

From: Laura D. Edles and Scott Appelrouth, eds.  
 Sociological Theory in the Classical Era (Thousand  
 Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2005), pp 29-39.




Figure 2.3 Marx's Core Concepts

Marx's writings included here are divided into four sections. The first section centers on Marx's "materialist conception of history," developed in reaction to the works of the German idealist philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). The second section offers his critique of the human costs of capitalism. The third section contains Marx's call for the inevitable communist revolution that will usher in the "end of prehistory" and, with it, the end of alienation, private property, and oppressive government. In the final set of readings, we move from Marx's prophecy of emancipation to his theory of economics. Here you will read his analyses of the sources of value and the nature of commodities.

Introduction to "The German Ideology"

*Recommended:*

Written in 1845-46, *The German Ideology* presents the most detailed account of Marx's theory of history. In it, Marx set out to reformulate the work of the eminent German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel. In contrast to previous philosophers who focused on explaining the roots of stability in the physical and social worlds (i.e., why things seemingly stayed the same), Hegel saw change as the motor of history. For Hegel, change was driven by a dialectical process in which a given state of being or idea contains within it the seeds of an opposing state of being or idea. The resolution of the conflict produces yet a new state of being or idea. This synthesis, in turn, forms the basis of a new contradiction, thus continuing the process of change.

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As an example, consider the division of gender roles. Traditionally, women and the roles they perform have been devalued relative to the positions occupied by men. Thus, the notion that a "woman's place is in the home" serves as a justification for male dominance in economic and political affairs. Out of the ideas that sustained the oppression of women was born the opposing view that women are in fact superior to men. From this vantage it is argued, for instance, that women's "innate" compassion or empathy better qualifies them for positions of leadership compared to the "innate" aggression said to characterize men. From the clash of these opposing ideas, a synthesis or state of being has evolved in which neither women nor men are considered superior to the other, but instead are viewed as equal. Thus, women have entered into roles formerly reserved for men, while men have begun to perform more traditionally "feminine" tasks.

Is society thus faced with a never ending challenging of ideas as one "truth" replaces another in the evolution of history? Hegel's answer is a definitive "no." He expressed, instead, a belief in the ultimate perfectibility of humankind. Such perfection occurs through the progressive realization of "Spirit" or "Absolute Idea" as revealed by God. In other words, history comes to an end as the utopia of "Truth" and "Reason" resolves the contradictions between ideas and reality. In arguing that the evolution of human history proceeds purposively according to an immanent or predestined design, Hegel offers a teleological vision shared with both Christian theology and Enlightenment philosophy. (As you will read, Marx, too, fashioned a teleological theory, but one that casts communism as the final end to which history progresses.)

If this seems abstract, it is because it is! Perhaps we can clarify Hegel's dialectic idealism a bit further. The essence of reality lies in thought or ideas because it is only in and through the concepts that order our experiences that experiences, as such, are known. Thus, as our knowledge changes, so does reality. The stages of history are then defined by progressive stages in the negation of the prevailing conceptual ordering of experience. The millennial aspect of this development is found in the assertion that a final Truth exists. Here, humankind's knowledge will reach the perfected state of Reason or Absolute Idea once we become fully self-conscious and are able to recognize that the objective world is a product of the human spirit. At this point in the evolution of consciousness or ideas, humans will become truly free!

*The German Ideology* reflects both Marx's indebtedness to and break from Hegel's philosophy. On one hand, akin to Hegel, Marx depicts the unfolding of history as a progressive, dialectical process that culminates in a utopia of freedom and self-realization. In other words, like Hegel, Marx argues that each successive period in societal evolution is a necessary consequence of the preceding stage; and Marx projects a millennial significance onto the process itself, claiming that social development ends in a "necessary" utopia free of conflict and exploitation. However, Marx breaks decisively from Hegel by insisting that it is *material* existence—not consciousness—that fuels historical change. Thus, Marx sought to take Hegel's idealism, which had the evolution of history "standing on its head," and "turn it right side up" so as to discover the real basis of the progression of human societies. Theoretically, this inversion is of utmost significance because it reflects a shift from a nonrationalist to a rationalist theoretical orientation.

In suggesting that history is marked by a separation of the True from the real, it follows that we are alienated from our consciousness or Spirit. Hegel's notion of alienation would play a central role in Marx's work. Marx, however, argued that alienation was not a consequence of distorted consciousness but, rather, resulted from the material conditions of production. Marx takes up this issue in his essay "Alienated Labor," excerpted below.

Recommended!

