written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
(find your bioregion/watershed)
(find your bioregion/watershed)
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written from Upper Rock, Wisconsin
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Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2000 15:27:31 -0600
To: Edward Riquelme <riquelme@scs.unr.edu>
From: Mark Douglas Whitaker <mrkdwhit@wallet.com>
Subject: Re: four criteria and requirements of all democracies in
practice
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At 02:39 PM 11/18/00 -0800, you wrote:
>On Fri, 17 Nov 2000, Edward Riquelme <riquelme@scs.unr.edu> wrote:
>
>I certainly will forward your work/writings so that others may evaluate
>them. Your perspective is unique and worth the effort...
>
>On Rousseau, his argument against "representative" government was that
>elected public officials do/should not - in theory - represent individual
>citizens themselves but rather attempt to discern "the general will",
>which in this context transcends the particular (strictly geographical).
>Thus geographically-based electoral systems (districting) is inherently
>flawed and would lead to the complex political problems YOUR work appears
>to elaborate on.
I was familiar with Rousseau's 'theory.' It's certainly an ideal I see as
important, however it leaves much to be desired as to how politics works in
a democratic context.
The following is a bit of elaboration of the four factors I see that define any
actual
democracy.
Missing even one factor, disqualifies it.
We require a more nuanced perspective on democracy and democratization,
instead of simply expecting 'clean elections' to be the only criteria.
Clean elections happened a lot in the Soviet Union. However the point of
them was rather moot. We require criteria to gauge whether the elections
actually have 'a point' instead of listlessly considering that the mere
evidence of elections define a 'democracy.'
I'm more interested in the actualities of power relations and networks.
Here are some clarifications, if you forward anything:
I would like to clarify one further point. I see nothing problematic about
geographic representation districts. The issue is presently how
*un*geographic they are. The organization of the districts is the first
criteria of any democracy. They should be geographic, and they should
remove party clientelism, they should be set up so voters can choose
representatives, instead of representatives choose voters.
Note, I do use the terms 'un-geographical' and 'geographical' elsewhere.
These relate to separate phenomena, and this separation of the terms is
intentional.
It is from the expansion of ungeographical (distanciated,
related to 'no where' specifically) knowledges and politics (which are
typically ideological and very 'un-general will' like) I see the difficulty
arising. Particularly at issue are the 'ungeographic' districting policies that
are exclusionary (ones that avoid geographic inclusions)
because they are
designed along particular distanciated demographics, instead of geographic
specifics. The issue is how environmental degradation is associated
with a framework of ungeographic bailiwicks as well as how environmental
degradation is associated with a gatekeeping clientelism in the state that sets
up its own 'districts' to remain in power. The question becomes one of elite
formation and how representative they are: to what are the various leadership
elites beholden if they design their own representative structures that rubberstamp
their policies, or that write out of the polity more locally inclusive social
frameworks of politics--dismantling local geographies by the engineering of
district level creations around demographic lines instead of inclusive
geographic lines which would change the frameworks of informal party
interaction and make elections more competitive, and thus, more
integrative, more representative--since people would have a choice of
informal parties as well as informal parties would be required to appeal to
specific geographies instead of particular demographic groups.
