Econ 805 Advanced Micro Theory I Fall 2009
Lectures: Tuesdays and Thursdays
1:00-2:15 p.m.
Social Sciences 6314
Office Hours: by appointment (but please dont be shy!)
Syllabus
Schedule of Student Presentations
Suggested Papers
Guidelines
General Advice on Giving Good Presentations
Problem Sets
Problem Set 1 due October 6
Solutions
Problem Set 2 due November 3
Lecture Notes
Introduction
Lecture 1 Intro/Overview and then a Review of Bayesian Games
Independent Private Values
Lecture 2 Common Auction Formats and the Symmetric IPV Framework
Lecture 3 The Envelope Theorem and Revenue Equivalence
Lecture 4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium
Lecture 5 Mechanisms, the revelation principle, Myersons Optimal Auctions (part 1)
Lecture 6 Optimal Auctions (part 2), Auctions Versus Negotiations, and Reserve Prices
Interdependent Values
Lecture 7 First-Order Stochastic Dominance and Affiliation
Lecture 8 More on Affiliation; the Affiliated Interdependent Values World of Milgrom and Weber
Lecture 9 The Linkage Principle and revenue rankings; common values and equilibrium multiplicity; almost common values
Lecture 10 Drainage Tract Auctions and symmetry in asymmetric auctions; Information Aggregation
The Bigger Game
Lecture 11 Auctions with Endogenous Entry
Lecture 12 Collusion among Bidders; Endogenous Information (Persico)
Lecture 13 More Endogenous Information (Hernando-Veciana, Quint)
Other Topics
Lecture 14 Double Auctions (both small and large)
Lecture 15 Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Contests
Lecture 16 Multi-Unit Auctions
Matching Markets
Lecture 17 The Gale Shapley marriage model and the deferred acceptance algorithm
Lecture 18 Strategic concerns (incentives for misreporting) in the marriage model
Lecture 19 More complicated models of matching: many-to-one without money; with money; with contracts; supply chains
Lecture 20 Applications of matching: school choice, kidneys, unraveling
If youre interested, here are materials from past semesters: Fall 2007, Fall 2008.