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Source: Excerpts from "The Reader, Second Edition, by 1978 by W.W. Norton & Co

*The German Ideology* is a pivotal writing because it offers the fullest treatment of Marx's materialist conception of history. It is in Marx's theory of historical materialism that we find one of his most important philosophical contributions, namely his conviction that ideas or interests have no existence independent of physical reality. In numerous passages you will see Marx's rejection of Hegel's notion that ideas determine experience in favor of the materialist view that experience determines ideas. For instance, Marx asserts that "Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process" (Marx and Engels 1846/1978:154). And again, "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (ibid.:155). In short, Marx argues that the essence of individuals, what they truly are, is determined by the material, economic conditions—"what they produce and how they produce"—in which they live out their very existence (ibid.:150).

This perspective, moreover, yields a radical conclusion: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (ibid.:172). In other words, Marx maintains that the dominant economic class controls not only a society's means of material production, but the production of ideas as well. To illustrate this point, consider, for instance, the *idea* of individual equality. From where did it spring? The notion of equality is by no means universal. Not only do some contemporary societies reject the concept of equality, but even those societies that do guarantee such rights (the United States, France, England, to name but a few) have not always done so. How are we then to account for the development of this principle? The answer, in short, lies in the development of capitalism. As an economic system, capitalism is based on the notion of "freedom"—workers are "free" to find work or quit their job. Entrepreneurs are "free" to open or close their businesses. In order for competitive capitalism to develop to its fullest productive capacities, individuals must be able to move, work, and invest their capital freely. This ability is expressed through the idea of individual equality. Thus, the concept of equality is born out of the capitalist mode of production and the nature of the social relationships it demands. It is an idea advanced by the bourgeoisie to sanction individualism and sustain the economic conditions in which they themselves are the dominant force. In short, it serves the economic and political interests of the ruling class.

REQUIRD!

## The German Ideology (1845-1846)

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals—physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of

The premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.

Source: Excerpts from "The German Ideology: Part I," translated by Robert Tucker, from *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Second Edition, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, edited by Robert C. Tucker. Copyright © 1972, 1978 by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

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course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, or hydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. . . .

The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour and internal intercourse. This statement is generally recognised. But not only the relation of one nation to others, but also the whole internal structure of the nation itself depends on the stage of development reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse. How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative of productive forces already known (for instance the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the division of labour. The separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the

separation of town and country and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labour. At the same time through the division of labour inside these various branches there develop various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the methods employed in agriculture, industry and commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same conditions are to be seen (given a more developed intercourse) in the relations of different nations to one another.

The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership, i.e., the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product of labour. The first form of ownership is tribal [*Stammesgenossenschaft*] ownership. It corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by the rearing of beasts or, in the highest stage, agriculture. In the latter case it presupposes a great mass of uncultivated stretches of land. The division of labour is at this stage still very elementary and is confined to a further extension of the natural division of labour existing in the family. The social structure is, therefore, limited to an extension of the family; patriarchal family chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, finally slaves. The slavery latent in the family only develops gradually with the increase of population, the growth of wants, and with the extension of external relations, both of war and of barter.

The second form is the ancient communal and State ownership which proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied by slavery. Beside communal ownership we already find movable, and later also immovable, private property developing, but as an abnormal form subordinate to communal ownership. The citizens hold power over their labouring slaves only in their community, and on this account alone, therefore, they are bound to the form of communal ownership. It is the communal private property which compels

the active citizens to a derived form of association based on this society based on this with it the power of the same measure as, private property evolves already more developed antagonism of town and country interests, and antagonism between sent town interests and county interests, and the antagonism between commerce. The class and slaves is now composed of the third form of estate property. If a town and its little territory started out from this starting-point was determined of the population at a large increase from the outset, therefore, territory, prepared by the spread of agriculture. The last century Empire and its corner destroyed a number of culture had declined, want of a market, violently suspended, had decreased. The mode of organisation determined by them, undermined the influence under the influence constitution. Like the ship, it is based against directly producing class, as in the case of the slaves, but the As soon as feudalism also arises antagonistic structure of armed bodies of nobility gave the nobility private feudal organisation against a subjected form of association a

producers were different because of the different conditions of production.

This feudal system of landownership had its counterpart in the towns in the shape of corporative property, the feudal organisation of trades. Here property consisted chiefly in the labour of each individual person. The necessity for association against the organised robber nobility, the need for communal covered markets in an age when the industrialist was at the same time a merchant, the growing competition of the escaped serfs swarming into the rising towns, the feudal structure of the whole country; these combined to bring about the *guilds*. The gradually accumulated small capital of individual craftsmen and their stable numbers, as against the growing population, evolved the relation of journeyman and apprentice, which brought into being in the towns a hierarchy similar to that in the country.

