Regression Discontinuity

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I will describe the basic ideas of RD, but ignore many of the details

Good references (and things I used in preparing this are):

- "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, EMA (2001)
- "Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test," McCrary, Journal of Econometrics (2008)
- "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice," Imbens and Lemieux, Journal of Econometrics (2008)
- "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Lee and Lemiux, JEL (2010)

You can also find various Handbook chapters or Mostly Harmless Econometrics which might help as well



The idea of regression discontinuity goes way back, but it has gained in popularity in recent years

The basic idea is to recognize that in many circumstances policy rules vary at some cutoff point

To think of the simplest case suppose the treatment assignment rule is:

$$T_i = \begin{cases} 0 & X_i < x^* \\ 1 & X_i \ge x^* \end{cases}$$

Many different rules work like this.

Examples:

- Whether you pass a test
- Whether you are eligible for a program
- Who wins an election
- Which school district you reside in
- Whether some punishment strategy is enacted
- Birth date for entering kindergarten

The key insight is that right around the cutoff we can think of people slightly above as identical to people slightly below

Formally we can write it the model as:

$$Y_i = \alpha T_i + \varepsilon_i$$

lf

$$E(\varepsilon_i \mid X_i = x)$$

is continuous then the model is identified (actually all you really need is that it is continuous at $x = x^*$)

To see it is identified not that

$$\lim_{X \uparrow X^*} E(Y_i \mid X_i = x) = E(\varepsilon_i \mid X_i = x^*)$$

$$\lim_{X \downarrow X^*} E(Y_i \mid X_i = x) = \alpha + E(\varepsilon_i \mid X_i = x^*)$$

Thus

$$\alpha = \lim_{x \downarrow x^*} E(Y_i \mid X_i = x) - \lim_{x \uparrow x^*} E(Y_i \mid X_i = x)$$

Thats it

What I have described thus far is referred to as a "Sharp Regression Discontinuity"

There is also something called a "Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity"

This occurs when rules are not strictly enforced

Examples

- Birth date to start school
- Eligibility for a program has other criterion
- Whether punishment kicks in (might be an appeal process)

This isn't a problem as long as

$$\lim_{x \uparrow x^*} E(T_i \mid X_i = x) > \lim_{x \downarrow x^*} E(T_i \mid X_i = x)$$

To see identification we now have

$$\begin{aligned} & \underbrace{lim_{x\uparrow x^*}E(Y_i\mid X_i=x) - lim_{x\downarrow x^*}E(Y_i\mid X_i=x)}_{lim_{x\uparrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x) - lim_{x\downarrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x)} \\ &= \frac{\alpha\left[lim_{x\uparrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x) - lim_{x\downarrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x)\right]}{lim_{x\uparrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x) - lim_{x\downarrow x^*}E(T_i\mid X_i=x)} \\ &= \alpha \end{aligned}$$

Note that this is essentially just Instrumental variables (this is often referred to as the Wald Estimator)

You can also see that this works when T_i is continuous

How do we do this in practice?

There are really two approaches.

The first comes from the basic idea of identification, we want to look directly to the right and directly to the left of the policy change

Lets focus on the Sharp case-we can get the fuzzy case by just applying to Y_i and T_i and then taking the ratio

The data should look something like this (in stata)

We can think about estimating the end of the red line and the end of the green line and taking the difference

This is basically just a version of nonparametric regression at these two points

Our favorite way to estimate nonparametric regression in economics is by Kernel regression

You learned this from Jeff, but let me refresh you some

Let K(x) be a kernel that is positive and non increasing in |x| and is zero when |x| is large

The kernel regressor is defined as

$$E(Y \mid X = x) \approx \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} K(\frac{X_i - x}{h}) Y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} K(\frac{X_i - x}{h})}$$

where h is the bandwidth parameter

Note that this is just a weighted average

- it puts higher weight on observations closer to x
- when h is really big we put equal weight on all observations
- when h is really small, only the observations that are very close to x influence it

This is easiest to think about with the uniform kernel

In this case

$$K\left(\frac{X_i - x}{h}\right) = 1(|X_i - x| < h)$$

So we use take a simple sample mean of observations within h units of X_i


Clearly in this case as with other kernels, as the sample size goes up, h goes down so that asymptotically we are only putting weight on observations very close to x


To estimate $\lim_{x\downarrow x^*} E(T_i \mid X_i = x)$ we only want to use values of X_i to the right of x^* , so we would use

$$\lim_{x \downarrow x^*} E(T_i \mid X_i = x) \approx \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} 1(X_i > x^*) K(\frac{X_i - x^*}{h}) Y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} 1(X_i > x^*) K(\frac{X_i - x^*}{h})}$$

However it turns out that this has really bad properties because we are looking at the end point

For example suppose the data looked like this





For any finite bandwidth the estimator would be biased downward

It is better to use local linear (or polynomial) regression.

