Over the past thirty years, symbolic interactionists have proposed, on one hand, a synthesis between symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology (Denzin 1970), or, on the other hand, that these two forms of sociology are philosophically, conceptually, and methodologically incompatible (Gallant and Kleinman 1983). In reply, ethnomethodologists argue that neither the synthetic version (Zimmerman 1970) nor the incompatibility hypothesis (Rawls 1985) accurately understands ethnomethodology. Conversation analysis, which is related to ethnomethodology, no doubt gets painted by the same brushstrokes, and conversation analysts would raise similar objections to arguments about either synthesis or incompatibility.

We agree that a synthesis between symbolic interactionism (SI) and ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA) is not possible. However, we do view SI and EM/CA as at least partly congruent. A chapter on EM and CA, accordingly, has a place in a book that is mainly about SI, and we aim to describe EM and CA and their approaches to the study of everyday life and interaction. As a preliminary matter, we characterize the congruence between EM/CA and SI, per Boden (1990: 246), as deriving from the impulse to study social life in situ and from the standpoint of societal members themselves. This impulse has directed both SI and EM/CA to a concern with language, meaning, and social interaction, albeit in distinctive ways. In Mead’s (1934: 76–78) vernacular, meaning involves a threefold relation among phases of the social act: a gesture of one organism, the adjutive response of another organism, and the completion of a given act. Accordingly, meaning is available in the social act before consciousness or awareness of that meaning and has its objective existence within the field of experience: “The response of one organism to the gesture of another in any given social act is the meaning of that gesture” (Mead 1934: 78).

This placement of meaning within activity streams of participants’ overt and mutually-oriented conduct, rather than within heads or consciousness as such, is very compatible with the EM/CA attention to vocal and nonvocal...
behavioral displays and eschewal of reference to internalized values, rules, attitudes, and the like. As Joas (1985, 1987) has argued, Meadian social psychology is behavioristic in the sense of being concerned with overt human activity. This is not behaviorism in the Skinnerian sense because Mead was still concerned with subjectivity, in a limited way, as it emerges from blocked or frustrated routine actions. Even when actors, being blocked, become cogitative, they do so within the realm of practice. That is, in discussing Mead’s work on reflective human activity, Joas (1985, 1987) develops the notion of “practical intersubjectivity” and refers to the role of communication, language, and symbolically mediated interaction as aspects of concrete social acts. Here, in the realm of practice and activity, is where EM/CA and SI potentially make contact. Both EM and CA are concerned with the methods and practices whereby participants in talk, action, and social interaction—who are “communicating” with one another by the use of symbols and language—manage their joint affairs.

However, although a concern with action and sequence and intelligibility can be found in Mead’s theoretical writings and Joas’ extension of Mead, these matters have not ordinarily been pursued empirically within the SI tradition. Symbolic interactionist empirical studies tend to focus on comparatively broad meanings and persistent definitions of the situation rather than singular actions and the sequences in which their meanings emerge. By exploring such issues, EM/CA can be seen as subjecting some of the most compelling aspects of Meadian social psychology to empirical analysis.

**ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND CONVERSATION ANALYSIS IN OVERVIEW**

We begin with a brief and highly general characterization of the ethnomethodological program of theory and research. Ethnomethodology offers a distinctive perspective on the nature and origins of social order. It rejects “top-down” theories that impute the organization of everyday life to cultural or social structural phenomena conceived as standing outside of the flow of ordinary events. Adopting a thoroughly “bottom-up” approach, ethnomethodology seeks to recover social organization as an emergent achievement that results from the concerted efforts of societal members acting within local situations. Central to this achievement are the various methods that members use to produce and recognize courses of social activity and the circumstances in which they are embedded. The mundane intelligibility and accountability of social actions, situations, and structures is understood to be the outcome of these constitutive methods or procedures.

This distinctive perspective on the foundations of social order originated in Garfinkel’s encounter with Talcott Parsons, with whom Garfinkel studied while a graduate student at Harvard (Garfinkel 1967; Heritage 1984: ch. 2). In The
Structure of Social Action, Parsons observed that members’ sense of the world is necessarily mediated by conceptual structures; through such structures, otherwise “raw streams of experience” are ordered and rendered intelligible (1937: 27–42). Just as conceptual structures organize ordinary experience for lay members of society, they are also essential for scientific inquiry. Accordingly, Parsons held that a first step for social science is the development of a descriptive frame of reference capable of segmenting the complex flux of social activity. This involves analytically specifying certain abstract elements of action that permit empirical generalization and explanation (Parsons 1937: 727–775). To this end, he developed the well-known “action frame of reference” consisting of the unit act; the means, ends, and material conditions of action; normative constraints on action; and the “analytic elements” or variable properties of action. Subsequent theorizing then focused on explaining patterns of social action by reference to institutionalized norms and more general value systems whose internalization ensures actors’ motivated compliance with the normative requirements of society.

As a student and admirer of Parsons’ “penetrating depth and unfailing precision,” Garfinkel (1967: ix) nevertheless discerned a range of issues that were not addressed in the analysis of social action. For Parsons, research and theorizing proceeds from a prespecified analytic construct—namely, the unit act and its components—instead of those concrete actions that form the substance of the ordinary actor’s experience of the world (Schegloff 1980: 151; 1987a: 102). Correspondingly, Parsons’ emphasis on how actors become motivated to act in normatively standardized ways diverts attention from the real-time process through which intelligible courses of action are produced and managed over their course (Heritage 1984: 22–33). Finally, Parsons’ analytic frame of reference forestalls appreciation of the indigenous perspectives of the actors themselves who, as purposive agents in social life, use forms of common sense knowledge and practical reasoning to make sense of their circumstances and find ways of acting within them. Indeed, it is through such reasoning practices, and the actions predicated upon them, that actors collaboratively construct what are experienced as the external and constraining circumstances in which they find themselves. Garfinkel placed matters involving the local production and indigenous accountability of action, matters that were peripheral for Parsons, at the center of an alternate conception of social organization.

Although ethnomethodology thus embodies elements of a distinctive theory of social organization, that theory was not developed independently of empirical research. Indeed, it is a feature of the theory that propositions about social organization cannot be divorced from ongoing courses of inquiry in real settings. Since the intelligible features of society are locally produced by members themselves for one another, with methods that are reflexively embedded in concrete social situations, the precise nature of that achievement cannot be determined by the analyst through a priori stipulation or deductive reasoning. It can only be discovered within “real” society (in its “inexhaustible details”), within
“actual” society (in the endlessly contingent methods of its production), and within society “evidently” (in analytic claims that are assessable in terms of members’ ongoing accounting practices) (Garfinkel 1988). Accordingly, Garfinkel’s (1963, 1967) theoretical proposals were developed in conjunction with his own empirical studies, and they have inspired diverse streams of research united by the common goal of investigating a previously unexamined domain of social practice (Maynard and Clayman 1991).

