

Review essay

## Making “race” and nation in the United States, South Africa, and Brazil: Taking *Making* seriously

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Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation. A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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Recent scholarship on “race” has rejected the view that race is a natural, biological division among human beings, emphasizing instead its socially constructed, and hence historically variable, meanings.<sup>1</sup> This insight has informed important research into particular cases of “racialization.”<sup>2</sup> It has also contributed to a renewed emphasis on the importance of studying “race” in comparative and historical perspective. However, despite calls for comparative analysis of the social construction of “race,” there is still a paucity of serious comparative work among recent contributions to the field.

An important and welcome exception is Anthony Marx’s *Making Race and Nation*. In this ambitious book, Marx explores the relationship between “race-making” and the consolidation of modern nation-states in South Africa, the United States, and Brazil. Armed with a sophisticated arsenal of conceptual tools and theoretical insights, he seeks to account for why states in South Africa and the United States established formal rules of racial exclusion and domination, while the Brazilian state did not. Further, he explores the consequences of these state policies for the subsequent development of black identity and mobilization in each country.

Marx argues that where significant intra-white conflict threatened political stability and hence nation-state consolidation, legal racial domination was used to unify whites by excluding blacks.<sup>3</sup> State elites, concerned in the first instance with political stability – which would

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allow for economic stability and growth – sacrificed liberal ideals to attenuate violent conflicts between whites.<sup>4</sup> Faced with the emergence and reemergence of internal conflict, state elites in South Africa and the United States found “the crutch of exclusion was too handy to ignore.”<sup>5</sup> While in South Africa and the United States racial exclusion served “strategic purposes of coalition building by those in power,”<sup>6</sup> in Brazil, state elites did not face significant intra-white conflict and thus did not need to resort to formal racial exclusion to ensure political stability.

The presence or absence of institutionalized racial domination during the period of nation-state consolidation shaped the prospects for black resistance to official discrimination in the decades that followed. Marx argues that “where and when states enacted formal rules of domination according to racial distinctions, racism was reinforced, whites were unified as whites, challenges from those subordinated eventually emerged, and major racial conflict ensued. Where racial domination was not encoded by the state, issues and conflicts over race were diluted.”<sup>7</sup> Marx sees the relationship between state policy and black protest as dialectical; official racial domination “consolidates” racial identity among blacks, making it possible for them to respond to political opportunities and possibly force political change. Paradoxically, in Marx’s view, formal racial domination in South Africa and the United States consolidated black identity, making significant black protest and the dismantling of formal exclusion possible; in contrast, the absence of legal exclusion in Brazil has made it difficult for blacks there to combat pervasive racial discrimination and inequality.

Marx thus tackles important and largely neglected questions. Of crucial importance, his work highlights the intimate relationship between historical dynamics of nation-state building and the contextually variable meaning of “race.” Understanding the imperatives and strategies of nation-state building thus becomes central to understanding historical variations in the social construction of “race.” The way in which “race” was codified and institutionalized by consolidating states, in turn, can help account for subsequent dynamics between state policy and “race”-based social protest. The central questions addressed by Marx promise to yield important insights into variations in the forms and consequences of racial domination in different contexts.

Yet despite the book’s up-to-date constructivist language and impressive historical scope, this promise is only partially fulfilled. The core

problem is that the historical narratives and comparative analysis fail to take seriously the theoretical claims laid out in the beginning of the book. In place of a theoretically informed comparative analysis that takes seriously the idea that “race” is a social construction, the historical narratives and analysis fall prey to the type of essentialist reasoning and reductionist interpretation that Marx criticizes in the opening pages. Contrary to his stated intentions (and the title of his book), Marx does not offer an explanation of “*making* race and nation,” but rather a descriptive account of the strategic *manipulation* of “race” by “whites” concerned with ensuring political stability and white racial domination.

This essay explores the disjuncture between the theoretical insights outlined in the preface and first chapter of *Making Race and Nation*, and the presentation of the historical narratives and comparative analysis in the rest of the book. By critically examining (1) the analysis of “race”; (2) the rationale for case selection; (3) the comparative logic; and, (4) the conceptualization of “nation” and “state,” I suggest how the argument would be strengthened by a theoretical perspective that takes seriously the *making* of “race” and “nation.”

### **Analysis of “race”**

Marx’s analysis points to the problems that can arise from adopting everyday, practical language and uncritically employing it as analytical language. Specifically, the comparative analysis of “race” as an essentializing *category of practice* is undermined by insufficiently critical use of “race” as a *category of analysis*.<sup>8</sup> To explain how “different meanings and uses of race emerged”<sup>9</sup> historically in different contexts requires an analytical vocabulary that avoids reproducing the vision of the social world that is the declared object of study.

Marx is aware of this problem, yet his analytical vocabulary leads him directly into the trap he wishes to avoid. “It is imperative,” he writes in the preface, “not to reify what is meant by race. To do so would be to fall into the trap of essentialism. Assumptions of primordial difference and pervasive race prejudice did emerge, but from distinct histories, and informing varying practices.”<sup>10</sup>

Here two distinct phenomena are blurred – reification of “race” by the analyst and reification of “race” in practice in everyday life. The

sentences quoted above are not logically linked; the first two warn the analyst of the “trap of essentialism,” while the last describes the essentialism that characterizes understandings of “race” *in practice* in specific historical cases. This blurring is carried into the historical narratives. The narratives rely on the categories “black” and “white” without distinguishing between their analytical use by Marx himself as *tools* of study and their practical use by the actors that are Marx’s *object* of study.

In profound tension with his theoretical stance against the reification of “race,” essentialist assumptions are built into Marx’s central argument. The core of Marx’s “theory of race making” is that “...elites strike bargains and deploy state authority to unify a core constituency of whites within the nation-state by excluding blacks.” “Racial domination” thus serves “strategic purposes of coalition building by those in power.”<sup>11</sup> As a *theory of race making*, this argument is fundamentally flawed. It relies upon the division between “blacks” and “whites” pre-existing the “making of race” by the state. “Racial domination” refers to the formal codification of exclusion along racial lines that are already drawn and understood *as such* by “white” elites. The logic of the argument requires readers to “fill in” with commonsense understandings (everyone knows a “black” person from a “white” person) what should be the contingent outcome of a theory of race making: the boundary that simultaneously divides populations into categorical groups and constitutes the meaning of categories such as “black” and “white.”

