University
of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Economics
Economics 741: Public
Economics
Fall 2007
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mbrown/741.htm
Prof.
Meta Brown Lectures
TR 11-12:15
Office:
7442 Social Science 234
Education
Hours:
MW
Phone:
262-8789
Email:
mbrown@ssc.wisc.edu
Economics
741 studies the literature on the effects of government taxes, expenditures,
and mandates on the decision-making of individuals, families, and firms, with
emphasis on both applied theory and empirics.
Students will gain familiarity with the Public Economics literature and
some knowledge of topics of current relevance in the field, with the goal of
developing independent research programs.
The
reading list offers an introduction to the literature on each of the nine
topics addressed in the syllabus.
Required readings are marked with **, and strongly recommended readings
are marked with *. Many additional sources are listed for students who identify
topics of particular interest.
PROBLEM
SETS (30%): Three problem sets will be
assigned during the semester. These will
be collected and graded. Group work is
permitted, and one problem set may be submitted by three or fewer group
members. Some problems will require use
of STATA and GAUSS. This software is available to students in the third floor
lab. Take special care to understand all solutions to problem sets, as this
will be important preparation for the final exam.
PRESENTATION
(20%): At various times during the
semester, class members will make presentations of roughly 30 minutes each on a topics of their choosing. Presentations will involve overviews of the
literature on the student’s topic, which must relate to government activities
and their influence on individual or firm-level decisions. It is intended that these literature surveys
support students’ field paper research. Presentation of original research is
encouraged but not required. Students will be expected to provide hard copy of presentation
slides, and the final exam will include questions drawn from the information in
some of the student presentations.
FINAL
EXAM (50%): There will be an in-class,
open-note final examination during the examination period. The date of the exam will be determined by
the class later in the semester.
The
syllabus, problem sets and some rough lecture notes will be posted on the class
web site, which you can link to from www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mbrown/741.htm.
Students
in the public economics field must submit a field paper by August 2008. Public economics field advisors are Jane
Cooley, Karl Scholz, Bobbi Wolfe, and me. If you intend to submit a paper to
the public field then now is the time to begin to identify a public faculty
member who can advise your paper.
AER American Economic Review EMA Econometrica JEP Journal of Economic Perspectives JPE Journal of Political Economy NTJ National Tax Journal BPEA Brookings Papers on Economic Activity JEL Journal of Economic Literature JHR Journal of Human Resources JPubE Journal of Public Economics QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics
Lecture Topics
Tax
Incidence
**
Kotlikoff,
L. and L. Summers, “Tax Incidence,” Handbook of Public Economics, v2,
1987.
Cutler,
D.,“Tax Reform and the Stock Market: An Asset Price Approach,” AER December
1988 1107-1117.
Atkinson,
A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz, Lecture on Public Economics, Mcgraw Hill 1980,
Diamond, P.,“Tax Incidence in a Two-Good Model,” JPubE
1978.
Harberger, A.,“The Incidence of the Corporate Income
Tax,” JPE June 1962.
Lang, M. H. and D. Shackleford, “Capitalization of
Capital Gains Taxes: Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to the 1997 Rate
reduction,” JPubE April 2000, 69-85.
McClure, C. “General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis: The
Harberger Model After 10 Years,” JPubE February 1975.
Life Cycle Incidence
**
Poterba,
J. “Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes,” AER 79
(May 1989), 325-330.
Mandate
Incidence
** Summers, L., “Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits,” AER May 1989, 177-189.
**
Gruber, J. “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” AER June 1994, 622-641.
Gruber,
J. and A. Krueger, “The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance:
Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance,” Tax Policy and the Economy,
D.
Government-induced
irregularities in the budget constraint, individual decision-making and estimation issues
** Moffitt, Robert, “The Econometrics of Kinked Budget
Constraints,” JEP Spring 1990 119-139.
Blomquist, S., M. Eklof and
* Blundell, R., A. Duncan and C. Meghir, “Estimating labor
Supply Responses Using Tax Reforms,” EMA 66 (1998), 827-862.