Of the various forms of research inspired by Garfinkel’s (1967) *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, perhaps the most prominent has been the enterprise initiated by Harvey Sacks in collaboration with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, which has come to be known as conversation analysis (Clayman and Gill, forthcoming). Like EM, CA adopts a thoroughly “bottom-up” approach to research and theorizing. Although conversation analysts are not averse to advancing theoretical claims, often of a highly general nature (Wilson and Zimmerman 1979: 67), every effort is made to ground such claims in the observable orientations that interactants themselves display to one another. Within this framework, CA has developed its own relatively focused set of substantive concerns. While CA retains an interest in forms of common sense reasoning, these are analyzed as they are put to use within the specific arena of talk-in-interaction. Hence, conversation analysts have developed a distinctive interest in how various orderly characteristics of talk—regular patterns of turn taking, activity sequencing, institutional specializations, and the like—are accountably produced by interactants via procedures implemented on a turn-by-turn basis. Despite this focus it is clear that, at least in their broad contours, EM and CA approaches to research and theorizing have much in common.

How closely ethnomethodology and CA are connected is a matter of some controversy, however, as scholars have specified points of divergence (Bjelic and Lynch 1992: 53–55; Clayman 1995; Garfinkel and Wieder 1992; Lynch 1985: 8–10; Lynch and Bogen 1994). Arguably, Harvey Sacks was influenced by a wide range of intellectual sources in addition to Harold Garfinkel (Schegloff 1992: xii-xxvii), including Erving Goffman (one of Sacks’ teachers while a graduate student at Berkeley), Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy, Chomsky’s transformational grammar, Freudian psychoanalysis, anthropological field work, and research by Milman Parry and Eric Havelock on oral cultures. Moreover, the subsequent development of conversation analytic research indicates that, in terms of both substance and method, it has a character and a trajectory that are partially independent of ethnomethodology. Substantively, ethnomethodology’s broad concern with diverse forms of practical reasoning and embodied action contrasts with the conversation analytic focus on the comparatively restricted domain of talk-in-interaction and its various constituent activity systems (e.g., turn taking, sequencing, repair, gaze direction, institutional specializations). Methodologically, ethnomethodology’s use of ethnography and quasi-experimental demonstrations contrasts with the emphasis on audio- and videorecordings of naturally occurring interaction within CA.
Despite these differences, bonds between the two approaches run deep. Garfinkel and Sacks had an ongoing intellectual and personal relationship that began in 1959 and was sustained through the early 1970s (Schegloff 1992: xiii), a period when foundational research in both areas was being developed. Moreover, they coauthored a paper (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970) on an issue that is central to both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis: the properties of natural language use. As a result of this extended relationship, Garfinkel’s ongoing program of ethnomethodological research informed the development of conversation analysis and vice versa. As we explore the two enterprises, however, we will see that their commonalities are not to be found in terms of specific topics of interest or methodological techniques, about which there are clear differences. Linkages are most evident at deeper levels where one can discern common theoretical assumptions, analytic sensibilities, and concerns with diverse phenomena of everyday life. We organize our discussion around these points of convergence between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, first in overview and then with reference to more specific issues.

METHODOLOGICAL CONTINUITIES: BREACHING EXPERIMENTS AND DEVIANT CASE ANALYSIS

The first specific point of contact to be discussed is methodological in character and concerns the relationship between Garfinkel’s early breach experiments and what has come to be known as “deviant case analysis” within CA.

A methodological problem that Garfinkel initially faced was how to make forms of common sense reasoning available for empirical research. Within the phenomenological tradition, Schutz (1962) had emphasized that the constitutive operations of perception, cognition, and reasoning are normally taken for granted in everyday life. Actors confront a world that is eminently coherent and intelligible, and they adopt a thoroughly pragmatic orientation to their affairs in the world thus experienced. Within that orientation, common sense serves as a tacit resource for the pursuit of practical ends but is not ordinarily an object of conscious reflection in its own right. Thus, Garfinkel (1967) wrote of the “seen-but-unnoticed background features” of social settings, features that are essentially “uninteresting” to the participants themselves; but how can “unnoticed” practices be made accessible to systematic empirical scrutiny?

As a first step, Garfinkel (1963: 190) stipulated that although such practices may originate within consciousness, they are sociologically meaningful only insofar as they are consequential for, and are observable in, public forms of behavior. Hence, their analysis does not require a verstehende method, for they may be investigated exclusively by “performing operations on events that are ‘scenic’ to the person.” The “scenic operations” that might best reveal the existence and
nature of order-productive reasoning procedures are operations that, ironically, generate disorder rather than order. The strategy, as Garfinkel put it, was to start with a system of stable features and ask what can be done to make for trouble. The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of perceived environments and disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained. (1963: 187)

Garfinkel thus dealt with common sense by approaching the phenomenon indirectly in situations where it had ostensibly broken down. Successfully disrupted situations should enable one to infer the absence of some essential procedure and, by working backward, elucidate its constitutive import in normal circumstances. Thus, Garfinkel's ingenious solution to the problem of analyzing common sense methods was based on the insight that they remain obscure and taken-for-granted only so long as they "work." If they can somehow be inhibited or rendered inoperative, the disorganizing social consequences should be both predictable and observable.

In light of these considerations, Garfinkel (1967: 38) developed the well-known breaching experiments that would serve as "aids to a sluggish imagination" in the analysis of common sense. For inspiration as to what the procedures of common sense might consist of, he drew on Schutz' (1962, 1964) analysis of the assumptions that constitute "the natural attitude of everyday life" and Gurwitsch's (1964, 1966) discussion of the use of contextual knowledge in the manner suggested by a gestalt-type phenomenology of perception. Then, to inhibit these common sense and contextualizing procedures, Garfinkel (1967) instructed his confederates to demand that subjects explain and clarify the meaning of their most casual remarks, to act as boarders in their own homes, to act on the assumption that subjects had some hidden motive, and so forth. Although he was hesitant to use the term "experiment" in reference to such studies, preferring to characterize them more modestly as "demonstrations" (Garfinkel 1967: 38), nevertheless, the approach is reminiscent of the earlier incongruity experiments of Asch (1946, 1951) and Bruner and his associates (Bruner 1961; Bruner and Postman 1949). Garfinkel's demonstrations, however, were designed to be not merely incongruous with subjects' expectations but also massively senseless.

