written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
(find your bioregion/watershed)
(find your bioregion/watershed)
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written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
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More on why IRV would lead to unoptimal democratic processes. In IRV, low plurality elections are institutionalized, without strengthening third parties advantage or even institutionalized existence more directly. In the United States case, IRV would lead to a further consolidation of the Democratic and the Republican parties, without them actually being required to work for votes--IRV gives them votes by default for being more and more unrepresentative. It's a poor incentive structure for expanding political inclusivity, and instead, IRV institutionalizes even lower plurality appeals and calls them 'wins.' IRV sets up lower and lower plurality winners and party strategies.
IRV is a cheap version of fusion laws.
If Greens actually want more competitive elections, promote fusion laws instead of IRV.
Promote proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment for the electoral college, instead of IRV.
I go into detail about the dynamics (with examples) of IRV institutionalizing lower pluralities for party appeals. IRV will make the Democratic and the Republican parties more secure, as well as make them more unrepresentative of third party politics simultaneously.
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2000 17:16:12 -0600
To: mrkdwhit@wallet.com
From: "Robert Bolman" <robtb@efn.org>
Subject: Re: Preferential voting (IRV) fails to change the context of
politics., IRV and low pluralities, citations, further explanation
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" At 01:30 AM 10/23/00 -0700, you [MDW] wrote:
>>Preferential voting (IRV) fails to change the context of
>>politics.
>>It creates a more consolidated two party context, in the United States
>case.
>>Third parties will be maintained in their peripheral position--they will be
>>shut out--only successfully swallowed without having to address any green
>>issues.
>
>Mr Whitaker,
>
>I believe the above words are yours.
>While not an expert on electoral reform, I'm having trouble with your utter
>dismissal of preference voting (IRV). In the last presedential elections,
>IRV would certainly have given the Greens/Nader the 5% they sought and very
>possible much more - if not this year than in 2004.
>
>IRV is clearly not a be-all-end-all. We could use proportional
>representation and campaign finance reform (to say nothing of an effective
>public media educating the people), but to dismiss it out of hand as you do
>makes me question where you're at.
>
>Do you have some other literature to back up your POV?
>
>Sincerely,
>Robert Bolman
Greetings,
Yes, I feel that 'if' (large if) there was IRV you can rest assured
that third parties will pool more of the vote. However, who benefits from this work
of theirs in an IRV context? Certainly third parties--though certainly most of
the benefits go to the Democrats and the Republicans. I'd rather third parties
work and keep the vote for themselves, instead of accepting their
tar-and-feathered epithet as 'spoilers' to parties that fail to be
representative and want to get into office by being unrepresentative, or
representative of mere pluralities, which is what IRV does.
It is the Democratic and the Republican parties by gatekeeping the
election agenda and policy output of the United States that are the democratic
spoilers. The Democrats/Republicans tend to discuss their parties as if they
were the ultimate representation of democratic politics, instead of just parties.
IRV basically institutionalizes plurality winners, allowing the Democratic and the
Republican parties to appeal to less and less of the population, and get away
with it more and more--because they get third party votes gratis--without
having to work for them. If you want more representation from your candidates,
then promote fusion laws, instead of IRV. I discuss this below.
Your phrase captures what I was saying: IRV is far from an
"be-all-end-all" strategy.
Here is a bit of elaboration on why I take such issue with IRV in the
United States context: in this case, the position is the presidency, a
geographic as well as popular vote issue, by state.
IRV, if it was organized across the whole United States popular vote (keeping in mind
that this would remove the electoral college, a change that has been attempted on over 700
occasions, and it is very unlikely this will occur--I read that number in a CNN article),
an IRV popular vote removes that electoral college deliberation and the importance of the
geographic knowledges in the vote, and sets up further clientelism to large
scale parties that fail to representative of geographic bioregional interests.
And if IRV was done state by state (more possible, given the batting average of
electoral college attempts of change, as well as more suitable to the way the
Constitution is already set up), it would certainly build third parties, though
it would keep third parties shut out of the nation-state politics--leaving the
Democrats and Republicans the field. IRV for the president, by demoting the Electoral College,
assures that only Democratic and Republican parties are the only options in federal politics.
