Faculty women have been almost universally supportive. They have found the workshops very valuable, many claiming that they would never have been able to construct their personnel dossiers based on the kind of advice provided by their chairs and deans. Our workshop entitled “Just Say No” drew some fire from women colleagues who feared that in encouraging women to refuse to do service that interfered with their research and writing, we were making it harder for senior faculty in small departments who were already overwhelmed with service commitments. We again declined to change our position. The faculty has elected women associated with WOW and the Women’s Studies program for participation on committees that evaluate renewal, tenure, and promotion dossiers. Perhaps most important, faculty women now know where they can go with their concerns. And I like to think that we had some impact on the reversal of a negative tenure and promotion decision by the administration in the case of a feminist sociologist.

Our experience raises some major sociological questions relating to the impact of collective bargaining in colleges and universities on women. While individual women have had important leadership positions on boards and in negotiations, our union has not emerged as a force for gender equity. This is particularly disappointing given the fact that the union accepted the highly structured and multi-layered annual reviews in collective negotiations, with little understanding of how they could be used against particular groups. On the other hand, the union established itself against a strongly antiunion university administration and has struggled fairly successfully for wages and benefits.

As I begin a summer devoted to catching up on the research my involvement with campus politics made difficult during the school year, I look with frustration at how far we have to go to achieve parity for faculty women. I also look with pride and wonder at the generation of young feminist scholars beginning to make their mark in our classrooms and enriching our lives in innumerous ways. Such contradictions are the stuff that makes academia an often maddening place—and feminist leadership imperative if institutions of higher education are to serve the young women of the twenty-first century.

MARIETTA MORRISSEY
University of Toledo

GENDERED CITIZENSHIP
South Africa’s Democratic Transition and the Construction of a Gendered State

GAY W. SEIDMAN
University of Wisconsin—Madison

The tendency for abstract theorists of democratization to overlook gender dynamics is perhaps exacerbated in the South African case, where racial inequality is obviously key. Yet, attention to the processes through which South African activists inserted gender issues into discussions about how to construct new institutions provides an unusual prism through which to explore the gendered character of citizenship. After providing an explanation for the unusual prominence of gender concerns in South Africa’s democratization, the article argues that during the drawn-out democratic transition, South African activists, often influenced by international feminist discussions, developed a collective definition of gender interests and began to build those interests into the structure of democratic institutions, in ways that will affect politics and the definition of “women’s interests” in the future.

Conventionally, democracy and human rights have been defined and interpreted in terms of men’s experiences. . . . If democracy and human rights are to be meaningful for women, they must address our historical subordination and oppression. Women must participate in, and shape, the nature and form of our democracy.


In 1985, a leading South African antiapartheid activist rejected feminist concerns that gender inequality should be part of the antiapartheid struggle. “It would be suicide,” she told the Nairobi Women’s Conference, for women in the antiapartheid movement to discuss gender inequalities. To do so might undermine the struggle for racial justice by creating division and rancor (The Nairobi Conference 1985). But nine years later, when South Africa’s first democratically elected government was installed under President Nelson Mandela, that same activist had emerged as a vocal feminist, who articulated democratic aspirations in explicitly gendered terms. As the newly installed Speaker of Parliament, Frene Ginwala drew

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on international feminist discussions of gendered citizenship, insisting that South Africa’s new democratic state must address gender subordination at all levels—from establishing a day care center in the formerly all-white, mainly male Parliament building, to creating new institutions within government ministries to remove gender inequalities.

Given South Africa’s history, it is not surprising that most discussions emphasize the racial dynamics of democratization: Apartheid was a racial system, and South Africa’s Black majority was denied the right to vote until 1994. What is surprising—in light of South Africa’s own history, as well as in light of the tendency for general discussions of democracy to overlook issues of gender in the construction of new states—is that the makers of South Africa’s new democracy discuss citizenship in explicitly gendered terms, paying close attention to the ways in which gendered identities and interests play out in the consolidation of democracy. During the South African transition, women activists played a surprisingly important role in the negotiations, in the elections, and in designing the new state. Women’s participation is already leading to new approaches to policy making and, I will suggest, to the construction of a new vision of gendered citizenship.

Many feminist theorists have argued that abstract theories of democracy ignore the way citizens’ gendered lives mean men and women experience political institutions differently. Rather than treating citizenship as a universal relationship between (ungendered) individuals and the state, they suggest that democratic theory must acknowledge the way gender dynamics affect both individual political participation and the impact of state policies on individuals (Jensen 1995; Orloff 1993; Pateman 1989; Philips 1991; Young 1990). Yet, discussions of democratization in the 1990s tend to overlook this insight. Ironically, although most contemporary analysts agree that women as well as men will vote in new democracies, they generally remain silent on how gender dynamics play out in the construction of new institutions. At an empirical level, “transition theories” tend to focus uncritically on men and male-dominated organizations; at a theoretical level, they tend to view the relationship between citizen and state in universalist terms, ignoring the way men and women experience new democratic institutions in different ways or explicitly avoiding the question (cf. Aminzade 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Remmer 1991; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992).

When gender is discussed at all, it tends to be examined in terms of women’s participation in democratic oppositions or how transitions affect women’s lives—for example, in terms of changing state policies regarding employment and day care facilities—rather than in terms of new gendered possibilities for political participation (Jaquette 1989).