The outcomes of his demonstrations were indeed dramatic, although not precisely as Garfinkel initially anticipated. Instead of yielding a state of bewilderment or "cognitive anomie," subjects typically reacted with marked hostility, displaying acute anger, sanctioning the confederates, and attributing various negative motivations to them. The main exception to this pattern of hostility occurred when subjects departed from the order of everyday life and assumed that some extraordinary circumstance was operating—for instance, some kind of game—which
enabled them to “normalize” the anomalous action. Taken together, these reactions served as evidence that societal members orient to tacit methods of reasoning in ordinary life. Moreover, the hostile reactions suggested that, within the domain of everyday life, sense-making procedures have an underlying moral dimension (Heritage 1984: ch. 4). That is, use of the procedures is not merely an empirical regularity but a moral obligation that societal members enforce with one another; the procedures are treated as mutually relevant and binding. This moral orientation, which Garfinkel (1963) initially referred to under the rubric of “trust,” constitutes a basic frame of reference in terms of which societal members encounter their fellows. Powerful sanctions can be mobilized against those who violate these relevances and the trust that they embody. Garfinkel concluded that

the anticipation that persons will understand, the occasionality of expressions, the specific vagueness of references, the retrospective-prospective sense of a present occurrence, waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before, are sanctioned properties of common discourse. (1967: 41; emphasis added)

Since Garfinkel’s early breaching experiments, ethnomethodologists have continued to pay close attention to disruptions of perceivedly “normal” states of affairs on the assumption that such events can illuminate otherwise invisible order-productive practices. However, recent work has tended to avoid experimentally contrived disruptions in favor of seeking out disruptions that arise naturally and spontaneously within social situations. Garfinkel’s (1967: ch. 5) own case study of Agnes, who “passed” as a female despite seemingly masculine elements of her anatomy and biography, is an early exemplar of a naturally occurring disruption. Subsequent examples include Pollner’s (1975, 1987) use of reality disjunctures in traffic court to explore the parameters of mundane reasoning, Wieder’s (1974) use of departures from official routines in a halfway house as a resource for exploring the reflexive relationship between norms and the instances of conduct that they are seen to regulate, Lynch’s (1985, 1982) use of research artifacts to explore the material and praxeological foundations of scientific findings, and Maynard’s (Maynard forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b) studies of bad news and good news in relation to everyday life.

Naturally occurring disruptions of seemingly “normal” states of affairs have also played an important role in conversation analysis, where investigators examine “deviant” cases as a routine methodological practice. After locating and initially describing some interactional regularity, analysts commonly search through their data for incongruous cases in which the proposed regularity was not realized. For instance, in Schegloff’s (1968: 1077) pioneering analysis of conversational openings, a single deviant case is central to his analysis, and he cites Garfinkel for the inspiration that normal scenes can be illuminated by considering disruptions of them.
Conversation analysts typically deal with deviant cases in one of three ways, only the first of which is directly related to Garfinkel's breaching demonstrations. First, some deviant cases are shown, upon analysis, to result from interactants' orientation to the same considerations that produce the “regular” cases. In the analysis of adjacency pairs, for example, the regular occurrence of certain paired actions (e.g., question-answer, request-response) is explained by reference to the property of conditional relevance, which stipulates that the production of a first pair-part makes a corresponding response both relevant and expectable (Schegloff 1968, 1970, 1972). How, then, do we account for instances where the relevant response was not immediately produced? In many cases it can be shown that even though the item was not produced then and there, the interactants were nonetheless acting in accordance with the assumption that it should properly be forthcoming. For instance, the recipient may provide an account to explain and justify the nonproduction of a relevant response; alternatively, if no account is forthcoming, the initiator of the sequence may after a pause attempt to elicit the relevant item and thereby “repair” the unfinished sequence. Also relevant here are “insertion sequences” (e.g., question-answer sequences intervening between an adjacency pair initiation and the called-for response) in which the recipient seeks to elicit information necessary to provide an appropriate response. In any case, through such actions the parties display an orientation to the very same principles that are postulated to underpin the production of straightforward adjacency pairs (Heritage 1984: 248–253). This line of reasoning both confirms the initial analysis regarding conditional relevance and enriches it by showing how the same principles operate within, and thereby generate, a nonstandard course of action. Moreover, the line of reasoning is formally similar to Garfinkel's approach in the breaching demonstrations, where a proposed common sense procedure is confirmed and explicated by examining the consequences of its absence. And just as Garfinkel's demonstrations revealed a morality attached to sense-making procedures, departures from conversational procedures sometimes engender strong negative sanctions, suggesting that at least some of the latter also have an underlying moral dimension.

A second way of handling a deviant case is to replace the initial analysis with a more general formulation that encompasses both the “regular” cases and the “departure.” Perhaps the clearest example of this can be found in Schegloff’s (1968) analysis of telephone call openings. In a corpus of 500 telephone calls, Schegloff found that a straightforward rule—“answerer speaks first”—adequately described all but one of the call openings; in that one case, the caller spoke first. Rather than ignoring this instance or explaining it away in an ad hoc fashion, Schegloff argued that this case together with the other 499 could be explained in light of a prior interactional event and its sequential implications: namely, the ring of the telephone, which constitutes the first sequential “move” in any telephone interaction. A ringing phone functions as the first part of a summons-answer sequence, the components of which are linked by the prop-
ery of conditional relevance. Against this backdrop, the “rule” that answerer speaks first actually reflects the more general principle that once a summons (in the form of a ringing phone) has been issued, an appropriate response is relevant. The deviant case can also be explained in light of the summons and its sequential implications; in that case the ring was followed by silence, which for the caller represented the absence of the relevant response, and this prompted the caller to speak first by reissuing the summons to solicit a response and thereby “repair” the unfinished sequence. Accordingly, the initial rule was shown to be derivative of more general principles that were postulated to account for both the regular cases and the troublesome variant.

If these approaches fail, a third option is to produce a separate analysis of the deviant case, one which treats it as bringing about, in effect, an alternate sequential “reality.” The investigator may describe how the apparent “departure” differs from the “regular” cases, analyze what distinctive activity is being accomplished in and through the departure, and specify how this seemingly atypical course of action alters or transforms the interactional circumstances. A prominent example here is Jefferson and Lee’s (1981) analysis of departures from a proposed “troubles-telling sequence.” When personal troubles are expressed in conversation, recipients commonly respond with affiliative displays of understanding. However, in some circumstances, recipients appear not to produce this form of affiliation. Instead, they may offer advice to the troubles-teller, and they thereby transform the situation from a “troubles-telling” to a “service encounter” implicating different discourse identities and activities than those involved in troubles-telling (the troubles-teller becomes an advice recipient). This treatment of deviant cases, unlike the previous two, does not result in a single analytic formulation that can account for both the “regular” and “deviant” cases. But it does embody an effort to come to terms with apparently atypical courses of action and thereby incorporate such cases within a comprehensive analysis of the available data. And while this method is not directly related to Garfinkel’s breaching experiments, the idea of sequential departures as context-transforming or “frame-breaking” activities is analogous to the way in which some subjects analyzed the breaches as moves to reshape the interaction as a “joke” or “game.” It is also reminiscent of Goffman’s observation that “a rule tends to make possible a meaningful set of non-adherences” (1971: 61) and his corresponding practice of analyzing the activities that are accomplished through implementing such non-adherences. Within CA this approach has been used more frequently in recent years as researchers have begun to venture away from small, closely ordered sequences such as adjacency pairs and toward the analysis of larger episodes of talk that appear to be more loosely organized, are not sanctionable in the same way, and thus routinely permit a variety of sequential trajectories (see, for example, Heritage and Sefi 1992; Jefferson 1981, 1988; Kinnell and Maynard 1996; and Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen 1988).

