper is included in Towards a Bioregional State because it has an historical section discussing the environmental and political changes that the nation-state typically inflicted on the widespread more localized frameworks of representation--taking much representation away and localist participation away in the process of nation-state consolidation of jurisdictions instead of bringing more. I am arguing that it is the nation-state's unfortunate removal of much of this subsidiary jurisdiction and localization of politics which has been very influential in explaining why abstract formal democratic frameworks are innately environmental degradative, despite a discourse around nation-states as being more representative frameworks than what came before. To bring back more jurisdictional localism through the bioregional state is the route towards sustainability. In other words, a bioregional state is less creating something entirely novel in terms of human jurisdictions, it is only adding to the nation-state what it removed and shallowed in its initial consolidation: many more examples of localist jurisdictions and localist citizenship participation which were replaced with clientelistic participation in the nation-state context. The ideas in Toward a Bioregional State if anything are a maturing and filling out of the promise of the macro-state context of nation-state representation, adding what it has systemically and ecologically left out and left divided and conquered and unvoiced: the multiple particular localisms based on bioregions and watershed based developmental externalities in human health, ecology, and economics. Addressing this politics that is there already is a reflexive manner of dealing with the unsustainable aspects of the nation-state's frameworks. A more -more analytical description of six separate points that lead to environmental degradation in all nation-state frameworks of citizenship so far is described in Bioregional Letter #25 |
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| How did Nation-States
Become Innately Environmentally Degradative? Part Two. Six Historical Issues about Human/Environmental Relations that have influenced the Philosophical Principles of Institutional Design in the Bioregional State, and How these Principles are Different from Existing Democratic Theory The same six issues explain why existing Western abstract democratic theory is flawed without the ecological democratic theory of the Bioregional State This was written as an explanation to someone of the institutional ideas of Toward a Bioregional State in terms of how it differs from existing democratic theory. This is because the bioregional state starts on a different premise about what the state is, pointing out the flaws and oversights in existing democratic theory that have let unsustainability and systemic unrepresentation be expanded with the rhetoric of democracy. The era of sustainability means an entirely different sense. An ecological democratic theory is required. Here are a few notes for that purpose: six separate points that lead to environmental degradation in all nation-state frameworks of citizenship so far without the changes of the Bioregional State. |
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List of 38 Additional Checks and Balances Required in the Bioregional State: Overhauling Formal Democracy in the Era of Sustainability with Four Types of Checks and Balances instead of only One This can be used as Toward a Bioregional State's "index" so far. It pieces together all the issues mentioned in the Constitution of Sustainability and discusses them separately, in terms of the four different types of checks and balances that are the additional requirements for linking democracy and sustainability that are missing in exising democratic frameworks which lead to environmental degradation and state corruption. |
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An Introduction to the Bioregional State: A short abstract describing the goals of the Bioregional State, followed by a preface and an elaboration of four points that make the political theory of the bioregional state different. These are the four points that were left out of the existing Enlightment democratic theory which have set us on the road to an informally managed and very undemocratic unsustainabilty--instead of toward a democratic sustainability. Getting to sustainabilty means adding these four aspects to the formal institutions of democracy, which are described in detail in other Bioregional Letters. |
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#28
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Upcoming:Financial microcredit |
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#29
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Upcoming: Local National Global, theoretical sections perhaps |
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#30
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Upcoming:Notes for a Political Economy of Consumption |
link to a
map of the present congressional districts of
the United States
link to a map of the majoritarian districts of Wisconsin,
compared to the bioregions of Wisconsin