In Marx’s theory of “race making,” “black” and “white” are reified “identities” that exist prior to the outcome he seeks to explain: the presence or absence of formal exclusion of “blacks” by “whites.” Marx would most likely object to this characterization. At any rate, he seems to anticipate such a critique: “...the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’ remain unfortunate shorthand for socially constructed and varying identities. Indeed, the process by which who is signified by these terms was established remains a central concern, logically prior to the more conventional political question of who gets what, when, and how.”<sup>12</sup> Yet this insight is not incorporated into Marx’s “theory of race making.” Processes of signification and the politics of categorization are almost entirely absent from the analysis. “Race” is not *made* by states in his account, but rather “institutionalized” and “enforced.”

Marx's work suggests that an awareness of the potential for reification in analysis of "race" is not sufficient to avoid reproducing substantialist assumptions.<sup>13</sup> To analyze and understand the origins and consequences of essentializing categorization schemes such as "race" requires an analytical vocabulary that avoids the very essentialism that should be the focus of analysis.<sup>14</sup> It is difficult to avoid the "essentialist trap," as Marx refers to it, while employing essentializing categories of practice as categories of analysis.

Marx argues that "states made race: amid pervasive discrimination, official actions enforced racial distinctions or did not, with profound consequences."<sup>15</sup> But what can Marx mean when he argues that "states made race?" Since his argument depends upon the prior existence of clear, dichotomous racial distinctions, it is not clear in what sense, if any, "states *made* race."

This critique may seem inconsequential in the grand scheme of his argument. After all, "racial" distinctions between "blacks" and "whites" were being made and discussed prior to the putative "making" of "race" by state elites in the United States, South Africa, and Brazil in this period. This fact does not undermine the main thrust of Marx's historical argument. His explanatory task is to account for why "racial" divisions were legally encoded or not by consolidating nation-states. Does it really matter that he labels this "making race?"

I suggest that it does matter – and that this is more than a mere quibble over wording. The use of "race" as an analytical category to study the operation and consequences of "race" as a practical category leads to the reification of "race" throughout *Making Race and Nation*, largely undermining the potential for rigorous comparative analysis of "race-making." Further, and even more problematic, the "uncontrolled conflation of social and sociological understandings of 'race'"<sup>16</sup> has profound consequences for the way the project is conceptualized in the first instance – for the selection of cases and the logic of comparison.

### **Case selection**

The uncritical adoption of everyday categories of practice as categories of analysis leads Marx to set up a comparative argument among cases selected by criteria informed by everyday understandings of "race." In

particular, the view of “race relations” as relations between “blacks” and “whites” is central to the comparative framework employed. According to Marx, the “initial driving force” of his study is to explore “what accounts for twentieth-century race relations.”<sup>17</sup> A close consideration of the rationale for case selection reveals that what is meant by “race relations” is based on a particular understanding of the phenomenon of racialization, informed by everyday conceptions of “race” in the United States context.<sup>18</sup>

Marx writes that “the common history of racial dynamics ... makes the comparison of South Africa, the United States and Brazil obvious.”<sup>19</sup> Three distinct reasons are offered to account for this choice of cases. Each is problematic as an *analytical* rationale for case selection given the aim of accounting for twentieth-century “race relations.”

First, Marx points out that South Africa, the United States, and Brazil are the three most prominent instances of European domination of populations of African origin. The comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil is intuitively an interesting comparison for a broad range of empirical and theoretical questions related to the patterns and consequences of historical and contemporary interactions between African-origin and European-origin populations. There are certainly a number of good historical and theoretical reasons to compare historical processes of racialization in South Africa, the United States, and Brazil. However, it is not analytically “obvious” why these three cases are selected to account for twentieth-century “race relations” unless racialization is understood *by definition* to be a process *exclusively* affecting African-origin populations.<sup>20</sup> Such a narrow definition of racialization is untenable given the historical record. Populations other than those of African origin have been “racialized.”<sup>21</sup> That Marx presents these cases as “obvious” choices to account for twentieth-century “race relations,” given his stated project, reveals his assumption that “race” is about “the color line” between “black” and “white.”<sup>22</sup>

Second, Marx notes that modern indicators reveal significant social and economic inequality between those classified as “black” and “white” by such indicators. Contemporary inequality between those classified as “black” and “white” on surveys that try to measure social and economic status in each country may be a good reason for choosing to compare these three countries to explore a certain range of theoretical and empirical concerns. As rough indicators of the much more complex and subtle social processes that produce them, such

survey results can provide a useful starting point for investigation into systematic processes of differentiation and discrimination in various arenas of social life. However, the results of contemporary surveys are not a suitable starting point for a study explicitly focused on the comparison of “race making” in South Africa, Brazil, and the United States. Surveys take and present as “given” what a “theory of race making” should attempt to explain, such as: how the categories of “black” and “white” are understood by the respondents to surveys; how the resulting statistics come to be seen as indicators of “race relations” (or not) in each country; whether statistics comparing the categories of “black” and “white” can be compared across nation-state contexts without qualification or consideration of the contextually specific meaning of these categories in each country.

Third, Marx suggests that historical legacies of slavery (in the United States and Brazil) and conquest (in South Africa) “established a common pattern of discrimination” in each country. This third rationale is vague and somewhat curious. Whether each country exhibits a “common pattern of discrimination” is an empirical question that hinges on what is meant by “discrimination.” Yet regardless of the precise definition of “discrimination,” Marx’s analysis of *different* forms of “racial domination” in each case seems to undermine the claim that these countries shared a common pattern of discrimination. Indeed, it seems that a central task of the book is to explain *differences* in the patterns and forms of discrimination across cases. Again, common-sense “knowledge” that “blacks” are historical and contemporary victims of discrimination by “whites” in each of these countries makes “apparent” the basis for comparison in the absence of a rigorous analytical justification.