Here we choose

$$(\hat{a}, \hat{b}) = argmin_{a,b} \sum_{i=1}^{N} K\left(\frac{X_i - x^*}{h}\right) [Y_i - a - b(X_i - x^*)]^2 1 (X_i \ge x^*)$$

Then the estimate of the right hand side is \hat{a} .

We do the analogous thing on the other side:

$$(\hat{a}, \hat{b}) = argmin_{a,b} \sum_{i=1}^{N} K\left(\frac{X_i - x^*}{h}\right) [Y_i - a - b(X_i - x^*)]^2 1 (X_i < x^*)$$

(which with a uniform kernel just means running a regression using the observations between x^*-h and x^*

Lets try this in stata

There is another approach to estimating the model

Define

$$g(x) = E(\varepsilon_i \mid X_i = x)$$

then

$$E(Y_i \mid X_i, T_i) = \alpha T_i + g(X_i)$$

where g is a smooth function

Thus we can estimate the model by writing down a smooth flexible functional form for g and just estimate this by OLS

The most obvious functional form that people use is a polynomial

There are really two different ways to do it:

$$Y_i = \alpha T_i + b_0 + b_1 X_i + b_2 X_i^2 + v_i$$

or

$$Y_{i} = \alpha T_{i} + b_{0} + b_{1}X_{i}1 (X_{i} < x) + b_{2}X_{i}^{2}1 (X_{i} < x) + b_{3}X_{i}1 (X_{i} \ge x) + b_{4}X_{i}^{2}1 (X_{i} \ge x) + v_{i}$$

Lee and Lemieux say the second is better

Note that this is just as "nonparametric" as the Kernel approach

- You must promise to increase the degree of the polynomial as you increase the sample size (in the same way that you lower the bandwidth with the sample size)
- You still have a practical problem of how to choose the degree of the polynomial (in the same way you have a choice about how to choose the bandwidth in the kernel approaches)

You can do both and use a local polynomial-in one case you promise to lower the bandwidth, in the other you promise to add more terms, you could do both

Also, for the "fuzzy" design we can just do IV

Problems

While RD is often really nice, there are three major problems that arise

The first is kind of obvious from what we are doing-and is an estimation problem rather than an identification problem

Often the sample size is not very big and as a practical matter the bandwidth is so large (or the degree of the polynomial so small) that it isn't really regression discontinuity that is identifying things The second problem is that there may be other rules changes happening at the same cutoff so you aren't sure what exactly you are identifying The third is if the running variable is endogenous

Clearly if people choose X_i precisely the whole thing doesn't work

For example suppose

- carrying 1 pound of drugs was a felony, but less than 1 was a misdemeanor
- people who get their paper in by 5:00 on thursday afternoon are on time, 5:01 is late and marked down by a grade

Note that you need X_i to be precisely manipulated, if there is still some randomness on the actual value of X_i , rd looks fine

Mccrary (2008) suggests to test for this by looking at the density around the cutoff point:

- Under the null the density should be continuous at the cutoff point
- Under the alternative, the density would increase at the kink point when T_i is viewed as a good thing

Lets look at some examples

Randomized Experiments from Non-random Selection in U.S. House Elections

Lee, Journal of Econometrics, 2008

One of the main points of this paper is that the running variable can be endogenous as long as it can not be perfectly chosen.

In particular it could be that:

$$X_i = W_i + \xi_i$$

where W_i is chosen by someone, but ξ_i is random and unknown when W_i is chosen


Lee shows that regression discontinuity approaches still work in this case


Incumbency


We can see that incumbents in congress are re-elected at very high rates

Is this because there is an effect of incumbency or just because of serial correlation in preferences?

Regression discontinuity helps solves this problem-look at people who just barely won (or lost).