When districts are ungeographic, they are a creation of demographic blocks
instead of inclusive geographic blocks, and the informal frameworks of
clientelism are arranged structurally (through the district boundary
drawing around demographic exclusions) as well as informally (the parties
come to 'appeal' to only particular districts, and they have that 'party
appeal' only because of the way the districts are drawn, en masse. In this
sense, an entire level of politics--the one of deliberation and agenda
setting--becomes entirely a clientelistic experience, and the frameworks of
what passes as politics is extremely shallow. This is because (1) the
parties get to design their own districts, which is (2) in such a way as to
marginalize different geographical knowledges and feedbacks into power
which lead to (3) various issues becoming pocketed or divided across
demographically drawn districts and thus become 'the unseen majority.' It
was in this sense I was referring to the institutionalization and
maximalization of risk and the majority's exclusion--with demographically
drawn districts. I was referring to the minimumization of risk with
geographically drawn districts--which include various demographics and thus
are competitive and allow for a registering of the commonality of watershed
experiences of environmental pollutions and health issues to be reflected
into the state. All gerrymandered districts represent is the expansion of
material pollutions and expanding health risks. Instead of this registering
of material pollutions and health concerns, what occurs in a
demographically organized (ungeographical) district, is a filtering effect
of these issues precisely because they are split across 'districts' instead
of recognized politically as integrally related to systemic wide geographic
issues. With environmental and health concerns split across competing
self-designed districts between competing parties, the context of the
clientelism and the expansion of environmental degradative 'development'
frameworks are 'registered' in the minority in any 'demographic' district,
while they would hold a majority if the districts were drawn inclusively to
local geographic knowledges. More inclusive policy frameworks would come of
geographic districts, as well as would remove the fingers of clientelism of
what are, on the whole in the United States unrepresentative majoritarian
parties. Inclusion by geographic specifics which would lead to more
inclusive politics if the later were organized in this way.
Thus, by 'geographical' I was referring to bioregional material
frameworks, which I feel are required to be integrated into a nexus of
political feedback, particularly concerning environmental degradation.
Ungeographical districting generates an informal gatekeeping arrangement on
policy agendas as well as the process of elections that demote geographical
knowledges, and it is from geographical knowledges that people would be
more likely to generate localist 'general will' based solutions as well as
discourses about their situations. Bioregional bailiwicks give us 'micro
level' 'general wills' that are inclusive (instead of ungeographic and
divisive). Bioregional bailiwicks set election elites to task from
particular geographies that are unmanipulatable because clientelisms are
unable to 'draw' the boundaries in a certain way to divide and mimimize
particular political expressions, only in the name of assembling a
clientelistic and monopolistic base.
The second criteria of a democracy is a context where 100% of the voting
population is actively sought out, within (the first point of) geographic districts. This is a
result of both districts as well as voting laws. For instance, the voting
population in the way the districts are drawn presently only yielded a
clientelistic vote for Democratic districts and Republican districts,
instead of a sense of 'the vote.' It confuses the issue to consider
elections, where the parties design their own uncompetitive districts to
register anything except what are unrepresentative parties. I say
unrepresentative because if Gore and Bush were only able to collectively
pool around 50% of the voters to the polls, even in their own gerrymandered
districts mind you, then each of these parties are going to get into power
with each of them accorded to a position of power where less than 25% of
the population wanting either of them. Think on that. Our criteria of what
is democratic is very shallow if we only expect 'elections' to occur. 75%
of the United States rejects Bush. 75% of the United States rejects Gore.
In a 'competitive' majoritarian (two-party) framework of parties, which in
itself is rather rare, the base line of legitimacy drops from 50% to around
25% to get either of them into a formal position of power, and candidates
become thinner and thinner. By itself, majoritarianism is hampered, when
competitive elections actually occur as the sense of 'winners' drops well
below 50%, and they only achive this by basically by becoming as
unrecognizable in terms of particular issue reflection as possible.
How does one maximize the vote and get the parties to appeal to 100%? The
second criteria of a democracy is thus 'maximum majoritarianism' where all
parties have the ability to be the majority, to act as such, and to field
candidates as such, which creates a competitive 'race to the top' context
of appeals for as many people as possible, instead of only to certain
levels like 50% (which is much less in practice when the gerrymandered
districts are taken into account).
What is this second criteria of 'maximum majoritarianism'? I should
perhaps add that there is a 'minimum majoritarianism' and a 'maximum
majoritarianism' which relate to different strategies of optimality. A
'minimum majoritarianism' context is where the parties only have to appeal
to 50% of the population---this is even lower than a 50% 'aim' relatively,
when one takes into account all that parties are required to do is appeal
to demographically gerrymandered districts. A 'maximum majoritarianism' is
where the parties, to win an election, each are required to strategize how
to win 100% of the vote. In other words, minimum majoritarianism, with only
the aim of 50% as the 'optimum,' sets up a desire to 'slide by' into
offices of formal power, through successfully ignoring 50% of the
population. Any appeals for more than 50% of the population is selected
against, if there is only a minimum majoritarian framework of voting.