In summary, CA has developed a data-driven methodology that places a high priority on working through individual cases to obtain a comprehensive
analysis of the available data. In several ways, coming to grips with deviant cases has been part of the methodology. Although ethnomethodology has not been as committed to particular methodological strategies, at least one way of reasoning about deviant cases is deeply indebted to Garfinkel’s insight that the common sense expectancies underlying perceivedly normal events can be illuminated by considering situations in which that normality is disrupted.

NATURAL LANGUAGE AS A PHENOMENON: INDEXICAL EXPRESSIONS AND SEQUENTIAL ORGANIZATION

In a way that might enhance the SI concern with language and symbols, both EM and CA have been concerned with the use of natural language in everyday life. The capacity to categorize and describe persons, activities, and social situations is, of course, a central resource for the conduct of social scientific inquiry. However, this resource is by no means the exclusive province of the professional social scientist; it is derived from natural language capacities possessed by all competent members of society, capacities that play a pervasive and constitutive role in the everyday activities of both laypersons and professionals. For this reason ethnomethodologists of various stripes have sought to investigate what had previously been an unexplicated analytic resource. This theme arose early on in Garfinkel’s work; his studies of jury deliberations (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 4) and psychiatric intake practices (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 6), as well as some of the breaching experiments discussed previously, came to focus substantial attention on the oral and written accounts produced by members in various settings. For Sacks (1963), this theme was even more central and is the primary focus of his earliest published writings. Thus, he likened society to a machine that produced both a steady stream of activities and corresponding stream of accounts of those activities, a machine with both “doing” and “saying” parts. He then criticized sociologists for excluding the “saying” part of the societal machine from analysis—that is, for producing more refined natural language accounts of activities without attempting to examine language practices as activities or “doings” in their own right. This attitude is broadly congruent with the ordinary language philosophy of John Austin, the later Wittgenstein, and their respective associates, although ethnomethodology developed independently and offers an empirical rather than a philosophical approach to the analysis of language practices.

The interest in natural language use came into focus for both Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) via the phenomenon of indexical expressions and their properties, which is the subject of their only published collaboration, the oft-cited “On Formal Structures of Practical Actions.” Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 348–349) characterize indexical expressions as utterances whose sense cannot be determined without reference to the person talking, the time and place of talk, or more generally the occasion of speech or its “context.” Examples in-
clude expressions containing what linguists call *deictic* words or phrases: pronouns, time and place adverbs like “now” and “here,” and various grammatical features whose sense is tied to the circumstances of the utterance (Levinson 1983: 54). Hence, the meaning and understandability of any indexical expression, rather than being fixed by some abstract definition, depends upon the environment in which it appears.

For philosophers concerned with the formal analysis of language, and for social scientists seeking to produce propositions about the organization of society, indexical expressions are treated as a nuisance to be remedied. Thus, every effort is made to render scientific propositions (e.g., hypotheses, ideal types, interview schedules, coding formats) in abstract terms that will retain a determinate sense across the varied situations where such expressions are intended to apply. Despite these efforts, the best laid categories, descriptions, and explanations always leave something out, need fudging, or contain inconsistencies that remain to be addressed on an ad hoc basis. It seems that language is *necessarily* indexical, so that any attempt to remedy the featured circumstantiality of one statement by producing a more exact rendition will preserve that very feature in the attempt. The phenomenon is thus truly unavoidable (Garfinkel 1967: 4–7). Instead of treating the indexical properties of expressions as a nuisance to be remedied, an alternative approach is to examine them as phenomena. After all, however “flawed” indexical expressions may seem when semantic clarity is entertained as an abstract ideal, in everyday life societal members are somehow able to produce, understand, and deal with such expressions on a routine basis. Hence, Garfinkel and Sacks argue that the properties of indexical expressions are ordered, socially organized, properties; such orderliness, moreover, “is an ongoing, practical accomplishment of every actual occasion of commonplace speech and conduct” (1970: 341). Far from being a problem, for lay members of society the indexical properties of everyday language can be a resource for broadly social ends.

What, then, constitutes the orderliness of indexical expressions? As one instance, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) discuss “formulations” through which members describe, explain, characterize, summarize, or otherwise “say in so many words” what they are doing or talking about. Formulations are socially organized in that they may arise when the determinate gist of a potentially multifaceted conversation has become problematic, and they regularly invite confirmation or denial (Heritage and Watson 1979). As another instance of the orderliness of indexical properties, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) discuss “glossing practices” and a collection of examples. One of these is “a definition used in first approximation.” An author, at the beginning of an article, may offer a loose definition of some term, subsequently developing arguments and exhibits to elaborate the definition. At the end, the author will supply a second and more precise definition of the term, which formulates the features and connections among the exhibits, arguments, and definitions (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970: 364).
Neither formulations nor glosses, which are themselves indexical, can provide the essential means for rendering natural language expressions intelligible, however. Sacks takes up this very problem in his lectures on spoken interaction:

If . . . somebody produced an utterance and you figured that a way to show that you understood it was to produce an explication of it, then that explication would pose exactly the task that the initial utterance posed. And one can see how rapidly that would become an impossible procedure, and in any event would involve some sorts of constant, and possible indefinitely extended “time outs” in a conversation. (1992a: 720)

Although the sense of an utterance cannot be achieved solely via its explicative potentiality, that is, from formulations or glosses, Sacks argues that the mechanism of tying one utterance to another through “pro-terms” is an economical way of accomplishing intelligibility (Watson 1987). Pronouns, which may refer to some other noun or category on whose behalf they stand, are characteristic tying devices, as are what Sacks calls “pro-verbs”: “an interchange like, ‘Did John and Lisa go to the movies last night?’ ‘They did.’ There, via ‘They did,’ we have tying within a pair” (1992a: 717).

Tying practices provide for the accomplishment of mutually intelligible interaction in two distinct ways. On the one hand, utterances that are tied to previous ones may be understood by attending to the prior course of talk (Sacks 1992a: 717–718). Thus, in the previous example the referent of the pro-verb (“did”) is readily available from what preceded it (“go to the movies last night”). But in addition to facilitating understanding, tying is also a crucial means by which interactants display, in any given utterance, their understandings of antecedent utterances. Because pronouns and pro-verbs must be selected to fit what came before, the production of an utterance tied to some prior utterance “is the basic means of showing that you understood that utterance” (Sacks 1992a: 718; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974: 728–729). In short, by relating adjacent utterances to one another, interactants can efficiently understand such utterances, display their understandings to one another, and see that they were understood, all without recourse to formulations, glosses, or other explications.

