Microeconomic Theory (Econ 713), 2nd half

    TTh 1:00-2:15pm or 2:30-3:45pm, INGRAHAM 114
    Professor: Marzena Rostek
    Office hours: Tuesday, 4:00-5:30pm, 7432 SS
 

      Syllabus
     All the official materials (problem sets etc.) will be posted at the Learn@UW.

      Readings:
     L1: Axiomatization (what, why, how, relation to identification), Mixture set,
          Proof of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem; MWG, pp.175-8
 
     Spring break
 
     L2: Mechanism design (Intro), Static Bayesian games (continuous strategy
          spaces), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Harsanyi's trick, First-price auction,
          Linear equilibrium, Winner's curse
 
     L3: First-price auction (general solution for the linear BNE), Second-price
          auction, Revenue Equivalence Theorem
 
     L4: Double auction, Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
 
     L5 : Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Akerlof's Market for Lemons
 
     L6 : Spence's Job Signaling model
 
     L7: Equilibrium Dominance, Intuitive Criterion, Screening in the Job Market model
 
     L8: Screening in price discrimination, Information rent
 
     L9: Principal-agent problems, Moral hazard, Revelation Principle
 
     L10: Adverse selection with a continuum of types, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

      If you would like to supplement MWG with additional readings, I recommend
      Salanie, B., The Economics of Contracts (MIT Press),
      and Gibbons, R., Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton UP).
    

      Home