Bosworth, B. and G. Burtless, “Effects of Tax Reform on
Labor Supply, Investment and Saving,” JEP 6 (1992), 3-25.
Hausman, J., “Labor Supply,” in How Taxes Affect
Economic Behavior, H. Aaron and J. Pechman (eds), Washington: Brookings,
1981.
Hausman, J., “The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets,”
EMA November 1985.
Hausman, J. and J. Poterba, “Household Behavior and the
tax Reform Act of 1986,” JEP 1 (1987), 101-119.
Heckman, J., “Comment,” in Feldstein (ed) Behavioral
Simulations in Tax Policy Analysis (
MaCurdy, T., “Work Disincentive Effects of Taxes: A
Reexamination of Some Evidence,” AER 80 (1992), 243-249.
MaCurdy, T., D. Green and H. Paarsch, “Assessing
Empirical Approaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply,” JHR Summer 1990.
Mroz, T., “The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of
Married Women’s Hours of Work to Economic and Statistical Assumptions,” EMA
July 1987, 765-800.
Ziliak, J. and T. Kniesner, “Estimating Life Cycle Labor
Supply Tax Effects,” JPE, April 1999, 326-359.
The
Earned Income Tax Credit
** Hotz, J. and J. K. Scholz, “The Earned Income Tax Credit,” in Means-Tested
Transfer Programs in the United States, R. Moffitt (ed.), The University of
Chicago Press and NBER, 2003, 141-197.
Dickert, S., S. Houser and J. K. Scholz, “Taxes and the Poor: A Micro-Simulation Study of
the Implicit and Explicit Taxes,” NTJ 47 91994), 76-97.
Eissa, N. and J. Leibman, “Labor Supply Responses to the Earned Income Tax
Credit,” QJE 111(2) (1996), 605-637.
Hotz, J., C. Mullin and J. K. Scholz, “The Earned Income Tax Credit and Labor Market
Participation of Families on Welfare,” mimeo, UCLA Department of Economics.
Meyer, B. and D. Rosenbaum, “Making Single Mothers
Work: Recent Tax and Welfare Policy and its Effects,” NTJ 53 (2000), 1027-1061.
Scholz, J. K., “The Earned Income
Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance and Anti-Poverty Effectiveness,” NTJ
1994, 59-81.
** Mandatory notes will be distributed on
this subject. They draw heavily on notes from W. van der Klaauw,
P. Todd and the following references:
Besley, T. and
A. Case, “Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous
Policies,” NBER Working Paper #4956, 1994.
Burtless, G.,
“The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research,” JEP
Spring 1995, 63-84.
Goldberger, A.,
“Selection Bias in Estimating Treatment Effects: Some Formal Illustrations,”
Discussion Paper 123-72,
Hahn, J., P.
Todd and W. Van der Klaauw, “Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects
with a Regression-Discontinuity Design,” EMA 2000.
Heckman, J. J.
and J. A. Smith, “Assessing the Case for Social Experiments,” JEP, Spring 1995,
85-110.
Heckman,
J.J. and R. Robb, “Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of
Interventions", in J. Heckman and B. Singer eds., Longitudinal Analysis
of Labor Market Data (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Heckman,
J.J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd, “Matching as an Econometric Evaluation
Es-timator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme", REStud 64
(1997), 605-54.
Imbens, G. and
J. Angrist, “Identification of Local Average Treatment Effects,” EMA 62 (1994),
467-475.
Manski, C.F.,
“Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects", AER Papers and Proceedings 80
(1990), 319-323.
Meyer, B., "Natural and Quasi-Experiments in
Economics," Journal of the Business and Economic Statistics, 13(2)
(1995), 151-61.
** Van der Klaauw,
W., (2002) “Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on College
Enrollment: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” International Economic Review
43(4).
** Brown, M., J. K. Scholz, and A. Seshadri (2007), “A New Test of Borrowing Constraints for
Education,” working paper.
* Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (2001), “The Effect of
Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints on Educational Attainment,” IER
42November), 1051-1103.
* Carneiro, P. and J. Heckman (2002), “The Evidence on Credit
Constraints in Post-Secondary Schooling,” EJ 112, 705-734.