Tying is not the only means by which participants relate utterances to one another to provide for their intelligibility, because understanding interaction involves far more than grasping the lexical meaning of pro-terms or other deictic words. Also relevant is the issue of what a given utterance is doing in the service of some recognizable social action, such as insulting, requesting, apologizing, joking, or announcing news. Interactants can relate utterances to one another in terms of the actions they perform; hence, by positioning their talk in relation to some antecedent utterance, or in relation to some larger interactional trajectory, interactants can accomplish identifiable activities. Thus, Sacks (1992b: 530) comments on how the positioning of an utterance can provide in part for what it is doing, due to the “why that now” orientation of interactants:
Consider for example, that when you say 'hello' at the beginning of a conversation, the account or saying 'hello' is that it’s the beginning of the conversation. So by putting an utterance like that where you put it, you provide an explanation for why you said that thing. And there are whole ranges of ways whereby parties position their utterances. By ‘position’ I mean that they show, in an utterance’s construction, that they know where they’re doing it, and why they’re doing it then and there. (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 313)

The phenomena of tying and positioning imply that the sequential features of interaction are pervasively operative in the processes by which participants produce, understand, and exploit indexical expressions of every sort. In this sense, the conversation analytic investigation of sequential phenomena—from simple “adjacency pairs” (greeting-greeting, question-answer, invitation-acceptance/rejection, and other such two-part sequences) to the overall structural organization of a conversation—can be seen as an extended analysis of the “ordered and socially organized” properties of indexical expressions that Garfinkel (1967), in his own writings as well as in his collaboration with Sacks (1970), nominated for study.¹

This domain of organization (tying, positioning, sequencing), moreover, is a thoroughly local and endogenous production, rather than, say, operating on behalf of some externally based social structure, such as class, gender, or ethnicity. In that participants relate utterances to one another, a recipient who wishes to speak to whatever topic is on the floor is required to listen not just to some utterance-in-progress but to the spate of previous talk, for it is in terms of this previous talk that the current utterance itself makes sense. In addition, when taking a turn of talk, a current speaker is required to demonstrate its relationship to an immediately previous utterance and, indirectly, to the utterances preceding it (Sacks 1992a: 716–721).

Although sequential organization is a thoroughly local production, it is also a central means by which interactants, on a moment-by-moment basis, invoke larger interpersonal relationships and patterns of social “distance” and “intimacy” (Button 1991; Goodwin 1987; Jefferson, Sacks, and Schegloff 1987; Maynard and Zimmerman 1984). For instance, one can show that some current conversation is a developmental moment in the accomplished history of a relationship by connecting the current with a last meeting. Examples that Sacks (1992b: 193) provides are “You put up your hair” (as a remark when returning to somebody’s house) and “How’s your mother?,” both of which show attention to “that part of ‘us’ that is involved in our last interaction.”²

In a variety of ways, utterances and their indexical properties provide a window through which to gaze upon the bedrock of social order. Actors produce mutually intelligible courses of talk and achieve all manner of relationship, interdependence, and commitment (Rawls 1989) through the design and placement of single utterances in relation to the immediate environment of vocal and nonvocal activities. The investigation of this domain of organization is, then, one substantive bond between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.
ACHIEVED ORGANIZATION: RULES AND SEQUENTIAL ORGANIZATION

Ethnomethodology may be understood as investigating how social phenomena, whatever their character, are achieved and “accountable”—that is, in ways that are, for members of the setting, “seeable” or “verifiably” or “reportable” or “objective” in local environments of action (Garfinkel 1967). The practices involved in achieving a setting’s features do not lend themselves to formal and transsituational characterization. Conversation analytic inquiry, by contrast, has a concern with generic social practices that are “context-sensitive,” but also, importantly, “context free” (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). Research on turn taking, for example, began by specifying the organization of queuing for a turn of talk in ordinary conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974), and this has served as a foundation for investigating patterns of turn taking in a range of institutional settings, including classrooms (McHoul 1978), trial examinations (Atkinson and Drew 1979), news interviews (Clayman 1991; Greatbatch 1988), survey interviews (Maynard et al. forthcoming), and doctor-patient interactions (Frankel 1990). Consequently, descriptions of specific sequences and their organizational properties continue to accumulate.

These developments have generated unease among some ethnomethodologists; in particular, turn taking analyses have been criticized for their formalism (Liberman 1985; Lynch 1985: ch. 5, 1993: ch. 6; Molotch and Boden 1985; O’Connell et al. 1990; Peyrot 1982). For instance, Livingston (1987: 73) argues that descriptions of abstract rules for turn taking fail to capture the embodied work by which conversationalists exhibit and ensure that their talk is being done turn-by-turn. We shall illustrate that, although conversation analytic inquiries seek to produce formal descriptions of interactional structures, such inquiries also attend to the situated practices through which interactional structures are incrementally achieved. This focus on achieved organization thus represents another point of contact between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.

Ethnomethodology’s Approach to Rules

Within EM, the emphasis on achieved organization is perhaps clearest in studies that challenge rule-based models of social action characteristic of classical sociological theory and research (Wilson 1970). This aspect of EM has been discussed elsewhere (Heritage 1984: ch. 5; Maynard and Clayman 1991: 390–391), so here we only briefly review some of the main issues involved. Garfinkel has consistently criticized the received view propounded by Parsons and others that norms, conventions, or other rules of conduct operate as explanatory agents in the determination of courses of action. A major difficulty with normative theories of action lies in the unresolved relationship between
abstract rules and the concrete real-world circumstances in which societal members must act. Although rules provide rather general formulations of appropriate conduct, social situations have idiosyncratic features that distinguish them from one another. This raises the problem of how actors come to know whether the particular situation in which they find themselves falls within the domain of a given rule, and hence whether that rule should relevantly come into play. This problem is irremediable in just the way in which indexical expressions are irremediable: No matter how elaborate a normative formulation might be, it cannot encompass all possible circumstantial contingencies. For example, in his discussion of the followability of coding instructions, Garfinkel (1967: 18–24) observes that coders’ decisions are inevitably contingent on a range of ad hoc considerations that are not specified in the coding rules and cannot be eliminated by elaborations of those rules. Similarly, jury decisions concerning guilt or innocence are not determined by prespecified legalistic criteria (1967: 18–24; Maynard and Manzo 1993).

It would be incorrect to conclude from this that rules are irrelevant to the organization of social action. For societal members, social life is experienced as anything but arbitrary; activities are generally perceived as highly patterned and regular, and such regularities are frequently explained by members in terms of norms of various sorts. Garfinkel treats the apparent rule-governedness of action as a phenomenon, an endogenous achievement in which rules serve not as causal agents in the determination of action but as resources that members use when making sense of action. Here, Garfinkel’s discussion of the documentary method of interpretation (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 3), which specifies how particulars and contexts within a perceptual field mutually elaborate one another, may be applied to understand the co-constitutive relationship between rules of conduct and situated actions (Wieder 1974; Zimmerman 1970). For jurors, or coders, or anyone in “common sense situations of choice,” rules of various sorts provide for the intelligibility and accountability of social action. As members assemble and orient to relevant aspects of the circumstances at hand (e.g., the categorical identities of the interactants, the type of social or institutional setting in which they are situated), they understand and describe actions in terms provided by the norms and conventions presumed to be operative within those circumstances. In some cases, actions may be deviate from those rules, but are supplied with “secondarily elaborative” explanations (Heritage 1987: 246) involving special motives or other contingencies. For both perceivedly “normal” and “deviant” actions, then, norms play an important role in the process by which members grasp what a given behavior is “doing.” Moreover, by persistently accounting for the range of actions within a setting either in terms of some primary norm or a range of exceptional circumstances, that norm is preserved across “entropic” events that might otherwise threaten its objective status (Heritage 1987: 246–247). A rule, therefore, does not stand outside of social settings as an exogenous ordering principle, and it cannot in itself provide for
the orderliness of social life. Rather, members of society use and apply rules (to-gether with other ordering practices) within social settings as a way of making sense of and explaining their own activities. It is this situated accounting work that particularizes and reconciles abstract rules with the details of actual con-duct and thus provides for the maintenance of the objective-seeming features of social life.