In a sense, then, the decision to compare the United States, South Africa, and Brazil to explore what Marx refers to as “race relations” in the twentieth century is indeed “obvious.” But this simply reveals how case selection is driven by a particular, and particularly arbitrary,<sup>23</sup> “folk” understanding of “race relations” as relations between two clearly defined and recognizable “racial” groups: “blacks” and “whites.” Different folk understandings of “race” are a legitimate “dependent variable” for a comparative analysis of “race making.” They should not, however, be made central to the conceptual apparatus used to explore such differences.

By no means do I wish to suggest that it makes no sense to compare these three countries in an effort to explore the relationship between the building of nation-states and the “making of race.” But the rationale for doing so should be *historically and theoretically informed*, rather than an artifact of the way “we” have come to think about race in everyday life, which itself is a *consequence* of the very processes that are the object of study – the relationship between the making of “race” and “nation” in the process of consolidating modern nation-states.

### **Logic of comparison**

Allowing commonsense understandings of “race” to drive the case selection for a study whose object is to explain how such commonsense understandings have shaped social relations differently in different contexts is more than just ironic. It has profound consequences for the logic of the comparative argument, and hence for the conclusions drawn from comparative analysis.

To summarize, Marx’s analysis centers on two basic comparative questions: Given similar legacies of European domination of African origin populations, why did state elites in South Africa and the United States institutionalize racial exclusion while state elites in Brazil did not? Given pervasive discrimination and inequality between “whites” and “blacks” in all three countries, why has organization and mobilization of “blacks” in South Africa and the United States been so much more successful in recent decades than in Brazil?

The answers to the two central empirical questions of the book both hinge on the interpretation of the Brazilian case.<sup>24</sup> With respect to the first question – what accounts for the presence or absence of legal racial exclusion – Marx writes, “Including Brazil is pivotal, reminding us that legal racial domination was not inevitable.” The absence of formal racial exclusion in Brazil is approached as an anomalous outcome that requires explanation: “the lack of any official policy comparable to either apartheid or Jim Crow remains remarkable.”<sup>25</sup>

Yet in a broader comparative perspective, what is remarkable is the idea that Brazil is exceptional in this regard and not the other two cases. As discussed above, the conceptualization of the problem, and hence the determination of the set of relevant cases, is informed by a black-and-white understanding of “race.” Within the narrow realm of

cases delimited by this a priori conceptual understanding of “race,” Brazil appears anomalous. However, a theoretical understanding of “race” as the contingent (as opposed to necessary) product of processes of “racialization” – processes that are not restricted historically to any particular population or social group – opens up the universe of relevant cases. At a minimum, for the time period Marx considers, it would include the full range of places and societies subject to European imperialism. And among the nation-states that eventually emerged from within this broader field of cases, the absence of formal racial exclusion is closer to the historical norm.<sup>26</sup>

As but one example, the Latin American republics raise problems for Marx’s basic argument, that the absence of significant “intra-white” conflict explains the absence of formal racial exclusion. Following violent upheavals prior to and after independence throughout the region, formal exclusion was not imposed by any of the Latin American republics. This was the case despite serious “intra-white” conflicts surrounding independence wars that certainly threatened the stability – in some cases the existence – of new nation-states.

Marx mentions the Mexican Revolution of 1910 as a case of violent internal conflict that did not result in legal exclusion of “others.” He notes that “In a sense, Mexico’s inclusionary corporatism is similar to that of Brazil, but unlike Brazil was founded amid bloody conflict that elsewhere produced more exclusion.” But rather than treat this as a serious challenge to his theory, he asks whether Mexico suggests “some Latin American exceptionalism.”<sup>27</sup> Marx’s brief comments on Mexico appear at the end of the book – almost as an afterthought. It seems he does not see Mexico, or the other countries of Latin America, as challenges to his theory because his definition of “race relations” does not include them within the realm of relevant cases.

Marx’s attempt to account for the “remarkable” absence of formal exclusion in Brazil is telling. He correctly (and in line with current thinking on the topic by area specialists) rejects the argument that Brazilian “racial tolerance” from the late nineteenth century to the present is the direct result of a more tolerant history (the supposed tolerance intrinsic to Portuguese national character, putatively more benign slavery, etc.). He also correctly notes that the reconstruction of Brazilian history in these terms was part of a conscious project by intellectuals and politicians to interpret (and in the process construct) their “national” history. He is not too far off the mark when he argues

that “Brazil’s distinctiveness did not ... rest upon less historical discrimination, but rather in the country’s purposeful denial of that legacy.”<sup>28</sup>

The problem arises in his interpretation of this “purposeful denial.” He attributes it to the designs of “whites” to ensure the quiescence of “blacks” (presumably, to satisfy their strategic interest in maintaining peace and stability in order to stay in power). However, the works of historians who have reconstructed the ideas of elites in this period and considered their consequences for social policy suggest a different interpretation.<sup>29</sup> Within the context of avid “nation-building” that surrounded the first republic in Brazil (1889), the “purposeful denial” of the legacy of discrimination provides evidence less of denial than of *recognition* – recognition that, like it or not, African origin peoples had been and would continue be a major ingredient in the making of “Brazilians.” It is precisely the recognition, and in most cases fatalistic acceptance, of the extent to which “mixing” had already occurred prior to abolition (1888) and the formation of the first republic – and the winning out of this view of the Brazilian nation in concrete political struggles – that foreclosed the possibility of instituting formal legal exclusion in Brazil.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, when Marx quotes the conservative nineteenth-century Brazilian thinker, Nina Rodrigues, to illustrate that “the historical record contradicts the thesis of early tolerance,” he does not acknowledge the deeper implications of Rodrigues’s comment that Africans “would forever constitute one of the causes of our inferiority as a people.”<sup>31</sup> The statement does indeed reveal a negative attitude towards Africans. But more significantly for Marx’s analytical task, it also reveals that their inclusion in the Brazilian nation was not perceived as a choice, because it was already experienced as a social fact.