The Electoral College, with proportional representation, assures federal party competion. Only this
arrangement will yield federal level competition. The Electoral College is thus required for third/fourth
party competition, to make all parties more representative.
Third parties should ask for fusion laws--this is what they had before the Republicans changed
the rules against mutually beneficial Democratic/third party challenges--making
them illegal (read the below Argersinger citation).
The present formal political laws of the United States are a form of Republican party divide
and conquer against mutually beneficial (and successful Democratic/third/fourth
fusion tickets).
You ask for some examples/literatures, of how IRV leads to
marginalization of third parties, or leads to institutionalizing plurality outcomes--an even less
optimal arrangement for putting people in office than residual 50% 'majorities,'
when parties should be appealing to 100% of the populace:
Examples of how IRV institutionalizes low plurality winners, would be the recent
mayor of London election, or the Australian parliament (it uses STV as well as
IRV, I believe). Another example of this dynamic of plurality outcomes being
institutionalized in IRV: a quote from Ron Ritchie/Stephen Hill from
www.fairvote.org, writing in The Nation on IRV, that shows how IRV is far from
enough for third parties.
>
> Imagine this year's presidential race with IRV Nader supporters worried about
> George Bush could rank Nader first and Gore second. Suppose Bush won 45
> percent of first choices in a key state, Gore 44 percent, Nader 9 percent and
> the rest 2 percent. Under current rules, Bush wins. But with IRV, after Nader
> loses in the instant runoff, his supporters would propel Gore above 50
percent
> and defeat Bush. Rather than contribute to Gore's defeat, Nader could help
> stop Bush, while delivering a message to Gore: Watch your step on trade,
> political reform and the environment.
Recall that the late David Brower (Sierra Club) considered Gore/Clinton
to be more damaging to environmental issues than anything in the Reagan/Bush
tenure. IRV giving Green votes to Gore? Sheesh. I disagree with the 'message'
that Richie feels that this presumably sends to Gore, to be "more integrative
of Greens." Ha. The message that I read from this is closer to Gore thinking:
Gore: "Hey, I'll get the Green votes *anyway.* Who cares? They hate Bush. I,
Gore, can be even more depredating and an even more rightist, as IRV lets me
squeeze by with even thinner plurality appeals. What can the Greens do anyway?
We have the districts locked up, uncompetitive. They have no where to stand or
to appeal. IRV secures more and more shallow 'leadership,' like me, Gore,
secure that I can have the green vote that even despises me because of the
environmentalist hypocrite I am (I will give you data for his voting record, if
you want), out of their fear of the Republicans. They have no where else to
turn with IRV: we have them, and we have them automatically. This is rich. From
their fear of the Republicans, IRV sends then to me REGARDLESS of my policies
and my voting history."
Richie/Hill writes:
>
> For all IRV's benefits, ours remains a majoritarian system, and minor-party
> candidates aren't likely to win office much more [with IRV] than under
> plurality rules. To achieve truly fair representation would require other
> reforms, such as campaign finance reform and proportional representation for
> electing legislators. But IRV is the best way to eliminate the spoiler
> dynamic that suppresses candidacies-and the debate and participation they
> could generate. If progressives learn one lesson from campaign 2000, let it
> be that the next presidential campaign should be conducted under fairer
> rules. Real democracy needs a rainbow of choices, not the dull gray that
> results in one of the lowest voter turnouts in the demoCratic world.
> [If politics got real...
The Nation; New York; Oct 16, 2000; Robert Richie; Steven Hill;
He writes of "eliminating the spoiler"" dynamic, as if that was what
should be eliminated? What is at issue is the gatekeeping-spoiler dynamic of
the Democratic and the Republican parties "spoiling" the democratic process,
through uncontentious elections in which they win (Year 2000: 60+
Congressmen 'returned' to Congress without being challenged in an election;
Year 1996: 90 plus Congressmen 'returned' to Congress without being challenged
in the election; in general incumbency is 99% in the United States; most states
in the United States are uncompetitive as well, in state politics--i.e., they
typically are bottled and sold, by one party's plurality.)