This tendency to treat women as recipients of state policies rather than agents in the construction of new states is perhaps exacerbated in analyses of South Africa, which tend to focus on racial and class dynamics with little attention to gender. Adam and Moodley 1993; Adler and Webster 1995; Marx 1992; Slabbert 1992). But when and how do gender differences matter? What are women’s interests, and how should they be incorporated in the state? The consolidation of democracy involves new patterns of political participation, new social policies, new institutions, and any acknowledgment of the gendered experiences of daily life must raise questions about whether men and women experience democratic citizenship differently. This question is particularly important in light of a second theoretical discussion in feminist theory. Most feminist theorists have come to view “women’s interests” as shaped by social and political institutions. While most analysts probably agree with Chowdhury and Nelson (1994) that women everywhere define political interests partly in terms of coping with domestic demands, most have moved away from an essentialist understanding (cf. Dietz 1987; Jones 1990). Instead, most theorists increasingly suggest that state policies redefine or alter gendered domestic life in different ways for women in different social positions and emphasize the way gender interests are constructed through specific institutions in different contexts (Brenner and Laslett 1991; Orloff 1993; Pringle and Watson 1992).

This article asks why and how gender issues became so prominent in the construction of a democratic South African state and what difference it makes to the experience of citizenship for South African men and women. As I hope to demonstrate, a description of South Africa’s transition that pays attention to its gendered dynamics offers an unusual prism into the construction of gendered democratic institutions. An explicitly gendered democratization process—in which activists, increasingly influenced by international feminist discussions, inserted gender issues into discussions about how to construct new democratic institutions—has affected the character of democracy and citizenship, with important implications for men and women’s participation in the public arena. I suggest that in South Africa, feminist activists developed a collective definition of gender interests during the moment of the consolidation of a new democratic state. Furthermore, I argue that South African feminists have been able to build those interests into the structure of democratic institutions in ways that will affect politics and the definition of women’s interests in the future.

This description of a relatively visible and powerful feminist lobby within the newly democratized South African state may come as a surprise to those who have read discussions of South African gender debates in the past. In the late 1980s, feminist scholars were more likely to discuss the tendency of antiapartheid activists to subsume gender concerns to nationalist goals than to discuss activists’ efforts to challenge gender inequality (Bozzi 1983; Mc Clintock 1993; Walker 1982). But I hope to show that during the democratic transition, an increasingly articulate women’s movement successfully reversed this trend, so that women in the antiapartheid movement now treat gender issues very differently than they might have a decade ago—a description corroborated by other recent accounts (Albertyn 1994b; Kemp et al. 1995).

The empirical material presented here was collected between 1990 and 1997, during six visits to South Africa, each lasting between 3 and 15 months, beginning shortly after the white minority government entered into negotiations with the democratic opposition, through the first two years of President Nelson Mandela’s tenure in office. The description of women’s participation in the transition process
is based on participant observation of meetings and demonstrations of both mixed and women’s-only political groups; about 15 interviews and several dozen informal discussions with a range of political activists; and articles published in newspapers, community publications, and feminist journals in South Africa. In general, I have used direct quotes from published materials rather than from interviews and informal discussions with activists. In part, this choice was made because it was rarely possible to tape interviews verbatim and difficult in informal conversations to take down direct quotes; more important, however, it seemed unnecessary to rely on my notes and tapes when South African feminist activists are quite able to articulate their own ideas, in the format of their own choosing. In the 1990s, feminist activists in South Africa are generally self-reflective and very literate; recognizing that fact, I think, makes it easier for observers to allow individuals to choose their own words. Because published articles generally represent activists’ self-conscious choices of words and opinions and reflect more accurately the sense of public debates than would an individual offhand remark in an interview or discussion, I have chosen to cite interviews only when a respondent has made a point that is important to an overall understanding of the processes I describe but that has not to my knowledge appeared in print.

After presenting a road map to the process through which gender issues emerged as explicit concerns during the consolidation of democracy, the article describes efforts by South African feminist activists first to draw a broad picture of “women’s interests” during the transition process. I emphasize as explanatory factors the important participation of women in grassroots movements for democratization, combined with the material and ideological resources provided by an international feminist movement. In the next section, I discuss the way activists instituted a national debate around gender issues and their attempts to construct institutions that would force the new state to address gender inequalities in all aspects of state policy. Finally, I reflect on the implications of this case for broader feminist discussions of citizenship and democratization.

THE GENDERED CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY

In the late 1980s, prominent activists rarely sought to insert concerns about gender in discussions about how to end apartheid. As in most democratic transitions, the initial participants in secret discussions between the authoritarian white-supremacist government and the democratic opposition were almost entirely male, and gender issues were almost invisible. But during the first half of the 1990s, gender issues were increasingly raised in discussions of the character of South Africa’s future democracy. Women activists were increasingly included in the negotiations, and these activists became increasingly willing to articulate their democratic aspirations in gendered terms. Why did visible participation by women in the negotiated process out of apartheid—particularly participation by women willing to identify themselves with feminist issues—increase so dramatically after 1990? In this section, I offer a chronology of the process through which gender issues were made increasingly visible and suggest an explanation for why gender concerns emerged so prominently in the configuration of South Africa’s new democracy.

