CDHA CAAR

A. “It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans,” by Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, and Irina Stefanescu (w18764, February 2013, .pdf format, 51p.).

Abstract:

This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers.

www.nber.org/papers/w18764

B. “On Financing Retirement with an Aging Population,” by Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott (w18760, February 2013, .pdf format, 37p.).

Abstract:

A problem facing the United States is financing retirement consumption as its population ages. Policy analysts increasingly advocate savings-for-retirement systems, but are concerned with insufficient savings opportunities with limited government debt. This concern is unwarranted. First, there is more productive capital than commonly assumed in macroeconomic modeling. Second, if the policy reform subsumes the elimination of capital income taxes, then the value of business equity increases relative to the capital stock. Phasing in a switch from the current U.S. system to a savings-for-retirement system without capital income taxes increases welfare of all current and future cohorts.

www.nber.org/papers/w18760

C. “Empirical Determinants of Intertemporal Choice,” by Jeffrey R. Brown, Zoran Ivkovic, and Scott Weisbenner (w18755, February 2013, .pdf format, 50p.).

Abstract:

We study the empirical determinants of intertemporal choice by analyzing a unique decision Croatian retirees made recently about whether to accept an immediate pension payment or a larger stream of delayed payments. Individual decisions are correlated in sensible ways with income, liquidity constraints, longevity expectations, and other covariates. Attitudes toward government also matter: those less confident that the government will honor its commitments are more likely to take the immediate stream of payments. Those who believe it is important to receive ‘the full amount due, no matter how long it takes’ are substantially more likely to take the delayed payments.