


→ MICRO FOUNDATIONS
ROMER



TO SIMPLIFY ASSUME NO DEPRECIATION

$$d = 0$$

FINAL GOOD SECTOR

$$(1) Y = L_Y^{1-\alpha} \int_0^A X_j^\alpha d_j$$

WHERE $0 < \alpha < 1$
 X_j 'S = DIFF. CAPITAL GOODS.
 d_j = INTERMEDIATE DIFF. GOODS.

PERFECT COMPETITION
OUTPUT: $Y \rightarrow$ PRICE OF $Y = 1$

INPUTS: LABOR: $L_Y \rightarrow$ PRICE: w

INT: X_j 'S \rightarrow PRICE: p_j

PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN P. COMPETITION
 \implies INPUTS PAID VALUE OF MARGINAL PRODUCT -

ASIDE

X_j 's : SPECIALIZED ON
DIFFERENTIATED
CAPITAL GOODS

CONSIDER:

$$F(X_1, \dots, X_A) = X_1^\alpha + X_2^\alpha + X_3^\alpha + \dots + X_A^\alpha$$

WHERE $0 < \alpha < 1$

$A \approx \#$ OF DIFF. CAPITAL
GOODS.

EFFICIENCY REQUIRES THAT
FIRM BUY SAME QUANTITY OF ALL
AVAILABLE CAPITAL GOODS (X_i 's)

ASSUMING THEY COST THE SAME \Rightarrow

$$X_1 = X_2 = \dots = X_A = X$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow F(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_A) &= \underbrace{X^\alpha + X^\alpha + \dots + X^\alpha}_A \\ &= \boxed{A X^\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

LABOR :

$$\begin{aligned}
 MPL_Y &= \frac{\partial Y}{\partial L_Y} = (1-\alpha) L_Y^{1-\alpha-1} \int_0^A X_j^\alpha dj \\
 &= \frac{(1-\alpha)}{L_Y} \underbrace{L_Y^{1-\alpha} \int_0^A X_j^\alpha dj}_Y \\
 &= \left((1-\alpha) \frac{Y}{L_Y} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

PROFIT MAX
=>

$$\boxed{w = (1-\alpha) \frac{Y}{L_Y}} \quad (12)$$

JUST MPL SINCE $p_Y = 1$

INTERMEDIATES

$$\begin{aligned}
 MPX_j &= L_Y^{1-\alpha} \cdot \alpha X_j^{\alpha-1} \\
 &= \left(\alpha L_Y^{1-\alpha} X_j^{\alpha-1} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

PROFIT MAX
=>

$$\boxed{p_j = \alpha L_Y^{1-\alpha} X_j^{\alpha-1}} \quad (13)$$

JUST MPX_j SINCE $p_Y = 1$

QUESTION:

WHAT IS THE DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR X_j ?

(3)

DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR X_j :

$$\frac{\partial X_j}{\partial p_j} \cdot \frac{p_j}{X_j} = \frac{\frac{\partial X_j}{X_j}}{\frac{\partial p_j}{p_j}} = \frac{\hat{X}_j}{\hat{p}_j}$$

FROM EQUATION (B), TAKING GROWTH RATES :

$$\hat{p}_j = \underbrace{[\alpha L_y^{1-\alpha}]}_{=0} + (X_j^{\alpha-1})$$

$$\hat{p}_j = (\alpha - 1) \hat{X}_j \Rightarrow \left(\frac{\hat{X}_j}{\hat{p}_j} = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \right) \text{ ELASTICITY}$$

$$\text{OR } \left(\frac{\hat{p}_j}{\hat{X}_j} = \alpha - 1 \right) \text{ INVERSE OF ELASTICITY}$$

INTERMEDIATE GOODS SECTOR

(4)

$$\underbrace{1 \text{ UNIT OF RAW CAPITAL}}_{\text{RENTED AT } r} + \underbrace{1 \text{ BLUEPRINT/DESIGN}}_{\text{BOUGHT AT PRICE } P_A} = \underbrace{1 \text{ UNIT OF INT. GOOD/DIFF. CAPITAL } X_j}_{\text{SOLD AT } P_j}$$

REMARK: A SINGLE BLUEPRINT CAN BE USED TO PRODUCE ANY NUMBER OF UNITS OF X_j

COST FUNCTION FOR FIRM j (PRODUCING X_j)

$$= P_A + r \cdot X_j = C_j(X_j)$$

↓
FIXED COST



ASSUME MONOPOLIST
COMPETITION

(5)

$\Rightarrow MRX_j = MC_j$

\Rightarrow ZERO PROFITS OR
PROD. PROFITS = PRICE OF
BLUEPRINT/
DESIGN
 P_A

MARGINAL REVENUE:

$MRX_j = p_j \left(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_j} \right) = p_j \left[1 + \frac{\hat{p}_j}{\hat{x}_j} \right]$
↓ ELAST. OF DEMAND

WHERE $\epsilon_j = \frac{\hat{x}_j}{\hat{p}_j}$

USING WORK FROM PAGE (3):

