Public Affairs 856 Trade, Competition, and Governance in a Global Economy

Lecture 29 5/3/2017


Instructor: Prof. Menzie Chinn UW Madison Spring 2017

Outline

- Inequality
- China
- Labor standards

Inequality

Figure 1
Changes in U.S. Real Income, Working Adults, by Education and for Top 1 Percent



China




FIGURE 1. IMPORT PENETRATION RATIO FOR US IMPORTS FROM CHINA (left scale), AND SHARE OF US WORKING-AGE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING (right scale)

China

Table 1—Value of Trade with China for the US and Other Selected High-Income Countries and Value of Imports from all Other Source Countries, 1991/1992–2007

	I. Trade w (in billions			II. Imports from other countries (in billions 2007 US\$)			
	Imports from China (1)	Exports to China (2)	Imports from other low-inc.	Imports from Mexico/ CAFTA (4)	Imports from rest of world (5)		
Panel A. United States							
1991/1992	26.3	10.3	7.7	38.5	322.4		
2000	121.6	23.0	22.8	151.6	650.0		
2007	330.0	57.4	45.4	183.0	763.1		
Growth 1991-2007	1,156%	456%	491%	375%	137%		
Panel B. Eight other develope	ed countries						
1991/1992	28.2	26.6	9.2	2.8	723.6		
2000	94.3	68.2	13.7	5.3	822.6		
2007	262.8	196.9	31.0	11.6	1329.8		
Growth 1991-2007	832%	639%	236%	316%	84%		


Notes: Trade data is reported for the years 1991, 2000, and 2007, except for exports to China which are first available in 1992. The set of "other developed countries" in panel B comprises Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Column 3 covers imports from all countries that have been classified as low income by the World Bank in 1989, except for China. Column 4 covers imports from Mexico and the Central American and Carribean countries covered by the CAFTA-DR. Column 5 covers imports from all other countries (primarily from developed countries).

Table 2 presents initial estimates of the relationship between Chinese import exposure and US manufacturing employment. Using the full sample of 722 CZs and weighting each observation by start of period CZ population, we fit models of the following form:

$$\Delta L_{it}^{m} = \gamma_{t} + \beta_{1} \Delta IPW_{uit} + \mathbf{X}_{it}'\beta_{2} + e_{it},$$

where ΔL_{it}^m is the decadal change in the manufacturing employment share of the working-age population in commuting zone *i*. When estimating this model for

Panel A. 2SLS first stage regression, full sample



Panel B. OLS reduced form regression, full sample




Figure 2. Change in Import Exposure per Worker and Decline of Manufacturing Employment: Added Variable Plots of First Stage and Reduced Form Estimates

Notes: N = 722. The added variable plots control for the start of period share of employment in manufacturing industries. Regression models are weighted by start of period CZ share of national population.

Table 2—Imports from China and Change of Manufacturing Employment in CZs, 1970–2007: 2SLS Estimates

Dependent variable: 10 × annual change in manufacturing emp/working-age pop (in % pts)

	I. 1990-2007			II. 1970-1990 (pre-exposure)		
	1990–2000 (1)	2000–2007 (2)	1990–2007 (3)	1970–1980 (4)	1980–1990 (5)	1970–1990 (6)
(Δ current period imports from China to US)/worker	-0.89*** (0.18)	-0.72*** (0.06)	-0.75*** (0.07)			
$(\Delta \text{ future period imports} \\ \text{from China to US)/worker}$				0.43*** (0.15)	-0.13 (0.13)	0.15 (0.09)

Notes: N = 722, except N = 1,444 in stacked first difference models of columns 3 and 6. The variable "future period imports" is defined as the average of the growth of a CZ's import exposure during the periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2007. All regressions include a constant and the models in columns 3 and 6 include a time dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period CZ share of national population.

^{***}Significant at the 1 percent level.

^{**}Significant at the 5 percent level.

^{*}Significant at the 10 percent level.