Conversation Analysis and Sequencing Procedures

Against this backdrop, conversation analytic findings—such as procedures for turn taking, various sequence organizations, and the like—may at first glance seem to be rule-like formulations of proper interactional conduct. Sacks (1984a: 26–27, 1984b: 413–414) may have unwittingly fostered this impression by his use of mechanicist metaphors; he often referred to “the technology” or “the machinery” of conversation and characterized his program of research as an at-tempt to isolate and describe “the machinery” through which interactions are generated. However, this terminology was used metaphorically rather than liter-ally, mainly in the context of lectures to students, where it served a necessary pedagogical function. Sacks was seeking to overcome the deeply entrenched tendency to view the details of interaction as random or disorderly, or to dis-miss them as mere “manners of speaking.” By means of the “conversational ma-chinery” rubric, Sacks encouraged his students to assume the opposite, that is, to treat every interactional event, no matter how seemingly small or trivial, as a potentially orderly phenomenon. Perhaps indirectly, Sacks (1984a: 22) was also addressing his colleagues within the social sciences, who tended to neglect the study of talk-in-interaction in favor of what were generally perceived as “big-ger” or “more important” issues. In anthropology and sociology, interest in the structural properties of cultures and social systems greatly overshadow social in-teraction as an object of study, and the few attempts to take on the topic of so-cial action (e.g., Weber, Parsons, and Bales) deal not with concrete activities but with abstract typologies and properties of action that could be readily linked to structural, historical, or other “macro” levels of analysis. And within linguistics, the analysis of language as a formal, self-contained system of competencies (à la Chomsky) forestalled inquiry into how speakers put language to use in real cir-cumstances. Accordingly, Sacks’ use of the “conversational machinery” rubric must be viewed in the context of his efforts to justify inquiry into a domain of social phenomena—the details of actual interaction and language use—that in-vestigators sometimes marginalize and regard as a messy “garbage can” of errors, accidents, and random processes.

Conversation analytic investigations have sought to document the orderly, sequential structures of interaction, but in classic ethnomethodological fashion the locus of order is the situated work of the interactants themselves rather than abstract or disembodied rules. This emphasis is manifest in a number of ways,
but perhaps most fundamental is the familiar practice within CA of building analyses out of singular fragments of actual, naturally occurring talk. Sacks observes that although conversation analysts seek to specify the generic “technology of conversation,”

we are trying to find this technology out of actual fragments of conversation so that we can impose as a constraint that the technology actually deals with singular events and singular sequences of events. (1984b: 414)

Analysis thus begins with a given interactional form as it is enacted within, and thereby organizes, some concrete situation. By proceeding on a case by case basis, analysts approach a more general understanding of how the form operates across diverse situations. This way of working produces findings that are neither Weberian ideal types nor Durkheimian averages (Sacks 1963), findings that can be reconciled with, and are thus answerable to, singular instances of conduct. Correspondingly, the approach specifies a given sequential form in terms of the situated practices out of which instances are composed, rather than in terms of pristine rules of conduct.

Far from being immutable Platonic forms, the sequential structures of CA comprise flexible social practices that are highly sensitive to changing circumstances. In the analysis of deviant cases (discussed previously), substantial attention is devoted to courses of talk that do not run off canonically due to problematic local contingencies. Such cases reveal that interactants guide their speaking practices in accordance with, and as a constitutive feature of, the particular circumstances at hand, even as they sustain and reproduce the generic practices of talk and social interaction. For example, studies of turn taking have devoted extensive attention to cases where the parties find themselves to be talking in overlap (Jefferson 1973; Jefferson 1986; Jefferson and Schegloff 1973; Lerner 1989; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974: 723–724; Schegloff 1987b). Overlapping talk is plainly incongruous with the way in which turn taking is usually managed. It can also disrupt subsequent talk insofar as it interferes with a recipient’s capacity to analyze and understand the talk in progress as a prerequisite for determining when and how to speak next. As it turns out, however, overlapping talk is by no means a rare event, but it is usually short-lived, in part because at least one of the parties will stop talking in mid-utterance, before a turn is completed. Moreover, the speaker who emerges in control of the floor may subsequently take steps to retrieve what was lost in overlap (Jefferson and Schegloff 1973; Schegloff 1987b). For example, the speaker may cut off and restart his or her turn in such a way as to absorb the overlap from a competing speaker and thus produce a full unit of talk unfettered and in the clear. These responses to overlapping talk operate to preserve the intelligibility of what is currently being said. In so doing, they also restore regular patterns of turn taking, but they do so only by momentarily disrupting—through cut-offs and restarts—the canonical progression of turns.
Preserving intelligibility through the management of turns means that conversation requires mutual orientation, and this orientation is also evident in how speakers abort and restart units of talk in specific circumstances. Goodwin (1981: ch. 2) has shown that when the speaker of a turn at talk notices a recipient’s gaze begin to wander, that speaker will frequently cut off and restart the turn-in-progress, a move that regularly prompts the intended recipient to gaze back toward the speaker. Hence, what initially may seem to be a speech error or disfluency resulting from a problem in the thought processes presumed to underlie speech is in fact a methodical social practice that helps sustain patterns of turn taking and recipiency and, thereby, the participants’ mutual orientation.

Variation in Conversational Practices

From an ethnomethodological point of view, courses of action that run off “routinely” must be regarded as “achievements arrived at out of a welter of possibilities for preemptive moves or claims, rather than a mechanical or automatic playing out of pre-scripted routines” (Schegloff 1986: 115). To respecify interactional routines as achievements, there has been a strong emphasis on comparative analyses of various kinds, analyses that compare not only “canonical” with “deviant” cases but also alternate ways of interacting in different contexts. As a consequence, analysts remain sensitive to what interactants do, as well as what they refrain from doing, to realize a given course of action.

