This paper examines the effect of government child support enforcement (CSE) on marital dissolution. By raising the financial obligation of the absent father to the single mother under divorce, CSE generally lowers the wife's cost of divorce. On the other hand, it raises the husband's cost. Hence, the net effect of CSE on divorce is a priori ambiguous in sign. Using Current Population Survey data matched to CSE program data, I find empirical evidence that stronger CSE reduces marital breakup. This effect is larger for couples in which the wife is more likely lo be a welfare recipient under divorce.

Lucia A. Nixon is a researcher for Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. She is grateful to Rebecca Blank, Janet Currie, Jon Gruber, Steve Pischke, Jim Poterba, Mike Robinson, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The author also thanks seminar participants at MIT, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., RAND, Rutgers University, and Syracuse University for valuable suggestions and comments. Financial support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of these foundations or Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. The data used in this article can be obtained beginning in June 1997 through May 2000 from the author, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., 600 Maryland Ave., SW, Suite 550, Washington, DC 20024.

© 2002 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

US ISSN 0022-166X

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