Marx’s analytical framework leads to an interpretation of Brazil’s history through a black-and-white lens. Such an interpretation overlooks the grayness (or, more appropriately, the “brown-ness”) that the nineteenth-century Brazilian elite saw, more or less fatalistically, and with more or less regret, as the fate of their “nation.” In the words of nineteenth-century liberal reformer Silvio Romero: “The Aryan race, combining here with two totally different races, has contributed to the creation of a mestiço and creole sub-race distinct from the European.... It helps little to discuss whether this is good or bad. It’s a fact and that’s enough.”<sup>32</sup>

The limitations of a black-and-white lens for interpreting the relationship between “making race and nation” in Brazil are further revealed in the analysis of Brazil’s (in)famous ideology of “whitening.” Marx correctly points out how the goal of gradually “shifting the color balance toward lighter shades” had important consequences for state policy and cultural norms and preferences.<sup>33</sup> He notes how the decision to encourage European immigration following abolition instead of encouraging the hiring of ex-slaves was closely tied to the perceived desirability of bringing more “white blood” into the country. He points out that miscegenation was encouraged, as was identification with the category of “mulatto” instead of black to give the appearance, and the belief, that whitening was indeed happening.

Yet Marx fails to examine critically the motivation behind the “whitening” ideal. His interpretation reduces it to the fact that it served to “dilute” black solidarity and potential mobilization.<sup>34</sup> Such an interpretation implies that in the absence of whitening ideology, the “natural” tendency would have been toward “black” solidarity. This reveals how “black” is treated analytically as a natural, rather than a socially constructed, category of identity and potential basis of collective action. Further, explaining whitening ideology in terms of its putative function – to dilute “black” solidarity – ignores the complexity and contingency of the motivations driving policies aimed at the long-term “whitening” of the population. Indeed, Marx basically ignores the broader picture of which the ideology of “whitening” was a part: the construction of Brazilian national identity and the building of the national state. In so doing, he avoids consideration of how the meaning of “race” and “nation” were *mutually constituted* during the period of nation-state consolidation in Brazil.<sup>35</sup>

Marx’s interpretation of the causes and significance of “whitening” for understanding the relationship between nation-state building and “race” in Brazil is incomplete. He fails to recognize that the assumptions upon which, and in response to which, the ideology was constructed – that the “impurity” of the Brazilian was a social fact – most likely already ruled out the possibility of seriously considering the institutionalization of formal “racial” exclusion. It is not a question of whether the “actual” levels of miscegenation, in comparison with the United States or South Africa, ruled out the possibility of formal imposition of a dichotomous racial division. It is rather a question of how “miscegenation” was understood by those in the position to make social policy. Given the “racial image” that Brazilian elites had of their

country at the turn of the century, it is not at all surprising that no *legal* racial exclusion emerged in this period.<sup>36</sup> The problem these intellectuals faced, as they understood it, was how Brazil could become a nation among other progressive, civilized nations, given its “raw materials” of a “mongrel” population that according to prevailing European race theories would condemn Brazil to backwardness and degeneracy. The outcome of no legal segregation in Brazil only appears as surprising from within an analytical framework that interprets through a black-and-white lens a reality that contemporaries did not experience in these terms.

This problematic analytical framework creates problems for the way Marx poses and answers the second central question as well. In accounting for divergences in racial mobilization, Brazil is again presented as the curious exception. “Given South African and American experiences, it seemed surprising that comparable racial inequalities in Brazil were not more fully challenged.”<sup>37</sup> Again, the Brazilian case is framed as an anomaly. However, this framing relies on a commonsense, rather than a theoretical, understanding of what “race” means: Brazil only seems exceptional in this regard compared to the United States and South Africa because “we see” that there are so many “blacks” in Brazil and that “they” are concentrated at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. Based on the current social definition of “black” in the United States – governed by the one drop rule<sup>38</sup> – the fact that there was a large African origin population at the beginning of the century in Brazil means that there must currently be a large “black” population. The relative lack of mobilization, then, must be explained in terms of “lack of consciousness” of racial identity and interests.<sup>39</sup>

If we accept that social cleavages and political mobilization in modern nation-states tend to emerge along divisions and social categories institutionalized by the state,<sup>40</sup> and given Marx’s own analysis of the lack of institutionalized divisions along “racial” lines in Brazil, why should the low salience of “black” identity and relative absence of mobilization by “blacks” be a puzzle? Why should we expect mobilization along lines that are not fixed or institutionalized in any way, but are blurry, ambiguous, and contextually variable?<sup>41</sup> Only through an analytical lens that naturalizes the division between “white” and “black,” and thus implicitly rejects the view that “race” is a social construction, does the correlation of skin color and various dimensions of disadvantage<sup>42</sup> necessarily imply that “blacks” should be ex-

pected to mobilize. The logic of this comparative argument rests on the unstated assumption that “the color line” that is so central in the history of the United States is central to Brazilian history as well, regardless of the fact that no color line – *as such* – was ever drawn.

Marx’s own analysis of the relatively weak and small mobilizations by “blacks” in Brazil seems to lead toward a very different conclusion than the one he draws. According to Marx, “racial democracy deprived Afro-Brazilians of any legally explicit cause for their subordination against which they might mobilize. Even contemporary Afro-Brazilian activists have been forced to conclude that purported absorption long worked to discourage blacks from identifying themselves in terms of race, thereby avoiding racial conflict.”<sup>43</sup> Marx argues that the myth of racial democracy has diluted racial consciousness, and that the power of this “myth” largely explains the absence of mobilization by “blacks.”