Initially, most activists conceived of the democratization process as one that would address racial and economic inequalities, rather than gender-specific ones. When all political parties were unbanned in 1990, the African National Congress (ANC) included one or two women in its negotiating team, but gender issues were not raised explicitly—despite the ANC’s rhetorical inclusion of gender equality as part of its democratic aspirations (ANC 1990). This tendency to subsume gender concerns under concerns about racial equality had long been visible in the anti-apartheid movement. Until the mid-1980s, leaders in the anti-apartheid movement had generally remained silent on gender issues or, at most, had pointed to the way that apartheid prevented women from fulfilling their tasks as wives and mothers (Gaitskell and Underhalter 1989; McClintock 1993; Walker 1982). Yet, as scholars began to point out as early as the 1950s, although apartheid’s racial discrimination gained international notoriety, it also involved systemic gender discrimination, affecting women and men in quite different ways. Gender discrimination was not simply a secondary aspect of racial inequality. Women of all races faced some degree of state-sanctioned discrimination, since legislation ranging from tax codes to pensions re-created women’s subordination by assuming their dependence on male breadwinners (Rampiehe 1989; Segar and White 1992; Walker 1990). For Blacks, however, apartheid and gender inequalities were clearly intertwined. Under apartheid’s pass laws, Blacks’ urban residence permits depended on formal-sector employment, and gendered labor markets left most Black women working in the informal sector or unemployed, faced with a choice of waiting for migrant workers’ remittances in impoverished rural areas or living illegally near towns. Women organizing against government policies directed specifically at Black women—for example, prohibitions on beer brewing, one of the few cash-earning activities available to urban Black women, or laws extending passes to women—generally discussed their activities as part of the broader anti-apartheid struggle, rarely questioning the gender subordination that prevailed in African as well as white communities (Bradford 1987; Walker 1982).

Most anti-apartheid activists remained publicly silent about how a new government would deal with gender inequalities before the late 1980s. In discussions in the 1990s, several women who are now self-described feminists said that in earlier anti-apartheid campaigns, they avoided raising gender issues publicly because they feared creating internal divisions in an already embattled anti-apartheid movement; moreover, some women said that in townships, they faced physical threats from male activists if they raised questions such as reproductive rights (interviews with three ANC Women’s League officers, May 1993). But it is probably impossible in retrospect to ascertain how many women activists thought critically about gender inequalities within the anti-apartheid movement. While some activists may
indeed have censored their own concerns, others admitted in interviews that they simply accepted uncritically the general antiapartheid discourse that stressed the need to reunify African families divided by apartheid’s gendered migrant labor, rather than to address inequalities within families—not an uncommon tendency in nationalist movements, where gender issues are often subsumed under nationalist goals (Chatterjee 1989; Chazan 1989; Stacey 1983). For the most part, when women were mentioned at all by antiapartheid activists, it was usually as wives and mothers. Democratic goals seemed to embrace a domestic vision for Black women rather than calling for autonomous citizenship and political participation as gendered individuals (Gaitskell and Unterhalter 1989; McClintock 1993; Walker 1982).

By the early 1990s, however, this vision was explicitly challenged within the antiapartheid movement, as the result of two linked processes. First, South African intellectuals began to discuss the ways in which apartheid had treated Black women and men differently and to consider how women’s needs might thus differ from those of men during reconstruction. Increasingly, feminist intellectuals, mainly women, began to argue that unless gender concerns were considered during the course of democratization, new political institutions would re-create and reinforce inequality (Hassim 1991; Hassim, Metelkamp, and Todes 1987; Horn 1991; Serote 1991). Second, antiapartheid activists began to develop separate women’s forums, hoping to increase women’s participation in the grassroots movement against apartheid. Women whose husbands objected to their political activities might feel more comfortable going to all-women meetings, it was argued; moreover, women might speak more freely if no men were present and could thus gain valuable experience and confidence in public speaking. These forums represented the first explicit recognition within the democratic opposition that women and men might have somewhat different agendas. In a highly politicized environment, women mobilized within separate women’s groups often analyzed their lives not only in terms of race and class but also in terms of gender inequalities. Gender-specific organizational forms allowed, even encouraged, women activists to consider how their experiences differed from men; grassroots mobilization created a new constituency for feminist concerns within the antiapartheid movement—a new, explicitly gendered collective identity (Seidman 1993).

New forms of mobilization within the democratic opposition—particularly forms that encouraged women’s participation—prompted a reformulation of antiapartheid goals to include some consideration of gender issues. From the late 1980s, feminist ideas gained currency within the ANC. Prominent activists began to insist that the democratic opposition should commit itself to ending gender inequality both in its internal structures and more broadly in South African society. After its unbanning in 1990, ANC slogans increasingly demanded a “nonracial, democratic, and nonsexist South Africa,” and ANC meetings increasingly involved some discussion of what that goal might entail.

During this period, gender issues often provoked conflict within the ANC, challenging as they did both the assertion of shared oppression and unity, and male dominance within the organization. After a fierce debate, the 1991 national ANC conference refused to set gender quotas for leading ANC committees—overruling Nelson Mandela’s strong support for a gendered quota and provoking many women activists to take their first public stance identifying themselves with feminist concerns in opposition to their male counterparts. Similarly, in areas where violent protests became associated with masculine identity issues, township activists often threatened women who challenged gender subordination (Campbell 1992).