Kane, T. J. (1994), “College Entry by Blacks since
1970: The Role of College Costs, Family Background, and the Returns to Education,”
JPE 102(5).
Kane, T. J. (2003), “A Quasi-Experimental Estimate
of the Impact of Financial Aid on College-Going,” NBER working paper 9703.
Cameron, S. V. and C. Taber,
“Estimation of Educational Borrowing Constraints Using Returns to Schooling,” JPE
2004, 112(1) p1.
Dynarski, S. (2003) “Does Aid Matter? Measuring the
Effects of Student Aid on College Attendance and Completion,” AER 93(1).
Lochner, L. and A. Monge (2002), “Human Capital
Formation with Endogenous Credit Constraints,” working paper.
Shea, J. (2000), “Does Parents’ Money Matter?” JPE
77 ( August), 155-184.
Sauer, R. M. (2004), “Educational Financing and
Lifetime Earnings,” REStud 71(4), 11189-1216.
Stinebrickner, R. and T. R. Stinebrickner (2003),
“Working During School and Academic Performance,” JOLE 21(2), 449-472.
** Keane, M. and R. Moffitt, “A Structural Model of Multiple
Welfare Program Participation and Labor Supply,” IER 39, 553-589, 1998.
Welfare
Besley, T. and S. Coate, “Workfare Versus Welfare:
Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty Alleviation Programs,”
AER, 1992.
Blank, R. M. and P. Ruggles,
“When Do Women Use Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps?,” JHR Winter 1996, 57-89.
Knox, V., C. Miller and L. A. Gennetian,
“Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: A Summary of the Final Report on the
Moffitt, R., “Incentive Effects of the
Moffitt, R., “The Effects of Welfare on Marriage and
Fertility,” in Welfare, the Family and Reproductive Behavior, R. Moffitt
(ed), National Academy Press, 50-97.
Medicaid
Gruber, J., “Medicaid,” in Means-Tested Transfer
Programs in the United States, R. Moffitt (ed.), The University of Chicago
Press and NBER, 2003, 15-77.
Food
Stamps
Gundersen, C. and
J. Ziliak. “The Role of Food Stamps in
Consumption Stabilization.” Journal of Human Resources,
v38, 1051-1079. 2003.
Currie, J., “U.S. Food and Nutrition Programs,” in
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, R. Moffitt (ed.),
The University of Chicago Press and NBER, 2003, 199-289.
Daponte, B. O., S. Sanders and L.
Taylor, “Why Do Low-Income Households Not Use Food Stamps? Evidence from an
Experiment,” JHR Summer 1999, 612-628.
Ziliak, J., C. Gundersen,
and D. Figlio. “Food Stamp Caseloads Over the Business Cycle.” Southern Economic Journal,
v69(4), 903-919. 2003.
Housing
Currie, J. and A. Yelowitz,
“Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?” JPubE,
January 2000, 99-124.
VI. Social Insurance
Theory
Akerlof,
G., “The Market for Lemons,” QJE 84(3) 1970, 488-500.
Atkinson, A. B., “Income Maintenance and Social
Insurance,” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public
Economics Volume 2 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1987), 779-908. (required pages to be assigned in lecture)
Atkeson, A. and P. J. Kehoe,
“Social Insurance and Transition,”
IER, 37(2) (May, 1996), 377-401.
Feldstein, M., “Social Insurance,” Public Policy
25 (1977), 81-115.
Pauly, M., “Overinsurance
and Public Provision of Insurance: The Role of Moral Hazards & Adverse Seletion,” QJE 88(1) (1974), 44-62
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz,
“Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets,” QJE 91 (1976), 629-649.
Shavell, S., “On Moral Hazard and
Insurance,” QJE 93 (1979), 541-562.
Social
Insurance and Saving
** Hubbard, R. G., J. Skinner and
** S. Coate,
“Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy,” AER 1995.
M. Brown, “Mandatory Retirement Saving and the Efficiency
Consequences of Transfers to the Elderly,” working paper, 2005.
Labor
income (and health) risk: Unemployment and Disability Insurance
Atkeson, A. and R. Lucas,
“Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance,” JET 66
(1995), 64-68.