However, the evidence suggests that the absence of mobilization is better explained by the absence of a clear division between “blacks” and others in Brazil, and hence the absence of clearly and discretely bounded “racial” *groups*. “Blacks” are deprived not just of explicit causes against which “they” might mobilize, but of policies that would constitute “black” as a meaningful category, and from there possibly a meaningful group, in the first place. The challenge confronting Afro-Brazilian activists (self-named) is not simply mobilization of a given constituency the boundaries of which are known and unproblematically recognized by all concerned; it is *to create* a constituency by actively drawing “racial” boundaries.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, while analysts of the *movimento negro* often miss this fact, activists themselves are keenly aware of it. Central to their attempts to mobilize during the mid to late 1970s, and more recently in the campaign to get people to “darken” their response to the color question in the 1990 census,<sup>45</sup> are efforts to make the category “black” meaningful to Brazilians of African origin and hence to create a constituency by the very act of appealing to one as if it already, “naturally,” exists.<sup>46</sup>

Marx interprets the absence of official racial divisions by the state and Brazil’s explicitly nonracial national identity as evidence of an informal racial order. Through informal means, including the espousing of nonracialism as a tenant of national identity, Brazil achieves the same result as South Africa and the United States, only much more peacefully. And, in Marx’s analysis, Brazil’s is a more

insidious form of racial domination because it deprives “blacks” (by not clearly demarcating the boundaries of “blackness?”) of a target against which they can mobilize and fight for “racial” justice.

The problem with this framework is that it circumvents the question of what it means to talk about “blacks” in Brazil, historically and contemporarily. Who are the “blacks” that are deprived of a target in the fight for “racial justice” in Brazil? Are they those who self-identify as “black” in response to surveys, those identified as “black” by their neighbors or co-workers, those whom a Brazilian census-taker would identify as “black,” or those whom a North American census-taker would identify as “black?” To what extent and in what sense can the aggregate of “blacks” identified by any of these methods be considered a self-conscious social group (as opposed to a statistical category?) These complicated issues are avoided by Marx, for whom “blacks” in Brazil are analytically equivalent to “blacks” in the United States and “blacks” in South Africa. There is no explicit place in his comparative framework, or in the logic of comparison underlying his two central questions, for serious consideration of the contextually variable meaning of “race.”

Marx’s framework thus avoids altogether what ought to be central to comparative analysis of “race making” – the contextually specific meanings and contingent social consequences of racialization across time and the borders of nation-states. To theorize common patterns of causal relations across distinct cases of racialization, the idiosyncrasies of each case must be explicitly acknowledged. Recognizing theoretically consequential similarities across cases requires taking seriously historical differences. In particular, for the purpose of Marx’s argument, it is necessary to examine the historically specific – and often contested – meanings of both “race” *and* “nation” during the period of nation-state consolidation across cases in order to theorize “making race and nation” in comparative perspective. This leads to a final weakness that unnecessarily restricts the potential of Marx’s work: the failure to incorporate insightful theoretical approaches to “nation” and “state” that are mentioned in the first chapter into the conceptualization and analysis of the three empirical cases.

## Conceptualizing nation and state

### *Nation*

Contrary to the title of the book, there is no systematic theorization or empirical treatment of “making nation” in these three countries. Rather, Marx equates “nation” and nation-state conceptually in the historical narratives. As a consequence, the analysis privileges a two-way relationship (state consolidation/race-making) instead of a three-way relationship (state-consolidation/race-making/nation-building). This results in the neglect of questions and relationships crucial to understanding the making of race and the making of nation in the context of state consolidation. A theoretical framework that considers the tripartite relationship among competing visions of the “nation,” ideas about “race,” and political projects and social policy related to state building would greatly enhance our understanding of *making race* and *making nation* in the context of nation-state building.

Such a framework requires a clear analytical distinction between nation-state and “nation,” and the maintenance of this distinction throughout the comparative historical analysis. Marx briefly discusses “nation” in the introductory chapter, basically adopting Charles Tilly’s definition of nation as “the central identity encouraged by states” to ensure popular loyalty and allegiance.<sup>47</sup> However, in the historical narratives, “nation” – as something analytically distinct from nation-state – all but disappears.

Marx’s recapitulation in the introductory chapter of Rogers Brubaker’s analysis of *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* in relation to his own argument is telling in what it leaves out of Brubaker’s original thesis:

Divisions within the potential German nation were purposefully overcome by state policies of ethnically exclusive citizenship aimed at unifying those included. By contrast, an earlier unified French state adopted formal rules of “civic,” inclusive citizenship. Already achieved French unity did not require reinforcement with official “ethnic” exclusion, though informal discrimination is increasingly evident. In South Africa, the United States, and Brazil, colonialism, slavery, and geography had left a substantial and historically differentiated black population. “Bounded citizenship” according to race was constructed in South Africa and to a lesser extent in the United States to bolster nation building, much as German unity was reinforced by excluding ethnic groups defined as not German. In the relative absence of regional or

any ethnic division, race was not so used in Brazil, akin to the French example of long avoiding official ethnic exclusion.<sup>48</sup>

In drawing these analogies, Marx basically ignores the core of Brubaker's argument – that differences in citizenship policy in France and Germany are intimately related to the different ways in which the “nation” has been conceived or “imagined,” with historical understandings having a continued influence on contemporary understandings of the meaning of nationhood in each country, and hence on citizenship policy. Such an argument is very different from one that posits that differences in citizenship policy are explained by the presence or absence of the need to unify the state.

This reading of Brubaker's argument is indicative of the more general neglect of the relevance of “national imaginings” to the social construction of “race” by state actors motivated to consolidate nascent nation-states. Without giving independent consideration to the political and ideological conflicts attendant to “nation-building” or the construction of national identity, Marx cannot explain why “race” comes to be understood so differently, and with such different consequences in the three cases he examines. For instance, the self-conscious “national imaginings” of Brazil's political and intellectual elite go a long way toward explaining the peculiar combination of ideas about “race” adopted from prevailing European theories. Specifically, the content of such imaginings help explain why strains of racial thought already in disrepute in Western Europe were championed by Brazilian intellectuals while more popular and “legitimate” theories were rejected.<sup>49</sup>

To improve understanding of individual cases and hence improve the historical rigor of comparative research, it would be a great improvement on Marx's framework to consider how the meanings of “race” and “nation” are mutually constituted in the process of consolidating nation-states. To do so requires a conceptualization of “nation” independent of nation-state; it also requires a conceptualization that avoids reification. Fortunately, the foundations for a sophisticated theoretical approach to an analysis of “nation” already exist. Several authors have suggested ways to approach the study of “nation” and nationalism that avoid reproducing the nationalist assumptions about the social world that are the object of study.<sup>50</sup> For example, Rogers Brubaker has suggested how to avoid reification of “nation” by focusing on nation “not as substance but as institutionalized form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but as contingent event.” Craig

Calhoun outlines an approach to “nation” as a discursive form. And Katherine Verdery conceives of “nation” as a symbolic operator in a system of social classification.<sup>51</sup> Drawing on these analytical resources to incorporate “nation” into the theoretical framework employed by Marx would add a much-needed third dimension to his portrayal of “making race and nation.” The potential to improve our understanding of the social construction of “race” and “nation” in relation to nation-state consolidation would be greatly enhanced by the addition of this third dimension to the analysis.