But at the ANC’s national headquarters, leading activists—both male and female—continued to insist that women should be included on all important committees. As an organization, the ANC adopted this policy for its national headquarters by late 1992. In practice, the policy meant that leading women activists were stretched thin, running from meeting to meeting, but the principle was increasingly accepted within the national headquarters of the ANC. By early 1993, when the ANC Women’s League demonstrated against women’s exclusion from national negotiations, they described themselves in interviews as carrying to a national level a principle that had been successful within the ANC’s organizational structure (interview, TM, June 1993).

Gradually, the principle of gendered representation at the national negotiations for democracy became accepted within the country’s political elite. As national negotiations proceeded, women activists grew increasingly visible across the political spectrum, and women activists of all political views began to agree that gender issues should be taken up during, rather than after, the transition, insisting that women’s voices be heard—although generally acknowledging that those voices would be multiple and often contradictory (Fouche 1994, 79). An activist in the Africanist Pan African Congress, a Black nationalistic group that had previously called for the suppression of gender issues in the interest of supporting African tradition, argued that since “women are universally discriminated against. . . . it becomes necessary that the rights of women should be defined, enshrined in the constitution of a liberated Azania” (Mothopeng 1992, 49). Similarly, the Black-consciousness organization AZAPO (Azanian People’s Organization) committed itself to anticolonialism in 1993 (Moodley 1993)—rejecting AZAPO’s previous view of feminist concerns as divisive and irrelevant to Black aspirations. Women activists in the largely white centrist Democratic Party concluded,

The status of women in society must be improved both on the grounds of democracy and justice. The period of transition is the moment to tackle this. Very seldom is there an opportunity to remake society and to let this opportunity pass without improving the status of women would be a dereliction of responsibility. (Democratic Party discussion document, cited in Bonnin 1992, 44)

Gradually, as these views became increasingly public and widespread, women activists insisted that gender concerns be built into the very structure of negotiations—first at an advisory level, and then later, at the main table. In 1991, although most official negotiators were still male, all parties agreed to the creation of a Gender Advisory Board, to consider the “gender impact” of negotiated agreements.
Although this board was not itself present at negotiations, its commentaries began to raise questions about an abstract discourse of democracy that ignored gender completely. In early 1993, ANC women activists decided that the gender advisory committee was inadequate and that more direct involvement of women was needed. Seeking to ensure that women’s voices would be heard inside the negotiating chambers, in March 1993, in a little-publicized event, women ANC activists stormed the negotiation chambers, blocking talks until women were literally given places at the table. Amazingly, all 26 parties participating in the negotiation process accepted a gender quota— a decision that reflected the extent to which women on all sides had already raised issues of gendered representation in the construction of democracy. Fifty percent of each two-person team had to be female; thus, half of the negotiators who finally accepted a provisional constitution and set the elections in motion were women—a composition that had real implications for the kinds of institutions created under the new constitution.

On most issues, the women negotiators could find little common ground. As one activist asked,

Who do the women now in the talks really represent? Many are loyal to their parties, not to women. And many of those parties are not gender-sensitive at all. So can we really say that women are represented in the talks? (Mthintso 1993, 32)

Yet, despite their political differences, during the final constitutional negotiations the women negotiators managed to form a separate women’s caucus that could find unity on some issues (Finnemore 1994). Most important, the women’s caucus insisted that the new constitution assert the principle of gender equality over that of respect for customary law, allowing millions of African women married under customary law to use the new constitutional framework to demand greater equality within the household. The women’s caucus thus sought a democracy in which domestic relations as well as relations in the public arena could come under state scrutiny (Albertyn 1994a, 1994b; Segar and White 1992). Two other major successes of the caucus were the creation of a special body to ensure women’s participation in the 1994 election process and the inclusion of an advisory committee to scrutinize the gender implications of new policies in the new government structure (Manzini 1994).

But perhaps the greatest achievement of the women’s negotiating caucus was the insertion of visible gender concerns into national debates. By South Africa’s first democratic election campaign, in early 1994, most political parties had expressed at least a rhetorical commitment to gender equality. Putting it politely, a leading ANC activist— later appointed to a cabinet post— concluded, “Gender consciousness has become one of the national priorities in South Africa” (Mabandla 1994, 3). Speaking rather more bluntly, another leading ANC activist told a reporter, “Suddenly all the old men have woken up and realized that women are the majority in this country and that they need women’s votes. It might be opportunism, but what the hell, we should make the most of it” (Carolus, in Gevisser 1994, 3).

Why were South African women activists so willing to raise gender issues during the transition, and why were male negotiators apparently willing to listen? As most activists recognized during the transition process, both South Africa’s oppositional activists and its authoritarian were willing to take gender issues seriously in the 1990s— seriously enough to include consideration of gender inequality in the way they structured negotiations, the constitution, and parliament itself— because of a new global discourse around gender issues in the 1990s. In interviews and discussions during the first half of the 1990s, activists repeatedly suggested that changing international influences and dynamics altered their understanding of politics and gender inequalities. Internationally, feminist ideas gained new visibility in the 1980s. Although many anticolonial activists continued to view feminism as a new form of cultural imperialism, the fact that democratic transitions in the 1990s occurred at a moment when intellectuals around the world were coming to view gender differences as socially constructed rather than biological was critical to the way women activists thought about gender equality. Activists could draw on new theories, concepts, and vocabularies, developed within a growing international feminist discourse. While structural changes in women’s lives— new educational and labor force participation patterns for women, changing household patterns, and the like— helped to create new possibilities for women to challenge existing gender inequalities in many regions, the growing repertoire of feminist theory played a key part in helping democratic activists in many settings rethink gender issues (Alvarez 1989; Basu 1995; Chinchilla 1991; Jelin 1996).

