|
SYLLABUS
All the official materials (problem sets etc.) will
be posted at the Learn@UW.
OUTLINE:
L1: Axiomatization (what,
why, how, relation to identification), Mixture set,
Proof of Von
Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem;
Readings: MWG, pp. 175-8
L2: Static Bayesian games (continuous strategy
spaces), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,
Harsanyi's
trick, Standard auction formats, First-price auction, Winner's curse;
Readings: Gibbons 3.1.C,
3.2B+Appendix 3.2B, MWG, pp. 865-6
L3: First-price auction (Linear equilibrium and
general solution for the monotone BNE),
Second-price auction;
Readings: Jehle and Reny 9.1, 9.2.1-9.2.4
L4: Revenue Equivalence Theorem, Stochastic
orders, Double auction, Myerson-Satterthwaite
Theorem;
Readings: MWG 6.D, Gibbons
3.2.C, (Salanie 3.2.3, optional)
L5: Adverse selection, Akerlof's
Market for Lemons
Readings: MWG 13.A-B (or Jehle and Reny 8.1.1))
L6: Spence's Job Signaling model,
Single-Crossing Property
Readings: MWG 13.C (Gibbons 4.2.B offers a
nice treatment, though it’s not a substitute)
L7: Costly signaling games, Equilibrium
Dominance, Intuitive Criterion
Readings: MWG Appendix A in Ch 13, The relevant part of Gibbons 4.4
L8: Principal-agent problems, Screening, Price
discrimination, Information rent
Readings: Salanie
2.2, MWG 14.C
L9: Moral hazard, Incentives versus risk
sharing, Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
Readings: MWG 14.B
L10: Costless signaling games, Partitional equilibrium
Readings: Salanie
4.3.2 (Gibbons 4.3.A, optional)
L11: Adverse selection with a continuum of types,
Incentive compatibility in general mechanisms
Readings: MWG, pp. 887-9
L12: Mechanism design, Direct mechanism, Revelation
Principle
Readings: MWG, pp. 884-5, 889-891
HOME
|
|