In addition to improving the explanatory potential of his theoretical framework, incorporating “nation” as a conceptually independent, third dimension would help avoid the recurring tendency in Marx’s analysis to pit “race” against “class” explanations of the phenomenon to be explained. Marx argues against a class-based reductionist explanation of legal racial exclusion, but in turn he basically replaces such an account with one premised on a race-based reductionism: it is the interests of state elites as “whites” (as opposed to elite interests as capitalists), to impose formal racial exclusion. By looking at how the ideal interests in pursuing particular “national imaginings” in this period intervened in and had consequences for ways of thinking about both race and class, the pressure to reduce the outcome to either so-called “race” or “class” interests would be removed.

Finally, this tripartite framework would focus analytical attention on issues absolutely central to the questions posed by Marx, but almost entirely neglected in his comparative analysis, involving the role of symbolic politics in the social construction of “race” and “nation.” Consideration of the intersection of state building, race making, and nation making in the process of nation-state consolidation points to the centrality of symbolic politics to the outcomes Marx seeks to explain. Incorporating “nation” into the theoretical framework using the approaches mentioned above would help focus analytical attention on the important dimension of symbolic politics.<sup>52</sup> Additionally, however, analysis of this dimension of politics requires adoption of a conceptualization of the “state” more attuned to the objectives Marx sets for his analysis.

*State*

For the purpose of explaining the making of “race” and “nation” by state elites in their quest to consolidate states, theoretical consideration of the symbolic power of modern nation-states is crucial. Marx discusses this aspect of state power and activity at some length in the introductory chapter; however, he does not incorporate these insights into the conceptualization or analysis of the historical narratives.

Marx adopts a definition of the state that is very close to the frequently quoted definition offered by Max Weber.<sup>53</sup> In addition to this, he cites the work of Theda Skocpol to highlight the idea that “states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).”<sup>54</sup> In connection with this, Marx also cites Paul Starr’s work on how classification works: “social categories ... are shaped, manifested and entrenched through the state.”<sup>55</sup> Marx thus demonstrates an awareness of the power of the state to shape the “visions and divisions of the social world,”<sup>56</sup> and of the relevance of this power for the formation of collective identities, groups, or other potential bases of political mobilization.

Yet these insights are not fully exploited in developing the argument or analyzing the cases. Marx focuses on whether or not states institutionalized “race” through formal exclusion, but he neglects the ways in which state policies and systems of classification themselves created “race” or changed its meaning in fundamental ways. Even when such processes enter into the historical narratives, they remain peripheral to the analysis and theoretical conclusions drawn from them. The notion that official categories may be constitutive of reality, as opposed to mere reflections of existing power relations and interests, is not seriously entertained.<sup>57</sup> The explicit suggestion in the first chapter that “the identification of racial, ethnic, or regional actors remained fluid, shaped by ongoing conflict and policy”<sup>58</sup> is almost entirely absent from the presentation or interpretation of the historical cases.

The framing of the central question – why states do or do not enforce a racial cleavage<sup>59</sup> – is indicative of this shortcoming. On this account, the establishment of legal racial boundaries by states *enforces* racial

cleavages; it does not itself constitute a cleavage understood as “racial” (whatever that may mean in a given context). Marx argues that “coercive powers have been used to define citizenship according to race – states bind the nation they claim to represent by institutionalizing identities of racial inclusion and exclusion.”<sup>60</sup> This formulation demonstrates how insights into the importance of the symbolic power of the state are not put to good use. He sees states *binding* the nation, but does not explore in the historical narratives how this process is simultaneously one of *defining* the nation. Likewise, coercive powers define citizenship according to “race,” but there is no serious consideration of the fact that this is also an act of defining “race” itself. In Marx’s argument, the state (or “state elite”) defines the nation by institutionalizing “racial identities.” This can be contrasted to a perspective that sees the definition of “race” and “nation” both in flux as they are defined in relation to each other by state actors who are oriented toward two distinct, if related, goals: the construction of national identity and the consolidation of the state.

The neglect of symbolic dimensions of state power is indicative of a broader weakness in the operationalization of “state” throughout the comparative analysis. The diverse dimensions and domains of state activity are not even minimally disaggregated, nor is any distinction drawn among different types, roles, and interests of “state elites.” Marx is aware of the shortcomings of reified conceptualizations of the state and emphasizes that the state is not a unitary actor.<sup>61</sup> Nonetheless, the way the state is treated in the historical narratives obscures the historical complexity and contingency of the concrete political struggles among competing, crosscutting sectors of elites in each country. The state is conceptualized as composed of “white” state elites who strike deals with other “white” elites to end “intra-white” conflicts that threaten to undermine the consolidation of the central state. In addition to taking “whiteness” as a self-evidently relevant basis of interests and identities, this formulation is problematic because it conceives of state elites’ interests too narrowly. Focusing exclusively on their interests in ending wars to ensure short-term political stability – to the neglect of other ideal and material interests – the analytically relevant realm of state activity is reduced to hard politics and peace-keeping. Although these dimensions of state activity are certainly central to nation-state consolidation,<sup>62</sup> they only begin to encompass the relevant domains for understanding the relationship of nation-state consolidation to the social construction of “race” and “nation.”