In South Africa, the impact of a global feminist movement was evident in two ways. First, South Africans visiting Europe and North America, either as students or exiles, were often introduced to new feminist ideas and publications. South Africans returned to participate in antiapartheid oppositional groups— particularly those who returned to the leadership of antiapartheid organizations— with a new vocabulary of feminist theory, challenging earlier assumptions about the role of women in the democratic struggle and about the nature of women’s political aspirations.

Activists inspired by feminist theories were often influential in deciding to create women’s organizations. In the early 1990s, feminist ideas received additional support from returning exiles, who had been exposed to other feminist movements outside South Africa and who returned to find, as one returnee put it, that patriarchy might be the one social institution shared by South Africans of all races (Sachs, in Berger 1991, 1). Women in the antiapartheid movement increasingly insisted that postponing feminist issues for the sake of unity could erode opportunities for raising gender issues in the future. ANC activist Pethu Serote, for example, wrote,

In earlier times it was almost taboo to talk about women’s emancipation within the ANC. The subject was considered divisive. It was always argued that the national liberation struggle was supreme (an argument nobody disagrees with) and that the emancipation of women would come naturally and automatically with its triumph. History . . . negates the second part of the statement. . . . When one builds a house one has
to start at least by digging and laying the foundation, and that’s the stage we are at.

(1991, 6)

Intellectuals’ increasing insistence on tackling gender issues during the construction of a new democracy paralleled and informed a growing willingness on the part of activists to assert gender concerns in the democratization process. Drawing on international feminist discussions, many women activists—from Frene Ginwala, a constitutional lawyer and advisor to Mandela, who became increasingly vocal about the need to consider gender issues during the process of democratization, to Thenjiwe Mnhintsho, former ANC guerrilla who took undergraduate courses in feminist theory as a student while participating in national-level negotiations—infused South African discussions with new ideas about differences in the way women and men experience citizenship, while intellectuals described the way other countries’ policies and institutions had attempted to redress gender inequality (Hasim 1991; Segar and White 1992).

But there is also a material aspect to the emergence of gendered concerns, linked to the way in which international funding agencies understood gender and democratization. Social movement theory tends to view “new social meanings [as] products of the struggles within social movements and between them and their opponents” (Tarrow 1992, 175). But these meanings are also influenced by debates outside the movements—especially when those external influences come with material resources that strengthen specific contestants in internal struggles. Although the process is difficult to document, many South African activists suggested in interviews that western donor agencies made resources available to the antiapartheid movement and the new government in support of feminist concerns.

During the 1980s, antiapartheid organizations relied heavily on foreign donors—reasonably enough, since they sought to mobilize people with few resources to spare for political campaigns. Projects aimed at Black South African women may have gotten a more sympathetic hearing from donor agency personnel, themselves often influenced by feminist movements in Europe and North America. Antiapartheid activists looking for outside help were frequently asked to consider the gender implications of their projects—a request often interpreted by South Africans to imply that donor funds required active efforts to include women in political organizations. Thus, for example, activists in a range of settings acknowledged in interviews how important foreign donors were in pushing them to focus on gender-specific aspects of democratization. One group designed projects documenting the special needs of rural Black women, at the suggestion of the Catholic Institute for International Relief; the labor movement included campaigns to organize women as part of its national strategies from the mid-1980s, partly at the suggestion of foreign union movements; and a center for legal studies and human rights developed a gender research project partly at the suggestion of the Ford Foundation (1995). International organizations’ concern with gender—and their role as funding agencies—prompted many South African groups to tackle issues that they might otherwise have left unexplored.

Emphasizing the importance of international ideological trends and donor influence should not be interpreted as degrading the role of domestic activists. Especially in the 1980s, antiapartheid activists devoted a great deal of time and energy to understanding the ways in which women and men experienced apartheid differently, and to addressing these differences within their organizations and strategies; moreover, through the 1970s, women were increasingly participants in the urban communities and factories that served as the basis for the antiapartheid movement’s constituency. Without international feminist influences, however, it is easy to imagine that women’s participation in grassroots movements might not have been translated into an effort to redefine citizenship. And as South African activists became increasingly aware of, and involved in, feminist debates during the process of democratization, they increasingly drew on international debates and documents to fuel their own efforts to address gender inequality at home.

If anything, international resources have been even more important in the period since the 1994 elections. New government officials, often working together with international donors, have promoted projects and strategies aimed specifically at addressing gender inequalities. The most obvious examples of this process have come since late 1995, when feminists in the new government used South Africa’s participation in the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing as a platform from which to articulate feminist concerns at home. The 45-person official delegation included cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, the Speaker and several members of parliament, civil servants from a range of departments, and activists from several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). On their return, these delegates publicized the conference’s findings widely, shifting the basis of South Africa’s commitment to addressing gender inequalities from a moral or ethical stance to an internationally recognized obligation (Fourth World Conference 1995). Even more pointedly, the Department of Welfare published a “Report on the South African Government’s Commitments arising out of the Fourth UN Women’s Conference,” which used the occasion of the Conference to underscore specific aspects of gender inequality in South Africa; moreover, the report drew attention to which government departments were best situated to address each of these concerns (Department of Welfare 1996). Through television interviews, widely disseminated reports, and other forms of mass media, many of the delegates listed aspects of gender inequality discussed in Beijing and then showed in detail how these broad trends worked out in South Africa. Then Deputy Minister for Social Welfare Geraldine Frazier chaired a “national post-Beijing planning committee”; by late February 1996, she could go through the government departments, specifying targets set by each department in response to these concerns (Frazier 1996). Listing mechanisms, budgets, and time frames, she explicitly named departments she considered relatively serious
about addressing gender inequalities—as well as those she believed were lagging behind. "It is time to implement our commitments," she concluded.2

