Self-targeting welfare programs have received increasing attention from economists and policymakers alike. This paper provides evidence on the redistributive impact of transferring low-quality goods in-kind. I study a school feeding program in Jamaica, which distributes a bland snack to all students. Poorer households and those with a greater number of eligi­ble children are found significantly more likely to self-select into the pro­gram. But, against these targeting benefits is a large estimated dead­weight loss.

The author is a professor of economics at the University of Rochester. He wishes to thank Tim Besley, seminar participants at Rochester and the World Bank, and several anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The data used in this paper were provided by the World Bank. All views expressed are his own and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to affiliated organizations. The data can be obtained beginning in August 1997 through July 2000 from the author at the Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.

© 2002 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

US ISSN 0022-166X

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