It is this spoiler context of the Democratic and Republican parties
absorbing and deflecting their presumed representation (together they pooled
only 49% of the vote, or 25% each, of the voting populace in 2000. There is nothing
representative about them: they have simply designed and keep shifting the design
of
uncompetitive districts each 10 years to keep their particular
unrepresentative
policies in power
). The Democratic and the Republican spoilers leads to more
and more radical third party challenges to make democracy competitive.
Typically, without IRV, this expanded contention/democracy that challenges the
Dem/Republican spoiler context, ironically only allows the homeostatic context
of voting dip even further below the minimal 50% of the voters to get a president.
The more contentious elections become in a presidential election, the less and
less are the vote totals for the president going to be, and the less any party is
required to appeal to more people. This suits the Democrats and the Republicans fine.
They can win on even shallower and unrepresentative tickets appealing to well below
50% of the voters, the more competive it is.
Competition is thus only a sign to appeal only to
smaller and smaller electorates, without IRV. However, with IRV, this gets even worse.
With IRV, the more contentious the elections become, the Democratic and the
Republicans can be assured that they will always be second choices, making the
homeostatic context of voting dip even lower than it would if we were without
IRV, and still allowing them to get into office--with much lower pluralities.
IRV further institutionalizes plurality elections, and allows any party to win
with lower and lower appeals to the electorate by default.
This is the inverse of what should be occurring: a context where parties are forced,
in competition, to appeal more and more to wider and wider audiences, instead of
(an IRV context) that allows them to appeal more and more to smaller and smaller
audiences, and the least smallest audience wining by default.
Richie has something on this at www.fairvote.org, discussing the
expansion of mere plurality election winners in the United States, instead of
majority winners. IRV would only lower the context of plurality appeals by
parties, while shoring up the thinnest wishy washy parties by default.
This is what IRV sets up. Do you want that?
On the other hand, the optimal is a context that gets all parties competing for
100% of the vote, and makes them competitive, instead of (IRV) a context where
lower and lower pluralities can walk away with an election by specializing in voters,
and being less and less competitive,
and thus generate policies that are even more
opposed by the majority of those who voted in the first place.
As I explain in more detail at
www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/biostate/bioregion10.htm
as well as
www.sit.wisc.edu/~mrkdwhit/biostate/bioregion11.htm
the issue is how to make elections and structures competitive where each party
can assume the role of majoritarian (i.e., any party competitive and integrative
of a wide audience). IRV does the opposite, institutionalizing lower and lower
plurality election winners by default.
Where does IRV lead third parties, if plurality winners with IRV become
the default winners? In the present United States context, I see IRV setting up
a context where third parties like the Greens are maintaining a two party
majoritarian context--a context that become more and more delegitimated while
simultaneously becomes more and more by default secure in winning.
Instead,
what is required is a multi-party majoritarian context--where each party
can be the majority and is forced to appeal to 100%. This will lead to more
issue based candidacy.
That was what I mean by IRV sweeping third parties under the rug and
laughing about it--the lower pluralities institutionalized by IRV allow the
parties that no one in aggregate (across several different parties) wanted to see to
win--instead of setting up a context where each party is forced to appeal to
100% of the electorate, IRV sets up a context where less than 50% becomes the
default optimal appeal, because the election is secure only if parties 'slide
by' into power. In other words, IRV sets up a situation that defrocks any semblance that
the majority is to be listened to whatsoever. IRV enshrines the 'largest smallest' plurality party, and
demotes the
majority vote entirely--a majority vote which would be in aggregate entirely against this party.
Any incentives to set up party appeals to more than 50% of the electorate is selected against with IRV.
Why should any party attempt to be politically integrative when IRV gives them
votes anyway? In the United States case, the Democrats and the Republicans
would win anyway with IRV, and they could IN THE FUTURE count on being less and
less environmentally inclined, because, as my hypothetical Gore would say,
Gore: "Hey, so what? We'll get their votes anyway with IRV."
If IRV is sought to be 'the solution' that is very mistaken.
It will assure lower and lower plurality winners, as well as more and more contested
elections, which only lowers the bar even further, etc.