CONSOLIDATING A GENDERED DEMOCRACY

Thus far, I have described the processes through which women activists and gender issues became prominent in South African discussions of democratization. But what did this shift mean for the consolidation of a new democracy and for the construction of a gendered citizenship? Specifically, what issues did these women activists bring to the construction of democracy? To understand the gendered character of citizenship in South Africa, I look first at the content of women’s concerns and then at the new institutions and policies designed to address these concerns. Alongside the negotiation process, feminist activists sought to promote an explicitly gendered perspective on democracy and democratization. Representing women’s interests in the state first requires knowing how a specific group of women understand and interpret their interests. Through what process did South African feminists attempt to define the women’s interests that would be incorporated into the new democracy, and then, how did they seek to incorporate those interests?

In 1991, the ANC Women’s League began developing a nonpartisan “Women’s Charter,” a set of demands that was to reflect the concerns of women across the country. The league launched a broader Women’s National Coalition, seeking to discover and articulate women’s common concerns (Fester, Adams, and Horn 1992; Ginwala 1993; Kemp et al. 1995). Made up of some 70 women’s organizations from across the political spectrum, the coalition was organized around the principle that women of different social locations could find areas of common concern and interest—although most spokeswomen acknowledged that race and class shaped women’s experiences in fundamental ways, creating significant differences in how women would rank priorities (Fouche 1994). These differences were not straightforward reflections of the different experiences of Black and white, rich and poor but also reflected the broad range of attitudes under the coalition’s umbrella. The coalition’s unity was severely strained, for example, when members of church groups disagreed with feminist activists over reproductive rights—particularly, the right to legal, safe abortions (Makatini 1993, 19; Rumney 1994).3 Despite the organizers’ original intention to include all political tendencies, coordinators acknowledged that within months, women from conservative, largely white groups had tended to drop out, leaving mainly activists from the antiapartheid movement dominating the coalition.

The coalition sought to develop some consensus around major issues of gender inequality. Following a suggestion made initially by the ANC (1990), the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) embarked on an 18-month campaign to write a “Women’s Charter,” which it hoped would serve as a kind of gendered bill of rights. In addition to general discussions among activists, the WNC led 203 focus groups with 1620 members and administered 2,973 individual questionnaires, seeking to ascertain what women wanted from a new state. Although most participants in the survey were already part of women’s organizations and thus probably were already influenced by some feminist ideas, the research report reflects a striking degree of agreement: Generally, respondents were concerned about giving women equal opportunities in the world of work and sharing burdens equally in the home. While Black and white women emphasized different concerns—for example, Black respondents frequently referred to the ways in which racial differences overrode gender commonalities among women—the report detailed a series of ways in which gender shaped women’s life chances, from discrimination in property, tax, and inheritance laws, to exclusion from politics and jobs, to the prevalence of violence against women (WNC n.d., 11-13).

On the basis of this research, the WNC proposed a women’s charter to be included in South Africa’s new constitution. The charter is relatively general, but its proponents can reasonably claim that its demands, which range from the assertion of women’s reproductive rights to demands for full equality at the workplace and in the home, reflect the aspirations of a broad spectrum of women. The charter insists that women should be included in decision-making forums throughout society, from traditional courts to policy-making bodies, and rejects gendered discrimination in law, education, and employment. It asserts the absolute right of women to control their own bodies and calls for state efforts to protect women from sexual harassment and violence. Recognizing that women are concentrated in the informal sector and in unpaid work, the charter calls on the new state to take affirmative steps to improve women’s access to formal jobs; to ensure all citizens have access to parental leave and child care facilities; and to create a system of medical, pension, and welfare benefits that does not discriminate against citizens who have not worked for wages (Moziashilwane 1994; South African Women’s Charter 1994; WNC n.d.).

The women’s charter campaign clearly succeeded in its explicit aim: It publicized gender-specific demands, detailing the ways in which women’s experiences and access to resources differ from men’s. In the process, however, the charter campaign also attained an implicit goal, creating at least the impression of broad public consensus regarding gender priorities, building differences among women into a more generalizable set of principles. Many rural African respondents, for example, were concerned that husbands should not take all the proceeds from selling vegetables that the wife has grown (WNC n.d., 99-100); in its more general summary, the charter’s authors subsume this concern under the principle of granting women greater equality within the home. Similarly, the charter downplays issues that might divide women; whereas the research report includes Black women’s comments about white women’s exploitation of Black domestic servants, the charter discusses employment in the more neutral terms of equal access to employment and training for all South Africans.

Obviously, simply collating women’s concerns into a charter will not lead to radical change in gender relations within most households. Most feminists realized that even if the charter were adopted in the new constitution, the legal innovation
would not necessarily improve women’s lives; activists treated the women’s charter as a political document rather than a legal one, to be used as a basis for lobbying parliament and mobilizing women in the future (Haffajee 1994). Similarly, Noizizwe Madlala, an ANC feminist who became a new member of Parliament, concluded that the most urgent task was “for women to organize themselves into a strong mass-based women’s movement,” which would monitor the new government’s policies.

