Volume 37, Number 4 (Fall) 2002
Eberts, Randall, Kevin Hollenbeck, and Joe Stone. 2002. "Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes." Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 913-927.
Although merit pay systems have been established in many school districts across the United States, little empirical evidence exists concerning their influence on student achievement. This paper reviews that evidence and presents case study evidence from a county where one high school piloted a merit pay system to reward student retention while another comparable high school maintained a traditional compensation system. A difference-in-differences analysis implies that merit pay increased retention, had no effect on grade point averages, reduced average daily attendance rates, and increased the percentage of students who failed.
Randall Eberts is the executive director of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Kevin Hollenbeck is a senior economist at the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Joe Stone is the W. E. Miner professor of economics at the University of Oregon. The authors appreciate the helpful comments two anonymous referees and of Richard Murnane and other participants in the National Academy of Sciences Conference, "Devising Incentives to Promote Human Capital," held December 17-18, 1999, in Irvine, CA. The research assistance of Kristine Kracker and Noyna DebBurman is gratefully acknowledged, as is the excellent clerical assistance of Phyllis Molhoek and Claire Black. The views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or The University of Oregon. The usual disclaimer applies. The data used in this article are available February 2002 through January 2005 from Randall Eberts, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 300 S. Westnedge Ave., Kalamazoo, MI49007.
© 2003 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
US ISSN 0022-166X