For the purpose of exploring the relations among the making of “race,” “nation,” and nation-states, it is necessary to disaggregate the state analytically and operationally to make visible the diversity of ideal and material interests at stake for “elites” occupying different positions within the state apparatus. Theorists of the modern state have demonstrated the importance of recognizing that different domains of state activity and different state bureaucracies are involved in the “actual political struggles” that determine policy outcome and implementation. Increasingly, the bureaucracies of modern states are apparatuses of infrastructural, rather than despotic, power.<sup>63</sup> The symbolic powers of the modern state are manifested in an array of official activities, such as census-taking, map-making, and “artefact”-collecting.<sup>64</sup> The official categories institutionalized by the bureaucracies in charge of these activities structure the legitimate principles of vision and division of the social world.<sup>65</sup> The state is involved in “world-making”<sup>66</sup>; it creates “kinds” by institutionalizing certain distinctions and not others.<sup>67</sup> For the purpose of explaining the making of “race” and “nation” in relationship to processes of nation-state building, “state” should be defined conceptually to include the symbolic dimensions of state power within the rubric of analysis.

### **Conclusion**

*Making Race and Nation* is a rich, valuable book that asks compelling questions and points in several potentially fruitful directions for future research. The introductory discussion gestures toward the types of insightful theoretical approaches and conceptual tools that are adept for the type of ambitious comparative historical analysis Marx undertakes in this book. I have identified some gaps between the promising approaches introduced by Marx and the implementation of the empirical research. Additionally, I have pointed to some additional conceptual resources not mentioned by Marx that also promise to provide a great deal of analytical leverage for exploring these issues. The great weakness of Marx’s work, in my view, is the failure to take full advantage of these theoretical resources. The field of comparative analysis opened up by *Making Race and Nation* could be much more richly mined if these theoretical resources were more fully exploited.

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## Notes

1. See, for example, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 1994); Barbara Fields, "Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of America," *New Left Review* 181, May-June (1990): 95–118; Jeremy King, *The Biology of Race* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "Rethinking Racism," *American Sociological Review* 62/3 (1997): 456–479; David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1991); Colette Guillamin, *Racism, Sexism, Power and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1995).
2. Prominent examples include Fields, *ibid.*; Roediger, *ibid.*; Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Frank Dikötter, "Group Definition and the Idea of 'Race' in Modern China (1793–1949)," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13/3 (1990): 420–432.
3. Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation. A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xii.
4. Marx, *ibid.*, 12.
5. Marx, *ibid.*, 275. According to Marx, "intra-white" conflicts posed a greater threat to stability than black protest following the Civil War in the United States and the Boer War in South Africa. This is offered as an explanation for why victors of these two wars allied with "whites" with whom they had been at war in implementing legal racial exclusion rather than pursuing a liberal agenda (and incorporating blacks). Thus state elites in the United States were primarily concerned with diminishing "sectionalist" conflicts between North and South, while those in South Africa needed to reduce "ethnic tensions" between Afrikaners and English.
6. Marx, *ibid.*, xii.
7. Marx, *ibid.*, 267.
8. The distinction between categories of analysis and categories of practice is developed, following Pierre Bourdieu, by Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): chapter 1; and Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond Identity," *Theory and Society* (forthcoming in vol. 29, 2000).
9. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, xii.
10. *Ibid.*, xii.
11. *Ibid.*, xii.
12. *Ibid.*, xii.
13. The tension between Marx's critique of reified concepts and the essentialism underlying his central argument is a weakness present in other recent "social constructivist" approaches to "race making" as well (Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in*

- the United States*; Bonilla-Silva, "Rethinking Racism." For a critique of this tendency, see Mara Loveman, "Is 'Race' Essential? A Response to Bonilla-Silva," *American Sociological Review* 64/6 (1999).
14. For an elaboration on this point, see Loveman, "Is 'Race' Essential?" Related arguments are presented by Robert Miles and Rudy Torres, "Does 'Race' Matter? Transatlantic Perspectives on Racism after 'Race Relations,'" in Vered Amit-Talai and Caroline Knowles, editors, *Re-Situating Identities. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, Culture* (Orchard Park, New York: Broadview Press, 1996); Loïc Wacquant, "Towards an Analytic of Racial Domination," *Political Power and Social Theory* 11 (1997): 221–234; Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond Identity," *Theory and Society* (forthcoming in vol. 29, 2000). In the words of Brubaker and Cooper, "Reification is a social process, not only an intellectual practice. As such, it is central to many social and political practices oriented to 'nation,' 'ethnicity,' 'race,' and other putative 'identities.' As analysts of these practices we should certainly try to account for this process of reification, through which the 'political fiction' of the 'nation' – or of the 'ethnic group,' 'race,' or other 'identity' – can become powerfully realized in practice. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis."
  15. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 2.
  16. Wacquant, "Towards an Analytic of Racial Domination," 222.
  17. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 1. For a critique of the "race relations" framework see Miles and Torres, "Does 'Race' Matter?" Though I do not directly address this issue here, it should be clear from my argument that I agree with Miles's and Torres's conclusions.
  18. For a discussion of how "the peculiar schema of racial division developed by one country during a small segment of its short history, a schema unusual for its degree of arbitrariness, rigidity and social consequentiality, has been virtually universalized as the template through which analyses of 'race' in all countries and epochs are to be conducted," see Wacquant, "Towards an Analytic of Racial Domination"; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, "The Cunning of Imperialist Reason," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 16/1 (1999).
  19. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 7.
  20. For a compelling argument against an overly restrictive conceptual definition of "racism" and "racialization," see Miles and Torres, "Does 'Race' Matter?"
  21. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*; James Loewen, *The Mississippi Chinese: Between Black and White*, 2nd ed. (Waverly Press, 1988).
  22. That Marx conceives of "race relations" in terms of "the color line" between "black" and "white" is also suggested by the opening paragraph of his book, which begins with W.E.B. Du Bois's famous claim that the color line is the pivotal problem of the twentieth century.
  23. F. James Davis, *Who is Black? One Nation's Definition* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).
  24. I restrict my substantive engagement with Marx's argument to the Brazilian case, and then only to illustrate key points. Given space constraints, I address the Brazilian case because it is the crucial negative case for Marx's comparative argument.
  25. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 7.
  26. Davis, *Who is Black?* discusses the peculiarity of the United States in this respect.
  27. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 277. The other possible explanation suggested by

Marx for the Mexican “anomaly” is that there might be “something different about how class conflict has been contained.” This passing comment problematically implies both that the Civil War and the Boer War were not also strongly shaped by class conflict, and that there was not a strong ethno-racial component to the Mexican Revolution.