The dynamics should be the inverse--how to get more than plurality winners,
how to force parties to be more integrative as the optimal strategy, instead of (with IRV)
rewarding them by specializing further and further to smaller and smaller groups, and 'winning.'
That optimal dynamic is done with proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment.
(see bioregional letters #10-#11, above).
Any long term 'solution' is how to set up a sustainable political framework, one
that enacts sustainability politically. Perhaps, I see IRV as both a road
*toward that proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment (only if
it activates third parties in their interest in changing four other factors of
the United States).* If if fails to activate them on these other issues, IRV
will only set up more structurally safe majoritarianism and lower and lower
voter outcomes for the party that gets the office by default more and more,
instead of by their appeals to be inclusive.
I suppose to understand how limited I find IRV you should read
something about the "four characteristics of all democracies in practice" letter I wrote,
on bioregional letter #10. I suppose outside of my critique of IRV setting up
lesser and lesser plurality winners and the dynamics that entails for the United States,
secondly, the issue is strategy. Selling IRV to unrepresentative
majoritarian Democrats and Republicans is a blue moon chance. They understand
how skewed the structures of voting are, and they would see IRV as a threat
regardless, I imagine. To them it is a threat, because it does bring third parties
into the picture, however much they get to automatically sponge up their votes
and appeal to less and less people to win in the bargin.
However, my critique: IRV brings third parties into the picture in such a way that
third parties fail to recoup any of the added democracy that they, as third parties, bring to the
United States. The lesser pluralities of IRV allow the Democrats and the
Republicans to move further and further right, and allow any party to win with
lower and lower pluralities. This is far from optimal.
I suppose I am being the political pessimist. I ask: "OK, the Democrats
and the Republicans saw through the third party feint of innocently saying: "oh, we're only
helping get rid of your spoliers' routine," and the Dem/Republicans completely shelved the
idea. What then if this occurs? Third parties then have nothing.
It is because of my political pessimism about the Democrats and the
Republicans "adopting something for the good of democracy" (when they do everything
in their power to malign democracy and competition--they are even willing to curtailing
debate on corporate television against what were majority poll preferences to see
Nader (even Buchanan) debate, which would lead to issues contention., i.e., democracy,
something they want to avoid entering into). So what did these informal parties do, formally
speaking, to keep democracy out? They do they suddenly changed the
polls requirments to "enter the democratic debates" to 15%. They did this only in their self-interest,
with their conflict of interest that they want to maintain as the operating force in American politics:
the conflict of interest is that they despise democracy, competition, and citizen feedback.
Plus, the "federal formal" 5% limit is entirely their informal party whim, to suit
themselves, etc.--i.e., they could change it whenever another challenger has more than 5%.
A more secure and longer term strategy is to understand you are only going to change
the United States by having third parties actively contending for power, as well as all parties
actively appealing to 100% of the electorate, having competitive districts, and like (I suggest) proportional
representation in the electoral congress, by state, for a popular and a geographic vote.
Plus, proportional representation with a majoritarian allotment would allow for making
sure all parties are forced to contend for 100% of the vote, regardless of what the election is for--
President or Congressperson.
In short, IRV lowers the voting optimum dynamic well below plurality
winners, by default. We should be working for the inverse. IRV is a shallow
fusion law, a fusion law that only benefits and rewards unrepresentative
parties.
citations:
1) www.fairvote.org, on plurality elections context
2) Richie commentary above, in the Nation
3) article about voting as a context for the least hated for the one least
hated ( forget this one, I'll get back to you on it, if you want it)
4) article discussing an IRV like context--the fusion laws. IRV is a kind
of fusion law, however, a fusion law that basically removes the power of third
parties to influence the debate. The fusion laws would be preferable to IRV as
a third party stance. IRV demotes the third party issue, while allowing the
Democrats/Republicans to pick up their votes anyway? Do you follow the dynamics
of this? While fusion laws make the Democratic Party actually more accountable
to third party interests, IRV only lets them swallow votes without being
accountable. And if your only aim with IRV is that it will help archive the
magical 5%, What is to keep the Democrats and the Republicans in turn from
magically changing this 5% into 10%, or 15%, and keeping IRV, furthering
shoring up their gatekeeping on the political agenda. IRV is a safe version of
fusion laws.
