Handout on Bernanke-Blinder

Consider an economy where bank credit is imperfectly substitutable for bond finance, as in Bernanke and Blinder (*AEA Papers and Proceedings* 1988), augmented by allowing the credit supply to depend on a shift variable, the "riskiness" of the marginal investment project. Banks hold liabilities of deposits. On the asset side, the banks hold loans, reserves and either domestic government debt.

Loan demand is given by:

\[ L^d = L(\rho, i, y) \]

Loan supply is given by:

\[ L^s = \lambda(\rho, i, Z)D(1 - \tau) \]

where \( Z \) is a measure of riskiness of the marginal investment project, and \( \tau \) is the reserve ratio. The data generating process of \( Z \) is not modelled explicitly. The credit market equilibrium is given by equating loan supply and demand. *Note: \( Z \) is not in the Bernanke-Blinder model.*

The money market equilibrium is given by equating the demand for deposits with the supply; hence the LM schedule is:

\[ D(i, y) = mR \]

where \( m \) is the money multiplier, and \( R \) is the stock of reserves. (Excess reserves are ignored in this analysis.) The money multiplier is assumed constant. Allowing it to depend positively on the interest rate does not change the qualitative conclusions.

The CC curve is a conventional IS curve, except that it depends upon the bank lending rate as well as the interest rate:

\[ y = Y(i, \rho) \]

Substituting money market equilibrium into the loan market equilibrium yields:

\[ L(\rho, i, y) = \lambda(\rho, i, Z)mR(1 - \tau) \]

Solving for the equilibrium loan rate, \( \rho \), one obtains:
\[
\rho = \varphi(i, y, R, Z)
\]

In this formulation, the spread between the bank loan rate and the risk free rate, \(\rho - i\), is a positive function of \(Z\), the riskiness of the marginal project. The CC schedule is obtained by substituting (6) into (4).

To solve out the model analytically, work with the semi reduced form equation representing the CC equation is:

\[
y = Y(i, \rho)
\]

Taking the total differential yields:

\[
dY = Y_i di + Y_{\rho} (\rho_i di + \rho_{\rho} d\rho + \rho_{R} dR + \rho_{Z} dZ)
\]

Rearranging:

\[
dY(1 - Y_{\rho}) = (Y_{\rho} \rho_i + Y_{i}) di + Y_{\rho} \rho_{R} dR + Y_{\rho} \rho_{Z} dZ
\]

The LM curve is obtained by differentiating (5):

\[
dD = m(dR) = D_i di + D_{\rho} d\rho
\]

\[
m \equiv D_{R}
\]

**Figure 1**
Solving for the deposit interest rate:

\[ di = \frac{m(dR) - D_i dY}{D_i} \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Substituting (10) into (8):

\[ dY \left[ 1 - Y_p \rho_Y + \frac{(Y_p \rho_i + Y_i) D_Y}{D_i} \right] = \left[ \frac{(Y_p \rho_i + Y_i) m}{D_i} + Y_R \rho_R \right] dR + Y_p \rho_Z dZ \]  \hspace{1cm} (11)

\[
\begin{align*}
    dY &= \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ \left( \frac{(Y_p \rho_i + Y_i) m}{D_i} \right) dR + Y_p \rho_Z dZ \right] 
\end{align*}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (12.1)

Solving for income:

Where

\[ \Delta = \left[ 1 - Y_p \rho_Y + \frac{(Y_p \rho_i + Y_i) D_Y}{D_i} \right] \]  \hspace{1cm} (12.2)

The comparative statics are summarized in the table below.

**Table 1 — Effects of Shocks on Observable Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rise in:</th>
<th>(1) Income</th>
<th>(2) Money</th>
<th>(3) Credit</th>
<th>(4) Interest Rate*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank Reserves</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Demand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Supply</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Demand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Demand</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On bonds.*

Marginal risk

One can examine what happens graphically, and how policy can respond.
• If riskiness of the marginal investment project rises \((Z)\), the CC curve shifts in.
• If the money multiplier \((m)\) falls, both the CC and LM curves shift in.
• If some financial institutions fail, both the CC and LM curves shift in.

Here, we take \(Z\) as exogenous. But if \(Z\) depends upon the level of economic activity, then one could have an adverse feedback loop, wherein the initial shift inward of CC results in an additional increase in \(Z\) and hence further inward shift of CC.

If either financial institutions fail, or the monetary multiplier falls, then the monetary authorities can either increase Reserves, or directly lend to the financial institutions. This is shown below as a shift outward of the LM curve, and of the CC curve (gray arrows).