28. Marx, *ibid.*, 8.
29. See Thomas Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993 (1974)); Thomas Skidmore, “Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870–1940,” in Richard Graham, editor, *The Idea of Race in Latin America 1870–1940* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Nancy Leys Stepan, 1991, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
30. Color bars were debated in Brazil’s parliament between 1891–1907, as Marx points out (*Making Race and Nation*, 166). However, the debates Marx refers to were over immigration policy (Skidmore, *Black into White*, 24) – whether and how to exclude certain “types” from entering Brazil – not over color bars as a domestic policy option. Further, even on the issue of immigration policy, “most deputies, like most members of the elite, shied away from such overtly racist gestures as an absolute color bar” (Skidmore, *Black into White*, 24).
31. Quoted in Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 8.
32. The quote is from 1888. Cited in Skidmore, *Black into White*, 35.
33. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 162.
34. Marx, *ibid.*, 163.
35. For instance, while citing Skidmore’s *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* for evidence of the selective borrowing of racial ideas from Europe, Marx fails to note that the attempts by intellectuals in newly republican Brazil to grapple with the idea of “race” were triggered by attempts to envision a progressive future for the new Brazilian “nation” in the face of European theories of racial determinism.
36. The fact that legal or institutional racial exclusions were not implemented does not, of course, mean that Brazil was the “racial democracy” its proponents claimed it to be. Cultural expressions and activities that Western European-oriented Brazilian elites associated with Africa, such as *candomblé* and *capoiera*, were frequent targets of state repression during the First Republic.
37. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, xi.
38. Davis, *Who is Black?*
39. Other authors have also posed the issue in these terms. Michael Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Pierre-Michel Fontaine, “Blacks and the Search for Power in Brazil,” in Pierre-Michel Fontaine, editor, *Race, Class and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for African-American Studies, 1985). An additional problem with this formulation is that it implies that a crystallized collective identity is a prerequisite for mobilization. According to Marx, only when identity is “consolidated” will “the logic of response to structural conditions apply” (*Making Race and Nation*, 266). This view conflicts with that of social movement theorists who emphasize how collective identity is often constructed in the *process of participation*. See Craig Calhoun, “The Problem of Identity in Collective Action,” in Joan Huber, editor, *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology* (Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publications, 1991); Roger Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

40. See Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973); Cynthia Enloe, "The Growth of the State and Ethnic Mobilization: the American Experience," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4/2 (1981): 124–136. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
41. Marvin Harris, "Referential Ambiguity in the Calculus of Brazilian Racial Identity," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 26/1 (1970): 1–14; Charles Wagley, "On the Concept of Social Race in the Americas," in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, editors, *Contemporary Cultures and Societies in Latin America* (New York: Random House, 1965).
42. Nelson do Valle Silva, "Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil," in Pierre-Michel Fontaine, editor, *Race, Class and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for African-American Studies, 1985); Edward Telles, "Race, Class and Space in Brazilian Cities," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 19/3 (1995): 395–406.
43. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 169.
44. Efforts by some Brazilians of African origin to organize and mobilize around "racial consciousness" in post-abolition Brazil date back at least to the 1920s in São Paulo, with various organizational predecessors in prior decades. See Michael Mitchell, "Racial Consciousness and the Political Attitudes and Behavior of Blacks in São Paulo, Brazil," Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977. These efforts suggest that the state is not the only determinant of the possible axes of political contention within its borders. The capacity of non-state actors to influence, to varying degrees, the lines of political struggle is well documented in work on so-called "new social movements." However, the difficulties encountered by those who have tried to mobilize people along "racial" lines in Brazil, in the past and more recently, do suggest that the symbolic power of the state can be highly effective in determining the "natural" and "legitimate" lines of vision and division of the social world (see Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," in Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
45. Melissa Nobles, "'Responding with Good Sense': The Politics of Race and Censuses in Contemporary Brazil," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1995.
46. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, "Identity and Representation," in Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1991); Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," *Theory and Society* 14/6 (1985): 723–744.
47. Charles Tilly, editor, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
48. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 17. Compare to Brubaker's original formulation in Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
49. Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*.
50. Ernest Gellner describes the basic premises of these assumptions: first, that humans have nationality the way they have height and weight; second, that they wish to be in the same political community as others with the same nationality; third, that this is rightly so. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964).
51. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 16; Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham:

- Open University Press, 1997); Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism?'" *Daedalus* 122/3 (1993): 37–45.
52. cf. Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power."
  53. Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
  54. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Reusche-meyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 21.
  55. Cited in Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 5; see Paul Starr, "Social Categories and Claims in the Liberal State," in Mary Douglas and David Hull, editors, *How Classification Works* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 169.
  56. Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power."
  57. Exemplary works that take seriously the potential constitutive power of official categories include Ian Hacking, "Making up People," in Thomas Heller, Morton Sosna, and David Wellbery, editors, *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Ian Hacking, "World-Making and Kind-Making: Child Abuse for Example," in Douglas and Hull, *How Classification Works*; Nelson Goodman, *Ways of World-making*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978); Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power"; Paul Starr, "The Sociology of Official Statistics," in William Alonso and Paul Starr, editors, *The Politics of Numbers* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987).
  58. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 14.
  59. Marx, *ibid.*, 6.
  60. Marx, *ibid.*, 5.
  61. Marx, *ibid.*, xiii.
  62. cf. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  63. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*.
  64. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), chapter 10.
  65. Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power."
  66. Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*.
  67. Hacking, "Making Up People."