A maximum majoritarian framework of voting creates a context where
parties, to win, are required to be more inclusive than 50%. How do we get
this maximum majoritarianism? Through institutionalizing the 'checks and
balances' of durable positions for third parties, which of course have the
ability themselves to become majoritarian instead of marginalized. A
maximum majoritarian framework of voting is similar to my recommendations
for the proportional representation with majoritarian allotment for the
electoral congress, for each state. In this context, third parties
competitive ability to compete durably (with the proportional
representation context assuring that nothing will be wasted if they do
field candidates and do win some votes) ratchets the competition for votes
up to 100% of the voting populace. Plus, the third parties ability to win
the majority of a particular area keeps any party (including themselves)
from a strategy of 'sliding by' with only minimum 50% appeals, or less. It
becomes detrimental to an informal party to gatekeep and 'sit on' issues,
when reflecting them would get them more votes, and when other parties
would be there to make sure that each compete for votes. This ratchets
voting into calls of wide inclusion. It makes issues very important,
instead of candidates, because any candidate (even third parties) can
become the representative chosen (the one that wins.) Proportional
representation with a majoritarian allotment, makes each party compete in a
maximum majoritarian context, to be as inclusive as possible, instead of
halving their appeals to less than 50%. And the proportional representation
with a majoritarian allotment allows for the circumstance when particular
parties are unable to agree, then it moves into proportional representation
in that context--which is closer to the 'demographic vote' than by default
giving everything to a party that achives less than 50%, which is tyically
what is institutionalized in a minimum majoritarian context. I'm thinking
of this in either legislatures, or the Presidency's electoral college in
this sense. The majoritarian allotment clause allows for the maximum
majoritarian sense of appealing to 100% of the voting populace, which
either proportional representation by itself, or minimum majoritarianism,
fail to do this.
Of course what I said about the issue of districting is paramount.
Strategically, this may be state level required before the particular
informal party politics are representative enough to challenge the 25% lack
of representation of the self-designed districts of the parties that like
to go by the discourses of 'majoritarian.' Actually, in the (gerrymandered)
districts, as well as the United States voting laws, the legislatures and
candidates all strive for this 'sliding by' context of minimum
majoritarianism (50% is all any party every wants). And in a context where
third parties are unable to compete unless they suddenly have 50%
clout--(where districts designed against such an eventuality, and where
they are considered both illegal in many states, as well as the criteria
for this illegality is a fluxing level changeable by the Democratic and the
Republican parties on a whim, designed to keep third parties' heads below
water regardless of their voter clout, a level that rises and falls with
their showing in elections)--simple minimum majoritarianism keeps 50% being
seen as all that is ever required in any election. That is why I am for
proportional representation though with a majoritarian allotment--it would
allow for the maximum majoritarian context. In a situation where each party
has the ability to become the majority, instead of relegated to a
particular small percentage of voters (as straight proportional
representation does, or even worse minimum majoritarianism where any third
party showing), then we will see much more competitive elections, issue
campaigns, and a democratic optimum of appeals that move to 100%.
Presently, the context of minimum majoritarianism allows for and actually
admires the systematic marginalization of 50% of the population. Plus,
groups this minimum majoritarianism with gerrymandered districts, and we
come to have a United States that only systemically appeals to less than
50% of the population because they cordoned off 'demographic undesirables.'
The third characteristic of a democracy is its treatment of third parties.
The fourth is 'clean elections.' The United States loves to 'monitor
elections' in other countries, as if the informal aspects of a 'clean
election' (the party competition, the counting of votes) are the only
issues here. However, what are there are many other issues for any
comparative treatment of democracy. I feel there are four requirements. A
democracy is known by: the issue of the treatment of third parties, the
structure of the voting laws, the districts, *and* 'clean elections.' The
United States 'polices' a micro-thin reading of what a democracy is, by
only analyzing 'the clean elections' part. It is possible to have a
flawlessly clean election, and create an very unrepresentative outcome.
