Fields, Gary S., and Olivia S. Mitchell. 1984. “Economic Determinants of the Optimal Retirement Age: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Human Resources 19(2):245-262.

In this paper we examine how the structures of earnings, Social Security, and pension benefits affect retirement behavior. We use an intertemporal model of labor supply, paying special attention to the institutional features of private pensions and Social Security benefits. This theoretical formulation produces comparative dynamic predictions and guides empirical modeling. Data from a new survey of workers and their income opportunities are used to implement the empirical model. On the basis of empirical retirement estimates, we conclude that (1) people with higher base wealth retire earlier, and (2) those who expect to gain more by postponing retirement retire later.

Fields is Professor of Economics, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of Labor Economics, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. We are equally responsible for the content of this paper. We wish to thank Jorge Ducci, Ronald Ehrenberg, Daniel Feenberg, Alan Gustman, Richard Ippolito, and Robert Smith for helpful comments; we also appreciate the comments of participants at the Cornell, Harvard, and Chicago Labor Workshops and the Harvard Social Insurance Seminar. Vivian Fields and Jeff Avizinis provided able computational assistance. Research support was received from the U.S. Department of Labor, Cornell University, and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The research reported here is part of the NBER’s research program in Labor Studies. Opinions expressed are those of the authors.

© 2003 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

US ISSN 0022-166X

Return to JHR Home Page