Consider, for example, how interactants produce stories and other extended courses of talk involving multiple turn constructional units. Within ordinary conversation, story forms cannot be realized unless the turn taking system for conversation is modified to allow the storyteller, or in some instances, two or more storytellers (Lerner 1992), primary access to the floor for an extended period. This modification is set in motion when the speaker initially projects that an extended telling is forthcoming, for instance by producing a story preface (Sacks 1974). This is by no means the end of the process, however; also essential to the realization of a story are the other interactants, who align as story recipients or take up other interactional identities in relation to the story, by withholding a range of turn types and by engaging in specific forms of body movement and posturing while the story is unfolding (Goodwin 1984). Similarly, news interviews regularly consist of journalists asking questions and public figures responding (Greatbatch 1988). However, since journalists often produce one or more statements as a way of leading up to the question, question-answer sequences are achieved only insofar as public figures withhold speaking in response to these statements until the question is delivered. This is just one instance of an “institutional” form of talk that is constituted in part by reductions in the range of practices available for use in ordinary conversation (Clayman 1989; Heritage 1985; Heritage and Greatbatch 1991; Whalen and Zimmerman 1987). In each of these cases, a given sequential form is constituted in part by the systematic absence of talk at points where such talk might
otherwise be relevant. These absences provide for the achievement of organizational forms in two distinct ways. First, the absences show that the interactants treat each unit of talk as one component of a larger sequence-in-progress, and thus orient to that larger sequence-in-progress on a moment-by-moment basis. Second, such absences facilitate the realization of the sequence as an accomplished fact.

Finally, it should be noted that CA studies are not confined to cases where sequential forms are successfully achieved, maintained, or repaired. Substantial attention has also been paid to cases where such forms are subverted or transformed by interactants in pursuit of some local interactional work or objective. Interactants may remain silent following a question or a summons as a way of “snubbing” an interactional coparticipant (Schegloff 1968). Or they may depart from standard turn-taking procedures by beginning to speak a bit “early,” before the current unit of talk is complete, as a way of displaying recognition or independent knowledge of what is being said (Jefferson 1973). As a final example, interactants may say “uh huh,” which usually occurs within an extended story and serves as a display of passive recipiency, at the completion of a discourse unit, where it “resists” a more substantive response (Jefferson 1984). Also relevant here are cases where highly specialized institutional forms of talk “break down” in spectacular ways (Clayman and Whalen 1988/1989; Schegloff 1988/1989; Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen 1988). In many of these cases the transformative action acquires its sense in part by reference to the organizational form from which it departs; for example, the production of “uh huh” cannot be heard as “resistant” unless the stronger forms of receipt are tacitly oriented to as potentially relevant.

Conversation analysts seek to isolate and describe sequential forms of a highly general nature, specifying these forms in terms of the concrete situated practices through which they are contingently realized, rather than in terms of abstract rules of conduct. Thus, every effort is made to avoid general or ideal-typical characterizations of interactional procedures in favor of attending to specific instances as they unfold within, are shaped by, and in turn organize, concrete circumstances. Correspondingly, rather than treat any particular sequence of activities as a fait accompli, investigators seek, through comparative analyses, to remain alive to the various possibilities for action that branch from successive junctures within interaction as it develops. By these various means CA, consistent with its ethnomethodological heritage, seeks to recover the constitutive processes involved in the production and maintenance of seemingly “natural” and “routine” conversational patterns.

ACHIEVED ORGANIZATION: SEQUENTIAL COMPONENT PRODUCTION

While CA retains a lively sense of sequential structures as achievements, what about the singular activities that constitute sequences? How are these activities
assembled, recognized, and thus rendered consequential within a developing course of talk? This problem of sequential component production can be elaborated by juxtaposing two investigations of a most mundane event in daily life: the opening of a telephone call. As we have already noted, Schegloff’s (1968) study of telephone openings revealed that they are managed through a distinct type of adjacency pair: the summons-answer sequence. Because the sequence components are linked by the property of conditional relevance, and because its completion projects further talk by the initiator of the sequence, this sequence enables parties to coordinate entry into conversation. Schegloff’s elegant analysis demonstrates an achieved, unitary solution to the problem of coordinated entry that operates across a variety of settings, across vocal and nonvocal activities, and even across the duration of a single conversation. Nevertheless, there is further orderliness to conversational openings than a strictly sequential analysis provides. In addition to the logic and organization of sequences, there is also the question of how participants design the actions that set sequences in motion (e.g., a first-pair part of an adjacency pair). With regard to the “summons” part of a summons-answer sequence, its design and constitution have been investigated within both CA and EM. The approaches to “summoning” provide additional insight into the CA and EM relationship.

Conversation Analysis

Schegloff’s (1968, 1970, 1986) early work on telephone openings focuses attention not only on summons-answer sequences and their sequelae but also on summonses as phenomena in their own right. The ringing of a telephone achieves the properties of a summons as a result of social and interactional processes (Schegloff 1968: 376). In other words, the activity of summoning is not intrinsic to the items that compose it; it is an assembled product whose efficacious properties are cooperatively yielded by the interactive work of both summoner and answerer.

Consider that “who” a ringing phone is summoning depends upon how an actor, in concert with others, forges the social environment in which that event occurs. This process can include:

1. how one categorizes and orients to the environment—as one’s own office or home, or someone else’s office or home, or a public domain, and so forth;
2. the spatial positionings and activities of members of an office or household vis-à-vis one another and the telephone—for instance, the person who is nearest to a ringing phone or is not presently “working” or otherwise engaged, may be treated as the summoned” party;
3. the expectations that result from relationships, routines, and arrangements that enable one party to anticipate that the other will call one just here, just now—for example, “my wife’s parents call every Thursday night about this time”; (4) the informing that are available among members of the setting prior to or during the phone-ring, such as “Jane should be calling soon,” or “That’s Jane”; and (5)
whether one is using a phone and calling someone else, such that the ringing represents an “outgoing” summons on the other end of the line, or is merely in the vicinity of an inert phone that commences to ring with a bell or other noise that can be taken as an “incoming” summons.

Consider also that there is, loosely speaking, a “proper” number of rings to a summoning phone—not too few and not too many—which a summoned party and others may work to achieve (Schegloff 1986: 118–119). Thus, in addition to those items listed previously, (6) persons who are close by the phone often let it ring several times before answering. Apart from whatever psychological factors might lie behind this tendency, one interactional consideration is that quick-answering is something that can be topicalized, as in “you were sitting by the phone,” or “waiting for someone to call.” Such topicalization can then take on its own dynamic, requiring determinate effort to exit, and may well be avoided by allowing some rings to pass. Correspondingly, (7) persons far from the phone sometimes rush to it. Obviously, this is in part because the recipient knows that the caller might make the inference that no one is home and thus hang up before the connection is made. But multiple rings are also vulnerable to topicalization in the way that few rings are, there may be inquiries about where the summoned party was so that a call recipient has to explain the delay in answering, and thus answering a summoning phone “late” may also be something to avoid. Finally, (8) answerers sometimes await the end of a ring or until the next ring has just started before picking up the phone. In light of such observations, Schegloff concludes that “the actually heard rings [of a summoning phone] are not a random or mechanical matter, but are the product of distinct and methodical forms of conduct by the participants” (1986: 120).

