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Microeconomic Theory
(Econ 713), 2nd half
TTh 1:00-2:15pm or 2:30-3:45pm, INGRAHAM 114
Professor: Marzena Rostek
Office hours: Tuesday, 4:00-5:30pm, 7432 SS
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Syllabus
All the official materials
(problem sets etc.) will be posted at the
Learn@UW.
Readings:
L1: Axiomatization (what, why, how, relation to identification), Mixture set,
Proof of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem; MWG,
pp.175-8
Spring break
L2: Mechanism
design (Intro), Static Bayesian games (continuous strategy
spaces),
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Harsanyi's trick, First-price auction,
Linear
equilibrium, Winner's curse
L3: First-price
auction (general solution for the linear BNE), Second-price
auction, Revenue
Equivalence Theorem
L4: Double auction, Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
L5 : Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Akerlof's Market for Lemons
L6 : Spence's Job Signaling model
L7: Equilibrium Dominance,
Intuitive Criterion, Screening in the Job Market model
L8: Screening in price
discrimination, Information rent
L9: Principal-agent
problems, Moral hazard, Revelation Principle
L10: Adverse selection with
a continuum of types, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
If you would
like to supplement MWG with additional readings, I recommend
Salanie, B., The
Economics of Contracts (MIT Press),
and Gibbons, R., Game
Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton UP).
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