Autor, D. and
M. G. Duggan, “The Rise in Disability Recipiency and
the Decline in Unemployment,” QJE 2003.
Cullen, J. B. and J. Gruber, “Spousal Labor Supply
as Insurance: Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out the Added Worker Effect?,” Journal of Labor Economics, 18(3) 2000, 546-572.
Engen, E. and
J. Gruber, “Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving,” NBER Working
Paper 5252, 1995.
Feldstein, M., “Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of
Unemployment,” JPE 84 (1976), 937-958.
Topel, R., “On Layoffs and
Unemployment Insurance,” AER 73 (1983), 541-559.
Gruber, J., “Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor
Supply,” JPE 108 (2000), 1162-1183.
Halpern, J. and J. Hausman, “Choice Under
Uncertainty: A Model of Applications for the Social Security Disability
Program,” JpubE 31 (1986), 131-162.
McGarry, K., “Factors Determining
Participation of the Elderly in SSI,” JHR 31 (1996), 331-358.
Longevity
risk: Social Security
Theory
** Eckstein, Z., M. Eichenbaum and D.
Peled, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Enhancing
Properties of Annuity Markets and Social Security,” JPubE
26, 1985.
** Feldstein, M., “The Optimal Level of
Social Security Benefits,” QJE May 1985, 300-320.
Bernheim, D., “The Economic
Effects of Social Security: Towards a Reconciliation of Theory and
Measurement,” JpubE 1987, 273-304.
Diamond, P., “A Framework for Social Security Analysis,” JPubE 1977, 285-298.
Diamond, P. and J. Hausman,
“A Model of Social Insurance with Variable Retirement,” JPubE
10 (1978), 295-336.
Feldstein, M., “Should Social Security Be Means
Tested?,” JPE 1987, 464-484.
Mitchell, O., J. Poterba, M. Warshawsky and J. Brown, “New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities,” AER, 2002.
Savings, retirement timing, Social Security and Medicare
Rust, J. and C. Phelan, “How Social
Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete
Markets,” EMA 65(4) (1996), 781-831.
Burtless, G., “Social Security, Unanticipated Benefit Increases, and the Timing of Retirement,” REStud 1986, 781-805.
Coile, C. and J. Gruber, “Social Security and Retirement,” NBER Working Paper #7830, 2000.
Gustman, A. L. and T. L. Steinmeier, “Retirement in Dual-Career Families: A Structural Model,” Journal of Labor Economics 18(3), 2000.
Dwyer, D. and J. Hu,
"Expectations and Realizations of Retirement: The Role of Poor Health on
Work Transitions," Pension Research Council Conference Volume,
forthcoming.
Fields, G. and O. Mitchell, “Economic Determinants
of the Optimal Retirement Age: An Empirical Investigation,” JHR 19 (1984),
245-262.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise, “Social Security Programs
and Retirement Around the World: Introduction and
Summary,” in J. Gruber and D. Wise (eds), Social
Security and Retirement Around the World (
Stock, J. and D. Wise, “Pensions, the Option Value
of Work, and Retirement,” EMA 58 (1990), 1151-1180.
Social
Security Reform
Aaron, H. and R. Reischauer, Countdown to Reform:
The Great Social Security Debate,
Feldstein, M., “The Missing Piece in the Policy
Analysis: Social Security Reform,” AER 86 (1996), 1-14.
Feldstein, M., Privatizing Social Security,
Feldstein, M. and E. Ranguelova, “Individual Risk in an Investment-based Social
Security System,” NBER Working Paper 8074, 2001.
Kotlikoff, L., K. Smetters
and J. Wallises, "Social Security: Privatization
and Progressivity." AER (May 1998).
Mitchell, O., R. Meyers and H. Young (eds), Prospects for Social
Security Reform (
Health
risk: Medicare
Feldstein, M. S. “An Econometric Model of the
Medicare System,” QJE 85(1) (1971), 1-20.
Coyte, P. C., “The Economics of
Medicare: Equilibrium within the Medical Community,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 1(3) (1983), 264-285.