There is, then, within CA, concern not just for sequencing and turn taking as such but also for how the components of these organizations are socially assembled, orderly objects in their own right. However, with respect to conversation analytic work on component production, the preceding analysis of summonses is somewhat atypical, in part because it is based on research done in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before CA attained its present form. Thus, Schegloff combines conversation analytic methods based on recorded data with more traditional ethnographic data to shed light on how summonses are assembled. Sacks’ early lectures on how members “do” specific activities so as to be recognizable as such, and his work on membership categorization devices, are similarly eclectic methodologically (e.g., Sacks 1974).⁶

*Ethnomethodology*

We now to consider an ethnomethodological approach to the constitution of summoning. In another of his evocative demonstrations, Garfinkel (1992) lays out a way of decomposing the “utter familiarity” of a ringing telephone. Students are asked to gather tape recordings of and ethnographic
notes on ringing phones that are (1) hearably summoning just them, (2) hearably summoning someone else, (3) simulating hearably summoning just them, (4) simulating hearably summoning someone else, and (5) just ringing rather than “summoning.”

Products of the exercise include recordings and extensive notes regarding the collection of those recordings. The aim is to recover the “more, other, different” details that are ignored and yet depended upon in the response to a ringing or summoning phone (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 203). Ordinarily these details remain unobserved by the participants, but the exercise renders them conspicuous in a surprising way. We wish to consider two examples of properties that inhere in such seen-but-unnoticed details. First, the background from which a phone-ringing emerges depends upon an actor selecting some high-pitched frequency from a heretofore differently constructed ambiance that immediately has the character of silence out of which the just-now hearable phone-ring emerged. That phone-ringing, in other words, is heard in relationship to the prior silence it simultaneously composes as “preceding” the ring (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 195). This aspect of ringing phones is partly revealed by the simulation, where one might call another person to obtain a callback that “hearably simulates” summoning the originator. In the simulated case there is a moment of anticipation anterior to the first ring, rather than a “preceding silence” composed simultaneously with the onset of ringing. In other words, “waiting-for-the-first-ring-according-to-the-agreement” is a part of the background that distinguishes the simulation from the actual episode, which is revealed to have a taken-for-granted background of “no telling when.”

A second property of summoning phones is the directionality of the ring. To determine whether a phone is “hearably summoning” oneself, the potential answerer seeks to determine where the ring originates. Wherever the hearer might be, he or she seeks to determine if the ringing is coming from close or far, to the right or left, from in front or behind, and so forth. As Garfinkel and Wieder state:

> Experimental perception studies are thick with demonstrations that the direction from which a sound is heard is a detail with which the listened to sound is recognized and identified as a sounded doing. (1992: 197)

The property of directionality, although unnoticed in the daily routine of answering phones, emerges from Garfinkel’s exercise as participants begin to distinguish how a phone can be hearably summoning a particular someone—that is, either the experimenter or another party. It is partly through imbuing a ringing sound with spatial attributes that one decides what the sound is and whether and how to respond.

When examined for such properties as its background and directionality, the “functional significance” (Gurwitsch 1964: 114–22) of each summoning
phone (whether it is “hearing summoning me” or “simulating hearably summoning me”) is essentially unique in its structure of detail (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 202). Using a classification to refer to a lived course of action can collapse, eviscerate, suppress, or lose that uniqueness and structure. To refer to a summons-answer sequence, even, can hide from analytic appreciation the lived work of participants producing soundings that emerge for them as this or that particular “summons” to be handled in some specific way. Summonses might be first pair parts that make answers conditionally relevant, and thus serve to initiate a conversational sequence through which participants can coordinate and make accountable their entry into conversation, but those summonses are also phenomena of orderly achievement, with an achieved coherence and methods for assembly and detection that render a lived course of action as nameable in a specific way (i.e., as a “summons”). This point converges with Schegloff’s observation that summoning is an “assembled product.” What is distinctive about the ethnomethodological approach is, first, a concern to unlock the unseen, the unnoticed, the invisible, but to do so through some contrivance rather than observing naturally occurring processes or records thereof. In this respect, the summoning phones exercise is reminiscent of early ethnomethodological investigative strategies, and, as is characteristic of his overall body of work, Garfinkel’s summoning phones exercise is vigorously and insistently suggestive in its probing of the ordinariness of an object of common experience.

CONCLUSION

Specifying interrelationships between EM and CA helps define the relative strengths of each mode of investigation and suggests what can be yielded from complementary studies. For the past two decades, ethnomethodology has explored various scientific enterprises (Garfinkel, Lynch, and Livingston 1981; Lynch 1985, 1993; Maynard and Schaeffer 2000) and other technical work domains (Button 1993; Heath and Luff 2000; Suchman 1987; Whalen 1995). For its part, conversation analysis has continued to explicate the fundamental organization of interaction while also examining how this organization intersects with and can illuminate aspects of the social world ranging from social structures and institutions (Boden and Zimmerman 1991; Drew and Heritage 1992b; Heritage and Maynard forthcoming) to the organization of grammar (Ochs, Schegloff, and Thompson 1996), to processes of cognition and cognitive development (Goodwin 1994; Wootton 1997).

The overriding objective of both EM and CA is to advance our knowledge of the inner workings of social life as it is lived. Both enterprises suggest that there is a self-generating order in the behavioral concreteness of everyday life. This order exists in conversational and other methodic practices whereby members of society assemble social actions and the circumstances in which they are embedded.
Consequently, EM and CA are on a footing that is similar to symbolic interactionism, or at least that area of SI concerned with language and symbols and their usage as part of what Joas (1985) has called practical intersubjectivity. As we stated at the outset, EM and CA may have subjected some of the most compelling aspects of Meadian social psychology to sustained empirical analysis.

NOTES

1. As an example of the organization of indexical expressions and embodied behavior, consider Goodwin’s (1986) analysis of gestures that are often paired with prototypical indexical or deictic terms such as “this” or “that.” Through such pairings, a speaker can solicit the gaze of a recipient who is looking elsewhere. Once again, indexical expressions turn out to be significant for the maintenance of mutual involvement of an ongoing course of action.

2. For the possibility that such utterances are “micro events” that can constitute what Collins (1981) refers to as “interaction ritual chains,” see Hilbert (1990). For an alternative view that is more appreciative of the autonomous ordering of utterances, see Rawls (1989).

3. For a general discussion of the structures of talk in institutional settings, see Drew and Heritage (1992a).

4. Systematic absences are somewhat different from what have been called “official” or “noticeable” absences within CA (Schegloff 1968: 1083ff.). An item is “officially absent” when co-participants exhibit some orientation to its nonoccurrence. By contrast, an item can be characterized as “systematically absent” when the investigator can (1) formally characterize the sequential environment at hand, (2) show that the item in question regularly occurs at that sequential juncture in other situations, and (3) show that in the present class of situations the item is regularly withheld.

5. Discussion of components such as those on the following list can be found in Schegloff (1968, 1970, 1986). The list of examples was also informed by taped and written comments of participants in seminars on ethnomethodology and conversation analysis taught by Doug Maynard at the University of Wisconsin.

6. Some investigators in the EM and CA tradition suggest that there should be more emphasis on the “categorical aspects of conversation” than is present in current CA studies emphasizing sequential analysis. See, for example, Hester and Eglin (1997) and particularly Watson’s (1997) chapter in that volume, and Silverman’s (1998) discussion about how sequential and membership categorization analysis are complementary.

REFERENCES


200  Douglas W. Maynard and Steven E. Clayman


