written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
(find your bioregion/watershed)
(find your bioregion/watershed)
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written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
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title, PR in the EC, majoritarian allotment clause as the pragmatic context that opens the present political doors; and sets up a context where they fighting amongst each other *for* third party votes, instead of united against third parties. Majoritarian allotment clause sets up an important divide and conquer between potentially allied majoritarian parties to stop competing. The majoritarian allotment clause sets them to competing with each other, instead of like a cabal, working to disenfranchise third/fourth parties. With a majoritarian allotment clause, the dynamics between majoritarian and third/fourth parties entirely changes. Five pragmatic points about this interaction are discussed.
[written by 'Wnyott', a response from Bioregional Letter #6:]
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>To be clear, Maine and Nebraska do not have such a plan. They allocate
>electors based on (a) the plurality winner in each congressional district
>gets one vote per victorious district; and (b) the statewide winner gets two
>votes. Partly because of gerrymandering, this system doesn't necessarily
>reflect the relative support for each candidate in a state. For example, in
>Maine, Gore got all 4 votes despite Bush getting 44% of the vote; while in
>Nebraska, Bush got all 5 votes despite Gore getting 33% of the vote . . .
>since both candidates won all of the CDs.
Oh, I was aware that Maine's version was like that (at least that one example, thanks, I was unaware of exactly how Nebraska's version was organized--seems the same gerrymandering of uncompetitive districts, with electors from the presumed 'congressional districts,' which are more like 'majoritarian districts' instead.)
As I said, I was unsure about Nebraska. Thanks. I wanted a simple letter though. ;-) Mentioning [to Rep. Miller] that I was---(A) interested in him introducing legislation for setting up competitive districts for instance, or (B) in materially geographic districts based on the physical catchment basis of watersheds, to accurately reflect environmental degradation, pollution, and health concerns, see: www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/bioregionEC.htm,--would have gotten nowhere with a majoritarian candidate, of either party.
Thank you for pointing that out though, about Nebraska.
Once more, here's what I feel is the formal structural issue and the pragmatic issue. The formal structural issue is that proportional representation in the electoral congress sets up the popular and the geographic contexts of the vote simultaneously to be registered for the presidential election. As for the pragmatic issue, the issue I see in the proportional representation in the electoral college is that it requires majoritarian parties backing to have it pass, thus it has to appeal to them in some way, thus, the majoritarian allotment clause, as a "Trojan Horse" bait. However, the proportional representation in the Electoral Congress:
(1) It will be useful to them actually in many situations where fusion arrangements can help pull off a presidency in the electoral college.
(2) It will be useful to third parties, because it is a way of outflanking the localist unrepresentative war-game of uncompetitive districts, that keep them from assembling other voter demographics that are indeed out there, only guillotined because the districting is set up to facilitate and engineer the 'return' of particular majoritarian parties clientelisitically, instead of districting set up to generate actual congressional districts. That is why I call what we have majoritarian districts INSTEAD of congressional districts, because if they were actually congressional districts we would have (a) elections, (b) competitions between parties for voters in particular geographic contexts, (c) and more representative incumbency at least. It's a tribute to confusion to call them congressional districts at present, because they are based on uncompetitive 'pocket boroughs' (English history term for the same phenomenon) that 'return' people to the legislature instead of creating a context where they are representatives that we choose. Instead we are voters who are chosen by these majoritarian parties as their own private property. Thus, one of the only venues remaining outside and around of this clientelistic arrangement organized by the majoritarian parties, that would be useful for third parties, is the electoral college.
(3) It will make majoritarian parties more representative as they are forced to work outside their small hand-picked electorate of around only 45-50% of the United States misnamed 'popular' (sic) vote. It has been this way since fusion was declared illegal by the majoritarian parties (mostly the Republicans, though there were some other parties and another issue, the issue of creating 'legal percentage requirements' to be recognized, which basically set up a context which demobilized opposition to what was seen as unrepresentative activities on the part of congressional representatives and senators--because they were unregisted. They would have to wait until the 'next election,' and catch-22, they could only register and be an 'offical party' suddenly if they were a party in the previous election according to many laws--you can see how it works, or if they had what seemed to be an escalating percentage of the electorate sign a petition--a game of "OK, well attempt to cross this line, OK, what about this line, OK, what about this next line?" This 'offical escalation of the hurdle' was employed by the Democrats/Republicans in the presidental debates--suddenly, it was, er, 15%, yeah, that was 'required' (by whom? instead of 5% to get in on the debates.) The fusion issue was in the late 1890s. The creation of 'state regulations' on parties was throughout the Guilded Age--by parties less interested in being representative, and more interested in keeping power by dividing the opposition to their rule, through invented 'regulatory' laws designed for the purpose, instead of bending themselves to be representative. The United States voting population drops precipitously because of this novel arrangement, particular the fusion laws, and remains about where it has been, for over a century, around 50% or less typically. The electoral college can set up benefical fusion politics.
(4) It can be a media icon. It can be an additional awareness 'flag' for other issues that we are proposing are required--such as more competitive districting, for instance. Voters can compare who got elected by the informal parties to the presidency with the more accurate samiple of their voting preferences in the proportionally allocated Electoral College. Voters can use the proportionally representative Electoral College as an evaluation tool against any party's claim's to being representative. All third parties I know of are for these issues, they are embedded and they 'live' these issues (gerrymandered districts, uncompetitive elections, 'regulations' on open (sic) debates, majoritarian parties escalating third/fourth party petition total requirements to even 'register' to compete: all this keeps raising the bar, 'the requirements' to compete, with each election conflict. People should be made aware that these 'regulatory' issues are less state mandates, and more unrepresentative party mandates to demote party competition. This electoral college issue is a 'work down' approach that would pry open the local awareness of these other issues.
(5) It drives a wedge between the two majoritarian parties. Third parties, even if they are small, suddenly are largely important and coveted votes. Instead of united against third parties, they are competing for their votes. The dynamics around third parties entirely changes, and moderates any majoritarian designs on gatekeeping power, since third parties can 'check' them if they are able to use their votes in a meaningful (presidential elections) way. This has ramifications on the local level, where changes are actually required, in the districting. It makes durable any state level third parties. It pulls the majoritarian parties away from empty ideological positioning, and into geographic representativeness, in integration. (point 4, once more).
Regards,
Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison
link to a map of the present congressional districts of the United States
link to a map of the majoritarian districts of Wisconsin, compared to the bioregions of Wisconsin
link to www.fairvote.org, where you can see the irregular majoritarian districts.
Choose 'redistricting.' This site discusses the degree to which they are uncompetitive as well, with 60+ Congressional representatives and senators 'returning' to Congress without having been challenged when they 'ran' for election. There were over 90 of them in 1996. For a sense of scale, there are only 535 members of Congress total (435 House; 100 Senate). The size of the Congress is adjusted occassionally. The House of Representatives has been at 435 since 1910. Additionally, incumbency as a phenomenon is over 90% in the United States as well. There is very little 'running' for office in the United States. Why is this so? Some of this was explained above. See the other pages for more.
other pages on the bioregional state, keep reading them in order (recommended)
or