$\frac{\hat{p}_j}{\hat{x}_j} = \alpha - 1 \Rightarrow$

$\boxed{MRX_j} = p_j [1 + \alpha - 1] = \boxed{\alpha p_j}$

WE SET $MRX_j = MC_j$

\Rightarrow

$$\underbrace{2 p_j}_{\text{MAX}_j} = \underbrace{r}_{\text{MC}_j}$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{p_j = \frac{1}{2} r} \quad (14)$$

is
BIGGER THAN ONE
i.e. MARK-UP

IMPLICATION :

SINCE r IS THE SAME FOR
EVERY FIRM \Rightarrow

$$p_j = p \quad \text{FOR EVERY } X_j$$

ALL INT. HAVE THE
SAME PRICE :

$$\boxed{\frac{1}{2} r = p} \quad (14)$$

OR $\boxed{r = 2p} \quad (14')$

\Rightarrow DEMAND FOR EACH INTERMEDIATE IS THE SAME $\Rightarrow X_j = X$

REMARK:

(7)

FIRM RENT GENERIC/RAW CAPITAL
FOR 1 PERIOD AT A RENTAL PRICE
"r".

WHAT IS THE TOTAL DEMAND FOR
RAW CAPITAL? HOW MANY
UNITS?

$$\int_0^A X_j$$
$$\approx \sum_0^A X_j$$

$$\equiv A \cdot X$$

IF
FIRMS

IDENTICAL

$$X_j = X$$

BECAUSE
FIRMS
TRANSFORM
1 UNIT OF
RAW CAPITAL
INTO 1
UNIT OF X_j

TOTAL SUPPLY OF RAW CAPITAL
IS K

\Rightarrow FEASIBILITY/
EQUILIBRIUM

$$AX = K$$

$$\text{OR } X = \frac{K}{A}$$

WILL SHOW THAT (1) (8)
 [PROD. FUNCTION OF FINAL
 GOODS SECTOR]

COINCIDES WITH:

$$Y = k^\alpha (A L_Y)^{1-\alpha}$$

PROOF:

$$Y = L_Y^{1-\alpha} \int_0^A x_j^\alpha dj$$

$$\stackrel{\text{SINCE}}{\downarrow} x_j = X \quad \boxed{L_Y^{1-\alpha} A \cdot X^\alpha} \quad (15)$$

$$\stackrel{\text{SINCE}}{\downarrow} X = \frac{k}{A} = L_Y^{1-\alpha} A \left(\frac{k}{A}\right)^\alpha$$

$$\boxed{Y} = \boxed{k^\alpha (L_Y A)^{1-\alpha}}$$

⑨

WE CAN WRITE (13)

IN A DIFFERENT FORM :

$$(13) p_j = \underbrace{\alpha X_j^{\alpha-1} L_Y^{1-\alpha}}_2$$

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X_j} = MPX_j$$

$$\alpha L_Y^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{K}{A}\right)^{\alpha-1}$$

SINCE

$$X_j = X = \frac{K}{A}$$

$$= \frac{\alpha}{K} L_Y^{1-\alpha} A^{1-\alpha} K^{\alpha}$$

$$= \frac{\alpha}{K} \underbrace{K^{\alpha} (L_Y A)^{1-\alpha}}$$

$$\boxed{p_j = p} = \boxed{\alpha \frac{Y}{K}}$$

PRODUCTION PROFIT FOR

A FIRM IN THE INTERMEDIATE

SECTION = π

(i.e. EXCLUDES
DESIGN/BLEUPRINT
COST)

REMARK: "ZERO PROFIT CONDITION"

(10)

"ZERO PROFIT IS NOT THE SAME AS SETTING $\pi=0$, WE NEED TO PAY FOR THE BLUEPRINT -

THE "FREE ENTRY (ZERO PROFIT CONDITION" IS MORE COMPLICATED -

PROD. PROFITS FOR ONE PERIOD = $\pi = \alpha(1-\alpha)\frac{Y}{A}$ (6)

SHOW USING (15), (13), (14)

BIG QUESTION: $\pi = P_A$?
BLUEPRINT PRICE?


R&D SECTION

(11)



$P_A?$

ARBITRAGE CONDITION



RETURNS HAVE TO BE THE SAME IF

BOTH INVESTMENTS ARE TAKING PLACE

COST OF BLUEPRINT: P_A

$$\underbrace{r P_A}_{\text{PUT } P_A \text{ IN A "BANK" FOR 1 PERIOD.}} = \underbrace{\pi + \dot{P}_A}_{\text{RETURN OF BUYING A BLUEPRINT \& RESELLING IT AFTER 1 PERIOD}}$$

PUT P_A IN A "BANK" FOR 1 PERIOD.

RETURN OF BUYING A BLUEPRINT & RESELLING IT AFTER 1 PERIOD

⇒

(12)

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A}$$

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \hat{P}_A \quad (17)$$

ALONG BGP: \hat{Y} , \hat{K} , $\hat{L} = n$
 \hat{P}_A CONSTANT

⇒

WILL GET
IMPLICATIONS

NEXT TIME:

$$P_A = \frac{\pi}{r-n}$$