Table 1 Electoral outcomes and pre-determined election characteristics: democratic candidates, winners vs. losers: 1948–1996

Variable	All		Margin < .5		Margin < .05		Parametric fit	
	Winner	Loser	Winner	Loser	Winner	Loser	Winner	Loser
Democrat vote share election $t + 1$	0.698	0.347	0.629	0.372	0.542	0.446	0.531	0.454
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	[0.179]	[0.15]	[0.145]	[0.124]	[0.116]	[0.107]		
Democrat win prob. election $t+1$	0.909	0.094	0.878	0.100	0.681	0.202	0.611	0.253
*	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.035)
	[0.276]	[0.285]	[0.315]	[0.294]	[0.458]	[0.396]		
Democrat vote share election $t-1$	0.681	0.368	0.607	0.391	0.501	0.474	0.477	0.481
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.01)
	[0.189]	[0.153]	[0.152]	[0.129]	[0.129]	[0.133]	` ′	` ′
Democrat win prob. election $t-1$	0.889	0.109	0.842	0.118	0.501	0.365	0.419	0.416
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.039)
	[0.31]	[0.306]	[0.36]	[0.317]	[0.493]	[0.475]	` ′	` ′
Democrat political experience	3.812	0.261	3.550	0.304	1.658	0.986	1.219	1.183
	(0.061)	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.029)	(0.165)	(0.124)	(0.229)	(0.145)
	[3.766]	[1.293]	[3.746]	[1.39]	[2.969]	[2.111]	` ′	` ′
Opposition political experience	0.245	2.876	0.350	2.808	1.183	1.345	1.424	1.293
	(0.018)	(0.054)	(0.025)	(0.057)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.17)
	[1.084]	[2.802]	[1.262]	[2.775]	[2.122]	[1.949]	(()
Democrat electoral experience	3.945	0.464	3.727	0.527	1.949	1.275	1.485	1.470
	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.075)	(0.032)	(0.166)	(0.131)	(0.23)	(0.151)
	[3.787]	[1.457]	[3.773]	[1.55]	[2.986]	[2.224]	()	(,
Opposition electoral experience	0.400	3.007	0.528	2.943	1.375	1.529	1.624	1.502
	(0.019)	(0.054)	(0.027)	(0.058)	(0.12)	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.174)
	[1.189]	[2.838]	[1.357]	[2.805]	[2.157]	[2.022]	` '	, , , ,
Observations	3818	2740	2546	2354	322	288	3818	2740

Table 2
Effect of winning an election on subsequent party electoral success: alternative specifications, and refutability test, regression discontinuity estimates

Dependent variable	Vote share $t+1$	(2) Vote share $t + 1$	(3) Vote share $t+1$	(4) Vote share $t+1$	(5) Vote share $t + 1$	(6) Res. vote share $t + 1$	(7) 1st dif. vote share, <i>t</i> + 1	(8) Vote share $t-1$
Victory, election t	0.077 (0.011)	0.078 (0.011)	0.077 (0.011)	0.077 (0.011)	0.078 (0.011)	0.081 (0.014)	0.079 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.011)
Dem. vote share, $t - 1$	-	0.293	- ′	- ′	0.298	- ′	-	-
		(0.017)			(0.017)			
Dem. win, $t-1$	-	-0.017	_	_	-0.006	-	-0.175	0.240
		(0.007)			(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Dem. political experience	-	-	-0.001	-	0.000	-	-0.002	0.002
•			(0.001)		(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)
Opp. political experience	-	-	0.001	-	0.000	-	-0.008	0.011
			(0.001)		(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.003)
Dem. electoral experience	-	-	_	-0.001	-0.003	-	-0.003	0.000
F				(0.001)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)
Opp. electoral experience	_	-	-	0.001	0.003	-	0.011	-0.011
				(0.001)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.003)

Maimonides' Rule

Angrist and Lavy look at the effects of school class size on kid's outcomes

Maimonides was a twelfth century Rabbinic scholar

He interpreted the Talmud in the following way:

Twenty-five children may be put it charge of one teacher. If the number in the class exceeds twenty-five but is not more than forty, he should have an assistant to help with the instruction. If there are more than forty, two teachers must be appointed.