The United States fails to be a democracy in my view, even by its own
definitions of 'majority rule.' Even in the United States, should a clean
election ever occur, the maximum appeals to get anyone elected are reduced
well below any majority. This is because of the other three factors that
make a democracy are marginalized in the United States: there are
gerrymandered districts, there is a framework of minimum majoritarianism,
and third parties have 'special laws' that change on a whim to marginalize
sections of the voting population that attempt to actually make the state
more representative. In this context of United States elections, there will
always be less than 50% of any population voting, because systemically the
way the informal parties in the state act is to maximize themselves, while
minimizing democratic input into the state.
This is certainly clear with the huge systemic upset at the globalization
policies of the United States from the early 1990s onward (NAFTA, etc.)
where in a minimum majoritarian context, the more contentious the elections
become, the lower and lower is the level to 'win' an election. Thus,
majoritarianism itself is a huge contradiction in terms because it leads to
lower voter turnout, and it has a homeostatic effect of lowering the level
of votes required to win an election, when it is more contentious. For
these two rationales majoritarianism should be replaced with proportional
representation with a majoritarian allotment, to generate a context where
the appeals go to 100% of the voting populace, instead of whatever minimum
clientelistic gerrymandering a party can dream up to 'return' its
candidate. Once more the way the districts are drawn around particular
demographics impedes this expression of even 50% of the voting population.
No where in the world thus is a democracy, though these four senses of
democracy is the basic underlying requirement if we are to challenge the
clientelisms that maintain and expand environmental and human health
degradation.
I hope this was clear on what are the criteria of an actual democracy as
well as how to approach crafting democracies. It requires unclientelistic
districting based on geographic inclusions where parties are required to
compete. It requires a maximumization of the voting population to 100%,
achievable by creating a context where any informal party wants to maximize
turnout and achieve more than 50% of the voting populace, instead of a
situation where only 50% (of those that vote, mind you) are important which
leads to a strategy that attempts to minimize on issues and even voter
registration because 'sliding by' without any issues becomes the optimal
framework in that context. Thus, a democracy requires a context where
parties are rewarded for appealing to issues instead of empty
personalities. This is selected for when parties are actually competing in
districts and in a voting law context that rewards competition, where 100%
turnouts optimal, instead of only 50% turnouts optimal--as they would be in
a minimum majoritarianism context (or even less than 50% is considered
'optimal' in a minimum majoritarian context with gerrymandered districts).
A democracy requires the facilitation of third parties instead of 'special'
laws that flux and change to exclude third parties based on strength of
particular third party challenges, or the existence of any changeable
criteria about 'requirements' to be a party or about ballot listing
limitations. When there is this maximumization of voting context, any party
can be the majority winner.
The United States, for instance, only scores 1 in 4, and in this
Presidential election, perhaps 0 in 4. The romanticization of 'elections'
as the only criteria of democracy serves aristocracy more than it serves
democracy. The Holy Roman Emperor was elected of course, though no one
presumed to call that a democracy. Though by this thin criteria the United
States would see little at issue, as long as 'the elections were clean.'
Regards,
Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison
link to a map of the present congressional districts of the United States
link to a map of the majoritarian districts of Wisconsin, compared to the bioregions of Wisconsin
link to www.fairvote.org, where you can see the irregular majoritarian districts.
Choose 'redistricting.' This site discusses the degree to which they are uncompetitive as well, with 60+ Congressional representatives and senators 'returning' to Congress without having been challenged when they 'ran' for election. There were over 90 of them in 1996. For a sense of scale, there are only 535 members of Congress total (435 House; 100 Senate). The size of the Congress is adjusted occassionally. The House of Representatives has been at 435 since 1910. Additionally, incumbency as a phenomenon is over 90% in the United States as well. There is very little 'running' for office in the United States. Why is this so? Some of this was explained above. See the other pages for more.
other pages on the bioregional state, keep reading them in order (recommended)
or