TABLE 3—Imports from China and Change of Manufacturing Employment in CZs, 1990–2007; 2SLS Estimates

Dependent variable: 10 × annual change in manufacturing emp/working-age pop (in % pts)

		I. 199	0-2007 stack	ed first differe	ences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Δ imports from China to US)/ worker	-0.746*** (0.068)	-0.610*** (0.094)	-0.538*** (0.091)	-0.508*** (0.081)	-0.562*** (0.096)	-0.596*** (0.099)
Percentage of employment in manufacturing_1		-0.035 (0.022)	-0.052*** (0.020)	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.040*** (0.013)
Percentage of college-educated population_1				-0.008 (0.016)		0.013 (0.012)
Percentage of foreign-born population_1				-0.007 (0.008)		0.030*** (0.011)
Percentage of employment among women_1				-0.054** (0.025)		-0.006 (0.024)
Percentage of employment in routine occupations_1					-0.230*** (0.063)	-0.245*** (0.064)
Average offshorability index of occupations ₋₁					0.244 (0.252)	-0.059 (0.237)
Census division dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		II	. 2SLS first st	age estimate	s	
(Δ imports from China to OTH)/ worker	0.792*** (0.079)	0.664***	0.652*** (0.090)	0.635***	0.638*** (0.087)	0.631*** (0.087)
R^2	0.54	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58

Notes: N = 1,444 (722 commuting zones \times 2 time periods). All regressions include a constant and a dummy for the 2000–2007 period. First stage estimates in panel II also include the control variables that are indicated in the corresponding columns of panel I. Routine occupations are defined such that they account for 1/3 of US employment in 1980. The offshorability index variable is standardized to mean of 0 and standard deviation of 10 in 1980. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period CZ share of national population.

TABLE 4—IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND CHANGE OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION IN CZ, 1990–2007: 2SLS Estimates

Dependent variables: Ten-year equivalent changes in log population counts (in log pts)

	I. B	y education l	evel	I	II. By age group		
	All (1)	College (2)	Noncollege (3)	Age 16–34 (4)	Age 35–49 (5)	Age 50–64 (6)	
Panel A. No census division	on dummies or	other control	's				
(Δ imports from China to US)/worker	-1.031** (0.503)	-0.360 (0.660)	-1.097** (0.488)	-1.299 (0.826)	-0.615 (0.572)	-1.127*** (0.422)	
R^2	_	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.59	0.22	
Panel B. Controlling for c	ensus division	dummies					
(Δ imports from China to US)/worker	-0.355 (0.513)	0.147 (0.619)	-0.240 (0.519)	-0.408 (0.953)	-0.045 (0.474)	-0.549 (0.450)	
R^2	0.36	0.29	0.45	0.42	0.68	0.46	
Panel C. Full controls							
(Δ imports from China to US)/worker	-0.050 (0.746)	-0.026 (0.685)	-0.047 (0.823)	-0.138 (1.190)	0.367 (0.560)	-0.138 (0.651)	
R^2	0.42	0.35	0.52	0.44	0.75	0.60	

Notes: N = 1,444 (722 CZs × two time periods). All regressions include a constant and a dummy for the 2000–2007 period. Models in panel B and C also include census division dummies while panel C adds the full vector of control variables from column 6 of Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period commuting zone share of national population.

TABLE 5—IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION WITHIN CZS, 1990–2007: 2SLS ESTIMATES

Dependent variables: Ten-year equivalent changes in log population counts and population shares by employment status

	Mfg emp	Non-mfg emp (2)	Unemp (3)	NILF (4)	SSDI receipt (5)
Panel A. 100 × log change in population co	unts			10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 -	
$(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-4.231*** (1.047)	-0.274 (0.651)	4.921*** (1.128)	2.058* (1.080)	1.466*** (0.557)
Panel B. Change in population shares All education levels					
$(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.596*** (0.099)	-0.178 (0.137)	0.221*** (0.058)	0.553*** (0.150)	0.076*** (0.028)
College education $(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.592*** (0.125)	0.168 (0.122)	0.119*** (0.039)	0.304*** (0.113)	_
No college education $(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.581*** (0.095)	-0.531*** (0.203)	0.282*** (0.085)	0.831*** (0.211)	_