This rule has had a major impact on education in Israel

They try to follow this rule so that no class has more than 40 kids



But this means that

- If you have 80 kids in a grade, you have two classes with 40 each
- if you have 81 kids in a grade, you have three classes with 27 each

That sounds like a regression discontinuity

We can write the rule as

$$f_{sc} = \frac{e_s}{\left[int\left(\frac{e_s - 1}{40}\right) + 1\right]}$$

Ideally we could condition on grades with either 80 or 81 kids

More generally there are two ways to do this

- ullet condition on people close to the cutoff and use f_{sc} as an instrument
- Control for class size in a "smooth" way and use f_{sc} as an instrument


Mean	S.D.	0.10	0.25	0.50		
			0.20	0.50	0.75	0.90
02 scho	ols, test	ed in 19	91)			
	6.5	21	26	31	35	38
					100	128
14.1						35
27.3				28	32	36
		19	23			36
		64.2	69.9			83.
67.3	9.6	54.8	61.1	67.8	74.1	79.
13 scho	ols, test	ed in 19	91)			
30.3	6.3	22	26	31	35	38
78.3					101	127
	13.4	2	4	9	19	35
27.7	6.5	19	24	28	32	36
	6.5	19	24			36
72.5	8.0	62.1	67.7	73.3	78.2	82
68.9	8.8	57.5	63.6	69.3	75.0	79.
ll scho	ols, test	ed in 19	92)			
30.5	6.2	22	26	31	35	38
	37.3	34		74	104	129
	13.4	2	4	9	19	35
			21			31
	5.4	18	21	25	29	31
		78.4	83.0	87.2		93.
	6.8	75.0	80.2	84.7	89.0	91.
	29.9 77.7 14.1 27.3 27.7 74.4 67.3 13 scho 30.3 13.8 27.7 72.5 68.9 11 school 30.5 72.5 68.9 11 school 30.5 72.5 84.1 84.5 24.7 85.3 86.3	29.9 6.5 77.7 38.8 777.7 38.8 27.3 6.6 27.3 6.6 27.3 6.6 27.4 7.7 67.3 9.6 13 schools, test 30.3 6.3 77.3 13.4 27.7 6.5 72.5 8.0 8.0 8.9 8.8 11 schools, test 30.5 6.2 79.6 37.3 13.8 13.4 27.7 6.5 79.6 37.3 13.8 13.4 27.7 6.5 79.6 37.3 13.8 13.4 27.7 6.5 28.1 6.5 28.2 6.5 28.3 13.4 28.4 6.5 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.5 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.6 6.2 28.7 6.2 28.7 6.2 28.7 6.2 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.9 8.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.9 8.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.9 8.8 6.3 28.8 6.3 28.9 8.8 6.3	289 6.5 21 1777 38.8 31 14.1 13.5 2 173.3 6.6 19 27.7 6.6 19 27.7 6.6 19 30.3 6.3 22 13 schools, tested in 19 30.3 6.3 22 17.7 6.5 19 27.7 6.5 19 27.7 6.5 19 27.7 6.5 19 27.7 6.5 19 27.5 8.0 62.1 1 schools, tested in 19 30.5 6.2 22 24.5 5.4 17 24.4 5.4 18 86.3 6.1 78.4 86.3 6.1 78.4	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

B. +/- 5 Discontinuity sample (enrollment 36-45, 76-85, 116-124)


	5th g	rade	4th g	rade	3rd grade		
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	
	(471 classes, 224 schools)			15 classes, (441 cl 95 schools 206 scl			
Class size	30.8	7.4	31.1	7.2	30.6	7.4	
Enrollment	76.4	29.5	78.5	30.0	75.7	28.2	
Percent disadvantaged	13.6	13.2	12.9	12.3	14.5	14.€	
Reading size	28.1	7.3	28.3	7.7	24.6	6.2	
Math size	28.5	7.4	28.7	7.7	24.8	6.3	
Average verbal	74.5	8.2	72.5	7.8	86.2	6.3	
Average math	67.0	10.2	68.7	9.1	84.2	7.0	

Variable definitions are as follows: Class size — number of students in class in the spring, Enrollment — September grade enrollment, Percent disadvantaged — percent of students in the school from "disadvantaged backgrounds," Reading size — number of students who took the reading test, Math size — number of students who took the math test, Average verbal — average composite reading score in the class, Average math = average composite math score in the class.


