written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin (find your bioregion/watershed)

Toward a Bioregional State:

Bioregional Letter #22

Multi Member Districts as another Trojan Horse
for expanding multiple parties and voter choice,
though like IRV frameworks, it has its own drawback: it formally demotes
majoritarian appeals which serve as a form of informal check and balance
against the singular option of multiplying small parties in multi member district frameworks

More benefits of proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment

Rob Richie, of The Center for Voting and Democracy, writes the following in an email appended to an article about potential racial gerrymandering court suits against the Ohio Republican Party. This is his take on the benefits of Multi Member Districts (MMD). I respond with a caveat that multi-member districts detract from the potential of political integration, and they actually demote and constrict options for multiple parties that would operate on different strategies. I argue that in proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment potential, as mentioned in other Bioregional Letters, we can have a multi-member district effect, simultaneously without maligning against the politics of majoritarian appeals. Simple multi-member districts malign the majoritarian strategy.

Richie writes:
Now that computers allow districts to be drawn with exquisite precision (house by house, voter by voter) single-winner districts are drawn to ensure that the voters have little or no say in the outcome. And given that there is so much commercially available data out there on voters (consumer databases etc.) even if the government sources of data went entirely dark (which ain't gonna happen) the precision with which the districts are drawn would hardly be touched.

One solution that has a chance of working and *increasing* voter power is to go to multi-member districts electing three or more reps at a time using one of the proportional or semi-proportional representation systems (choice voting, cumulative etc.)

You can't gerrymander a state with multi-member districts because the gerrymander feeds on wasted votes -- forcing the voters to squander their votes on a sure loser or add them to a certain winner's tally. The proportional representation systems eliminate virtually all of the wasted votes so the ability to feed the gerrymander is defeated.

I responded:

Of course there are difficulties with multi member districts as well.

It innately is created against having majority appeals and small parties as multiple options. Multi member districts are systemically biased toward a single framework of politics. Proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment guards against this.

First difficulty with multi member districts, is that they are a biased single framework of politics, so this fails to address the issue of the single framework of politics that they would be replacing: from the option to having only majoritarian parties, to the option of having only small minority parties, this is only exchanging one bias for another in that it fails to open up majoritarian and small party options simultaneously.

Second difficulty with multi-member districts is that in this first difficulty--of a single framework of politics is biased into being--is an informal context of parties and counteropposed politicians, typically as it comes out in practice, on different lifestyle issues or on opposed on extreme ideological slants because every group gets mobilized as minority interests. The second difficulty is that with multi member districts there is little incentive to be a party that appeals to all voters.

The third difficulty with multi member districts is that it demotes the proportional representation with majoritarian allotment feature of a check and balance framework against such multiplicity, when in PRMA (proportional representation with majoritarian allotment) voters get to decide whethey they want to support a party that has a majority appeal, or. In multi member districts this decision is made for them by letting them have only minority parties to choose from. In a multiple mobilization of very extreme groups created by multi member districts, any appeals to the majority of voters AS A MAJORITY is effectively sealed off within a multi member framework, and thus, multi member districts remove a voter check and balance (and choice) against multiplying small parties.

However, in practice, I would be for multi member districts as a Trojan Horse strategy to get voters access to more party choices, similar to what IRV (instant runoff voting) does. Both IRV and multi member districts, even though they both yield an informal context of a wide array of small parties, have different effects. Where IRV allows large unrepresentative 'marjoritarian' parties to exist in practice because of the coup of second round voting allows them to wait for that round and continue to be unrepresentative, multi member districts demotes all majoritarian party strategies period, without leaving voters even the option of a party that would appeal to all voters. As I mentioned above, this is an important informal check and balance that proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment creates: it allows for both small parties (like IRV and multi member districts), and it additionally allows for pressure for majoritarian parties to be representative (IRV actually allows for majority parties to be default coup winners in elections in the second round; and multi member districts removes majoritarian party appeals as a check and balance entirely.)

Because IRV maintains the majority appeal potential at the same moment of expanding multiple parties. Strategically speaking, in the United States two party duopoly (and the districts that are one party frameworks instead of based on voter choice), pressure of third and fourth parties would likely find a resonate appeal in the Democratic and Repubican parties more than multi member districts, because the Democratic and the Republican party can work within the IRV framework--and thus they can be a supporter for it--at the same moment that multiple parties are expanded.

However, in the multi member district appeal--in a two party duopoly--there is little incentive for the Democratic or the Republican party (as the parties that would pragmatically be the ones to make the changes in a duopoly) to support multi member districts because it demotes them immediately. Thus, multi member districts are a poor strategy for a Trojan Horse, because it is a Trojan Horse that fails entice them to let into their duopoly.

However, IRV is a Trojan Horse that would similarly open up multple parties, and it would be sponsored by the duopoly (and is being sponsored as we speak in some states, like Alaska) as an outgrowth of competition between the Democratic and Republican parties. To make a successful Trojan Horse appeal, it is important to help the interchangable majoritarian party framework of Democratic or Republican win their elections, simultenaously as it expands voter choice and multiple third and fourth party durability. Any other Trojan Horse is pragmatially dead in the water unless it does this work for the duopoly at the same moment it expands party choice.