Thus the chief form of property during the feudal epoch consisted on the one hand of landed property with serf labour chained to it, and on the other of the labour of the individual with small capital commanding the labour of journeyman. The organisation of both was determined by the restricted conditions of production—the small-scale and primitive cultivation of the land, and the craft type of industry. There was little division of labour in the heyday of feudalism. Each country bore in itself the antithesis of town and country; the division into estates was certainly strongly marked; but apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and peasants in the country, and masters, journeymen, apprentices and soon also the rabble of casual labourers in the towns, no division of importance took place. In agriculture it was rendered difficult by the strip-system, beside which the cottage industry of the peasants themselves emerged. In industry there was no division of labour at all in the individual trades themselves, and very little between them. The separation of industry and commerce was found already in existence in older towns; in the newer it only developed later, when the towns entered into mutual relations. . . .

The fact is, therefore, that definite individual-als who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each

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the active citizens to remain in this spontaneously derived form of association over against their slaves. For this reason the whole structure of society based on this communal ownership, and with it the power of the people, decays in the same measure as, in particular, immovable private property evolves. The division of labour is already more developed. We already find the antagonism of town and country; later the antagonism between those states which represent town interests and those which represent country interests, and inside the towns themselves the antagonism between industry and maritime commerce. The class relation between citizens and slaves is now completely developed. . . .

The third form of ownership is feudal or estate property. If antiquity started out from the town and its little territory, the Middle Ages started out from the country. This different starting-point was determined by the sparseness of the population at that time, which was scattered over a large area and which received no large increase from the conquerors. In contrast to Greece and Rome, feudal development at the outset, therefore, extends over a much wider territory, prepared by the Roman conquests and the spread of agriculture at first associated with them. The last centuries of the declining Roman Empire and its conquest by the barbarians destroyed a number of productive forces; agriculture had declined, industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out or been violently suspended, the rural and urban population had decreased. From these conditions and the mode of organisation of the conquest determined by them, feudal property developed under the influence of the Germanic military constitution. Like tribal and communal ownership, it is based again on a community; but the directly producing class standing over against it is not, as in the case of the ancient community, the slaves, but the enserfed small peasantry. As soon as feudalism is fully developed, there also arises antagonism to the towns. The hierarchical structure of retainers associated with it, gave the nobility power over the serfs. This feudal organisation was, just as much as the ancient communal ownership, an association against a subjected producing class; but the form of association and the relation to the direct

id country and to the slaves. Its further development of commercial from the same time through it inside these various various divisions among rating in definite kinds e position of these individuals by the methods determined by the methods of slavery, industry and commerce, are to be seen (given a course) in the relations of re another.

is of development in the re just so many different e, the existing stage in the determines also the relations; another with reference to ent, and product of labour. of ownership is tribal ownership. It corresponds to age of production, at which a ing and fishing, by the rear- the highest stage, agriculture. pre-supposes a great mass of es of land. The division of age still very elementary and ther extension of the natural existing in the family. The s, therefore, limited to an family; patriarchal family tem the members of the tribe, slavery latent in the family; growth of wants, and with the nal relations, both of war and form is the ancient communal hip which proceeds especially if several tribes into a city by conquest, and which is still slavery. Beside communal ready find movable, and later private property developing, al form subordinate to communal citizens hold power over slaves only in their community, amount alone, therefore, they are m of communal ownership. It is private property which compels





different classes are fought out among one another. . . . Further, it follows that every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself, must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do. Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal interest (in fact the general is the illusory form of communal life), the latter will be imposed on them as an interest, "alien" to them, and "independent" of them, as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general" interest; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the *practical* struggle of these particular interests, which constantly *really* run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes *practical* intervention and control necessary through the illusory "general" interest in the form of the State. The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and of the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.

This "estrangement" (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two *practical* premises. For it to become an "intolerable" power, i.e., a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity "propertyless," and produced, at the same time, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which conditions presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development. And, on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their *world-historical*, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it *want* is merely made general, imagination, as the "general interest," but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided. And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood: while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.