a. Fifth Grade




b. Fourth Grade







b. Fourth Grade



To estimate the model they use an econometric framework

$$Y_{ics} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 C_{cs} + \beta_2 X_{ics} + \alpha_s + \varepsilon_{ics}$$

Now we can't just put in a school effect because we will loose too much variation so think of α_s as part of the error term

Their data is a bit different because it is by class rather than by individual-but for this that isn't a big deal

Angrist and Lavy first estimate this model by OLS to show what we would get

TABLE II OLS ESTIMATES FOR 1991

	5th Grade					4th Grade						
•	Reading comprehension			Math		Reading comprehension			Math			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Mean score		74.3			67.3			72.5			69.9	
(s.d.)		(8.1)			(9.9)			(8.0)			(8.8)	
Regressors												
Class size	.221	031	025	.322	.076	.019	0.141	053	040	.221	.055	.009
	(.031)	(.026)	(.031)	(.039)	(.036)	(.044)	(.033)	(.028)	(.033)	(.036)	(.033)	(.039
Percent disadvantaged		350	351		340	332		339	341		289	281
		(.012)	(.013)		(.018)	(.018)		(.013)	(.014)		(.016)	(.016
Enrollment			002			.017			004			.014
			(.006)			(.009)			(.007)			(.008
Root MSE	7.54	6.10	6.10	9.36	8.32	8.30	7.94	6.65	6.65	8.66	7.82	7.81
R^2	.036	.369	.369	.048	.249	.252	.013	.309	.309	.025	.204	.207
N		2.019			2.018			2,049			2,049	

The unit of observation is the average score in the class. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors were corrected for within-school correlation between classes.

Next, they want to worry about the fact that C_{cs} is correlated with $\alpha_s + \varepsilon_{ics}$

They run instrumental variables using f_{sc} as an instrument.

TABLE IV 2SLS Estimates for 1991 (Fifth Graders)

	Reading comprehension				Math							
	Full sample			+/- 5 Discontinuity sample			Full sample			+/- 5 Discontinuity sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Mean score (s.d.)	74.4 (7.7)			74.5 (8.2)		67.3 (9.6)		67.0 (10.2)				
Regressors												
Class size	158 (.040)	275 (.066)	260 (.081)	186 (.104)	410 (.113)	582 (.181)	013 (.056)	230 (.092)	261 (.113)	202 (.131)	185 (.151)	443 (.236)
Percent disadvantaged	372 (.014)	369 (.014)	369 (.013)		477 (.037)	461 (.037)	355 (.019)	350 (.019)	350 (.019)		459 (.049)	435 (.049)
Enrollment		.022	.012			.053		.041 (.012)	.062			.079
Enrollment squared/100			.005						010 (.016)			
Piecewise linear trend				.136 (.032)						.193 (.040)		
Root MSE N	6.15	$6.23 \\ 2019$	6.22	7.71 1961	6.79 4'	7.15 71	8.34	$8.40 \\ 2018$	8.42	9.49 1960	8.79 4	9.10 71

The unit of observation is the average score in the class. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors were corrected for within-school correlation between classes. All estimates use f_{ic} as an instrument for class size.

Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education

Sandra Black, QJE, 1999

In the Tiebout model parents can "buy" better schools for their children by living in a neighborhood with better public schools

How do we measure the willingness to pay?

Just looking in a cross section is difficult: Richer parents probably live in nicer areas that are better for many reasons

Black uses the school border as a regression discontinuity

We could take two families who live on opposite side of the same street, but are zoned to go to different schools

The difference in their house price gives the willingness to pay for school quality.




FIGURE I
Example of Data Collection for One City: Melrose
Streets, and Attendance District Boundaries

TABLE II REGRESSION RESULTS^a

(Adjusted Standard Errors Are in Parentheses^b) Dependent Variable = \ln (house price)