This is why I feel that IRV is the best strategy to concentrate on as a Trojan Horse for expanding voter choice and multiple third and fourth party durability. Of course IRV has its own difficulties, that I have address earlier. Only proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment addressed both the shortcomings of multi member districts and IRV.

For more information on proportional representation with majoritarian allotment which keeps the features of multmember districts and IRV (multiple small party choices options created for voters) without demoting majority appeals systemically as a process like both IRV and multi-member districts do--see Bioregional Letters #10-#14 at: the bioregional letters list.

Side note:

The following article shows that even the informal context of "smear" or "trash your opponent" campaigns seem to disappear in "preferential voting" (another name for rank the candidates in IRV. This is because no one wants to get a bad reputation when total vote tally matters and smearing other candidates may come back to haunt you when voters avoid giving that candidate second or third choice votes. Giving voters the capacity to punish smear campaign tacticts by withholding second/third preference votes is another rationale for any type of preferential voting. There is still the issue with demoting the dynamics where large party majority appeals can check and balance extreme small party contexts. However, this is interesting to note. I expect the same dynamics would exist in proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment because it has a similar tendency to punish those who are divisive, by automatically rewarding the outcomes as a plurality proportional representation wins (i.e., your "smeared" candidate gets office as well as you do) and no one gets 50% or more. I'll have to ponder on this point a bit more.

Utah GOP alters vote method
By Bob Bernick Jr.
Deseret News political editor

http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,400006978,00.html?

Utah Republicans may be conservative, but they aren't afraid of
change - at least when it comes to a new way of voting.
At Saturday's state Republican Convention, the 3,480 delegates
will vote in the three U.S. House races using what's known as a
preferential ballot. Delegates in the House races will pick, on a
single ballot, candidates as their first, second, third choices and
so on down the ballot.

In the case of the packed 2nd District race, they will actually
rank - if they so chose - 12 candidates.

In the first round of counting, the candidate with the fewest
number of ballots listing him as the delegates' first choice is
eliminated. Those ballots are redistributed to the candidates who are
those delegates' second preferences. The counting/elimination process
continues, and if at any time one candidate gets 60 percent of the
vote he is declared the nominee. After the last round of counting,
two candidates will remain. If one has 60 percent of the vote, he's
the nominee. Otherwise those last two candidates go to a June 25
primary.

The fact that candidates know they face a preferential ballot
has resulted in more gentlemanly campaigning, believes GOP state
executive director Scott Simpson.

"Everyone wants to be ranked first, of course. But it is also
very important to be ranked second, third, or ranked as high as you
can be," he says.

And so candidates are timid about criticizing any other
candidate, for if you bad-mouth a candidate to a delegate who may be
putting that candidate first, the delegate is not likely to put you
second, or third, or fourth. He may not vote for you at all, in any
ranking, which is also allowed, said Simpson.

When the National Rifle Association sent out a letter to all
1st District delegates criticizing candidate Rep. Kevin Garn on one
of his state House votes, candidate Rob Bishop, a gun-rights
lobbyist, quickly and firmly distanced himself from the letter. "You
could see by Bishop's reaction to the NRA letter" that candidates are
worried about being tagged with negative campaigning in combination
with the preferential ballot, said Simpson.

In any case, while preferential voting has been used in some
county party races before, this will be the first time it will be
used in a major party state convention.

It's the wave of the future, some say. And it's possible you
could see such voting in municipal or other races over the next 10
years.

Preferential balloting, used in Australia for years, has a
number of advantages, proponents say. The system, depending on how
its used, could save taxpayers the cost of a primary election (which
ranges from $600,000 to $800,000 statewide in Utah). And, some argue,
it gives middle-of-the-road candidates in a big candidate field a
better shot at winning. For example, a number of political observers
believe Salt Lake Mayor Rocky Anderson sits in office today because
in the 2001 city primary election two moderates - Dave Jones and Jim
Bradley - split the moderate vote, letting Anderson, a more liberal
candidate, and Stuart Reid, the more conservative candidate, take
first and second place. In the final election, Anderson drew more of
the Jones/Bradley support and topped Reid. A preferential primary
ballot may have advanced Jones or Bradley into a final election
against Anderson or Reid, and a more moderate candidate may have won
the mayoralship.

Going low-tech and low-cost, state GOP leaders decided not to
spend $30,000 to have a professional voting firm handle the
preferential balloting Saturday, or spend the time and money to re-
program punch-card vote counting machines. Instead, "we're doing this
in-house and manually," says Simpson. Ballots will be hand counted
each round, with candidates' poll watchers making sure everything is
proper, said Simpson.

Second District candidate Steve Harmsen, a Salt Lake County
Councilman who has stood for election off and on for 30 years, thinks
the new balloting is the right way to go. "I like it. But people have
to understand that, given 12 candidates (in the 2nd District), it's
highly unlikely a delegate's first choice will come out of the
convention. It could be a delegate's 2nd or 3rd choice that comes
out," says Harmsen. "I understand how they are going to count the
ballots. They have their act together. I think it will work."

back to the list of bioregional letters

contact:
mrkdwhit@wallet.com
mwhitake@ssc.wisc.edu

Work toward sustainability:
bioregional voting districts
that reflect your experience of health and environmental risk