The struggle for emancipation depends on one key tool: organization. . . . We cannot assume that the government will automatically be sympathetic to our demands as women. In fact, we will have to apply our united power to make sure the government heeds them. (Madlala 1994, 6)

Nevertheless, politically active feminists continued to focus more on the construction of a gendered state than on mobilizing grassroots support for feminist ideas and practices. While the notion of “women’s interests” remained somewhat opaque, South African feminist activists were deeply concerned with ensuring women’s representation within new state structures—with creating gendered institutions through which women could actively help shape new policies. Most South African feminist activists seemed more concerned with creating explicitly gendered institutions than with outlining specific policies needed to redress gender inequalities. The discussion of how to construct gendered institutions took place at two levels. Feminists sought first to ensure that there would be individual women in decision-making bodies and second to ensure that state structures were designed to consider new policies’ impact on gender relations.

ANC activists viewed South Africa’s first democratic elections as an opportunity to greatly increase the number of women representatives in national political office. Because negotiators agreed that the new electoral system would involve proportional representation, parties did not run individual candidates but electoral lists. Responding to internal demands for gender-based affirmative action within the party, the ANC set a 30 percent quota for women on its electoral list—a decision reflecting political theorists’ analyses of electoral systems most likely to produce a larger number of women in political office (Albertyn 1992, 2; Phillips 1991). Other parties appear to have considered gender issues important in attracting voters and began to include more women as candidates on their lists (Gevisser 1994).

When the new national Parliament opened in May 1994, it included 106 women, or 26.5 percent, out of 400 representatives, a dramatic change from the white-controlled, almost entirely male Parliament that preceded it. New parliamentarians almost immediately proposed the creation of a new parliamentary day care center, as well as additional women’s rooms. Most of these women insisted they were not going to Parliament exclusively as representatives of women but were active feminists. Many new parliamentarians insisted that a top priority for the new government would be finding ways to challenge existing relations of gender inequality (Gevisser 1994, 3). Although the first cabinet included only two women out of 27 ministers, several more vocal feminists were added to the cabinet within the first two years of President Mandela’s tenure, giving even greater visibility to feminist activists.

Largely as a result of proposals from the women’s caucus during preelection negotiations, the new constitution required the creation of some kind of national gender commission in the new state. However, drawing on experiences from around the world—looking at the histories of feminist efforts to institutionalize gender concerns in countries ranging from Australia to Nicaragua—South African feminist intellectuals expressed concern about the ways gender issues are often marginalized. Feminist intellectuals argued that creating a women’s ministry—the most common approach to addressing gender issues in new African states—would ghettoize women’s issues, even though it would ensure cabinet-level representation and executive powers for the broadly defined women’s movement. Although some activists considered the women’s ministry the easiest way to ensure that feminist voices would be heard in government, most pointed out that such ministries elsewhere have tended to restrict their vision to women’s domestic roles. Underfunded and understaffed, they offer courses in nutrition, child care, and handicrafts, rather than addressing the underlying dynamics of gender inequality (Mabandla 1994).

Most South African feminists expressed some preference for a more multifaceted approach: The government would create gender focus desks in all ministries, linked by a national commission on the status of women, which would then have some say in any policy that would affect the lives of gendered citizens (Albertyn 1992; Biehl n.d.; Mabandla 1994). Thus, for example, the gender focus desk in a ministry of development might insist on redesigning a job-creation program, to ensure prospective workers included women as well as men. In the land reform ministry, a gender focus desk might make sure that land was available to women household heads, rather than allowing redistribution programs to favor men. Reviewing departmental policies, developing appropriate strategies to ensure the integration of gender concerns in planning, coordinating training of staff in relation to gender concerns, and monitoring projects in terms of their effect on gender equity, these desks could permit concrete efforts to change the way policies were designed and implemented throughout government (Albertyn 1995, 25). By institutionalizing some discussion of the gender implications of all policies implemented by the new state, feminist activists hoped that gender desks would require policy makers to consider how gender patterns affect citizens’ lives. In theory, gender desks could ensure that the new state’s policies do not exacerbate, and might even erode, the bases of gender inequality (Albertyn 1995). By early 1997, at least two departments—the Department of Land Reform and, somewhat surprisingly, the Department of Intelligence—had apparently implemented this mechanism for policy review, and other departments had begun to make plans for creating similar structures under a new government policy (Department of Welfare 1996). Similarly, the Justice Department had undertaken to review the country’s family laws—including customary marriage, separation, and divorce laws—to “encompass gender equality” (Sentle 1997).
From the point of view of many of the feminist activists involved in national policy debates, however, the most important new government structure seemed likely to be the national Commission on Gender Equality, which was mandated by the 1993 interim constitution, but for which Parliament did not pass enabling legislation until 1996. As the peak coordinating body for all policies attempting to address gender inequality, activists viewed the commission as a crucial lobby within government, whose members could pressure both political parties and civil service ministries to honor their rhetorical commitments. After much debate, appointments to the commission were announced at the end of 1996. The 12 commissioners included 10 women, of whom several had already earned reputations as thoughtful and energetic feminists. In addition to individual histories of feminist activism during the transition period, several commissioners had produced academic research on gender inequality and on policy options, while others had established reputations as vocal feminists within the ANC. Moreover, the commission's budget and statutory powers were clearly sufficient to ensure that the commission could make significant interventions in national policy discussions in the future. Commissioners clearly expressed their intention to block attempts by other civil service ministries to undermine their status as an independent body.