And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community the latter takes an independent form as the *State*, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration—such as flesh and blood, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests—and especially, as we shall enlarge upon later, on the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others. It follows from this that all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc., etc., are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the

and with *destitution* reproduced; and further this universal development a universal intercourse which produces in all phenomena of the "J" competition), makes revolutions of the other *historical*, empirical place of local ones. V could only exist as a intercourse themselves as *universal*, hence in have remained home by superposition; and course would abolish cally, communism is the dominant people neously, which presentment of product intercourse bound u otherwise could for i history at all, have te landed property, for eferent premises give from parcellation to a few, in England and from parcellation to a few to parcellation today? Or how does after all is nothing products of various in the whole world through demand—a relation must says, hovers over ancients, and with inv misfortune to men, se empires, causes nation while with the abolition property, with the co-duction (and, implicit the alien relation be themselves produce) supply and demand; men get exchange, pr mutual relation, under Communism is i which is to be est

and with *destinon* the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put *world-historical*, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism could only exist as a local event; (2) the *forces of intercourse* themselves could not have developed as *universal*, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world-intercourse bound up with communism. How otherwise could for instance property have had a history at all, have taken on different forms, and landed property, for example, according to the different premises given, have proceeded in France from parcelation to centralisation in the hands of a few, in England from centralisation in the hands of a few to parcelation, as is actually the case today? Or how does it happen that trade, which after all is nothing more than the exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the whole world through the relation of supply and demand—a relation which, as an English economist says, hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires and overthrow empires, causes nations to rise and to disappear—while with the abolition of the basis of private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and, implicit in this, the destruction of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relation, under their own control again?

Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which the bourgeoisie embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as State. The term "civil society" [*Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*]<sup>111</sup> emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the

<sup>111</sup> *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* can mean either "bourgeois society" or "civil society."

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idealist superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name. . . .

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e., civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc., etc., and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly on the real *ground* of history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by resolution into "self-consciousness" or transformation into "apparitions," "spectres," etc., but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory. It shows that history does not end by being resolved into "self-consciousness" as "spirit of the spirit," but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances. This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as "substance" and "essence of man," and what they have deified and attacked: a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact that these philosophers revolt against it as "self-consciousness" and the "Unique." These conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, decide also whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary convulsion will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire existing system. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present (namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of society up till then, but against the very "production of life" till then, the "total activity" on which it was based), then, as far as practical development is concerned, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves. . . .

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which has the *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law."

The division of labour, which we have already seen above as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as

the division of mental inside this class one of the class (its action who make the particular class about itself thereby while the others' actions is more passive are in reality the active have less time to m about themselves. W can even develop in hostility between the in the case of a particular class itself is endangered, in which case semblance that the ruling class are the power of this class in a particular existence of a ruling class premises for the latter said above.

If now in consideration detach the ideas of the ruling class itself and a dependent existence, if we that these or those ideas, without bothering conditions of production, if we thus ignore conditions which are can say, for instance, aristocracy was dominant, loyalty, etc., were loyalty, etc., were equality, etc. The ruling class imagines this to be something which is common since the eighteenth century come up against the increasingly take on each new class which

world-wide intercourse interests (in the beginning

one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.<sup>17</sup> It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of the other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only insofar as they became bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, whereas the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, aims at a more decided and radical negation of the previous conditions of society than could all the previous classes which sought to rule.

This whole semblance, that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the "general interest" as ruling.

<sup>17</sup> Marginal note by Marx: "Universality corresponds to (1) the class versus the estate, (2) the competition, world-wide intercourse, etc., (3) the great numerical strength of the ruling class, (4) the illusion of the common interests (in the beginning this illusion is true), (5) the delusion of the ideologists and the division of labour."

the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class: about the premises for the latter sufficient has already been said above.

If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for instance, that during the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e., ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of

development of men, others revolt against it of the "Unique." These different generations find either or not the primary convulsion will throw the basis of the material elements. If these material elements are not present he existing productive nation of a revolution only against separate I then, but against the I then, the "total active", then, as far as practical, it is absolutely a of this revolution has times already, as the class are in every epoch as which is the ruling s at the same time its ion at its disposal, has or the means of mental y, generally speaking, r the means of mental The ruling ideas are eal expression of the nships, the dominant ed as ideas; hence of re the one class the r- of its dominance. The : ruling class possess ousness, and therefore they rule as a class and compass of an epoch, it this in its whole range, rule also as thinkers, as regulate the production eas of their age: thus a country where royal geists are contending therefore, mastery is separation of powers and is expressed as which we have already left forces of history up o in the ruling class as

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses. The names are listed in a single column, and the addresses are listed in a single column to the right of the names. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The addresses are: 123 Main St, 456 Elm St, and 789 Oak St.