Newhouse, J. P., “Policy Watch:
Medicare,” JEP 10(3) (1996), 159-167.
Attanasio, O., “A Cohort
Analysis of Saving Behavior by
Boskin, M., “Taxation,
Saving, and the Rate of Interest,” JPE April 1978, 3-27.
Hall,
R., “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” JPE
April 1988.
Summers, L., “Capital Taxation and
Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model,” AER 1981.
Saving
Incentives
** Engen, E.M., W. G. Gale and J. K. Scholz,
“The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives,” JEP Fall 1996, 113-138.
** Poterba, J., S. Venti and D.
Wise, “How Retirement Saving Programs Increase Saving,” JEP Fall 1996, 91-112.
Gale,
W. G. and J. K. Scholz, “IRAs and household Saving,” AER December 1994
Scholz, J. K., A. Seshadri, and
Venti, S. and D. Wise, “Have IRAs Increases
Capital
Gains
** Burman, L. and
Auten, G., and C. Clotfelter, “Permanent vs. Transitory Tax Effects and the
Realization of Capital Gains,” QJE 97 (1982), 613-632.
Poterba, J., “How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes?” JPubE
33(2) (1987), 153-172.
Stiglitz, J., “Some Aspects of
Capital Gains Taxation,” JPubE 21 (1983), 257-294.
Risk-taking
Bulow, J.
and L. Summers, “The Taxation of Risky Assets,” JPE 92(1984), 20-39.
Feldstein, M., “Personal Taxation and Portfolio
Composition: An Econometric Analysis,” EMA, 1976.
Gordon, R. and J. Wilson,
“Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital Income,” AER 79 (1989),
429-439.
Sandmo, A., “The Effects of
Taxation on Savings and Risk-Taking,” in Auerbach and
Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public Economics
Volume 1, North Holland, 1987.
** Gropp, R., J. K. Scholz, and M. J. White, “Personal
Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand,” QJE 112(1), Feb 1997, 217-251.
White, M. J., “Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards,” NBER
working paper 13265, 2007.
Kehoe, T. and D. Levine, “Bankruptcy and Collateral
in Debt Constrained Markets,” NBER working paper 12656, 2006.
* Livshits,
Livshits,
Mateos-Planas, X. and G. Seccia, “Welfare
Implications of Endogenous Credit Limits with Bankruptcy,” JEDC 2006.
Chatterjee, S., D. Corbae, M. Nakajima, and J.-V.
Rios-Rull, “A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of
Default,”
* Fay, S.,
** Kotlikoff, L. and A. Spivak, “The Family as an Incomplete
Annuities Market,” JPE 89(2) (1981), 372-91.
** Altonji, J., F. Hayashi and L. Kotlikoff, “Parental Altruism
and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence,” JPE 105 (1997), 1121-1166.
Brown, M., M. Mazzocco, J. K. Scholz, and A. Seshadri,
“Tied Transfers,” working paper, 2006.
Bruce,
Neil and Michael Waldman. 1990. “The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan’s
Dilemma.” QJE, 105 (1): 155-65.
Bruce,
Neil and Michael Waldman. 1991. “Transfers in Kind: Why They Can be Efficient
and Nonpaternalistic.” AER, 81: 1345-51.
Coate,
Stephen. 1995. “Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer
Policy.” AER, 85(1), March, 46-57.
Lindbeck,
Assar and Jorgen W. Weibull. 1988. “Altruism and Time Consistency: The
Economics of Fait Accompli.” JPE, 96: 1165-1182.
Pollak,
Robert A. 1988. “Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences.” AER, 78(2),
May: 240-44.
Brown,
M., “Informal Care and the Division of End-of-Life Transfers,” JHR,
winter 2006.
Barro, R., “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,” JPE,
1974.
Bernheim, B. D. and Bagwell, “Is Everything
Neutral?,” JPE, April 1988.
Bernheim, B. D., A. Shleifer and L. Summers, “The
Strategic Bequest Motive,” JPE 93 (1985), 1045-1076.
Gale, W. and M. Perozek, “Does the Estate Tax Reduce
Saving?” Working Paper, Office of Tax Policy Research,
Gale, W. G. and J. K. Scholz, “Intergenerational
Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth,” JEP, 1994.