Feminist activists have insisted that South Africa's democracy must be explicitly gendered. Building on the campaign that produced the women's charter—which began the process by defining a fairly broad consensus about the main mechanisms recreating women's subordination, and by legitimizing the idea that the state should deal consciously with gender inequalities—a relatively visible feminist movement recognized that unless new institutions were explicitly gendered, they would be unconsciously so. By seeking to ensure that women were visibly represented in new decision-making bodies, and that new institutions would explicitly consider gender issues when designing and implementing policies, feminists hoped to build the attempt to address gender issues into the structures of the new state. Thus, the fact that South Africa's democratic transition process was gendered—that a women's movement explicitly committed to a feminist vision of democratization emerged during the transition to democracy and was able to include a gendered understanding of citizenship in the construction of new democratic institutions—could have direct implications for the character of South African citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Most discussions ignore gender dynamics in transitions to democracy and in the consolidation of democratic institutions. But if all citizenship is gendered—that is, if relationships between individuals and states must be shaped, in part, by the gendered experiences of citizens—democratic institutions that treat all citizens equally almost inevitably reinforce gender inequalities. In South Africa, however, vocal feminists—supported by international feminist theory and resources—articulated democratic aspirations in gendered terms. Women activists managed to mobilize a constituency sympathetic to feminist claims and to assert the legitimacy of gender issues within the democratic opposition and the negotiation process. Once democratic aspirations had been redefined to include some degree of gender equality, feminist activists could use that new understanding of democracy to insist that the new state incorporate gendered concerns. Their success in redefining the terms of gendered political participation led first to unusual numbers of women participating in national-level negotiations during the transition, then to a process of defining gender concerns, and finally to the establishment of new state institutions that will continue the process of examining and addressing the multiple sites of gender subordination in South African society.

If women's interests are defined, in part, by the institutions through which political participation is channeled, the democracy that is being constructed in South Africa may offer a new vision of gendered citizenship. Institutional mechanisms requiring officials to consider the impact of policies on real (gendered) citizens may be the closest any democracy has come to incorporating gender into the definition of citizenship. Gendered citizenship, from this perspective, would include not so much a specific package of rights or policies as institutional mechanisms allowing, perhaps stimulating, the articulation of gendered democratic aspirations.

But South Africa's democratic transition also raises some larger questions about how we think about democratization and gendered citizenship. First, it underscores the importance of viewing democratic transitions in a larger context. Instead of simply focusing on internal organizations as vehicles of democratic aspirations, we need to consider how international influences strengthen or weaken specific players in local debates and how those influences redefine democratic aspirations. The success of antiapartheid activists in articulating feminist concerns in the consolidation of democracy is at least in part linked to transnational cultural flows, which provided crucial ideas and material support to women activists, promoting a feminist vision.

But more broadly, perhaps, the South African case should prompt us to reconsider the teleological view that underlies most discussions of democratic transitions in the late twentieth century. Instead of asking what role specific classes or groups play in democratic transitions, this case suggests that we should consider who defines democracy for a particular society and how that definition is incorporated in the consolidation of democracy. During democratization, who designs the institutions that will frame political discussions, and how do they conceive the participants? Who articulates participants' demands? How do they understand the collective identities of constituencies, and how does that understanding shape the way interests are represented within the state? And, of course, we would also have to ask, what voices are silenced during transitions, and what democratic aspirations are excluded?

The apparent success of South African activists in changing the terms of democratic discourse challenges us to reframe our understanding of democracy itself. Rather than treating democracy as a definable moment, an end point in a "democratic transition," this case suggests that, instead, we should view democracy
as a process, in which activists mobilize collective identities as they seek to give shape to democratic aspirations. Instead of focusing on negotiations or elections, perhaps we must also look at how the mobilization of collective identities during democratization plays out in the consolidation of democracy, as activists seek to build their vision of citizenship into the structures that will define political participation in the future.

NOTES

1. Under South Africa’s dual legal system, Africans could be married either under civil or “customary” law—a version of “traditional” law that had been codified by colonial administrators from the mid-nineteenth century, which gave husbands virtually total power over their families and household property (Murray 1994).

2. A similar, although slightly less public, process occurred in relation to the international Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which the South African Parliament ratified in December 1995. Feminist nongovernmental organizations, working with civil servants, incorporated discussions of South Africa’s commitments under the convention into discussions of the implications of the Beijing conference for South Africa. (CEDAW Working Group 1996).

3. In 1993, about 300,000 women a year were estimated to have illegal abortions, and nearly 36,000 women needed surgery yearly to remove the residues of these illegal operations in South Africa (Makatini 1993).

4. Some of the prominent feminists initially appointed to the commission were Cathi Albertyn, Nomboniso Gasa, Thenjiwe Minto, Phamelele Ntombela-Nzimbande, and Vivienne Taylor.

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Gay W. Seidman is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. She has published several earlier articles on the South African women's movement, as well as Manufacturing Militance: Workers' Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970-1985 (University of California Press, 1994). She is currently working on an ethnographic study of the South African Gender Commission.