I urge you to find this and read it.
"A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws
Peter H. Argersinger
The American Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2. (Apr., 1980), pp. 287-306.5)
5) anything on the dynamics of fusion laws and third parties.
I hope you see that I am far from "dismissing IRV out of hand,' as you
say. I am dismissing it after a bit of political calculation of what it means
in the United States context--IRV as a neutered version of the fusion laws.
Instead of IRV, Greens/third parties can work towards making fusion
legal (as it was, making it illegal dropped voting levels precipitously in the
1890s, and made third parties defunct symbolic gestures. Fusion laws would be
an actual political agenda tool, instead of the lower pluralities and vote
theft that lets unrepresentative parties 'recoup' any votes they loose for
being so unrepresentative in the first place. ;-) What would build third
parties would be fusion (and the other four changes I recommended on the
bioregionalEC.htm pages). What would build the Democrats and the
Republicans as they are--even more unrepresentative minority parties that have
structurally insinuated themselves as the only choices--would be IRV, by
lowering any party's appeals to more secure pluralities, instead of forcing
them to be representative of 100% of the population.
My 'stand' remains for proportional representation in the electoral
congress, by state, which would institute third parties in the electoral
congress as actual power contenders (Greens would have had 7 electors, even
more if they knew they would be getting electoral seats I imagine).
This can be done by state by state. It avoids the immediate set back
context of IRV, which if attempted federally, if it fails. It would leave
nothing else to strategize for, and if it failed on the state level (or even if
it succeeded), it would keep Democrats and the Republicans in even firmer
contextual domination of the Electoral College as well as nation-state
politics. Proportional representation in the Electoral College allows for both
a popular and a geographic context of voting. IRV is a neutered fusion law,
that only benefits the Democratic and the Republican party's consolidation in
the United States context, and allows them to be even more unrepresentative
than they are and get away with it.
Yes, I do see IRV making third parties more contentious on the local
level, getting their 5% or whatever. However, third parties are at a huge
disadvantage for four other rationales (in bioregional letter #10), and that is why
proportional representation in the Electoral College is a way to work to get these four
impediments to working practicing democracy removed; and IRV--even though it does allow for
third parties 'to place' in elections, it continues to impede them from winning
anything, as well as sets up an election context where lower plurality appeals
become more and more common, as well as lower and lower plurality wins. This
leads to divisiveness in the name of divisiveness, without any aim of
integration or change of particular party stances by threat (because they will
win by default anyway).
IRV demotes the expansion of appeals to 100% of the electorate. I suppose my
attitude is that IRV is useful to the Democrats and the Republicans more than it is
to third parties. IRV could be useful, though in the United States it is superfluous to
other changes in the dynamics of parties in the United States.
I feel the issue is more than simply 'setting up democracy.' The issue is what kind of
formal state leads to sustainability? Any context that cements a two party context, makes
election 'optimums' mere low pluralities (as IRV does, allowing any party to get into office
by only appealing to less than 50% of the population), I find far from an optimal arrangement.
IRV would basically institutionalize plurality winners in the United States, instead of finding
ways of making the winners appeal to more than 50% of the populace, which is
closer to the ideal of what representation is about. I hope you follow this
argument.
Cheers,
Mark Whitaker
link to a map of the present congressional districts of the United States
link to a map of the majoritarian districts of Wisconsin, compared to the bioregions of Wisconsin
link to www.fairvote.org, where you can see the irregular majoritarian districts.
Choose 'redistricting.' This site discusses the degree to which they are uncompetitive as well, with 60+ Congressional representatives and senators 'returning' to Congress without having been challenged when they 'ran' for election. There were over 90 of them in 1996. For a sense of scale, there are only 535 members of Congress total (435 House; 100 Senate). The size of the Congress is adjusted occassionally. The House of Representatives has been at 435 since 1910. Additionally, incumbency as a phenomenon is over 90% in the United States as well. There is very little 'running' for office in the United States. Why is this so? Some of this was explained above. See the other pages for more.
other pages on the bioregional state, keep reading them in order (recommended)
or