Notes: N = 1,444 (722 CZs × two time periods). All statistics are based on working age individuals (age 16 to 64). The effect of import exposure on the overall employment/population ratio can be computed as the sum of the coefficients for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing employment; this effect is highly statistically significant ($p \le 0.01$) in the full sample and in all reported subsamples. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 6 of Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period CZ share of national population.

Table 6—Imports from China and Wage Changes within CZs, 1990–2007: 2SLS Estimates Dependent variable: Ten-year equivalent change in average log weekly wage (in log pts)

	All workers (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Panel A. All education levels			
$(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.759*** (0.253)	-0.892*** (0.294)	-0.614*** (0.237)
R^2	0.56	0.44	0.69
Panel B. College education			
$(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.757** (0.308)	-0.991*** (0.374)	-0.525* (0.279)
R^2	0.52	0.39	0.63
Panel C. No college education			
$(\Delta \text{ imports from China to US})/\text{worker}$	-0.814*** (0.236)	-0.703*** (0.250)	-1.116*** (0.278)
R^2	0.52	0.45	0.59

Notes: N = 1,444 (722 CZs × two time periods). All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 6 of Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period CZ share of national population.

Labor Standards and Trade

Labor principles and standards are not subject to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and disciplines. The International Labor Organization (ILO), an arm of the United Nations founded in 1919, is the multilateral organization with responsibility for labor issues. For nearly 90 years, the ILO has been working to create, through adoption at its annual International Labor Conferences of Member countries, *Conventions*, which set international standards.

The ILO has adopted at least 183 Conventions, eight of which define four "core labor" principles. This occurred when first, a U.N. Social Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1995 declared that four categories of principles and rights at work are fundamental: (1) freedom of association and collective bargaining; (2) the elimination of forced labor; (3) the elimination of child labor; and (4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. The ILO then responded by pulling these together as the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up. The Declaration commits all ILO Member States, whether or not they have ratified the specific conventions, to respect the labor principles in these four key areas. The Follow-Up, among other things, calls for reports by developing countries that have not ratified one or more of the core Conventions, on the status of their implementation of the various rights.³

Standards in FTAs

Model 1: Nafta

Side agreement, not enforceable through same mechanism as commercial clauses

Model 2: Jordan

Labor and commercial issues use same dispute resolution procedure

Model 3: Seven FTAs

One enforceable clause, "nonenforcement"

• Model 4: May 10th Agreement

May 10th Agreement

- (1) a fully enforceable commitment that Parties to free trade agreements would adopt and maintain in their laws and practices the *ILO Declaration*;
- (2) a fully enforceable commitment prohibiting FTA countries from lowering their labor standards;
- (3) new limitations on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement" discretion (i.e., countries cannot defend failure to enforce laws related to the five basic core labor standards on the basis of resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues); and
- (4) the same dispute settlement mechanisms or penalties available for other FTA obligations

TPP

The TPP is based on the May 10 agreement, plus a few additional provisions designed to strengthen adherence to labor principles. Under these new provisions: (a) each country shall "adopt and maintain" statutes and regulations governing acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health; (b) Each party shall discourage "through initiatives it considers appropriate" the importation of goods produced in whole or in part by forced labor, including forced child labor; (c) Each party shall "endeavor to encourage" businesses to "voluntarily adopt" corporate social responsibility initiatives on labor issues "endorsed or... supported" by that party; and (d) Parties may use "corporate labor dialogue" to resolve labor issues expeditiously, to help them mutually agree on a course of action.