Distance from boundary:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) 0.15 mile
		0.35 mile from	0.20 mile from	0.15 mile fron	n from
	All	boundary	boundary	boundary	boundary
	$houses^d$	(616 yards)	(350 yards)	(260 yards)	(260 yards
Elementary	.035	.016	.013	.015	.031
school test score ^c	(.004)	(.007)	(.0065)	(.007)	(.006)
Bedrooms	.033	.038	.037	.033	.035
	(.004)	(.005)	(.006)	(.007)	(.007)
Bathrooms	.147	.143	.135	.167	.193
	(.014)	(.018)	(.024)	(.027)	(.028)
Bathrooms	013	017	015	024	025
squared	(.003)	(.004)	(.005)	(.006)	(.007)
Lot size (1000s)	.003	.005	.005	.005	.004
	(.0003)	(.0005)	(.0005)	(.0007)	(.0006)
Internal square	.207	.193	.191	.195	.191
footage (1000s)	(.007)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.012)
Age of					
building	002	002	003	003	002
	(.0003)	(.0002)	(.0005)	(.0006)	(.0004)
Age squared	.000003	.000003	.00001	.000009	.000005
•	(.000001)	(.0000006)	(.000002)	(.000003)	(.000002
Boundary					
fixed effects	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Census vari-					
ables	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
N	22,679	10,657	6,824	4,594	4,589
Number of					
boundaries	N/A	175	174	172	N/A
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.6417	0.6745	0.6719	0.6784	.6564
					

DIFFERENCES IN MEANS^a

Distance from boundary:	Full sample		0.35 mile		0.20 m	ile	0.15 mile	
	Difference in means	T-statistic	Ratio of 0.35 to full sample ^d	T-statistic	Ratio of 0.20 to full sample ^d	T-statistic	Ratio of 0.15 to full sample ^d	T-statistic
ln (house price)	.045	3.82	0.85	3.32	0.85	3.17	0.93	3.17
Test score (sum of reading and math)	1.0	32.90	1.03	27.28	1.06	24.44	1.06	22.57
House characteristics								
Bedrooms	0.02	1.68	0.90	0.91	-0.35	-0.30	0.25	0.18
Bathrooms	0.03	2.98	0.23	0.52	-0.02	-0.05	-0.07	-0.12
Lot size	2011	11.39	0.22	2.14	0.24	1.95	0.12	0.83
Internal square footage	31	2.93	0.61	1.32	0.61	1.07	0.84	1.17
Age of building	-3.13	-6.92	0.75	-3.71	0.94	-3.76	1.09	-3.52
Neighborhood characteristics ^c								
Percent Hispanic	0008	-0.79	2.50	-1.35	2.50	-1.21	2.50	-1.26
Percent non-Hispanic black	0007	-1.50	0.43	-0.54	0.00	-0.07	-0.14	0.16
Percent 0-9 years old	.005	3.30	0.16	0.63	-0.08	-0.31	-0.30	-1.21
Percent 65+ years old	01	-2.04	0.40	-0.72	0.67	-1.28	0.60	, -0.95
Percent female-headed households								
with children	001	-3.67	1.00	-3.17	1.20	-2.53	1.00	-2.38
Percent with bachelor's degree	.002	1.06	0.75	0.64	1.00	0.74	0.75	0.67
Percent with graduate degree	.008	3.32	0.88	2.77	0.88	3.02	0.88	3.31
Percent with less than high school								
diploma	005	-2.19	1.20	-2.02	0.80	-1.57	0.34	-0.64
Median household income	2,135	2.87	0.60	1.90	0.65	2.11	0.52	1.61

TABLE IV Magnitude of Results^a

	(1) Basic hedonic regression ^d	(2) 0.35 sample boundary fixed effects	(3) 0.20 sample boundary fixed effects	(4) 0.15 sample boundary fixed effects
Coefficient on elementary school test score ^b	.035 (.004)	.016 (.007)	.013 (.0065)	.015 (.007)
Magnitude of effect (percent change in house price as a result of a 5% change in test scores) ^c	4.9%	2.3%	1.8%	2.1%
\$ Value (at mean tax-adjusted house price of \$188,000 in \$1993)	\$9212	\$4324	\$3384	\$3948
\$ Value (at median tax-adjusted house price of \$158,000 in \$1993)	\$7742	\$3634	\$2844	\$3318

a. The results presented here are based on estimates from Table II, columns (1)-(4).

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b. Test scores are measured at the elementary school level and represent the sum of the reading and math scores from the fourth grade MEAP test averaged over three years (1988, 1990, and 1992). Source: Massachusetts Department of Education.

c. Approximately a one-standard-deviation change in the average test scores at the mean.

d. Regression includes house characteristics, school characteristics measured at the school district level, and neighborhood characteristics measured at the census block group level. See Table II, column (1), and Appendix I for more complete results.