Helland, Eric, and Alexander Tabarrok. 2007. “Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric Estimation.” Journal of Human Resources 42(2): 309–330.
We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California’s three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17–20 percent.
Names are in alphabetical order. Eric Helland is a professor of economics, Claremont-McKenna College and RAND, Claremont, California. Alex Tabarrok is a professor of economics, George Mason University. Tabarrok thanks the Center for Study of Public Choice and the Mercatus Center for financial support. Much of this work was undertaken while Helland was a visitor at the Stigler Center. He wishes to thank Sam Peltzman the Olin Foundation and the University of Chicago for their generous support. Helland also wishes to thank the Henri Salvatori Center at Claremont McKenna College for generous financial support. The authors also thank Joseph Bessett, Bryan Caplan, Robin Hanson, and two anonymous referees for especially helpful and informed comments. The data used in this article can be obtained beginning October 2007 through September 2010 from Eric Helland, 500 E. 9th Street Claremont, CA 91711 eric.helland@claremontmckenna.edu.