Issues

- Only some provisions are enforceable
- Different Enforcement Procedures for and Caps on Penalties for Labor Provisions
- Limits Placed on Scope of Definition of a Term in Labor Provisions
- Differentials in Procedures for Considering Disputes on Labor vs. Other Provisions

Empirics

- Kamata (2014) tabulates RTA's
- Evaluates labor clauses
- Investigates whether labor conditions vary when RTA's include labor clauses
- RTA's with labor clauses sometimes have an effect
- Sometimes decrease trade flows

Table 4.1. Overall Impacts of RTA intensity on Labor Conditions: RTA intensity based on the current trade shares

	Dependent varia	able: Labor Cond	ition Measure	
	Mean Monthly Earnings	Mean Weakly Hours actually	Fatal Occupational	No. of ILO Core Conventions
	(log)	worked	Injury Kate (70)	ratified
RTA intensity t-1	.303	-9.58	2.13	188
	(.729)	(11.5)	(1.83)	(0.382)
ln(GDP per capita)	-15.7	230.6	-4.80	11.3
	(9.95)	(149.7)	(17.4)	(3.60)
ln(GDP per capita) ²	1.04*	-14.8	.179	575***
	(.547)	(11.0)	(1.08)	(.198)
Industry employment	.0160	-2.85*	.0090	0226
(% in total emp.)	(.0742)	(1.44)	(.180)	(.0332)
Manufacturing VA	0455	977	0598	0254
(% of GDP)	(.0583)	(1.24)	(.137)	(.0277)
Political rights index	0544	9.35**	1.52	173
	(.357)	(4.54)	(1.01)	(.120)
Civil liberty index	627	-3.77	650	.0272
	(.391)	(5.19)	(0.888)	(.170)
N	193	173	134	324
Adjusted R ²	.765	.674	.658	.820

Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 5.1. Impacts of Labor-clause Inclusive vs. Non-inclusive RTA on Labor Conditions:
RTA intensities based on the current trade shares

with Labor Clauses (1.60) (37.3) (24.0) (.690) CFA Intensity [-] 353 -9.71 2.30 163 v/o Labor Clauses (.579) (13.5) (2.12) (.418) n(GDP per capita) -20.1** 226.6 -1.78 11.3*** (9.89) (139.1) (19.0) (3.63) n(GDP per capita)² 1.31*** -14.5 0194 576**** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) ndustry employment .0705 -2.80 .0206 0227 % in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA 0383 966 0666 0255 % of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43*** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* -3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15)		1	able: Labor Cond		
RTA intensity [-1] 5.19*** -6.79 -14.9204 with Labor Clauses (1.60) (37.3) (24.0) (.690) RTA intensity [-1]555 -2.91 2.50 -165 w/o Labor Clauses (.579) (13.5) (2.12) (.418) In(GDP per capita) -20.1** 226.6 -1.78 11.3*** (9.89) (139.1) (19.0) (3.63) In(GDP per capita)² 1.31** -14.50194576*** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .02060227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA038396606660255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324					
with Labor Clauses (1.60) (37.3) (24.0) (.690) KFA intensity [-1]555165 w/o Labor Clauses (.579) (13.5) (2.12) (.418) ln(GDP per capita) -20.1** 226.6 -1.78 11.3*** (9.89) (139.1) (19.0) (3.63) ln(GDP per capita)² 1.31** -14.50194576*** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .02060227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA038396606660255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324		The second secon	worked	Injury Kate (70)	ranned
Comparison of the comparison	RTA intensity t-1	5.19***	-6.79	-14.9	204
w/o Labor Clauses (.579) (13.5) (2.12) (.418) In(GDP per capita) -20.1** 226.6 -1.78 11.3*** (9.89) (139.1) (19.0) (3.63) In(GDP per capita)² 1.31** -14.5 0194 576*** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .0206 0227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA 0383 966 0666 0255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* -3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	with Labor Clauses	(1.60)	(37.3)	(24.0)	(.690)
In(GDP per capita) -20.1**	KIA intensity [-]	555	-9.91	2.30	165
(9.89) (139.1) (19.0) (3.63) In(GDP per capita) ² 1.31** -14.50194576*** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .02060227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA038396606660255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43*** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	w/o Labor Clauses	(.579)	(13.5)	(2.12)	(.418)
In(GDP per capita) ² 1.31** (.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .0206 0227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA 0383 966 0666 0255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* 3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N	ln(GDP per capita)	-20.1**	226.6	-1.78	11.3***
(.541) (10.2) (1.17) (.199) Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .02060227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA038396606660255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324		(9.89)	(139.1)	(19.0)	(3.63)
Industry employment .0705 -2.80 .0206 0227 (% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA 0383 966 0666 0255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* -3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	ln(GDP per capita) ²	1.31**	-14.5	0194	576***
(% in total emp.) (.0622) (1.90) (.188) (.0342) Manufacturing VA 0383 966 0666 0255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* -3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324		(.541)	(10.2)	(1.17)	(.199)
Manufacturing VA038396606660255 (% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	Industry employment	.0705	-2.80	.0206	0227
(% of GDP) (.0500) (1.24) (.139) (.0281) Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61 173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index 696* -3.79 764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	(% in total emp.)	(.0622)	(1.90)	(.188)	(.0342)
Political rights index .136 9.43** 1.61173 (.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	Manufacturing VA	0383	966	0666	0255
(.310) (4.41) (1.00) (.121) Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	(% of GDP)	(.0500)	(1.24)	(.139)	(.0281)
Civil liberty index696* -3.79764 .0275 (0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324	Political rights index	.136	9.43**	1.61	173
(0.401) (5.15) (.918) (0.169) N 193 173 134 324		(.310)	(4.41)	(1.00)	(.121)
N 193 173 134 324	Civil liberty index	696 [*]	-3.79	764	.0275
		(0.401)	(5.15)	(.918)	(0.169)
Adjusted R ² .778 .670 .654 .819	N	193	173	134	324
	Adjusted R ²	.778	.670	.654	.819

Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 6.1. Impacts of Labor-clause Inclusive vs. Non-inclusive RTA on Labor Condit for Countries in Different Income Levels:

RTA intensities based on the current trade shares

	Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure Mean Monthly Mean Weakly Fatal No. of ILO Condition Measure						
	Earnings (log)	Hours actually worked	Occupational Injury Rate (%)	Conventions ratified			
RTA intensity t-1	-3.87	156.9	-3.82	2.31			
with LC, Hi income	(2.87)	(235.2)	(24.8)	(1.99)			
RTA intensity t-1	482	-2.08	.760	.204			
w/o I C Hi income	(630)	(14.1)	(1.60)	(492)			
RTA intensity t-1	6.14***	-16.9	-764.9***	410			
with LC, Md income	(1.28)	(36.4)	(267.7)	(.644)			
RTT Intensity [-]	.123	36.0	0.05	.600			
w/o LC, Md income	(.863)	(22.1)	(2.78)	(.516)			
RTA intensity t-1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.			
with LC, Lo income	()	()	()	()			
RTA intensity t-1	23.0	368.3	47.4	-17.1***			
w/o LC, Lo income	(14.5)	(342.4)	(35.6)	(4.10)			
ln(GDP per capita)	-18.9*	238.1	-13.3	9.81***			
	(10.2)	(145.1)	(18.6)	(3.37)			
ln(GDP per capita) ²	1.24**	-14.9	829	498***			
	(.564)	(10.6)	(1.10)	(.174)			
Industry employment	.0581	-3.15	0500	0177			
(% in total emp.)	(.0604)	(2.10)	(.232)	(.0329)			
Manufacturing VA	0394	195	101	0288			
(% of GDP)	(.0560)	(1.28)	(.125)	(.0280)			
Political rights index	.150	9.45**	1.67	184			
	(.313)	(4.57)	(1.02)	(.126)			
Civil liberty index	711*	-1.62	753	.0711			
	(0.402)	(5.47)	(.873)	(0.163)			
N	193	173	134	324			
Adjusted R ²	.779	.669	.680	.827			