Econ 805 – Advanced Micro Theory I – Fall 2008

 

Lectures:      Tuesdays and Thursdays
               9:30-10:45 am
               Social Sciences 6232
 
Office Hours:  Mondays 1:30 – 2:30 p.m.
               Wednesdays 9:30 – 10:30 a.m.
 
 
 
Syllabus
Schedule of Student Presentations
 
 
 
Problem Set 1 – due Friday, October 3
Problem Set 2 – due Tuesday, October 28
 
 
Lecture Notes
 
 
 
Introduction
 
Lecture 1 – part 1 (overview), part 2 (review of Bayesian games)
 
 
Independent Private Values
 
Lecture 2 - common auction formats, the Symmetric Independent Private Values paradigm, and a little second-order stochastic dominance
Lecture 3 – the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence
Lecture 4 – single crossing conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium
Lecture 5 – mechanisms, direct revelation mechanisms, and Myerson’s optimal auctions (part 1)
Lecture 6 – Myerson’s optimal auctions (part 2), Auctions Versus Negotiations, and the ranking lemma
 
 
Interdependent Values
 
Lecture 7 – first-order stochastic dominance, the Milgrom and Weber framework, and properties of affiliated random variables
Lecture 8 – revenue comparisons with affiliated interdependent values, the Linkage Principle
Lecture 9 – common values: the drainage tract model, equilibrium multiplicity, almost common values, distribution-matching
Lecture 10 – information aggregation in common value auctions: Wilson/Milgrom, Pesendorfer and Swinkels, and extensions
 
 
Enlarging the Game
 
Lecture 11 – auctions with endogenous entry
Lecture 12 – auctions with endogenous information acquisition
Lecture 13 – more endogenous information and a little bidder collusion
 
 
Other Topics
 
Lecture 14 – double auctions (small and large)
Lecture 15 – all-pay contests and wars of attrition
Lecture 16 – multi-unit auctions
 
 
Matching Markets
 
Lecture 17 – one-to-one matching, the deferred acceptance algorithm
Lecture 18 – more one-to-one, the lattice theorem, and strategic concerns
Lecture 19 – hospitals and interns: many-to-one matching with responsive preferences
Lecture 20 – many-to-one matching with money: Kelso and Crawford
Lecture 21 – matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom)
Lecture 22 – supply chain networks (Ostrovsky)
Lecture 23 – public school choice, kidneys, unraveling
 
 
 
 
 
Possibilities for Second Half Syllabus, including suggestions for student presentations