Gale, W. G. and J. B. Slemrod, “We Tax Dead People,”
Working Paper, Office of Tax Policy Research, University of
Kaplow, L., “Tax Policy and Gifts,” AEA Papers
and Proceedings 88(2), 1998, 283-288.
Kotlikoff, L., “Intergenerational Transfers and
Savings,” JEP, Spring 1988, 41-58.
Laitner, J. and H. Ohlsson, “Bequest Motives: A
Comparison of Sweden and the United Sates,” JPubE 79 (2001), 205-236.
McGarry, K., “The Cost of Equality: Unequal bequests
and Tax Avoidance,” JPubE 79 (2001), 179-204.
McGarry, K., “Inter Vivos Transfers and Intended
Bequests,” JPubE 73 (1999), 321-351.
Modigliani, F., “The Role of Intergenerational
Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth,” JEP 2 (1988),
15-40.
Poterba, J., “The Estate and Gift Tax and Inter
Vivos Giving in the United States,” JPubE 79 (2001), 237-264.
Wilhelm, M. O., “Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs’
Earnings: Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests,” AER 86 (1996), 874-892.
Altig,
David and Davis, Steven J. 1992. “The Timing of Intergenerational Transfers, Tax
Policy, and Aggregate Savings,” AER, 82(5): 1199-220.
Altonji,
Joseph G., Fumio Hayashi, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. 1992. “Is the Extended
Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data,” AER, 82 (5):
1177-98.
Becker,
Gary S. 1974. “A Theory of Social Interactions.” JPE, 82: 1063-1093.
Browning,
M. and P.-A. Chiappori (1998), “Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: a
General Characterization and Empirical Tests,” EMA, 66: 1241-1278.
Perozek,
Maria G. 1996. “The Implications of a Dynamic Model of Altruistic
Intergenerational Transfers.” Mimeo,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
** Del Boca, D. and C. Flinn, “Expenditure
Decisions of Divorced Mothers and Income Composition,” JHR 1994.
** Brown, M. and C. Flinn,
“Investment in Child Quality Over Marital States,” mimeo,
* Nixon,
* Weiss, Y. and R.J. Willis (1993), "Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation,"
JOLE 11, 629-679.
* Weiss, Y. and R. J. Willis (1997), "Match Quality, New
Information and Marital Dissolution," JOLE 15, S293-S329.
Flinn, C. (2000), "Modes of Interaction Between
Divorced Parents," International Economic Review 41, 545-578.
Liu, H., T. Mroz, and W. van der Klaauw,
“Maternal Employment, Migration and Child Development,” working paper, 2005.
Blau, D. and W. van der Klaauw, “A Demographic Analysis of the Family Structure
Experiences of Children in the
M.
Tartari, “Divorce and the Cognitive Achievement of Children,” working paper,
Yale, 2006.
Gruber, J., “Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for
Children? The Long Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce,” NBER Working Paper
#7968.
Peters, H. E., “Marriage and Divorce: Informational
Constraints and Private Contracting,” AER 76(3) (1986).
Aiyagari, S. R., J. Greenwood and N. Guner (2000),
"On the State of the
Aiyagari, S. R., J. Greenwood and A. Seshadri,
“Efficient Investment in Children,” JET 102 (2002), 290-321.
Becker, G. S. (1981). A Treatise on the Family.
Becker,
G. S., E. M. Landes and R. T. Michael (1977), "An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability," JPE 85, 1141-1187.
Brien,
M. J., L. A. Lillard and S. Stern (forthcoming), "Cohabitation, Marriage
and Divorce in a Model of Match Quality," IER.
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin and G. Lacroix (2002),
"Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," JPE
110, 37-72.
Friedberg, L. (1998), "Did Unilateral Divorce
Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," AER 88, 608-627.
Haveman, R. and B. Wolfe (1995), "The
Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of Methods and Findings,"
JEL 33, 1829-1878.
Lundberg, S. and R. A. Pollak (1994),
"Non-cooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," AER Papers and Proceedings
84, 132-137.